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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of drug policy in England between 1994 and 2004. It 
focuses on five areas: - how drug policy was developed, why partnership 
forms were chosen as the mechanisms by which to achieve implementation 
and the impact of that décision, the relationship between the centre and 
localities, partnerships as new forms of governance and whether tnstitutional 
resilience has been observed. 
The research used a multi-method approach comprised of three components: 
a literature review; an analysis of documentai^ sources, including the three 
key drug policies, and original, empirical research. The latter was undertaken 
with two separate groups, the first responsible for drug policy development 
and the second for policy implementation. 
Tackling Drugs Together (TDT,1995) was developed by a small group of 
people who successfully exploited the opportunities open to them and who 
were observed to have used ail of the 'factors' identified by Levin (1997) in 
their capacities, as civil servants, politicians and members of the voluntary 
and campaigning sectors. They were 'motivated' to achieve change (from 
their institutional, personal or organisational position) and used the 
'opportunities' and 'resources' open to them to do that. They did not however 
form a 'policy network' (Berridge 2006; Duke 2002; Sabatier 1998; Wong 
1998; Hughes 1997). 
Those developing TDT (1995) chose partnership forms (Drug Action Teams -
DATS) as a mechanism for implementation, because they provided an answer 
in a complex social policy area, allowing a wide variety of organisations to be 
brought together. In addition, the concept was associated with newness and 
dynamism. 
The direction of drug policy, post 1998, is linked to New Labour's wider social 
policy perspective - incorporating a focus on communlty and social 
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responsibility. On the whole, DATs have supportée! this direction. Their 
relationship to the centre has in general been positive, whilst responding to a 
strong performance management framework. DATs have accepted this for 
the benefits it brings; and highly functional DATs have learned to adapt 
policies to their own local needs. Their sophistication, functionality and 
structure indícate that they have become new forms of governance (Newman 
2001). This does not mean however that the old institutions have 
disappeared; they have shown resilience (Klein 1993) and adapted to the 
changes, working within a partnership, performance management and 
regional framework. 
The thesis makes a contribution by focussing on drug policy development and 
implementation. Through the examination of the impact of the partnership 
and performance management approaches over a décade, it illuminâtes other 
social policy areas and New Labour changes, especially within the area of 
governance, developing our understanding of institutional change and 
resilience. 
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GLOSSARY 
ACMD - Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs 
A C P O - Association of Chief Police Officers 
APL's - Autonomous Policy Leaders (Wallis and Dollery 1997) 
ASBOs - Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
CAD - Communities Against Drugs Fund 
CARAT - Counselling - Advice - Referral - Assessment - Throughcare 
(team) 
C D C U - Central Drugs Coordination Unit 
C D R P s - Crime and Disorder Réduction Partnerships 
C E O - Chief Executive (Officer) 
CJIP - Community Justice Intervention Programme 
CJIT - Community Justice Intervention Teams 
C J S - Criminal Justice System 
C S R - Comprehensive Spending Review 
DATs - Drug Action Teams 
DDACs - District Drug Advisory Committees 
DoH - Department of Health 
DIP - Drug Intervention Programme 
DIR - Drug Interventions Record 
DPAS - Drug Prévention Advisory Service 
DPI - Drug Prévention Initiative 
DRGs - Drug Référence Groups 
DRR - Drug Rehabilitation Requirement 
DSD - Drug Strategy Directorate 
DTTOs - Drug Treatment and Testing Order 
EAZ - Education Action Zone 
GOs - Government Offices 
HAs - Health Authorities 
HAZ - Health Action Zone 
HO - Home Office 
ISDD - Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence 
IV - Intravenous (drug use) 
7 
KPIs - Key Performance Indicators 
LAs - Local Authorities 
Localities - used to denote the local área and / or DAT, as opposed to the 
'centre'. 
L S P s - Local Strategic Partnerships 
MPs - Member(s) of Parliament 
NDTMs - National Drug Treatment System 
N P M - New Public Management 
NTA - National Treatment Agency 
NHS - National Health Service 
NTORS - National Treatment Outcome Research Study 
O D P M - Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
PCTs - Primary Care Trusts 
P M - Prime Minister 
RDMD - Regional Drug Misuse Datábase 
S C O D A - Standing Conference On Drug Abuse 
S E U - Social Exclusión Unit 
SLAs - Service Level Agreements 
S R A - Social Research Association 
TDT - Tackling Drugs Together 
TDTBBB - Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain 
U K A D C U - UK Anti-Drugs Coordinaron Unit 
U K D P C - UK Drug Policy Commission 
Yots - Youth Offending Teams 
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Chapter one - introduction 
Research aims and questions 
The thesis is a case study of drug policy development and implementation 
over a décade (1994-2004). It looks at why drug policy took the form it did 
and includes a discussion of how it was subsequently shaped by 
implementation, as well as other historical and social factors. My interest in 
this area developed from my rôle in policy implementation in the early stages 
of Tackling Drugs Together (TDT, 1995) and ongoing professional work since 
then. This also meant that I had a familiarity with some of the conversations 
about how to implement policy in the early stages and it probably helped me 
to access to senior policy makers; ail of thèse things have helped to shape 
and mould the thesis. 
The aim of this thesis was to better understand the process of policy making, 
using drug policy (1994-2004) as the case study; it is, in particular, an 
exploration of how policy is developed and implemented. The research was 
principally concerned with a number of questions: 
1. How was drug policy developed? 
2. Why were partnerships chosen as the mechanism of policy 
implementation and what was the impact of that approach? 
3. How have relationships between the centre and localities worked with 
regard to policy development and implementation? 
4. Have partnerships become a new form of governance? 
5. Have partnership structures changed anything or has institutional 
resilience been demonstrated? 
The questions are answered by the différent facets of the research including 
an analysis of documentary sources, interviews with national policy actors and 
those concerned with policy implementation. In this way it was possible to 
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explore the process of policy development and Implementation with those 
responsible. 
Drug policy - trends and changes 1994-2004 
The thesis considers why the area of drug policy, which had attracted little 
notice historically, began to receive an increasing level of attention from the 
late 1980s rising to a crescendo of activity during 1994 - 2004. The complex 
social and political phenomena responsible for, or contributing to, this are 
considered in this thesis. The focus is particularly on England, but takes 
cognisance of other UK developments and European and international 
influences. During the period under considération three drug stratégies were 
launched, Tackling Drugs Together (TDT) 1995; Tackling Drugs To Build A 
Better Britain (TDBBB) 1998 and The Updated Strategy 2002. The first drugs 
strategy was launched under a Conservative administration and was aimed 
just at England; the two later stratégies were devised by New Labour and 
were targeted at the UK. 
Partnership and Community 
Notions of legîtimacy, community and citizenship, inclusion and exclusion 
permeated policy making during 1994-2004. These issues were topical under 
the Conservative administration in 1994 and remained valid in policy debate 
after the élection of New Labour in 1997 (Newman 2001:83). The change of 
government did not appear to change the îdeological nature of debate, the 
dichotomous urges towards centralisation and régionalisation and the création 
of new forms of governance. Two areas of importance for this thesis are 
therefore partnership and community. 
Understanding or defining the term 'partnership' is not straightforward. It has 
been argued that partnership 'risks becoming a Humpty Dumpty term' (Powell 
and Glendinning 2002:2) and this 'catch-ail' term will be explored in Chapter 2 
and throughout the thesis. One élément of the exploration and enquiry is to 
consider what is partnership? It has been necessary within the research to 
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explore the term and consider whether it is a 'quasi network (Powell and 
Exworthy 2002) or a new form of governance. For the purposes of the 
research it has been explored at a working level as a 'quasi-network; since 
the term incorporâtes éléments suggesting coopération rather than a 
command structure or a purchaser/seller relatïonship (Powell and Exworthy 
2002:27). The partnerships investigated are Drug Action Teams (DATs), 
instituted under TDT (1995) and given a loose, but definite structure. As such 
they allow for 'partnership' to be explored through the empirical work, both as 
a 'quasi-network' and as a new form of governance. 
Partnerships have existed for many years within a social policy setting, but 
have expanded considerably and changed form (Powell and Exworthy 2002). 
DATs were introduced initially by the Conservative administration and were 
continued by New Labour in their first drug policy, TDTBBB (1998). New 
Labour also expanded partnership work into other policy areas, such as Youth 
Offending Teams (Yots) in youth justice, Health Action Zones (HAZ) in health 
and Education Action Zones (EAZ) in éducation. Newman has argued that 
this amounted to 'a more explicit focus on partnership as a way of governing1 
(Newman 2001:105). As partnership has become a new and différent form of 
governance and has expanded across social policy domains it has been 
subject to académie research and review. Within académie review 
partnership is most widely portrayed as linked to a New Labour discourse and 
a way to demonstrate 'joined-up' government, new ways of working, an 
inclusive approach and policy implementation. 
The 'new' or 'third' way and inclusivity are seen to incorporate the notions of 
'Community' as part of a more gênerai 'collaborative discourse' (Glendinning 
2002:1). Skidmore and Craig (2004) have suggested however that 
'community is usually a loaded term,' which implies a 'positive'. This is 
because it is seen to provide the balancing factor against 'unrestrained 
individualisa and the 'unwieldy, impersonal hand of the statë. This element 
of 'community' provided the link with partnership, a form of governance which 
can be portrayed as inclusive, horizontal and positive; a form of governance 
which does not imply the dominating hand of an over active 'nanny' state. It is 
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the 'community as lactof which is important in a social policy sensé; and it is 
this suggestion of 'community' which was so compelling to New Labour 
leading up to and post 1997. The implementation and re-formations of English 
drug policy during this period drew on the language of community and 
partnership; in so doing they call on the positive and appear to seek to involve 
and include those within the 'community' within this social policy approach to 
drug misuse. Who forms the 'community' for drug policy 1994-2004 is an 
area of interest which is tangentially considered. 
Partnership in action - Drug Action Teams 
A key élément of implementation throughout each of the stratégies has been 
the use of partnership bodies - Drug Actions Teams (DATs). The first full drug 
strategy, TDT (1995), put them in place and made them responsible for local 
delivery across England of a nationwide strategy. The Chief Executives 
(CEOs) of health authorities were responsible for ensuring that the first DAT 
meeting was called. The other organisations expected to participate were the 
local authority(ies) (including social services and éducation) the police, the 
probation service, and where relevant, the prison service and Customs and 
Excise. The organisations were expected to work together on the three key 
policy aims of TDT: enforcement, éducation and treatment. When launching 
the later strategy, TDTBBB (1998) Ann Taylor highlighted the importance of 
their rôle, as 'responsible for implernenting the strategy on the ground\ 
In some areas DATs cover large, metropolitan populations with high levels of 
concentrated drug use and in other areas they are responsible for populations 
which are rural, dispersed or have low levels of drug use. Implementation 
therefore requires a range of responses according to local need and thus 
DATs have had to interpret and implement drug policy to meet that need. 
They were originally aligned with Health Authority boundaries (TDT 1995), 
although this was subject to local interprétation, but since 2001 they have 
been aligned with local authority boundaries and since 2004 have had to 
show that they 'join up' with other local partnerships. 
1 A n n T a y l o r M P Président o f the C o u n c i l and Leade r o f the H o u s e - speech to H o u s e o l C o m m o n s 27 
A p r i l 1998 l a u n c h i n g T D T B B - N e w s release. 
12 
Since 1995 DATs basic structure has remained the same with regard to their 
key functions and the requtrements of organisations to work together to meet 
the relevant drug policy aims. However the working teams themselves have 
developed in size and scope and in some areas are responsible for significant 
budgets. Their development and the reasons for it will be traced through the 
documentary sources and interviews with policy implementers. Some of the 
implications associated with those changes are an increasing 
bureaucratisation and an apparent centralisation. In addition, whilst functions 
and powers have been devolved to the DATs, so the level of information 
which must 'flow' up has increased. The nature of the 'verticaf and 
'horizontaf (Colebatch 1998:37) policy flow is one which is of interest and 
which can be traced through this case study. In 1998 an additional central 
'layer' was added in the rôle of the Drugs Czar, followed by the loss of this 
rôle in 2002. The reasons for the création of this rôle and the way this sought 
to sit as a link between the centre and DATs is considered in the thesis, 
particularly Chapter 5. 
Delivering partnership - Coordinators 
Drug Action Team coordinators were created by the TDT (1995) strategy 
through the allocation of a small amount of funds which DATs could spend on 
administration. DAT coordinators were responsible to their DAT for the 
delivery of the drug strategy within their area. They were meant to achieve 
this through the coordination of the efforts of the C E O s and senior managers 
from the participating organisations. 
The rôle and functions of the coordinators have changed considerably since 
those early days and by 2004 many coordinators were senior managers in 
health or local authorities with a staff team and considérable budget. The 
development of this rôle is considered although the stratégies and other 
documentation shed little light on it. However it was a subject for discussion 
with the interviewées, as many of the 'implementers' interviewée group were 
DAT coordinators. 
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A changing focus - performance management 
Rather than an overall change in direction between each of the drug 
strategies, there have been changes of emphasis. One such área is the 
performance management of the strategies by the centre. Since 2001 this 
function has been principally managed by a special Health Authority, the 
National Treatment Agency (NTA) and Drug Prevention Advisory Service 
(DPAS) 2 , a part of the Home Office. They eventually replaced the role of the 
Czar, although this had been a central function and they were regionalised in 
format. The similarity is in the performance management functions of the 
NTA and DPAS and these were made more explicit in the Updated Strategy 
which stated that the '...NTA and DPAS monitor the effectiveness of local 
delivery by DATs...e The emphasis was new; in the previous TDT (1995) and 
TDTBBB (1998) strategies, the role of the respective central functions, the 
Central Coordinating Unit (CDCU) and UK Anti-Drugs Coordinating Unit 
(UKADCU) were concerned with the coordination of strategy and those 
responsible for it. Whilst 'coordination' by the centre might appear a coded 
way of expressing the management of local implementation (and this is 
considered) there is a definite change in language and emphasis between the 
strategies. 
The development of the performance management of partnership structures 
in general has been portrayed by some as a sign of 'both continuity and 
change1 under New Labour (Davies 2002:172). Furthermore, the roles of the 
DAT itself and the coordinator have also appeared to be increasingly 
concerned with performance management within the locality, for example of 
drug treatment providers; this too is explored through the interviews 
undertaken with policy implementers. 
The Updated Strategy (2002) also drew out another new and possibly related 
emphasis, which was to link the performance management approach with 
2 D P A S teams have been s u b s u m c d in l o r eg i ona l G o v e r n m e n t O f f i c e s and are now ' d r u g t eams ' . 
3 U p d a t e d D r u g siraiegy 2 0 0 2 : 1 2 Execulive S u m m a r y L o n d o n : H M S O 
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regionalisatíon. Thus 'the regional management structuré of the NTA was 
highlighted within the executive summary, along with D P A S who were now 
said to be lintegrated within Government offices in the Regions' (Updated 
Drug Strategy 2002:12). The link was made between two new or evolving 
forms of governance. Regionalisatíon can also be interpreted as a way in 
which central control appears less apparent and in this sense diffuses the 
vertical and horizontal flows of power. This too is given further consideration 
and is looked at in more depth through the use of the implementation 
interviews. 
A changing focus - crime and Class A drug use 
Between the drug strategies there was a focussing down onto Class A drug 
use and an ever stronger link was drawn between drug misuse and crime. 
This replaced a rather more diffuse concern with drug use per se. Within 
TDTBBB (1998) the link with crime is noted, but the effects of drug use on 
health, education and employment, familíes and relationships are also 
acknowledged. In particular the sentence which linked drugs and crime did so 
within the context of how this lundermines communities' (TDTBBB launch 
speech by Ann Taylor April 1998). Tony Blair (the Prime Minister) in his 
foreword ¡ntroduced the notions of morality and the 'evil' of drug use. Two key 
issues for New Labour are therefore drawn out; the link between drug misuse 
and wider social policy issues and the notions of morality and the impact of 
drug misuse on others beside the drug user. 
The Updated Strategy (2002) launched just four years later appeared 
altogether more hard-hitting in its' approach. The 'What's New?" section of 
the strategy document outlined a 'tougher focus on Class A drugs' as its first 
objective. The rest of the page was characterised by plain, action driven 
words noting lmore\ 'reducincf, 'expansión', 'neW, lbetteiJ, 'strengthened, 
'improved, and a 'renewed emphasis on delivery and revised targets' 
(Updated Strategy 2002:4). There was continued mention elsewhere of 
communities, but the link was made particularly to 'deprived communities, 
currently suffering the worst drug-related crimé (Updated Strategy 2002:5). 
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There appeared to have been a simplification and réduction of the strategy 
and a focussing down on a smaller number of key issues such that there was 
the loss of a 'Vision' in which 'There are no easy answers' (TDTBBB 1998:3). 
The discussion of the issues of 'complexité and '1 partnership' présent in 
TDTBBB (1998:3) were noticeably absent from the Updated Strategy (2002). 
This is a significant change from TDT (1995) which appeared to présent itself 
as a discussion document for what might cause drug misuse and which 
sought to play down the links to social and environmental factors. 
A brief architecture of drug policy 1994-2004 
Each drug policy has created structures and initiatives which have evolved or 
changed with each subséquent policy. Following thèse changes can be 
confusing, even for those involved and especially for those trying to 'keep up' 
but on the periphery. Tackling Drugs Together (1995) created the 'basic' 
structure which ail other policies have adapted but left largely intact. This has 
included a 'strong' centre with access to power and influence at the highest 
level and a central and supporting team of civil servants; this was originally 
cross-departmental and called the Central Drug Coordination Unit (CDCU) 
based in the Cabinet Office and reporting to the President of the Council. The 
centre worked with, supported and 'oversaw' the local Drug Action Teams 
which had been created to bring together ail local agencies with the aim of 
ensuring Implementation of the strategy. In 1998 Tackling Drugs to Build a 
Better Britain kept the same basic structure but changed names and 'added' a 
layer. The C D C U became more explicitly named the UK Anti-Drug 
Coordination Unit and the civil servant who headed it was a more senior 
grade. They were still based in the Cabinet Office but now had to support the 
drugs Czar and his deputy and this was the new 'laver' which was added. It 
placed an advisor or non-political post between civil servants and politicians, 
although a politician retained ultimate responsibility4; the rationale for the rôle 
was 'to develop and co-ordinate and monitor the United Kingdom's drug 
policy (Hellawell 2003). The rôle of Cabinet Office was summed up by Mo 
Mowlam (the minister responsible 1999-2001) as 'to try to simplify, avoid 
4 T h e rôle o f the C z a r is d i s cuss ed in more deta i l in C h a p t e r 5 . 
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duplication' and to 'try and facilitate greater coopération between 
departments, or 'joined-up' government...' (Mowlam 2003:315). Under 
TDTBBB (1998) the structure in localities remained unchanged, although 
DATs began to grow significantly in size during this period as a resuit of the 
growth of funding, responsibilities and monitoring functions which they 
absorbed. 
In 2001 the National Treatment Agency (NTA) was created as a special 
Health Authority. This occurred outside of any policy change and in the 
Updated Drug Strategy 2002 which post-dated it, its remit was said to be to 
'drive delivery of treatment services throughout England (Updated Drug 
Strategy 2002:12). The Updated Drug Strategy (2002) brought about further 
structural change. The Home Office now drove 'the delivery of the Drug 
Strategy at Ministerial and officiai level...' in 'partnership' (Updated Drug 
Strategy 2002:12) with other key departments such as health and éducation 
and thus replaced the Cabinet Office. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
NTA was highlighted, providing as it did a key health / treatment function. The 
drugs Czar and his deputy were removed in 2002, although another central 
layer was added. This was the Strategie Planning Board which, it was 
speetfied, mirrored the composition of Cabinet sub-Committee and 'supports 
this structure at civil service officiai levé! (Updated Strategy 2002:60). It 
would seem that the purpose of this board was not to give administrative 
support to the Cabinet sub-Committee but to ensure that it engaged the senior 
civil servants responsible within individual departments; thus attempting to 
ensure cross-departmental activity at a central level. Finally the strategy 
allowed for the création of project specific cross-departmental groups who 
worked towards stated aims within the strategy. 
Under the Updated Strategy (2002) the structure in localities remained the 
same, with DATs responsible for 'effective delivery1 (Updated Drug Strategy 
2002:12). It was underlined, however, that there was a need for coordination 
of partnership activity in the localities because of the number of partnerships 
then operating; this was to be made possible under the Police Reform Act 
(2003) which would also give a statutory duty to Local Authorities, the police 
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and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to undertake activity to combat drug misuse 
within the localities. The suggestion was that DATs and Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) should 'merge'. Subsequently, however, 
DATs were advised that they could make their own arrangements, so long as 
they could demónstrate the alignment of the crime and drugs agendas within 
the localities5. This was further developed in 2004 through the creation of 
Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) which sought to bring together the 
various partnership activity and agency plans within a local authority área. 
This sought to ensure a 'joined up' approach and also included an element of 
performance management. 
Summary of Initiatives 
During this period there have been numerous new policies, reports and 
initiatives; some of which were quickly superseded and others which 
remained in forcé. Some of the key policies and initiatives introduced during 
this period (or immediately preceding it but of relevance) are shown 
chronologically in the table below. The range of policies and initiatives also 
helps to give a flavour of how deeply embedded in all forms of government 
activity drug policy had become. 
^ C i r c u l a r lettcr to D A T s and C r i m e and D i s o r d e r Par tnersh ips (undated but w i i h a rep ly date for 
consu l ta t i on 26 J u l y 2002 ) írom D a v i d B l u n k e l t H o m e Secre tary and A l a n M i l b u r n . H e a l t h Secre tary . 
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Chronological Summary: 
1982 - ACMD report - Treatment and rehabilitation 
1984 - Social Services Committee Report 
1985 - Cabinet Ministerial Sub-Committee on Drugs Misuse created 
1985 - Tackling Drug Misuse - First strategy document 
1988 - ACMD report - Aids and drug misuse. Part 1 
1988 - International Drug Summit 
1993 - ACMD report - Aids and drug misuse. Update 
1995 - Tackling Drugs Together - White Paper 
1996 - The Task Force to Review Services for Drug Misusers (NTORS) 
1998 - Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain 
1998- Modern Public Services for Britain: Investing in Reform: 
Comprehensive Spending Review Plans 1999-2002 
1998 - Crime and Disorder Act (lays provision for Drug Treatment and 
Testing Orders - DTTOs) 
1999 - Modernising Government (Cmd 4310) 
2000 - Police Foundation Report 
2000 - Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (creates Drug Abstinence 
Order - DAO) 
2001 - Proceeds of Crime Bill (CM5066) 
2001 - Communities Against Drugs (CAD) fund 
2002 - Updated Drug Strategy 
2002 - Models of care for the treatment of drug misusers (national framework 
for commissioning substance misuse services) 
2002 - National Crack Action Plan 
2002 - Proceeds of Crime Bill 
2002 - Police Reform Act 
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2002 - Home Affairs Committee Report: The Government's Drug Policy: Is it 
Working (HC318) 
2003- Criminal Justice Act (replaces DTTO with Drug Rehabilitation 
Requirement - DRR) 
2003 - Criminal Justice Intervention Project (CJIP - later becomes known as 
Drugs Intervention Programme - DIP) 
2003 - Building Safer Communities Fund (BSCF - changed from CAD) 
2003 - FRANK drug information campaign 
2004 - Tackling drugs: changing lives: delivering the différence 
2004 - Tackling drugs: changing lives. Every child matters: change for 
children: young people and drugs 
2004 - Tackling drugs - changing lives. Keeping communities safe from 
drugs 
2005 - Tackling drugs - changing lives. Delivering the différence 
2005 - Tackling drugs - changing lives. Turning strategy into reality. 
2005 - The Drugs Act 
2006- Select Committee on Science and Technology Fifth Report 
(CM200506) 
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The structures created by the various initiatives: 
Similarly a number of structures have been created to support the initiatives 
and polîcies which have been introduced and to respond to the various 
reports published. The chronological table below summarises those: 
1985 - Création of District Drug Advisory Committees 
1990 - Drug Prévention Initiative (DPI) 
1995 - Central Drug Coordination Unit (CDCU - located in the Cabinet Office) 
1995 - Drug Action Teams (DATs) 
1998 - Drugs Czar - Keith Hellawell (and Deputy Mike Trace) 
1998 - UK Anti-Drugs Coordination Unit (UKADCU - replaces C D C U -
located in the Cabinet Office) 
1999 - Drug Prévention Advisory Service (DPAS - replaces DPI) 
2000 - National Treatment Agency (NTA- Special Health Authority) 
2000 - Regional NTA teams 
2001 - DATs re-aligned with Local Authority boundaries 
2002 - Drugs Strategy Directorate (DSD - located in Home Office - replaces 
UKADCU) 
2002 - Rôle of the Czar and deputy disappears 
2002 - Strategie Planning Board created (for Senior Civil Servants to mirror 
and support Ministers at Cabinet sub-Committee) 
2002 - Regional Government Office Home Office drug teams (GO's - replace 
DPAS) 
2004 - Local Strategie Partnerships - (LSPs - some DATs and C D R P s merge 
/ ail have to demonstrate aligned functions) 
2007 - Merging of Home Office Drug Teams and NTA regional teams 
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Analytical framework 
Social policy provided the conceptual framework within which the research 
was framed. This allowed for consideration of questions such as how far 
social and public policy is able to drive social and instttutional change through 
the development, dissemination and ¡mplementation of nationally funded 
strategies. The work of Levin (1997) was particularly influential with regard to 
the construction of the interview schedules and to the subsequent frameworks 
constructed for analysis. In particular his use of three 'factors' - motivational, 
opportunity and resources - aided the exploration of the mechanisms by 
which policy is made and allowed for the process to be deconstructed, 
described and understood. However, the thesis was also ¡nformed by 
literature from a range of disciplines, including geography, management 
studies, social sciences (including criminology and drug research), politics 
and history. The inter-disciplinary background was appropriate both to policy 
analysis (Duke 2003:8-9) and to the study of partnerships. The latter because 
they have been brought into existence, it could be argued, to make sense of a 
complex social environment with which individual organisations were unable 
to cope. This is explored in depth throughout the thesis. 
Similarly it has been suggested that inter-disciplinary studies are necessary 
because: 
'Real worid problems do not exist independently of their sociocultural, political, 
economic or even psychological context. The need for múltiple disciplines 
and múltiple perspectives to illuminate the human context could not be more 
evident..: (Brewer 1999: 32:329) 
Examining the drug policy process 
'/n the commonsense use of the term, policy is an artefact: a 'thing' created by 
policy-makers'. (Colebatch 1998:111) 
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For this thesis 'policy' has been defined as a process and as such, one that 
can be explored. The research has sought to follow the policy 'process', by 
talking to those responsible for developing the first drug strategy, Tackling 
Drugs Together (TDT 1995) and to those responsible for implementing that 
and / or more recent strategies: Tackling Drugs To Build A Better Britain 
(TDTBBB 1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002). This approach is 
supported by Colebatch who commented that: 
'...formal policy activity can only be understood in terms of process, a 
continuing pattern of events and understanding which is structured by a sense 
of authorised decision making...' Colebatch (1998:111) 
This sense of 'authorised decision making; (Colebatch 1998) is important to 
the testimony of those responsible for developing and implementing the 
strategies, for it encompasses the idea that they were acting in an authorised 
manner and that this is traceable or auditable activity. Thus, there is the 
process which is 'policy', made by those authorised to do so, resulting in a 
pronouncement or set of objectives which have legitimate authority. Authority 
is integral and encapsulated when policy is developed or delivered, it can be 
evidenced in a number of ways, for example, it may be measured by the 
status of the person or people developing it or by the resources attached to it 
(Dearlove 1973). Drug policy between 1994 and 2004 has apparently been 
able to demonstrate considerable resources of authority; it has received 
support from all three Prime Ministers and increasing levels of funding have 
been attached to each strategy (Updated Strategy 2002:4). 
However, it is within its 'authority' that there is also the possibility for tension 
or contestability. Not all policies are shared across political parties, with 
whom policy making is most often seen to reside (Colebatch 1998:73; 
Lavalette and Pratt 1997:5); nor do all actors or citizens necessarily share 
commitment to particular policy ideas. This can be most notably seen in 
contestable policy areas, such as immigration. Drug policy has been largely 
uncontested throughout the period under discussion; for the most part it has 
enjoyed a high degree of cross-party support and collaboration. The research 
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has looked at the possible impact of this and also given considération to a 
changing policy emphasis. 
Policy can be seen to operate in différent planes, both at the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions. The 'vertical' is most often associated with the centre 
(or central government) and décision making which flows down to localities or 
implementers. The 'horizontal' is more often associated with localities (or 
local government) and the need for inclusive décision making and policy 
implementation which seeks to bring in a number of players. Partnership, a 
focus for this study is most often represented as a horizontal form of policy 
making. It is suggested that the relationship between the two dimensions 'is a 
source of ambiguity and tension' (Colebatch 1998:113). The suggestion is 
that tension might arise 'between having clear objectives and incorporating ail 
of the relevant participants'. 
The subject matter of this thesis is closely concerned with the interaction of 
the vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy making and with the contested 
sphères which exist between them; thus with regard to issues of 
accountability and autonomy, central control and regional or local flexibility, 
structural change or institutional resilience. The exploration of thèse two 
dimensions of policy making is possible because the interviews undertaken 
offer some insight into the 'endtess loop' of which developing policy and 
implementing policy are a part (Colebatch 1998:55). They also allow for 
considération of the processes involved in policy implementation and whether 
it is a procédure which is linear and logical (Colebatch 1998:44). Finally, the 
'social and interactive dimensions of the policy process' (Colebatch 1998:26; 
Levin 1997) were explored in particular, through a séries of interviews 
undertaken with a small group of policy actors involved in the development of 
the TDT (1995) White Paper. 
A brief summary of those interviewed at central and local level is shown in a 
table below: 
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Role of person Interviewed Date of interview 
National respondents / policy developers 
Respondent A - civil servant 2001 
Respondent B - campaigner/voluntary 
organisation 
2001 
Respondent C - quango employee 2001 
Respondent D - civil servant 2001 
Respondent E - civil servant 2001 
Respondent F - campaigner/voluntary sector 
organisation 
2001 
Respondent G - civil servant 2001 
Respondent H - civil servant 2002 
Local respondents / policy implementers 
Respondent 1 - DAT coordinator 2005 
Respondent 2 - DAT coordinator 2005 
Respondent 3 - DAT coordinator 2004 
Respondent 4 - regional representative 2005 
Respondent 5 - DAT coordinator 2004 
Respondent 6 - DAT coordinator 2004 
Respondent 7 - regional representative 2004 
Respondent 8 - DAT coordinator 2004 
Respondent 9 - DAT coordinator 2005 
Respondent 10 - regional representative 2006 
Respondent 11 - regional representative 2004 
Respondent 12 - DAT coordinator 2004 
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Methods 
The approach is a wholly qualitative one which '...seeks to capture what 
people's lives, expériences and interactions mean to them..,' in terms of their 
involvement in the development and implementation of drug policy (Maso 
1996:33). This has been triangulated (Gomm 2004:188) with other 
documentary sources. As Maso (1996:36) has outlined, thèse might include: 
'...other sources of information to acquire knowledge and ideas about the 
voids, contradictions, estrangements, circumspections and blindnesses they 
encounter...they have to use the relevant literature of the social sciences, 
documents produced by others (i.e. letters, biographies, autobiographies, 
memoirs, speeches, novels and a multitude of nonfiction forms)...' 
The use of documentary sources has allowed for the establishment of some 
chronological certainty about events and provided the évidence of the actual 
policy décisions which were made, the language in which they were 
expressed and the responses to them. In this way they provide the 
background reality to the changes which respondents described. 
Nevertheless, as Gomm (2004:185) has suggested: 
'There are many things which researchers cannot investigate at first hand, 
and can only find out about by asking people questions' 
The development and implementation of drug policy is one such area. It is 
possible to study the policy sources themselves, the political speeches and 
the other papers which were written around this time. However thèse can 
only hint at some of the connections between individuals, their reasoning, 
negotiations and considérations which were taken into account in the 
development of those policies. Relatively little is written about policy 
implementation and about drug policy in particular (Duke 2003:24); what is 
available is most likely to be a particular évaluation of one small part of the 
process, or might touch on some aspects of that process. The thesis has 
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therefore sought to focus with equal weight on this under-researched area. It 
is hoped that the methods used allow for a more detailed examination and 
exploration of the research questions and shed some light on the process of 
policy development and implementation. 
The timeframe under consideration 1994 - 2004 
The timeframe has been drawn to incorporate the development of each of the 
drug strategies and to allow some consideration of the implementation of each 
element. The interviews with the national policy makers focused on the 
development of the first drug strategy, TDT (1995), and gave brief 
consideration to the development under New Labour of TDTBBB (1998) and 
the changes which occurred. The interviews with DAT coordinators and other 
drug policy implementers focussed in particular on the strategies post 1995 as 
a number of interviewees had worked in an implementation capacity on all 
three strategies. The selection of the different groups and different time 
frames was deliberate. It allowed for the thesis to follow through the process 
of initial policy development and look at the original aims of the policy 
architects, and then consider what effects attempts to work with or implement 
the strategies had, along with other factors. 
In the words of TDTBBB (1998) the focus of TDT (1995) was on the structures 
for policy delivery, whereas the later strategy was concerned with the delivery 
of change (TDTBBB 1998). The chosen focus for this thesis allows for 
consideration of the intentions of the drug policies and particularly why the 
structures that were devised were created for drug policy delivery. In addition, 
it has been possible to look at how these structures affected the process of 
implementation. By focussing with each group of respondents on the 
particular process and structures for which they were responsible or operated 
within, the policies were able to be fully explored as an 'idea' and as an 
'actuality', a functioning process. 
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Chapter outline and structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis tells the story of drug policy development and 
implementation during the period 1994-2004. The chapters follow a logical 
sequence that introduces the key concepts and relevant literature, the 
documentan/ sources, and the drug policies. In the following chapters the 
empirical research considers the facets of policy development and 
implementation. In the closing chapter the findings are discussed and the 
conclusions drawn out. 
Chapter 1 introduces the key themes which will be revisited in each of the 
chapters and which have informed the analysis undertaken. This is fully 
developed in Chapter 2 which looks at the theoretical perspective and 
analytical framework which govems the thesis. The key concepts are 
discussed and the relevant literature explored. The intention has been to use 
these concepts as the focus for the literature review, so that it has been broad 
enough to include the relevant disciplines, but focussed enough on the 
essential themes. This review has included concepts such as policy, a policy 
community and the development of drug policy in particular. The latter has 
included a discussion of the political and historical context of penal and health 
agendas as they have focussed on the drugs issue. An analysis of the 
changing political consensus and moralisation of the social policy agenda 
during the period, which included ideas of social responsibility, community, 
choice and compulsión, has also been undertaken. All of the above ideas can 
be connected to the Conservative administration and latterly to New Labour 
who further developed the partnership structures and devolved and 
regionalised forms of governance which are also considered. Latterly the 
development and impact of performance management is examined. Finally 
the concepts of institutional resilience and change are introduced. 
Chapter 3 is the methods chapter and outlines how a methodology was 
designed and methods used to allow for the exploration of British drug policy 
1994-2004. Chapters 4 and 5 are based on documentan/ sources such as 
policy documents and other government reports, independent reports, political 
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speeches, research reports and manîfestos. However the focus is strongly on 
an examination of each of the drug policies from Tackling Drugs Together in 
1995, to Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain in 1998 and the Updated 
Strategy in 2002. The changing emphasis and architecture of each strategy is 
examined and this is supported by other evidential sources where they are 
available. The chapters consider the policy emphases and the many 
structures which have been created by each policy or metamorphosed from 
one document to another. 
Chapters 6 and 7 cover the empirical research which has taken place. 
Chapter 6 is focussed on the interviews undertaken with senior members of 
the policy making community from within the civil service and voluntan/ and 
statutory organisations. The interviews draw on key thèmes of a policy 
community, the ímpetus for policy development and the reasoning behind the 
partnership structures. Chapter 7, also based on original material, comprises 
the interviews undertaken with those involved with policy implementation. 
The majority of interviewées are drawn from DATs, but some were also 
included from organisations charged with linking the localities to the centre 
and managing theîr performance; thèse interviewées are drawn from the 
regionalised National Treatment Agency and Government Office drug teams. 
The interviews draw on the thèmes of change and developments in the drug 
policies and DATs over the period under considération. This helps to 
understand the changing focus of drug policy and the impact of this on 
localities. The interviews also explore the issues of performance 
management and the importance of funding. Importantly Chapter 7 seeks to 
understand, through the voices of implementers, what implementing drug 
policy through partnership structures during this period has involved. 
The final chapter draws out the important concepts and thèmes with which the 
thesis has engaged. It demonstrates how the documentan/ analysis and 
empirical research help to further our understanding of those concepts and in 
particular the making of drug policy 1994-2004. 
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Chapter two - Contextualising drug policy 
Introduction 
This chapter sets the context for the thesis and looks at what informed the 
development of UK drug policy, alongside scholarly considérations of what 
policy is and how it is made. In addition it is concerned with the development 
of partnership structures and thinking about thèse as new forms of 
governance. Other related issues are explored including the émergence of 
New Labour and an increasingly moral social policy agenda; the latter 
informed by ideas of social responsibility and community, allied to ideas about 
the primacy of the market and concerns to ensure value for money and 
effectiveness. The influence of thèse agendas on drug policy is looked at in 
particular. 
In this following section we will briefly consider a broad sweep: how this ail 
'fits' together as a whole, before the period and theorising is examined in 
greater depth. 
Key concepts 
Policy making can be described a process which involves a number of actors 
among them, politicians, civil servants and those working or lobbying on social 
policy issues in the voluntary, statutory or business sectors. It can be viewed 
as a pattern of events which contain a sensé of authorised décision making 
(Levin 1997: Colebatch 1998). Commonly, policy making is also portrayed as 
influenced by policy communities who work together to bring forward a 
collective policy aim (Duke 2003; Sabatier 1998). The development and 
implementation of policy and the potential for the existence of a policy 
community are therefore important to the thesis as a whole. 
The development, resulting structure and moral trajectory of drug policy has 
also been influenced by other factors. This thesis is concerned with the 
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period 1994-2004, but prior to this the collapse of the post-war social 
consensus can be seen to have laid the groundwork for the shape which drug 
policy took (Donnison 1991; Brown and Sparks 1989; Harris 1989). That 
groundwork was established through the formation of a moral agenda which 
delineated 'outsiders' and ïnsiders', allowing for a debatę which was shaped 
by appeals to the 'community' - defined as those who showed 'social 
responsibility' and who could therefore Claim 'social rights' (Deacon and Mann 
1999; Field 1996; Donnison 1991). These moral trajectories can be traced 
through the work of theoreticians whose work is considered to have been 
influential, such as Murray (1994 with Hernstein) with the New Right and 
Etzioni (1997) with New Labour. They can also be seen to become influential 
on the drug policy agenda with an increased focus on community within each 
drug policy over this period and the link between communities, deprivation, 
crime and social responsibility becoming more explicit (TDTBB1998). 
The moral trajectories and collapse of the post-war welfare consensus are 
seen to occur at the same time as the déconcentration or décentralisation of 
the centre through a process of dévolution, régionalisation and devolved 
partnership working. The two principal UK political parties (Conservatives and 
New Labour) can be seen to have pursued these same policies for différent 
reasons. The Conservatives favoured régionalisation and partnership working 
because it offered opportunities to 'go round' the local authorities with whom 
they had difficult working relationships (Deakin 1994) and because of their 
political orientation towards a deconcentrated State. New Labour were seen 
to embrace the same concepts for very différent reasons; for them 
partnerships offered the opportunity to 'reward' and modernise local 
authorities (Daly and Davis 2002) and to devolve power to the régions and 
Scotland and Wales (Newman 2001:72). 
Both parties, when in power during this period introduced and strengthened 
new forms of governance such as partnerships (Lowdnes 2005; Davies 2005; 
Glendinning et al 2002; Newman 2001). This style of work existed prior to 
1993 but was given new impetus and expanded and formalised under New 
Labour. Drug Action Teams (DATs), the partnership forms designed to 
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implement drug policy under the first strategy, Tackling Drugs Together, in 
1995 were one of the first formal structural partnership forms of thís kind. 
Partnerships are considered by some writers to have become 'new 
institutions' (Newman 2001) and by others to be over-exaggerated as new 
forms of governance (Davies 2005). The latter view is particularly related to 
an analysis concerned with the existence of a strong performance 
management and managerial culture which has grown alongside the 
partnership forms (Feeley and Simón 1996). It is arguable whether a 
performance management and managerial culture represent an overly strong 
central government or 'a new focus on deiiven/ (Modernising Government 
HMSO 1999:1) and a concern to ensure effectiveness. 
A concern with the delivery and effectiveness of policy has been 
demonstrated by government throughout this period and is linked to a wish by 
both parties to be able to demónstrate valué for money. For drug policy this is 
also borne from an acceptance that 'treatment works' (MacGregor 1998) 
combined with a need to investígate which treatment, to whom, where and 
how (Duke 2003). Despite some concems about performance management 
by the centre, empirical studies have been able to evidence a level of 'choice' 
which local partnerships are able to make in response to local needs and 
priorities (Lowdnes 2005; Davies 2005). Furthermore, the empirical studies of 
partnerships have demonstrated the influence of a number of factors which 
are central to their 'performance'; these are history, valúes, a policy structure 
and a network of key actors (Wong 1998; Miller 1998; Knoepfel and Kissling-
Naf 1998). 
There has been a plethora of partnership forms of governance between 1994-
2004, overwhelmingly introduced to deal with áreas of social complexity. 
They have, moreover, been a strong structural feature of drug policy. Some 
have considered that this form offered the opportunity to move away from the 
oíd dichotomies of penalty and treatment within the drug policy context 
(Macgregor 1998); others that the distinctiveness of British drug policy has 
been lost and that this has allowed for the hegemony of the penal approach 
(Stimson 1987; Duke 2003). It is clearly arguable whether new institutions 
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have been created from partnership forms, or whether we nave witnessed 
institutional resilience (Klein 1993:12) in the face of these innovations. Within 
the drug policy context this is of considerable interés! because of the historie 
institutional power of the Home Office and Department of Health, both of 
whom are key players in this social policy área. 
The chapter will now be divided into two sections; part one looks at the recent 
historical background to and development of drug policy in the UK and part 
two looks at the theory and practice of policy development. 
Part one - Drug policy 
Introduction 
Drug policy 1994-2004 is discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. The focus 
in those chapters is on the context in which policy was developed and in 
particular the detail and architecture of the policies, including the mechanisms 
which were designed for implementation, such as DATs. The following 
section therefore lays out briefly some of the key ¡ssues with regard to drug 
policy more generally during this period. In particular the link is also made 
between the other key concepts, such as policy, partnership, New Labour, 
managerialism and drug policy. 
Macgregor (1999) has suggested that after the Cold War the issue of drug 
misuse had '...risen higher on the international policy agenda because it 
serves as the glue which anti-communism previousiy provided...' There is a 
sense that drug policy is able to bring together disparate groups locally, 
nationally and internationally because it is possible for everyone to conceive 
of drugs as a menace which can be collectively fought against. In this sense 
working to combat drug misuse and working in partnership share a common 
understanding across different groupings within the social policy world; they 
are both 'joining' concepts which everyone 'knows' to be a 'good thing'. They 
are also both linked to a conception of complexity. Further, partnership 
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offered a method for dealing wîth issues which transcended a single social 
policy area and it was brought together with an issue (drug misuse) which eut 
across the agendas of many organisations and individuals at a local, national 
and international level. 
Additionally, the focus of drug policy has changed during this period. It is 
considered that throughout the history of drug policy dichotomous 
explanations have been proffered which have been characterised as the 
médical and pénal discourses. There has been a perceived shift in 
dominance between the two agendas within the UK during 1994-2004 and 
this is most often represented as an increasing dominance of the pénal 
agenda. At the same time however there has been a change within the wider 
social policy debate which has prioritïsed 'rights and responsibilities' and the 
needs of communities. It may be argued that the shift in thèse discourses has 
impacted on the drug policy debates and that this impact caused a change in 
the approach to the drug user. This change in approach may manifest itself 
as an apparently pénal discourse but may, in tact, arise from a moral 
conception of the duties of the active citizen who is due a safe and secure 
environment within their community, which takes precedence over the needs 
of the individual. 
What are drugs and drug misuse? 
The définition of drug misuse which is aeeepted in this thesis and is also used 
as the basis for much British social and drug policy throughout this period was 
proposed by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD 1982) as: 
'Any person who expériences social, psychological, physicai or legal problems 
related to intoxication and / or regulär excessive consumption and / or 
dependence as a conséquence of his or her use of drugs or other chemical 
substances/ 
Additionally, throughout this study 'drug' means a substance which is used to 
affect the functioning of the person taking it (Tyler 1988), but which has been 
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prohibited for use by societal expectation or législation. As South (1999) 
noted ' the bfurring of (egal and illegal status of drugs is one among several 
thought-provoking features of the émergence of a late modem 'pick 'n' mix' 
poly-drug culture'. Within the thesis, the focus is on policy making, which is 
concerned solely with illegal or prohibited drug use. 
The scale and nature of drug misuse 1994-2004 
Düring the period under considération there is a sensé that drug misuse 
changed in its nature and scale at a local, national (Stimson 1987) and 
international level and this presented nation states with issues with which they 
needed to deal (Mowlam 2002:367). Furthermore, there had been an 
economic downturn in the 1970s, the collapse of the welfare state (Deakin 
1994; Harris 1989), a rise in New Right explanations for social behaviour 
which were increasingly popularised (Hernstein and Murray 1994) and 
accepted (Brown and Sparks 1989) and a growth in crime and ail were linked 
in some way to changing explanations of drug misuse (MacGregor 1998; 
1999). The suggestion is that the policies of Thatcher (and those of Ronald 
Regan in the USA) achieved a change in the language of debate - \..how we 
taik about a problem, how we imagine its solution...' (MacGregor and Lipow 
1995:17). There is also évidence that in the UK (and the USA) the social and 
economic policies which had been pursued widened the gap between rich and 
poor and that this gap grew substantially between 1979 and 1989, 
representing the 'biggest shift from rieh to poor in the 20ih Centun/ and 
proving there was to be no 'trickle dowri (Townsend 1995:217). The impact 
of social policies like this was to create increased levels of perceived social 
dislocation and related problems, such as a growing crime rate (Downes 
1995). Additionally, England and Scotland experienced a heroin épidémie 
which: 
'...settled with particular severity in areas of high unempioyment, social 
deprivation andhousing decay...' (Pearson 1999:94). 
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A link was made between economic deprivation and drug misuse; heroin, in 
particular, in the UK. In the USA, writers such as Eloise Dunlap (1995:115) 
researched in-depth, ethnographie studies, which provided detailed évidence 
of the way in which: 
'...macro fevel 'social forces' create conditions which iead to stressfui 
situations and conflicts at a household ievel. 
The Suggestion was that the failure to address these fault lines, resulted in 
further 'crisis induced responses', of which drug misuse 7s only one response 
(Dunlap 1995:117). The focus taken by some académies onto specific 
geographica! areas and groups introduced and popularised the conceptual 
link between Community, environmental factors and drug use (MacGregor 
1998). The Conservative government did not draw a link between increased 
crime, rising drug use and economic circumstances, although it was included 
within a New Labour discourse. 
The aecount of a change in drug using behaviour in the UK (Parker et al 1987; 
Pearson 1987) is now largely aeeepted and has subsequently been built into 
British drug policy, along with an explanation which (more controversially) 
links drug misuse with crime (NTORS 1996:1 6; Hough 1995; Bean 1994; 
Anglin 1990). Additionally, empirical studies were commissioned and 
appeared to provide the évidence for this (NTORS 1996). They suggested 
that those who had committed offences were also misusing drugs and that 
there was a link between the two behaviours; driving down one would, 
therefore, arguably Iead to a drop in the other (NTORS 1996). Feeley and 
Simon (1996) have commented that the power and persuasion of such 
aecounts, was that they allowed for managerialist based assumptions about 
drugs and crime to be instituted into the penal fabric and that these 
assumptions led to the identification of groups of people who could then be 
contained or treated. It is possible to suggest that we can see the response to 
this actuarial challenge within drug and crime policies particularly under New 
6 T h i s was ihc T a s k F o r c e to R e v i e w Se rv i c es for D r u g M i s u s e r s 1996 p u b l i s h e d by D o H . It is 
re ferenced throughout the body o f the thesis as N T O R S as this is h o w it is most c o m m o n l y k n o w n . b u l 
s h o w n in the b i b l i o g r a p h y fu l l y re ferenced. 
36 
Labour. Furthermore, research and scholarly views have appeared to directly 
impact on drug policy during this period and have not fallen 'on deaf ears' 
(MacGregor 1999:75). Policies have been developed which, MacGregor 
(1999) would argue, have been derived from medical and sociological schools 
of thought, whose research has suggested that 'policies aimed at increasing 
employment, education and training for young people, especially those in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods...' are what is required to combat drug 
misuse. New Labour introduced a range of social policies (such as SureStart) 
which sought to tackle areas of deprivation, anomie and aimlessness and 
perhaps bolster prevention efforts. The policies drew on moral and 
managerial philosophies aimed at improving and containing drug users and 
others who were seen to be 'separated' from mainstream activity; the policies 
sought to lay the foundations for their re-engagement. 
How much drug misusing behaviour has spread out across the population to 
the point of 'normalisation' has been a more contentious debate. Meesham, 
Newcombe and Parker (1994) argued that there was a normalisation of drug 
use amongst young people, but South (1999) and Shiner and Newburn (1999) 
have countered this argument suggesting that even amongst the age group 
most likely to use (young people) - most do not use drugs. They have also 
argued that rather than a 'normalisation' of drug use, there is in fact a 
'neutralisation'. They suggest that drug using behaviour has been over-
represented and whilst there had been a change in the availability of drugs 
and changes in drug using behaviour this related principally to one off drug-
trying and cannabis use, along with an increased tolerance towards certain 
types of using behaviour by non-users. Additionally, they suggest the fear of 
drugs was linked to a fear of young people (South 1999) and that drug policy 
was aimed at their containment. 
The 'scale' of drug use and the possibility of normalisation or neutralisation of 
it as a behaviour is important to the thesis, because policy making must be 
seen to have legitimate aims and to be congruent with the public's 
commonsense expectations. Therefore a drug policy based on prohibition 
and prevention should, one would consider, require a population which is 
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largely drug free, in order that they support it's direction and be concerned 
about a rise in use, but which is 'drug aware' enough to support policies which 
aim to tackle misuse and supply increasing level of resources to do so. 
Whether those resources are aimed at treatment or containment is likely to be 
part of the debate in a changing social policy dimension. 
Drug misuse - a discourse of hegemonies? 
Drug policy in Britain has a long and well described history (Berridge 1996) in 
which it is considered there has been a continuous tension between medical 
and penal approaches and that at different times one or other approach has 
been exerted or dominant. These two apparently competing spheres of 
influence have remained and the 'struggle' between them has continued to be 
played out during recent years, despite partnership working. 
The 'British Model' and the penal / medical tensions are frequently discussed 
facets of British drug policy (Stimson 1987; MacGregor 1999; South 1999; 
Duke 2003). The 'British Model' term is usually used to describe a social 
policy approach which treats drug users as 'patients' and thus comes from a 
medico-centric (Stimson 1987) or socio-medical (Macgregor 1999) 
philosophy; which prescribes methadone to heroin users and whose approach 
was perceived as 'helping the individual1 and limiting 'the social problems of 
addiction' (Stimson 1987). This is largely contrasted with a social policy 
approach concerned more with penality and containment (usually linked to the 
USA; Stimson 1987). 
The tensions between treatment and punishment for drug misuse have been 
palpable throughout the varied social policy agendas, prior to and including 
the period covered by this thesis. The impact of these tensions is real and it 
is not a purely academic or semantic debate. An indication of what the penal / 
medical tensions meant in practice was given by Joy Mott, who (speaking 
from a Home Office research perspective in 2000) said that during the 1970's 
and '80's the Home Office could not fund research into treatment.... 
epidemiology;... seemed to belong to the Dept of Health but it ended up with 
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the Home Office putting questions on drug misuse into the British Crime 
Survey (Mott 2000:336). Thus, tensions and debates about who had the 
'right' to deal with drugs issues and how those varying perspectives could be 
debated, integrated and brought to bear, had a direct impact on policy, service 
delivery, law, and the ability to 'know' what was happening through research. 
The last 20 years have been a time of considerable activity with regard to 
British drug policy, possibly to an unprecedented level (Stimson 2000; 
Mowlam 2002). There have been changes to the legal system and penalties; 
there have been changes to the treatment options that are available; there 
have been numerous research studies, a new structure for implementing drug 
policy has been developed and there have been a considerable number of 
changes to the way in which drug policy is managed. The focus of this study 
is particularly on the latter two areas. The new drug policies have led to a 
scale of change and investment in the late 20 t h Century and early 2 1 s t Century 
that sometimes meant that even those actively involved were confused by the 
speed and scale of change or saw it as remarkable: 
'It was all progressing okay, (drug policy) but new initiatives kept being added 
ail the time. ' (Mowlam 2002:321 ) 
This is in marked contrast to the 1970's 'apathy about drugs' (Stimson 
2000:331). 
Despite the changes the trajectory of drug policy has been remarkably 
consistent over the last decade (1994-2004) with the penal / medical tensions 
which went before; there has also been continuity between Conservative and 
New Labour aims (Duke 2003). During this period penality appeared to 
emerge as the dominant hegemony; however it might also be argued that the 
penalogical hegemony has simply been the most obvious, as medical 
perspectives have remained influential and the funding of treatment 
interventions has flourished (Updated Strategy 2002). The thesis will explore 
this in greater detail throughout the following chapters. 
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As we have seen, economic and other changes were also occurring in Britain 
during the 1970's and 1980's which are characterised as the breakdown of 
the post-war social consensus (Brown & Sparks 1989; Harris 1989; Donnison 
1991) and during the 1990s there was an increased focus on partnership 
forms of working. The partnerships created for the implementation of drug 
policy are rarely included in the discussions about thèse new forms of 
governance (Glendinning, Powell & Rummery 2002). Similarly, within the field 
of drug policy research there is little focus on the structural changes to policy 
delivery which have occurred and much focus still on the penal/medical 
'divide' (Howard 2002; MacGregor 1999; Stimson 1987). 
Berridge (2006:106) has suggested that, historically, a similar pattern of 
tensions between différent discourses can be traced with regard to alcohol 
policy. She described a 'mingling of médical science with crime and disorder 
concerne which allowed for an 'historié connection between thèse médical 
stratégies and chminal justice agendas'. She highlighted the rôle of the 
probation service in typifying and organisationally providing the link between 
the two agendas. She described the 'médical and scientific sectof as 'less 
well neiworked by comparison with the public order lobby (2006:107) and 
suggested that the resuit was the dominance of the pénal agenda. She drew 
out the importance of networks, the development of policy trajectohes and the 
dominance of a particular agenda through the use of policy networks or 
communities. The similarities provide some understanding of how partnership 
working might also have impacted on the direction of drug policy, through the 
inclusion of the chminal justice agencies. This is useful because of the 
scholarly 'gap' in this area. Further, it points to how a number of factors in 
drug policy might have led to the direction which was pursued. This might 
include the changing pattern of dominance over the agenda, along with 
perceived changes in the profile of drug users and the linking of drug use with 
particular geographica! areas which perhaps made locally based partnerships 
appear an appropriate response. These inter-connections strengthened the 
link with conceptions of 'community' which were becoming increasingly 
important during this period. Finally, they might also have justified a focus on 
drug users as geographically and socially contained and as potentially 
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damaging to their communities and thus requiring (and perhaps deserving) 
compulsion towards change. 
Changing conceptions of drug use, users and the link to community 
As illustrated, concems about drug misuse increased during the 1980's and 
early 1990s based on évidence that it had risen and that the patterns of use 
and the profile of the drug user had also changed (Parker et al. 1987: Pearson 
1987; Stimson 1987; Home Affairs Committee report 1986). Explanations 
which featured substance misuse as a bohemian activity, solely the concern 
of the individual, declined and increasingly a link was made between 
substance misuse, poverty and anti-social or criminal behaviour and the 
safety of communities (Stimson 2000; Green 1998; MacGregor 1998). 
Himmelstein (1978) argued that the intention in so doing was to repress the 
drug user. 
'Drugs associated with groups low in the privilège structure are the ones that 
get proscribed and stigmatised. Groups high in the privilège structure are the 
ones who do the proscribing and stigmatising.'(H\rr\meiste\r\ 1978) 
MacGregor (1998:192) asserted that this led to a 'fear of contagion and... 
disorder...' and Stimson (1987:482) that it was 'linked to a demedicalisation of 
drug problems'. This change in perception and portrayal was understood to 
have occurred under both the Conservative and New Labour governments 
post 1979 and to have been allied to moral trajectories concemed with social 
responsibility and the importance of communities (Field 1996; Green 1998; 
Stimson 1987 and 2000) which in turn led to a désire for 'a new policy 
direction1 (MacGregor 1998:192). Some have suggested that this movement 
in perception also allowed the drug user to be viewed in their social context 
and that this brought a: 
'...récognition of the influence of social and environmental processes in both 
the causation of drug misuse and in intervention stratégies'. (Macgregor 
1998:185 drawing on Edwards 1995). 
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Community had become an increasingly contested term, whose meaning 
varied according to who used it. Nonetheless, for those who said and wrote it, 
the intention most often was to conjure a meaning which was positive and 
which related to a group of people with shared interests. It might be argued, 
moreover, that many political commentators also used it to provide the 'other' 
to the perpetrator of social 'evil' and dislocation. For the Conservatives in 
1979-1997 it was the social security 'scroungers', the single parents, the 
unions and the moral laxity of the 1960s; all of thèse were set against the 
'real' people, who lived in communities and wanted a retum to 'old fashioned 
values' and recognised the work ethic and the value of hard work and saving. 
For New Labour post 1997, the 'Community' was set against the 'scourge' of 
drug dealers and users, the criminals who wrecked social Spaces and parents 
who failed to take their duties seriously either in terms of anti-social behaviour 
or truancy. 
The link between Community as the positive and the threat from outside it as 
the negative 'other' may be linked to writers such as Etzioni (1998), who have 
argued that communities, meaning the majority population, were undermined 
by those who did not accept their füll social responsibilities. In so doing, they 
placed an unfair bürden on others, or undermined the positive things which 
the majority were doing. This led to a lack of social cohésion and brought 
about social décline. Etzioni (1998) was the principal theorist in this form of 
writing which became known as 'communitahan'. It was influential within the 
UK on both the Left and Right and can be seen to have directly influenced 
New Labour at a time when they were reconsidering their social stratégies in 
the early-mid 1990s. Frank Field (1996: a Labour MP and one of the New 
Labour thinkers in the early stages) was particularly influenced and devised 
social responses which drew on the idea of 'stakeholders' and that 'with rights 
come responsibilities', which communtarianism espoused, and stressed the 
'social duties' of individuals. 
Skidmore and Craig (2004:6) draw on the work of Marilyn Taylor (2001) to 
suggest that: 
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'the idea of Community has deschptive, narrative and instrumental 
dimensions'. 
They suggested that it is the normative term that has become the most 
'pervasive' and that consequently 'community is usuaily a foaded term,' which 
implies a 'positive'. This is because it is also seen to provide the balancing 
factor against ' unrestrained individualism' and the lunwieldy, impersonal hand 
of the State' (Skidmore and Craig 2004). It is the 'community' as 'actor' 
therefore within social policy which is important; the Suggestion of 'community' 
which can be seen to be so compelling to New Labour leading up to and post 
1997. 
Drug policy, partnership and 'joining up' 
General social policy concerns which embraced health, crime and 
communities are aspects which contributed to the national drug strategy 
which was launched in 1995, Tackling Drugs Together. MacGregor 
(1998:186) has argued that: 
'The changing shape of policy responses is a reflection of the changing 
context within which drug misuse occurs'. 
She suggested that drug policy could be seen to be the result of changes in 
drug taking and drug supply, but was also the result of an increasingly 
urbanised, globalised economy in which the post-war social consensus had 
broken down and the ideology of working in partnership was dominant. 
The strategy which 'emerged' from this context sought to bring penal and 
medical agendas together, although it was also asserted that it could not be 
known what 'caused' drug misuse, and that this might include individual, 
social or environmental factors (TDT 1995). It was coordinated at the centre 
by a small body, the Central Drug Coordination Unit (CDCU) which worked 
within the Cabinet Oftice and in the localities via partnerships which were 
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called Drug Action Teams. The strategy focussed on increasing the safety of 
communities, reducing the acceptability and availability of drugs to young 
people and reducing the health risks associated with use (TDT 1995). In 1998 
following the election of New Labour the drug strategy was extended, leading 
to a changing focus, so that links between drug use and social and 
environmental factors were drawn out and funding was also increased 
(Tackling Drugs To Build a Better Britain 1998); other developments included 
drug strategies for specific áreas, such as prisons (Duke 2003). In 2002 the 
Updated Strategy again increased funding levéis and placed a greater 
emphasis on the link between drug misuse and crime. All three strategies 
have however kept partnership as a core theme and DATs as their local 
embodiment and mechanism for delivery. 
The incorporation of drug issues into other initiatives also began under New 
Labour and this can be interpreted in a number of ways - as an attempt to 'join 
up' government, due to the raised profile of drug misuse issues or arising from 
recognition of the link between drug misuse issues and other áreas of social 
policy. Thus, drug misuse was a theme which ran through and across other 
policy áreas, such as the Criminal Justice and Court Services Bill (2000) 
which included specific provisions for dealing with drug users within the 
criminal justice system. MacGregor (1998:188) has suggested that the linking 
of drug issues into other policy áreas was a 'profound change. In addition, 
policy responses to drug misuse included performance management functions 
which would assist with the collection of evidence of their implementation and 
effectiveness. 
Managerialism and performance management 
The accounting mechanisms and the use of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) have been a consistent feature of recent British policy making and 
have impacted on drug policy. Much of the development of this apparent 
bureaucratisation and management focus is perceived to have begun in 
Britain under the Thatcher government in 1979 (Brown and Sparks 1989). 
Analytically it is often linked to the breakdown of the welfare state and its 
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perceived inability to deliver 'the good life' (Harris 1989; Deakin 1994), 
Various solutions were sought which included privatisation and the rolling 
back of the welfare state. Where state and welfare functions continued they 
were to be accountable to central government for the money they spent and 
the outcomes that flowed from that spending (Brown and Sparks 1989; Harris 
1989; Deakin 1994). These agendas have continued under subsequent New 
Labour governments and Mo Mowlam (2002) wrote in her memoirs that it was 
the responsibility of government to modernise so that central government 
could: 
'...do its job properly and make sure that the sen/ices people pay for through 
their taxes are delivered efficientiy and effectively for everyoné (Mowlam 
2002:344). 
Mishra (1990:106) suggested that some people underestimated the 
significance and reality of the changes in language introduced under 
Thatcher. This, he argued, was because they interpreted the terms, 
'management', 'adaptation' and 'flexibility' as politically neutral, but that the: 
lselective privatisation of the welfare state services has weakened the 
universal nature of these and paved the way for residualisatiorí (Mishra 
1990:35). 
Interestingly, Mowlam (2002) and Blunkett (2006) both appear more inclined 
to demónstrate a concern with implementation and to see their policy 
responses as pragmatic and New Labour have adopted a language of 
managerialism which has gone under the heading of 'modernisation' 
(Modernis'mg Government 1999: HMSO). More generally the arguments in 
this área fall under a heading of 'new public management' (NPM) which 
'...often eludes easy definitiorí (Powell and Exworthy 2002:19). Powell and 
Exworthy (2002:19) suggest (drawing on Ferlie et al 1996) that it includes four 
basic approaches - a drive for efficiency, decentralisation, 'a search for 
excelience and a public service ohentatiorí. 
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Feeley and Simón (1996) writing about NPM and its' impact on the criminal 
justice arena have cautioned against a neutralisation of the terms and have 
suggested that the incorporation of managerialism into the penal agenda 
represents both a continuation and a change. They ¡Ilústrate their account 
using drug misuse and policy as an example. They suggest that drug 
treatment and testing were 'hallmarks of the rehabilitative model in the 1950$ 
and 1960s' but that the recent interest was motivated by a 'hardening of 
attitudes' and a disintegration of the 'social conditions' of the urban poor 
(Feeley and Simón 1996:372) which required a 'distinctive change'; this 
reflected 'the logic of the new penology.' They argued that the new penology 
was the natural result of the realisation of the 'widespread evidence of drug 
use in the offending popufatiorí which meant that one did not need a new 
theory about what caused crime, but needed a new set of techniques which 
allowed one to identify and contain that group of offenders. This might be 
seen to lead to an 'emphasis' on offenders as drug users and on drug testing 
rather than treatment (Feeley and Simón 1996). It also allowed, they argued, 
for the dominant statutory agencies, such as probation and prisons, to 
maintain their position because rather than offer other forms of support and 
intervention they could now contain and test. Feeley and Simón (1996) 
foresaw that this approach would be focussed on the short-term and 
concerned to 'manage crimináis' (and presumably drug users) rather than 
reintégrate them. They linked this agenda to one concerned with 'risk' and 
containment, to the acceptance of notions of an 'underclass' and to the 
demise of the 'rehabilitative' ideal (1996:376) and thus to a social policy which 
was concerned with '...a kind of waste management functiorí (1996:378). 
They, therefore, directly linked the managerial agenda to a moral debate 
about drug use and crime. 
NPM and the new penology are of indirect relevance to the thesis because of 
the way in which drug policies are implemented, because of their increasing 
engagement with the penal estáte and because partnership structures are 
seen as being heavily managed by the centre and to have incorporated this 
managerialist agenda into their functioning (Davies 2005). The managerialist 
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features in drug policy can be seen to increase under New Labour and to 
have fitted well with their agenda; this will now be considered further. 
New Labour 
Social responsibility, choice, compulsion, Community and a link between 
drugs and crime are all words and ideas strongly suggestive of the New 
Labour approach to social policies subséquent to their élection in 1997. 
Davies (2005:6) has argued that New Labour espoused a lThird way doctrine 
of responsibiiities as the condition of rights'. Further, as they approached and 
then came into power they were clear that they wanted to 'modernise' 
government and deliver on their agenda (Donnison 1991; Mowlam 2002; 
Blunkett 2006); 
'...it is modernisation for a purpose; modernising government to get better 
government fora better Britain.' (Blair 1999: Modernising Government HMSO) 
The memoirs of those who were members of the first two New Labour 
governments are packed with références to the slowness of central 
government mechanisms, to their inefficiency and to the civil service lack of 
concern with delivery and to New Labour's own concerns to be able to make 
change and ensure policy implementation (Mowlam 2002: Blunkett 2006). 
This discourse can be clearly linked to discussions earlier in the chapter 
regarding social policy changes and partnership and to the rise of a 
managerial agenda across différent sphères of social policy. However it does 
not in itself provide évidence of a government obsessed with centralising and 
control; perhaps more with a government obsessed with delivering and 
implementing its policies and evidencing that to the electorate. A key feature 
of New Labour rhetoric is the use of the language of morality, alongside a 
focus on a well-meaning 'community' which needs to be saved from the 
scourges of poverty, economic instability, crime, anti-social behaviour and 
drug use. As we highlighted, during the period under considération, 
community became linked within the social policy agenda with conceptions of 
what drives and conthbutes to drug misuse. 
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During this period 'community' became a term which was contested, who's 
meaning varied, but was usually used to conjure a positive. In turn, Tony Blair 
the leader of New Labour used the philosophy of 'rights and responsibilities' 
on many occasions (Davies 2005). These philosophies directly influenced 
drug policy debates with the development of the idea of the drug user as the 
'underminer' of social cohesion, particularly in poor urban areas and large 
1950's post war council estates; they are important to the development of 
drug and other social policies under New Labour and are subtly different from 
NPM philosophies discussed above. 
Pete Alcock (1996:50) commenting on Field's theorising, argued that many of 
the early driving forces within New Labour, who shared Field's views, came 
from 'collectivism Christian' based leanings and a socialism of 'social 
obligation and mutual support which he likened to Tawney and opposed to 
what he saw as the more traditional Labour view of 'optimistic, altruistic 
socialism'. Others such as Deakin (1996:65) suggested that the theorising 
within New Labour was more directly dependent upon the victim blaming 
approach which he linked to the Christian, conservative writers Charles 
Murray and Lawrence Mead, despite, he argued, their theories having been 
discredited. Additionally, Melanie Philips (1996:106), writing from a 
conservative perspective, argued that Field (1996) and other New Labour 
thinkers failed to consider the cultural forces which she described as 
influencing a cultural response to welfare, so that 'welfare does not create 
moral or immoral behaviour, but does reinforce it. 
A common thread amongst those devising policy between 1994-2004, 
commenting on policy or commenting on those writing about policy, is the 
concern with morality; consequently there is a moral underpinning to the 
policy making and political concerns of this time. Community became a 
morally loaded word; those outside of it or threatening it could be 
characterised as morally or socially deficient, in need of reform and re­
integration into the social fold, or community. It was on this moral basis that it 
became possible to compel drug users to receive treatment (DTOs) and the 
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anti-social to reform (ASBOs). This approach is subtly différent from 
considering that this group just require 'management' (Feeley and Simon 
1996). 
Further, it is the moral under-pinning which can perhaps account for the 
différence in style and response to drug policy between the Conservatives 
and New Labour during this period. For whilst morality is présent and 
underpins both New Right and New Labour responses to many of the 
complex social issues of the time, the New Right responses are based on a 
'rampant indivîdualism', summed up in Mrs Thatcher's now infamous 'there is 
no such thing as society' quote. The Conservatives less directly linked their 
drug policy into this morally loaded philosophising and did not directly link 
drug users with the morally déficient underclass. Their responses to drug 
users at this time appear to dérive most from their more traditional 
philosophies of libertarianism and individualism, characterising the drug user 
as someone who harms only themselves. 
It is New Labour who brought about a change in the conception of the social 
responsibilities of drug users. This change can be traced in the speeches of 
Labour MPs in the House of Commons; speeches where the impact of drug 
users and drug use on local communities was lamented (Hugo Summerson 
MP, Walthamstow, 1989). This would suggest that whilst the philosophies of 
communitarianism and 'broken Windows' are right to be seen to have offered 
a philosophical basis to the moves in social policy, they may also have been 
taken up because they accorded with the expériences of the communities -
poor, traditional working class neighbourhoods - who prior to 1997 were the 
voting base for Labour MPs. 
The conception of 'community' contained in the speeches of MPs was as a 
geographical space (MacGregor 1999) which was being undermined by some 
people living in that area, namely drug users, youths and criminals. Certainly 
there is a coming together of the représentation of thèse groups as 'outsiders', 
often with shared characteristics which are inimical to the local community, 
although they may also be the sons, daughters, mothers and fathers of that 
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Community. The danger of strengthening some bonds within a Community 
(either a geographica! space or individuals with shared characteristics) is that 
some are then excluded from it by définition and that this can weaken as well 
as strengthen; it can promote the 'social disintegratiori which it seeks to avoid 
(Skidmore and Craig 2004:14). Additionally, 'social capital3, which is the 
'levers and bonds of trust within communities', is broken down by those who 
attack the Community by taking for themselves what they need, such as 
criminals. Social capital is, moreover, associated with the ideas of 'active 
citizenship', social well-being and happiness. Post 1997 a whole raft of 
policies was developed which sought to promote social capital and to draw on 
it through the inclusion of active Citizens (Davies 2005). Partnership policies, 
in particular, sought to make this link, including Education Action Zones, 
Health Action Zones, and Community Safety teams. The prolifération of thèse 
types of policies drew heavily on conceptions of community and on another 
dominant ideology of this time, partnership. Davies has asserted that: 
'...partnership serves the government's communitarian endeavour in that it 
aims to promote a consensual and participative ethos capable of binding 
diverse stakeholders together. It provides institutional scaffolding in which 
'community' can be rebuilt...' (Davies 2005:18) 
Thus, through linking community and partnership, building both and using a 
variety of approaches to achieve their social and drug policy ends, New 
Labour can also be seen to have challenged the 'traditional institutional 
framework of social policy delivery that governed the interactions between 
local and central government (Lowdnes 2005). 
Part two - Policy and policy making 
Research concerned with the development and implementation of policy 
contains within itself an acceptance that such activities exist and can be 
described. Within this thesis policy is taken to be a 'process' which can be 
examined; it is a pattern of events structured by a décision making pathway 
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which has an inhérent sensé of authority (Colebatch 1998). Levin (1997:15) 
has said that policy means différent things to 'people in governmen\, and 
those ...outside government...'7 suggesting that those outside of it, such as 
académies, often '...set out to define 'policy' rather than investigate how 
politicians and officiais use the term." (Levin 1997:23) The distinction is useful 
because within its' specificity about what policy means to policy actors with 
différent responsibilities, it highlights the range of rôles that are played within 
the policy framework by politicians, civil servants, voluntary sector 
organisations, managers and practitioners. The distinction also helps to 
elucidate the différent stages of a policy process and to incorporate and bring 
together the éléments of policy which are about developing, devising and 
forecasting action and those éléments which are about implementation, doing 
and being seen to have done. This approach suggests that a policy is not 
complète once it has been 'thought' and also highlights the différent forms of 
authority which might be exercîsed within the policy process by the différent 
actors. 
The impact of a centralised policy making System has been suggested by 
some to lead to a gap between policy development and implementation 
(Darke undated) and, in particular, Wong (1998:474) has linked this to a lack 
of a tailored response from the centre to local needs. David Blunkett 
(2006:270) described his surprise that 'some senior civil servants' were 
'...ciearly not used to implementing anything, just legislatinçf*. He portrayed 
this as a continued frustration throughout his time in office, combined with a 
sensé that civil servants did not know what to do with a '...Home Secretary 
who has ideas about which bits he is in favour of, which bits we are Consulting 
on and which bits to ruie ouf (2006:271). Blunkett is, therefore, helpful in 
illuminating the politicians' perceptions about the policy process and in 
particular about the frustrations which making and implementing policy might 
hold. The quote above is also useful in highlighting how 'consultation' might 
7 E m p h a s i s o r i g i n a l 
8 A s a cab ine t m e m b e r o f N e w L a b o u r admin i s t ra t i ons ove r a pe r i od s p a n n i n g 1997 and 2 0 0 5 and as 
H o m e Sec re ta ry between June 2001 and D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 D a v i d B l u n k e t t ' s m e m o i r s have been 
consîdcred to be he lp fu l in i n f o r m i n g an unde r s l and ing o f the deve l opmen t o f p o l i c y . o f N e w L a b o u r 
t h i n k i n g and the d e v e l opmen t o f the U p d a t c d Strategy in 2 0 0 2 . 
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be contained and circumscribed, so that there are 'bits' which are 'ruled in' 
and 'ruled out before others ever get to feedback or campaign on or against 
the 'bits we are consulting orí. Additionally, his memoirs elucidate both the 
frustrations he felt on occasions when his own policy making authority was 
circumscribed and when those at the centre did not understand the needs of 
local communities or the operational mechanisms of local government 
(Blunkett 2006). 
An analytical framework for investigating policy development was devised for 
the thesis drawing on the work of Levin (1997). This informed both the 
investigation of the development of drug policy and implementation. In 
particular it took cognisance of the roles of different policy actors, the role of 
the centre and localities. Within this framework 'policy' was seen as a 
process which could be investigated and to which there were core elements. 
Those core elements can be summarised with regard to policy development 
as ownership, commitment and a proposed course of action with a degree of 
specificity (Colebatch 1998:111); Blunkett's political memoirs highlighted all of 
these areas as crucial to policy development. He also strongly featured the 
over-riding imperative against change within the policy process; a 
commitment to the status quo which is upheld by the bureaucratic 
organisations of state, such as the Home Office (2006:14; 15; 17; 29; 275; 
279; 282; 292; 298; 304). The examples he gave included civil servants 
changing policy drafts without authorisation, assumptions that politicians were 
just the 'passing flotsam and jetsam' (2006:305), as well as acts of deliberate 
misinformation, withholding of information, individual and bureaucratic 
incompetence and sabotage. The aspects of bureaucratic inertia and self-
serving and self-reinforcing power may have been highlighted by Blunkett 
because of his personality (they are referred to but emphasised less strongly 
by Mo Mowlam 2003, for example) and because of the strongly reforming 
nature of New Labour. However his emphasis on implementation and 
delivery (Modernising Government 1999) provides important background 
evidence for this thesis, and highlights other areas such as the possibility of 
institutional resilience and an apparent inertia moderating and limiting change. 
The frustration with perceived bureaucracy and a lack of interest in 
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implementation may be seen however to have provided a further impetus 
towards and increased support for the use of the new institutional forms, such 
as partnership. 
With regard to implementation, the same factors of ownership, commitment 
and a proposed course of action which has within it a degree of specificity and 
authority are also present, but might also include the creation of structures, 
instruments and measures through and by which the policy will be achieved. 
Implementation as a policy stage therefore holds within in it an element of 
action, although this will usually be undertaken by, devolved to, or imposed on 
third parties who may or may not have been present at the point of policy 
development. This may be an increasingly less common experience, 
however, for as Larsen, Taylor-Gooby and Kananen (2006:647) have argued 
New Labour's inclusive approach to policymaking requires the '...support of 
the key stakeholders to ease implementation and legitimate reforms...'. 
Additionally, they suggest that New Labour have adopted and developed the 
inclusive approach because of their concern with implementation and 
recognition that '...targets alone cannot secure successful implementation 
and the government therefore wishes to 'energise' people through active 
involvement in the design stages of policy.' (Larsen et al 2006:634) 
The 'action' required for implementation might also be affected by factors 
(such as institutional resilience) which mitigate towards the status quo and 
this is an area for further investigation. Blunkett (2006:407) has also 
suggested that there can be a lack of understanding at a central government 
level about the impact of proposed policy changes on local government and 
considered that, on occasions, his previous experience in local government 
was crucial: 
'...if I hadn't known it backwards from being on a local authority, we would 
never have delved into it and we would never have got it right' 
The tensions between central and local government with regard to the way in 
which policy is circumscribed and implementation anticipated have also been 
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described by empirical studies undertaken looking at partnership and central 
government interactions (Sullivan et al 2002; Wong 1998; Miller 1998). 
The usefulness of Levin's analytical approach is that it helps to make clear the 
different phases of the policy process such that they can be expressed and 
investigated. This is helpful, suggesting that policy as a process can be 
empirically observed, contextualised and understood and Levin's approach 
helps to articulate the different policy stages. Darke suggests otherwise, 
arguing that policy is too variable a process 'to offer a generalised mode! 
(Darke undated:4) and that it might not be possible to '...identify the point at 
which policy is made...' (Darke undated:4). But Levin's approach offers a 
way to breakdown and analyse the policy process such that it is possible to 
consider the contribution of bureaucrats charged with policy implementation 
and to do so not solely from the perspective of an 'implementation gap', but as 
a part of the process of policy making. 
This thesis is concerned with thinking through drug policy development and 
implementation and has sought to critically identify and appraise that process. 
Academic models are useful for the conceptualisation of the policy process, 
and the exploration of policy development and how implementation works, by 
providing a framework around which to explore it. These frameworks help us 
to understand the process from design, through to adoption and 
implementation as Levin (1997) terms it - thus, the making of social policy. 
An area for further exploration is whether Levin's framework for examining 
policy making, in particular his 'factors' are as useful when considering policy 
interpretation and implementation - this is something which this thesis seeks 
to explore through the original interviews. It is therefore critical to consider 
whether his theorising helps in the deconstruction of the key factors regarding 
drug policy development and implementation between 1994-2004. 
The factors which Levin describes are: 
• Motivational factors 
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• Opportunity factors 
• Resource factors. 
What he has suggested is that 'motivational factors' allow the political and 
driving forces to émerge; the 'opportunity factors' are those whereby the actor 
takes advantage of the available procédures and structures and finally the 
'resource factors' are the opportunity to act and the power to do so. Levin 
(1997:1) developed his analysis by considering the adoption and progress of 
a number of policies under the Conservative governments 7n the 1980s and 
early 1990s'. He described how Mrs Thatcher liked 'to set-up ad hoc 
meetings' (Levin 1997:138) which in themselves could lead to commitment on 
the part of the PM and would give a mandate to officiais to act (also Mowlam 
2002). Blunkett's (2006) memoirs are also illuminating with regard to the 
Operation of these factors and one can for example trace how commitment 
can be built up over time to a particular policy direction (even before 
politicians are in power) and which can contain a particular dynamic of its own 
(2006:xvii). This is identified with regard to personal factors and Blunkett's 
description of how his own father's death due to an industrial accident led to a 
life-long commitment to health and safety matters (2006:xvi). Further, he 
discussed in detail his 'record' on disability living allowance suggesting his 
'unequivocal' stance on this from 1982 through to 1997, a stance which took a 
moral trajectory, considering lthe need to get people out of dependence and 
into self-reiiancë (2006:59). Once in power and installée! at the Department 
of Education and Employment he considered that he acted in aecordance with 
this perspective. These examples can be seen to illustrate Levin's (1997) 
framework. Blunkett's motivation might be seen to come from his own 
disability and early expériences, including a strong moral sense of self-
reliance; when presented with opportunities to actively forward his views in 
this area it is his contention that he did so and once in power he used the 
resources made available to him. 
Another important argument advanced by Levin is concerned with the 
'linkages' which exist between individuals, organisations, departments and 
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issues which aid policy development and the 'cleavages' which hinder it. He 
has argued that: 
7f is important to look not only for linkages but also for the absence of 
linkages, for cleavages9In a highly departmentalised structure, like the 
central government of the UK, with many hierarchical, up and down 
connections within each department but relatively few across from one 
department to another, the cleavages between departments are particularly 
prominent. The structure is not only departmentalised but compartmentalised.' 
(Levin 1997:53) 
A structure at the centre with a direct link to the Cabinet such as that created 
for drug policy in the first strategy, TDT 1995, appeared to be set-up to get 
round these cleavages and be able to create linkages. The structure 
appeared to demonstrate commitment from the Prime Minister, contained an 
opportunity to make links and, as a reflection of 'power', looked like one which 
had 'the capacity to produce intended effects' (Wrong 1979 from Levin 
1997:54). The intention in the structure created seemed to offer the 
opportunity to be neither departmentalised, nor compartmentalised, but policy 
focussed (and in a phrase which was to become ubiquitous) 'joined up'. 
Blunkett and Mowlam's diaries offered corroboration for the importance, when 
in power, of Prime Ministerial support when trying to make policy changes 
(Blunkett 2006:35; Mowlam 2002:299). Further, both suggested that not only 
were institutional 'cleavages' important, but that personal ones were also 
factors and that these 'cleavages' might be built up over time and come back 
to haunt a Minister or a policy (Blunkett 2006:13 and 44; Mowlam 2002:286). 
Consequently, politicians need to be careful not to 'build enormous 
antagonism' amongst colleagues and others; especially, if as Colebatch 
(1998:110) argued, policy is not solely reliant on a Ministerial decision, but the 
result of 'a complex process of inter-organisational negotiation'. 
9 E m p h a s i s o r i g i n a l 
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Levin has considérée! the importance of 'personality' to policy making and to 
Personal relationships, but does not highlight it with regard to cleavages in the 
way Blunkett's does (and to a lesser extent Mowlam 2002). Nonetheless, the 
importance of personal relationships, links and commitment to policy making 
is clear, both as a source of positive support and as a négative energy or 
dynamic (Blunkett 2006; Mowlam 2002). Levin (1997:57) argued that linkages 
can be visualised in two ways; as those based on levers' which are 
obligations and dependencies and those based on 'communication channeis\ 
The former fits well with descriptions given by Blunkett and Mowlam and the 
latter with the way in which they recounted conversations, lunches and other 
Personal interactions over matters of policy. We can examine évidence of the 
use of thèse 'communication channels' further in the empirical Chapters 6 and 
7, but Levin has also demonstrated in his work the importance of 'feeiings of 
sympathy or altruism' (Levin 1997:60). Thèse were known to have been 
applicable to Mrs Thatcher and some Cabinet colleagues with regard to the 
making of drug policy as it is known that some ministers in her cabinet had 
children with drug misuse issues. Sympathy to the plight of thèse individuals 
and families is probable and this draws too on other issues of 'policy as an 
outeome of a process', as a 'sélective response to interests' including 
'individual and interpersonal behaviour...the creating of commitment and the 
exerting of pressure.' (Levin 1997:63) The biographies and memoirs of 
politicians and other policy makers (Blunkett 2006; Hellawell 2005; Mowlam 
2002) are useful as they highlight the many processes which précède the 
formai announcement or publication of policy: the steps which are gone 
through before a policy even makes it to the point of public debate. In 
particular, they often highlight the 'personal' élément of policy making and 
provide évidence of the importance of personal relationships in the formation 
of policy and / or to the existence of a forma! or informai policy community. 
Thèse éléments are relevant to this thesis and as such are considered further 
in Chapter 6. 
There are clearly structural and législative stages in the development and 
implementation of policy, for example the use of White Papers as 'the 
forerunner of the législation and a key plank in stimulating debatë and which 
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can be knowingly used to ensure that people 'knew what it was thaï we were 
expecting - and what we were prepared to do to help them achieve 
/f.'(Blunkett 2006) Thus informai and formai channels are important in 
signposting ownership, intention, commitment and direction. The 
motivational, opportunity and resource factors présent in the policy making 
process along with the institutional and personal linkages and cleavages are 
able to be explored and may offer explanatory mechanisms. The intention is: 
'In searching for the mechanisms that operated in a particular case, we are in 
a sensé asking why a policy or measure came into being and why it 
possessed the characteristics that it oVoV (Levin 1997:65) 
Beyond this we are concerned with the way in which a policy is subsequently 
shaped by the attempts at implementation. Policy is not made just because it 
is 'thought', nor because it is written down and promulgated; thus the thesis is 
also concerned to investigate: 
'...the way in which a programme may have to adapt over time as a resuit of 
changes in the national policy context, as well as locally generated 
changes..: (Sullivan et al 2002:210) 
Too often, this is investigated as an 'implementation gap', but it can, in fact, 
be considered as a part of the policy process. Thus, the research has sought 
to explore thèse two éléments - policy development and implementation - with 
regard to drug policy in the UK 1994-2004, 'as a continuous policy dialogue 
(Knoepfel & Kissling-Naf 1998:344). It has looked at how central and local 
government and their constituent policy actors have been able to shape and 
refîne that policy and the structures created for its implementation -
partnerships. 
Governance 
Beyond signposting intention, the création of structures with which to support 
and promote policy objectives is an important step towards the achievement 
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of those aims; notably because policy development and policy ¡mplementation 
are quite different stages of policy making. The vertical powers and linked 
horizontal structures set up for implementing drug policy (by TDT 1995) and 
communicating effectiveness suggest that it was probable, as highlighted, that 
the drug issue was likely to be able to access many mechanisms of 
communication and to reach the notice of a full range of Ministers and others 
operating at a central government level. The structures were also evidence of 
other policy trajectories which were prevalen! at this time, such as partnership 
and the development of 'devolved' and horizontal forms of governance 
(Blunkett 2006; Davies 2005; Lowdnes 2005; Sullivan et al 2002; Newman 
2001; Miller 1998; Knoepfel et al 1998; Wong 1998). The structures proposed 
by the Green and White Papers (TDT 1995) regarding drug policy also 
contained mechanisms for communicating between the centre and localities 
about the effectiveness of policy ¡mplementation. The Central Drug 
Coordination Unit (CDCU) at the centre was based in the Cabinet Office and 
the Drug Action Teams, based in the localities, reported to the centre about 
the progress of ¡mplementation through the C D C U . Blunkett's memoirs 
suggest that this had the potential to be a particularly poweríul mechanism 
(2006:17). 
Recent academic concerns with 'governance' centre principally on whether 
there has been a 'hollowing out' of the state or whether the state has more 
effectively drawn control into the centre (Davies 2005 and 2006; Lowdnes 
2005; Newman 2001; MacGregor 1998; Stoker 1998). This concern has 
focussed in particular on devolved government, networks and partnerships 
such as the DATs created by TDT in 1995 and the regional and performance 
management institutions such as the government offices (Newman 2001:73) 
and National Treatment Agency (NTA) who have subsequently taken on the 
responsibílity to manage them. The government offices were set-up in 1994 
to coordínate the regional policies and programmes of the departments of the 
environment, employment, industry and transport. They were later expanded 
and took on responsibílity for drug policies post 2002 when responsibílity was 
devolved to the Home Office team instead of the DPAS. The NTA was 
created as a 'Special Health Authority' in 2000; in this way by 2002, the Home 
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Office regional teams and NTA regional teams mirrored the 'old' institutional 
forms of Home Office (penal) and NHS (médical) control of drug policy, 
although represented in apparently new functional forms. 
Newman (2001:16) has suggested that the term 'governance' is best 
understood: 
'...as a descriptive and normative term referring to the way in which 
organisations and institutions are (or shouid be) governed: 
Attempts to understand the process of new forms of governance have 
included évaluations of this form of work (Sullivan et al 2002; Wong 1998; 
Miller 1998; Knoepfel et al 1998; Hughes 1997), but, increasingly, académies 
have sought to théorise about the mechanisms for interaction between the 
centre and the localities, thus the vertical and horizontal forms of governance 
(Lowdnes 2005; Davies 2005 and 2006; Newman 2001; Marsh and Rhodes 
1992) and sought to explore the meanings of partnership and the implications 
of those meanings (Powell and Exworthy 2002). 
Partnership as policy 
As we have seen in Chapter 1 partnership has been portrayed as at risk of 
becoming a 'Humpty-Dumpty' term (Powell and Glendinning 2002:2), likely to 
lose meaning because of its contemporary ubiquitousness and because of 
apparent assumptions about it as a positive method of working, particularly 
around the implementation of policy within localities (Wilkinson and Craig 
2002; Miller 1998). As a term, it has appeared, therefore, to gain the status of 
dialectic. In line with this, Donnison (1991:174) has suggested that: 
'The more important occasions on which people propose new public policies 
are not llke the invention of a better machine....They are more like the 
émergence of a new school of art or drama which educates people to see the 
world differently..: 
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Parînerships had existed for many years within the UK context (Glendinning 
et al 2002; Miller 1998; Tyler 1988) although others such as MacGregor have 
suggested that they owed their résurgence and dominance as a policy form to 
the US: 
'The current fashionable partnership proposais owe their origin to American 
conceptuaiisations of social policy..: (MacGregor 1998:187) 
Additionally others have asserted that partnership has wider links to Europe 
and that it was indeed a 'Worldwide' phenomenon, as Miller asserted: 
'..the requirement to work in partnership across professional, organisational 
and sectoral boundaries ... dominâtes the agenda throughout the developed 
world'. (Miller 1998:344) 
The conceptuaiisations of partnership usually hold within themselves a sensé 
of organisations working together to solve social ills. They are, therefore, 
usually linked to complex social problems, such as drug misuse or urban 
régénération and attempt to apply 'policy interventions that are dynamic, have 
a high level of complexity and are able to embrace a diversity in stakeholders, 
geography and organisation' (Sullivan et al 2002:206). \ " h e policy of 
partnership has often exhorted the public and private sectors in particular to 
engage in working together and has also often sought to include communities 
and the not-for-profit sector (for example the Single Regeneration Budget; 
Miller 1998). In this way policy development appeared to embrace regime 
theory explanations for social policy behaviour within localities (Miller 1998; 
Stoker 1998). However, there has often been little significant involvement of 
the business sector, in particular in the partnership structures created during 
this period and very little involvement in DATs beyond token gestures. 
Additionally the rôle of the not-for-profit sector and communities has often 
been nominal (Sullivan 2002; Miller 1998; Wong 1998). Thus, it may be that 
the parînerships which have emerged have, in fact, had more in common with 
traditional British approaches to social policy (Sullivan 2002; Wong 1998) and 
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in earlier attempts to deal with drug misuse issues such as the District Drug 
Advisory Committees (DDACs; Tyler 1988). 
Partnership as a policy response is portrayed as one which makes sense in a 
world which is '...diverse and complex, in which power is diffused and 
governance can be achieved only by building on formal inter-sectorai 
partnershipś (Miller 1998:343). The emphasis on partnership as a new form 
of governance has become increasingly important and Janet Newman (2001) 
has theorised about it, focussing principally on the horizontal policy 
mechanisms, looking up to the vertical. This is helpful as many other analysts 
spend their time looking down from the vertical, in order to discuss the 
horizontal. Her perspective, therefore, provided some balance against the 
principally vertical orientation and was constructive for the thesis which is 
concerned with both the horizontal and vertical forms. Drawing on the work of 
Robert Quinn (1988), she presented a quadrant which can be used 
analytically to conceptualise the flows of power in and between the vertical 
and horizontal policy arenas. This quadrant offered the possibility to visualise 
and deconstruct those relationships. Newman (2001:32) has argued that: 
'The effects of change programmes do not flow directly from the intentions of 
those designing modernisation programmes or specific policy initiatives, but 
from the way competing pressures are resolved on the ground: 
This thesis is designed to explore that possibility and to test that assertion, by 
mapping out the ways in which the new form of governance that is partnership 
is manifested within a specific policy area. In this way it is possible to begin to 
conceptualise and théorise about the new structures and relationships (Powell 
and Exworthy 2002). 
Newman's version of Quinn's 'quadrant' has four 'models' of opération as its' 
constituent parts (2001:97); thèse are a self-governance model, a hierarchy 
model, a rational goal model and an open Systems model. Additionally 
bisecting the quadrant vertically is a dynamie for décentralisation descending 
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towards centralisation and bisecting the quadrant horizontally is a dynamic for 
continuity moving towards innovation: 
1 
T o w a r d s 
décentralisation 
Se l f - szuvernance m o d e l 
Towards 
continu itv 
H i e r a r c h y m o d e l 
O p e n - s v s t e m s m o d e l 
Towards 
Innovation 
R a t i o n a l - s oa l m o d e l 
T o w a r d s cent ra l i sa t i on 
l 
Modernising governance: models of government 
The model proposed, therefore, sought to incorporate a sensé of action and 
change and carry within itself a sensé of policy as a dynamic process which is 
influenced by a number of factors. It offered a complimentary model to 
Levin's (1997) factors which also proffered a mechanism for visualising and 
conceptualising policy as a dynamic process; however Newman's (2001) 
focus on horizontal policy structures and their relationship to the centre 
provided a balance against the tendency to see policy solely from the 
perspective of central government. 
Partnership as governance - a new institutional form? 
Partnership, networks and 'joined up' government are inter-linked concepts 
which are highly pertinent to the period under considération and to this thesis. 
The period is important because it is a time when many working within the 
public (and to some extent the private) sector at central and local level are 
enjoined to participate in the new mechanisms of shared working, or 
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partnerships (Wilkinson and Craig 2002). Partnership is important because 
the particular partnership mechanisms used for the implementation of drug 
policy, DATs, are one of the two main points of enquiry in this research. 
MacGregor writing in 1998 about the contemporary trends in drug policy 
highlighted that the '...key elements in this new paradigm are stressing multi-
agency cooperation' (1998:192). There has been significant debate about the 
development of the partnership approach (Wilkinson and Craig 2002; Stoker 
1998; Macgregor 1998; Donnison 1991) but of more particular relevance is 
the concern with how partnerships operate and whether they are new forms of 
governance. 
Within the literature there are different types of analyses which relate to 
partnerships as forms of governance. These can be concerned with how the 
mechanisms of partnerships operate (Davies 2005), or with seeking to 
analyse whether partnership can be seen to have effectively changed the 
'institutions' of local government and thus become a new institutional form in 
itself (Lowdnes 2005). Although these may not sound dissimilar they each 
reflect a different area of concern, as well as taking a different focus either at 
the vertical or horizontal level. The first is concerned with the mechanisms by 
which partnership or networks inter-face with central government and which 
has the most (or least) authority (Davies 2005; Stoker 1998) and the second 
with whether there is an empirically observable change in the way local 
government does business (Lowdnes 2005). This thesis is concerned to an 
extent with both aspects. It is concerned with the vertical axis with regard to 
policy development; with the inter-action between central and local 
government and how this has affected the process of implementation; and 
with whether we have witnessed enough change in local partnerships, such 
that this can be represented as an institutional change. 
Lowdnes (2005) has argued that institutions are now no more than 'the rules 
of the game' (Lowdnes 2005 citing Huntington 1968) and are therefore 'not 
the same as organisations' (Lowdnes 2005:292). In this analysis partnership 
styles of working can be represented as new institutional forms because they 
incorporate 'consciously designed and clearly specified rules for behaviour 
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and engagement, such as a structure and performance plans or agreements. 
Within this definition DATs clearly become new institutions. Additionally the 
rules might also include particular 'patterns of behaviour1 which might be 
portrayed as positive or negative. Within the new partnership structures 
changing patterns of behaviour may become acceptable - thus being open to 
sharing organisational knowledge and resources may within the new 
partnership structures become a positive form of behaviour, whereas formerly 
it may have seemed disloyal to ones' originating organisation. This research 
focuses on some of these normative behaviours and how partnership 
structures can change expected or acceptable behaviours (Miller 1998:346 
and 353). 
It can be considered that the willingness of local authorities (and localities in 
general, it might be argued) to 'experiment and learri is the premise upon 
which partnership forms are built (Stoker 1998). Other writers suggested that 
the changes wrought from this willingness '...matter by setting the parameters 
for action and establishing the rules of the game, by shaping group identities, 
goals and choices and by enhancing the bargaining power of some groups 
while devaluing others' (Duke 2003:12). Further, the new institutional forms 
are sometimes portrayed as having the potential for existing boundaries to 
become blurred; thus actors have to decide what might be in their 
organisational 'best interests' and what might be in the new institutions' (or 
partnerships') best interest. Additionally there may be considerations for how 
those might interact and whether or not there is tension between the aims of 
each (Knoepfel et al 1998; Miller 1998). Finally, there have been concerns 
that the new partnership forms may be anti-democratic and that the emphasis 
on them has 'downgraded the role of local authorities' (Wilkinson and Craig 
2002). 
The points for potential sources of tension within the new institutional forms 
are discussed further in the empirical Chapter 7. The role of 'conflict' is given 
consideration by Davies (2005:311) who considers it to have been neglected 
in the analysis of partnership and networks; although others have looked at 
this area, for example, Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf considered its effect on 
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partnership and network forms of governance in 1998. Davies suggested that 
conflict is inhérent and a 'constitutive and animating feature of market 
societies' and that because of this it is necessary for governmental (vertical) 
authority to be exercised in order to 'sustain' the new institutional forms. He 
asserted that conflict is the resuit of compétition which leads to 'winners and 
losers' and that this is inherently undermining because some may wish to 
continue to lplay' with the others in the group, whilst others will then seek to 
withdraw. As a resuit, he suggested that the notion of partnership within a 
compétitive organisational or institutional form of service delivery is 
antithetical to consensual forms of governance. Others would suggest, 
however, that partnership does, in fact, offer a consensual form of governance 
(Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998 and 1997). Further, they would suggest that 
partnerships and the quasi-market philosophies of the current public sector 
are not antithetical but that they are resolved in différent ways in response to 
local variations and that partnership styles of working effectively retumed 
power to local authorities who were '...increasingly expected to play a 
stratégie rôle in coordinating différent initiatives' (Wong 1998). 
Davies' (2005) analysis takes the form of considering those whom he defined 
as 'orthodox' scholars concerned with governance and those whom he 
defined as 'sceptical' 1 0. It is his suggestion that the former are inclined to 
highlight the areas of 'choice' (Davies 2005:312). Choice is perhaps best 
evidenced where policy is interpreted to fit local need (MacGregor 1998), or 
some areas of policy enhanced whilst others are conveniently ignored. Those 
portrayed by Davies as 'sceptical', amongst whom he places himself, put an 
emphasis on the increased levels of centralisation and managerialism which 
can be seen to have been created under the former Conservative 
administration and New Labour (also Stoker 1998). This tension between 
choice and conformity, between partnership as a consensual form of 
governance and devolved arm of the central state, is palpably relevant to the 
thesis and as Colebatch (1998:113) has highlighted policy relationships within 
1 0 C h a l l i s et a l c i t ed by P o w e l l and G l e n d i n n i n g (2002 :23 ) a l so appears to use a two d i m e n s i o n a l 
f r amework w h i c h contrasts o rgan isa t iona l o p t i m i s m and pess i rn isrn - the fo rmer sugges t ing a l t r u i s m 
and ra t i ona l i t y and the latter sugges t ing d i ve rgen t interests, c o n f l i c t and compétition. T h e y are not 
therefore u n l i k e the d i s t i n c t i ons d r a w n by D a v i e s . 
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the vertical and horizontal forms can be characterised as both a 'source of 
ambiguity and tension'. Furthermore, they are considered of more gênerai 
relevance for as Wilkinson and Craig (2002) draw out there are 'oniy two 
elected bodies in the country and thaï is national government and local 
authorities,. 
Lowdnes (2005) has developed considérations of the way 'choice' and 
'competing pressures are resolved on the ground (Newman 2001) and has 
argued that relationships between the horizontal and vertical forms are not 
based on a one way flow, but that: 
'Stratégies are shaped by the rules set down from above, the pull of local 
tradition, the economic incentives at stake and the way in which the game is 
regarded within society at large. Top-down and bottom-up instiiutionai 
influences interact in important ways to produce an uneven patterning of 
uniformity and diversity across local government. (Lowdnes 2005:294) 
She has hîghlighted that despite considérable innovation within local 
governance in récent years and under Thatcher and Major (2005:298), much 
has remained remarkably constant (2005:296). Thus there is évidence of 
change and continuity, évidence of central government directive and local 
interprétation (and also on occasions local disregard). For this reason she 
has argued (drawing on Pierson 2003) that 'in relation to institutiona! 
development we should look for long-term causes and long-term outcomes\ 
because otherwise we may misinterpret the significance of a particular 
change, or miss the long-term importance of another. Chapters 6 and 7 of this 
thesis are concerned to explore the empirical évidence regarding the flow of 
information and direction between the horizontal and vertical policy domains 
and the patterning of uniformity and diversity which have been created by 
drug policy and partnership working. As such, it offers the opportunity to 
consider both short-term and long-term effects. It will provide the opportunity 
to consider the relevance and évidence for the differing forms of analysis 
which suggest alternatively that partnership is a relationship based on 
consensus, or one based on central government domination. This will, 
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therefore, once again give the opportunity to consider the importance of 
institutional resilience and the vibrancy of new forms of governance. 
Partnership, déconcentration and performance management 
Partnership structures have become popular at the same time as other forms 
of devolved or localised forms of governance have also been promulgated. 
The debate in this area about the balance between the centre and the 
devolved institutions is outside the scope of this thesis, but it is tangentially 
important because of the création of regionalised forms of governance which 
have impacted on drug policy, such as government office drug teams and the 
regional offices of the NTA. Another term used to characterise thèse 
relationships is 1déconcentration'] it is used to denote apparent movement of 
power away from the centre but the emphasis is really seen to be on the 
maintenance of political power at the centre via delegated forms of 
managerial power (Davies 2005:319). The argument is, therefore, that 
dévolution is not supported by a décentralisation of political power but that 
there may have been a déconcentration of power. This analytical approach 
suggests that 'orthodox' observers may have exaggerated the 'consensual 
premise' of new forms of governance, but that, equally, the sceptics may have 
over-exaggerated the use of vertical forms of power (MacGregor 1998). 
Thus, observers such as Davies are particularly interested in conflict between 
the vertical and horizontal forms and suggest that conflict might arise because 
of a central government wish to performance manage the horizontal network 
forms. He has described this as the: 
'...independent variable in the anaiysis, explaining the interplay between 
hierarchy and network and particularly New Labour's tendency to centralise 
despite a rhetoric of décentralisation: (Davies 2005:321) 
Others, such as Miller (1998:346) suggest alternatively that partnership forms 
may allow local policy actors to conceive of their engagement pragmatically 
as one which is strategically significant and in which they are ail 'winners 
within a socialiy and environmentaiiy conscious framework. Further, 
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Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf (1998:356) argüe that the authority of central 
standardisation might be an important factor for local partnerships which 
enable them to 'bring about certain solutions' and Wilkinson and Craig (2002) 
that evidencing implementation might be useful to locally based partnerships. 
This research seeks to problematise the extent to which any of these 
interpretations are applicable or might be seen to describe the reality for 
partnerships implementing drug policy. Further, it will explore the nature of 
the performance management approach through which central government 
has recently sought to communicate, coordínate and manage the 
implementation of policy within localities, thus deconcentration; and to 
consider whether the performance management approach might simply be 
driven by a government concerned with evidencing stipulated outcomes and 
demonstrating delivery. Thus deconcentration and managerialism might not 
be driven by a desire to impose the will of the centre onto localities, which is 
essentially conflictual, but might arise from a desire to ensure implementation 
(Blunkett 2006). Thus, although the apparent overall impact might be the 
same, the intention is palpably different. 
Sullivan et al (2002:214) have explored the impact of New Labour on the 
social policy agenda and characterise it as composed of four approaches -
partnership, process, problem solving and prevention. They show these four 
approaches to be concerned with the delivery of policy which solves complex 
social problems and seeks to prevent their further or future development and 
which can be evidenced to have worked. Their argument is, therefore, not 
one which can be described as 'sceptical' as it portrays central government 
social policy under New Labour as concerned to break new ground and to 
evidence that they have done this and how effective that has (or has not) 
been, not as concerned to control local government or the new partnership 
forms per se. Sullivan et al (2002:215) have however suggested that the 
'capacita of local policy actors to 'take joint actiorí is sometimes 
'questionablé and thus they cannot be said to be 'orthodox' in their approach 
either, not because they question the willingness to be consensual in 
approach, more the ability or resources to do so effectively. 
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Davies (2005:314) argued that a model of governance 'based on a 
consensual premise in which people 'with diverse experience and capacities' 
can be enticed to 'sign up to a common agenda and deploy resources in a 
positive sum game' maybe somewhat optimistic. However, the apparent 
evidence which is proffered by the mere existence of a plethora of network 
and partnership arrangements across the social policy agenda since 1997 
(Wilkinson and Craig 2002) would suggest that there is, in fact, a willingness 
of organisations and individuals to do so. Thus, perhaps there is a 'normative 
emphasis' which can be placed on consensus within a social policy setting. 
Further, what might be ignored by the sceptical and orthodox approaches, 
which are portrayed within this conflictual analysis, is a consensual will 
towards the common 'good' , or the ability to tap into 'the human yearning for 
larger social purpose (Davies 2005:327 quoting Stone 1993:25). Additionally, 
empirical studies have noted a tendency amongst local policy actors to agree 
with the current orthodoxy (Sullivan et al 2002), to demonstrate a pragmatic 
acceptance and a willingness to display appropriate policy behaviour (Miller 
1998) and to reveal an increasing sophistication, learning 'how to manipulate 
the game rules' (Wong 1998:477). Newman (2001:82) has argued that the: 
'success of Labour's conceptions of 'Modernising Government' is marked by 
the way in which the language of evidence, pragmatism, 'what works', of 
goals, targets and outcomes, of joined-up government and partnership now 
permeates the discourse of ministers and civil servants, managers and 
professionals, journalists and political commentators and pervades the host of 
new policy networks and communities that influence the policy process: 
Thus, it may be possible that partnership as a policy aim has become a 
discourse of 'apple pie and motherhood' and that this dialectic has an internal 
mechanism of its own which, for a period, means that it is commonly 
perceived as a ubiquitously 'good thing' (Wilkinson and Craig 2002). This will 
be explored further within the empirical chapters. 
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Policy community 
Partnership is perceived as a network form of working and Powell and 
Glendinning (2002) have argued that government can currently be viewed as 
preferring network forms of governance to those of hiérarchies and markets. 
They suggest, as a resuit, that partnerships are in fact a 'quasi-network' as 
they do have the requisite 'mutual benefit, trust and réciprocité usually 
associated with a network (Powell et al 2002:16) especially as many are now 
imposed by government or législation. Powell and Glendinning acknowledge, 
however, that many of the words of partnership and network(s) are used inter-
changeably and, thus, it can be difficult to be clear what is intended or 
understood by the use of the terms. Partnerships are palpably différent from 
other forms of governance however and have sought to be inclusive and thus 
the term quasi-network is considered a useful analytical distinction which has 
been adopted as a working model for the thesis and which will be further 
explored in the empirical chapters. 
However, 'network' or 'policy network' is also used as a form of policy analysis 
in itself and it is important that this distinction is understood. It is a current 
perspective often used with regard to policy analysis and might also be 
referred to as a study of a policy community (Duke 2003 and Knoepfel and 
Kissling-Naf 1998). Many analyses from this perspective consider the extent 
to which ail potential organisational and individual players are involved in the 
development of policy in a given area and whether that might be an important 
factor in the power which they or their organisation subsequently corne to 
demonstrate within that network setting. It is suggested that policy is the sum 
of the organisations and the individuals who play a part in shaping it (Knoepfel 
and Kissling-Naf 1998:355), or, as Duke (2003:13) has argued, that policy 
may arise not as a resuit of 'unified interests, but may be 'the outcome of 
conflict between state agencies'. Blunkett's memoirs (2006) would support 
this, suggesting that policy can be heavily fought over by varying state 
institutions and departments. Mowlam (2002) would suggest, however, that a 
considérable amount of activity also goes into building and gaining consensus 
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for policy actions and demonstrated how these can be reliant on the use of 
policy networks. 
Policy communities or networks will be briefly considered in later chapters as 
important to the arena of drug policy which has been consistently portrayed as 
one which is defined by the penal and medical tensions which permeate, 
decide and divide it (Berridge 2006; Duke 2003; MacGregor 1998; Stimson 
1987), although they are not the principal focus of the thesis. The 
development of drug policy has been intrinsically linked to which might, or 
might not, have been the dominant discourse at any one time; further it is 
related to who may or may not have been influential on the development or 
(although less often considered) implementation of policy agendas across this 
period. Thus, not just whose 'bargaining power* may have been enhanced or 
'devalued' but who was present and a part of a policy community or 
alternatively, who was not. Wallis and Dollery (1997) developed this 
argument by suggesting that there were in fact 'Autonomous Policy Leaders' 
whose commitment to bring about change in a given area meant that they 
waited for their opportunities to advance their cause and, when the 
opportunity came, seized it and worked within an advocacy network, thus 
maximising the resources available to be re-directed towards their given goal. 
The analysis of networks has been applied to policy implementation, although 
with less frequency than for policy development (Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf 
1998). Partnerships can be seen to be important within this context because 
DATs sought to bring new organisations to the policy table with regard to 
implementation of the drug policy strategies. As such they were the 
embodiment of networked forms, but palpably different from a policy network 
which may be self-constituting. Nonetheless they may have impacted on 
policy development in the same way that policy networks do; thus 
partnerships (DATs) may arguably have changed the balance of drug policy in 
favour of penal and managerial approaches because criminal justice 
orientated organisations were allowed a greater level of influence (Duke 
2003). Further those organisations who were concerned to use these 
structures to further their own organisational aims may have gained an 
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opportunity to do so (Berridge 2006; Sabatier 1998; Wong 1998; Hughes 
1997) or to influence drug policy in line with those aims. Those who appeared 
to take a back seat at this time may have lost control of the agenda. This is 
drawn out by Lowdnes (2005:291) who has suggested that: 
'Institutional entrepreneurs exploit ambiguities in the 'rules of the game' in 
order to respond to changing environments and to protect (or further) their 
own interests'. 
Lowdnes' (2005) example of 'institutional entrepreneurs' is not dissimilar from 
Wallis and Dollery's (1997) 'Autonomous Policy Leaders' and both draw out 
the importance or impact of some individuals and their particular agendas on 
policy development and implementation. It is suggested that this is 
particularly the case through the use of networked or partnership forms, which 
allow for some changes to, or manipulation of the 'rules of the game'. Thus, it 
may be that a policy Community may corne together or exist for a reasonably 
short period, drawn in by the policy imperative or agenda which they share 
and to which they work for a common aim. This may include a diversity of 
aims, such as the advancement of their own organisational aims within the 
broader remit of the partnership agenda. 
Conclusions 
Drug policy has been affected by the debates about community and social 
capital in a number of ways. Drug users have been portrayed as undermining 
communities, leading to a décline in social capital and as increasing negative 
expériences such as crime, litter, negative représentations of an area and 
unemployment. Drug policy was moreover congruent and adaptable to these 
policy ideas because it was based on a concept of partnership and espoused 
a 'joined-up' ethos. As a social policy it was highly adaptable to the New 
Labour ideological perspective which was communitarian influenced. 
Moreover the Chief operating mechanisms of drug policy (that is the joining up 
of government departments with other agencies and the voluntary sector) 
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were exactly the sort which fostered a sense of community and social capital; 
they were designed to engage and empower. Larsen, Taylor-Gooby and 
Kananen (2006:630) have argued that New Labour typically make policy in 
one of two ways -bottom-up1 when they want to engage the prívate or 
voluntan/ sector and as an extensión of 'government authority when dealing 
with service orientated, administrative or cross-departmental forms of policy 
change. This they argüe can also be traced through their other 'dual' 
tendencies which are towards devolution and the strengthening of the 
executive (Larsen et al 2006:633). The response to drug misuse can be seen 
to have employed both aspects which the partnership style of work has made 
permissible and Larsen et al (2006:631) suggest that this is congruent with 
other policy áreas where 'different approaches are used even within the same 
reform'. Additionally, Larsen et al (2006) have contended that the power of 
the intended policy recipient ís also influential, as well as the amount of 
expenditure which is to be directed to the initiative. In the case of drug policy 
the recipients are weak and the funding has increased dramatically; it is 
perhaps no surprise that the performance management functions have also 
greatly increased in this policy área. 
It is the New Labour identification of drug misuse as a community issue which 
is particularly relevant to the importance placed upon drug misuse and drug 
misusers from 1997 - 2004. It explains the approach to drug users as not 
accepting of their social responsibilities and therefore requiring opportunities 
to change and, if not accepting of those, to be compelled to accept them; it 
becomes possible and permissible to do this because, according to this 
analysis, it is morally acceptable to compel them to take treatment because of 
the greater good which can be derived by the community from their becoming 
drug free. This approach has been described as '...contractahan', offering 
conditional access to the mainstream to outsiders..: (Davies 2005:3); such 
access for drug users comes vía a myriad of treatment options, many of which 
are accessed vía the criminal justice system post 1998. However, it may be 
premature to suggest that this means that the penal discourse has become 
dominant, orthat the medical approach has been disregarded. 
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Additionally a drug policy has been pursued which has dichotomous 
mechanisms for implementation; it utilises the mechanisms of partnership 
which were created by TDT (1995) and the language of working together on 
the issue. However it has also sought to strengthen the centre through the 
use of specially created agencies (government offices and the NTA) in order 
to ensure delivery. As we have seen policy implementation is a considerable 
driver for New Labour. This approach is pursued therefore because '...New 
Labour recognises that targets alone cannot secure a successful 
implementation..: (Larsen et al 2006:634). 
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Chapter three - research methods, process and 
analysis 
Introduction 
The focus of this study on the development, implementation and management 
of drug policy between 1994-2004 marks it out from much other research 
within the drugs field, where the focus is most commonly on the user (Duke 
2003), or the impact of treatment approaches. During this period there have 
been considerable changes within the social policy framework surrounding 
drug policy and to the legal system and penalties; these have included 
changed treatment options and the conceptualisatton of how, in what 
circumstances and with what rights drug users might 'choose' treatment, 
There have also been a considerable number of changes to the way in which 
drug policy is managed. This thesis has, therefore, sought to map the 
processes of policy development, implementation and management 1994-
2004 through the use of documentation and the testimony of individuáis who 
played a role within central or local government. The research is qualitative 
and the concern is with 'human action and interactiorí and not on 
"generaiisation and predictiorí, but on 'interpretativa power, meaning and 
illuminatiorí (Usher 1997:5). 
Research aims and questions 
The aim of the thesis is to tell a story; a story of how and why policy making in 
this área was undertaken and how and why certain structures were introduced 
(partnerships) and how and why those structures affected the implementation. 
Additionally, the intention is to be able to say how and why the story was 
shaped and influenced by individuáis, and perhaps by particular discourses; 
furthermore to consider what impact the combination a number of social 
factors may have had on the outcomes and why those particular factors may 
have come together in that way, at that time. According to Elton (1970:170) 
the use of 'how' questions is essentially narrative, whilst 'why' questions are 
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analytic and 'what' questions descriptive. The overall framework is one of 
'storytelling' but within an analytical approach; it goes to the heart of the 
enquiry which asks two key questions: why were partnerships chosen as the 
structures through which to implement drug policy? How did this 
subsequently affect implementation? 
Overall the research was driven by a number of questions. These were: 
1. How was drug policy developed? 
2. Why were partnerships chosen as the mechanism of policy 
implementation and what was the impact? 
3. How have relationships between the centre and localities worked with 
regard to policy development and implementation? 
4. Have partnerships become a new form of governance? 
5. Have partnership structures changed anything or has institutional 
resilience been demonstrated? 
A 'narrative' approach 
The story of partnerships is one which it might be argued is specific to the 
political, social and structural conditions which were in operation at a given 
time - namely 1994-2004 (Hughes and Sharrock 1990; Elton 1970). The 
methods which have been used for this research have therefore been ones 
which allow a story to emerge, which ask participants about the causes of 
events with which they were engaged, examine the documentary evidence 
which exists and seek to place the resultant 'stories' within their social context 
and from this draw conclusions about why these factors may have combined 
in this way to this effect - ...their meaningful relationship: (Elton 1990:112) It 
is about working 'backward so that one must first know the 'effect, before one 
can examine the 'cause (Elton 1990:135). 
The timeframe, 1994-2004, has been drawn to incorporate the development 
of each of the drug strategies and to allow some consideration of the 
implementation of each element. In so doing it is recognised that: 
77 
'However carefully designed, periods are artificial devices, usefui of course, 
and iegitimate as devices, but still quite unreal. ' (Elton 1990:162) 
The principal original sources of data are two sets of interviews; those with 
key players at a central government level who were instrumental in devising 
the first drug strategy, Tackling Drugs Together (TDT: 1995) and who 
essentially comprised an 'élite' group of interviewées. Additionally, interviews 
were undertaken with those who had worked in the implementation of drug 
policy (principally at a local level for a number of years). Thus, most had been 
involved in the implementation of TDT (1995), Tackling Drugs to Build a Better 
Britain (TDTBB: 1998) and the Updated Strategy. 
There are two strands of investigation; one concerned with policy 
development and the other concerned with policy implementation. It has been 
equally important to pursue both areas of enquiry and to ensure that each has 
been sufficiently considered and given equal prîority. The importance of this 
was to be confident that not only policy génération and development was 
understood, but that also the structures and mechanisms by which 
implementation is sought or achieved for social policies were fully considered 
in this area of drug policy. This was essential to avoid what Clarke (1996:31) 
has characterised as the idealism of some researchers and writers 
(particulariy those from a Foucauldian perspective) who he has argued, 
translate an 'attempi to achievë, as a fact of achievement. Thus an 
assumption might be made that because government makes social policy it is 
executed, or is implemented as devised. Clarke suggested that such an 
assumption was a mistake (also Darke, undated). Others such as Hughes 
(1997) have also criticised the 'grand théories' of Marxism and Foucauldian 
discourse analysis, 
...whereby the answers to the question are already known without recourse 
to empirical testing.' (Hughes 1997:158) 
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This research study sought to avoid such mistakes and to allow for the 
investigation of mechanisms of policy design and implementation and the 
interface between them, in order to allow for a deeper understanding of how 
those might operate. The research strategy was influenced therefore by 
writers who argued against taking 'organisational change' at its 'face value' 
(Clarke 1996). With regard to the changes he described in the welfare state 
and the surrounding and supporting structures, Clarke argued that: -
'It is important for the analysis of social policy to avoid treating such changes 
as though they were simply new technical solutions to the problems of 
organising social welfare provision. If they are detached from the analysis of 
the state and state power, whether as sectors or quasi markets, it becomes 
increasingly hard to make sense of the relationship between forms of 'service 
delivery' and the 'social' character and consequences of social policy.' (Clarke 
1996) 
This would appear therefore to suggest that it is a legitimate enquiry to 
consider how power is exercised and how the structures put in place to do this 
affect the outcomes. In this sense, Clarke goes to the heart of this enquiry, 
for this study is concerned to pursue why partnership mechanisms seemed, at 
this point in time, an appropriate way of delivering a social policy response to 
drug misuse problems. Thus, seeking to establish whether they were simply 
a straightforward technical solution to a given problem, or whether they were 
considered an appropriate response because of a number of other 'social' 
characteristics important at this period and whether the solutions chosen 
affected the 'service delivery', namely policy implementation. It also 
underlines the importance of 'placing' the policy development and 
implementation in their historical and social context. Furthermore, it allows for 
the consideration and exploration of direct cause and effect mechanisms and 
those which may have been influential or co-existent, but not determining. As 
Elton (1970:140) has argued: 
'Direct causes explain why the event happened; situational causes explain 
why direct causes proved effective..: 
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Using interviews to follow the 'stony' of this period and to explore the 
understanding of participants at that time, and since, was a useful way of 
achieving this. It allowed participants to talk about and reflect on other social 
factors and events as they saw them and to consider direct and situational 
causes. It also enabled the networks of individuals and documents known to 
participants at that time and also involved in the 'story' to be mapped and 
traced. The research has therefore been undertaken in an inductive way, 
looking for patterns and associations derived from observations of the world 
to generate the conclusions (Snape and Spencer 2003:14). It is based solely 
on qualitative methods which will be explored further below. 
Methods 
Literature review 
Denscombe (1998:158) has argued that a literature review serves three 
important purposes; it ensures that the researcher is aware of existing work in 
the area, it allows the identification of key concepts, questions and gaps in 
knowledge and it '...signposts for the reader...where the research is coming 
from.' There was a need therefore for the search to be broad enough to allow 
for a range of understanding and comprehensiveness but for specificity to be 
introduced which allowed for a narrowing down of the literature to that which 
was relevant to the topic and thus able to 'signpost' the direction. The 
literature review undertaken for this study and shown in Chapter 2 followed 
these precepts. 
The inter-disciplinary nature of the study meant that it was essential to 
consider a whole range of scholarship which covered the areas of drug policy, 
partnership and new forms of governance. There are, moreover, a number 
of writers who are increasingly discussing the inter-disciplinary nature of much 
current enquiry. They argue that inter-disciplinary studies exist because 
'problems do not exist independently of their sociocultural, political, economic, 
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or even psychological context...' and thus the need 'for múltiple disciplines 
and múltiple perspectives...' becomes increasingly important..' (Brewer 
1999:32:329) The literatura review therefore drew on work from social policy, 
social sciences (including criminology and drug research), geography, 
management studies, history and politics, because it is suggested that 
'...interdiscipiinarity requires an unusually comprehensive approach: (Brewer 
1999:32:330) 
If, as this thesis suggests, the policy response to substance misuse was, in 
part, an attempt to deal with complexity, it is unsurprising that trying to trace 
and follow the development of that response was not straightforward. The 
task to be achieved was to scope and then refine the subject área so that it 
became a more coherent whole. This presented additional problems which 
were dealt with in a number of ways. The plethora of ¡nformation meant that it 
was essential to focus down and identify themes and subsequently key 
concepts. In so doing, the intention was not to reject alternative or 
contradictory pieces of ¡nformation, for as Hammersley and Gomm (1997:8/9) 
have argued: 
' . . .a / / research necessarily relies on presuppositions, none of which can be 
established beyond aii possible doubt, we can never know for sure that that a 
presupposition is leading us towards the truth: 
The intention was to be 'non-culpable' and it was considered that this was 
achieved through the wide literature review undertaken ¡n order to remain 
open to the different 'stories' or narratives of the period. Nonetheless, it was 
also essential to develop a focus, both methodologically and theoretically. 
This was achieved through the use of a systematic refinement of search 
terms. 
The literature review was conducted in a systematic way using a number of 
single and combined key words in order to identify the range of literature 
available and then in order to narrow and specify it. Search terms included 
partnership; inter-agency; social policy, local government, social welfare, 
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networks, network societies, drug policy, substance misuse, New Labour, 
N P M , management and then through combinations, including: public policy & 
UK & (development / history). The latter identified, for example, three 
documents 1 1 which were ¡mportant in developing a theorisation of factors 
relevant to the functioning of partnership structures - those identified at this 
stage were - history, valúes, policy structure and a network of key players. 
Thus 'concept attainment' (Nievaard 1996) was incorporated into the research 
process through use of the literature and this helped to inform the interview 
schedules drawn up for use with national and particularly local policy actors. 
The role of the work of Levin (1997) and Newman (2001), which was also 
used in this way, is discussed in more detail below in the section dealing with 
the construction of the interview schedules. 
The exploration of the literature led to an understanding of the policy process 
and how this was differentially conceptualised. In addition, it was used to 
inform the research with regard to concepts and theories which other scholars 
were developing about partnership structures as new forms of governance or 
with regard to the critique of this approach; these have been discussed fully in 
the preceding chapter. They were built into the research process in order that 
they could be 'investigated' and 'tested' against the empirical evidence and 
documentan/ sources. 
The review was conducted to incorpórate the aims outlined by Denscombe 
that: 
'The literature review should demónstrate how the research being reported 
relates to previous research and, if possible, how it gives rise to particular 
issues, problems and ideas that the current research addresses.' 
(Denscombe 1998:233) 
" B y W o n g 1998, K n o e p f e l and fíissIing-Naí' 1998 and M i l l c r 1998 
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Documentary sources 
The approach is qualitative seeking 'to capture what people's lives, 
expériences and interactions mean to theni (Maso 1996:33) in terms of their 
involvement in the development and implementation of drug policy 1994-
2004. It has been necessary, however, to contextualise this information and 
be able to explore the adequacy of memories and accounts. This has been 
achieved by undertaking a number of interviews which allow one to compare 
the accounts given, thus allowing the détail of the picture to be built. 
Triangulation has been achieved through the combination of interview data, 
literature review and the use of documentary sources (Gomm 2004; 
Denscombe 1998: Denizen and Lincoln 1998). Ritchie (2003:35) has argued 
that documentary sources are appropriate where l...the history of events or 
expériences has reievance..: This is pertinent as we are concerned with how 
and why particular events occurred and thèse can no longer 'be investigated 
by direct observation or questioninçf as they are in the past. The participants 
in the récent past events can and have been interviewed, but the documents 
which they wrote, influenced or implemented were also examined. 
The examination of documents was undertaken mindful of the pitfalls of that 
process (Denscombe 1998). Elton (1970:84) has cautioned the researcher to 
read carefully and recall that documentary sources '...divide into those of 
discussion, décision, conséquences and reaction and each group has its own 
characteristics: His approach is to enjoin the researcher to approach records 
thoughtfully considering 'why and by whom was this material produced (Elton 
1970:88) and understanding that for example debates and reports which 
émerge from the parliamentary process can differ considerably, thus Royal 
Commissions are différent from select committees. The former he states are 
constructed to 'create a balance of interests', 'proceed by légal methods' and 
take their time; whereas the latter are constructed to 'reflect the balance of 
parties in the House of Commons and may be constructed by crusading 
individuals or pressure groups..:, are not conducted under oath and are 
flexible in their procédures (Elton 1970:89). Further, as he also pointed out, 
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contemporaneous sources can present other issues for they do not contain 
the insight of hindsight. Thus, for example newspaper cuttings might show 
how '...the confident accounts of one day may be thoroughfy demolished on 
another.. .' (Elton 1970:80). Similarly Denscombe (1998:167) urges 
mindfulness in the use of documents, setting four criteria for consideration -
authenticity; credibility; representativeness and meaning. He has suggested 
that these may be applied to all documents being considered (including 
newspaper articles) and, thus, can provide both a useful 'checklist' and a 
standard of consistency. 
The documentary sources included in this thesis are official government 
records, such as the drug policies themselves and contemporaneous records 
of House of Commons debates (Hansard); other policy documents which 
referred to criminal justice, drugs or partnerships; reports of the select 
committee and ACMD; independent reports, contemporaneous records such 
as journal articles and newspaper cuttings; the diaries and memoirs of key 
political actors of this time and finally the use of other documents (such as the 
annual records of DATs) where they were available. The documentary 
sources were used to verify, support or question issues raised by the 
interviewees. They were read carefully and thoroughly with mindfulness of 
the very different reasons for which they were written and the content was 
considered according to the purpose of the document (Elton 1970; 
Denscombe 1998). Thus, documents which were produced (in part or 
completely) for political or rhetorical effect (for example the strategies 
themselves) were analysed according to the language used and whether they 
reflected some of the key concepts considered relevant to the development 
and direction of drug policy during this period and outlined in chapter two. 
Documents which were records of debate, such as Hansard, were looked at 
with regard to the debates taking place, their frequency, the names of the 
speakers (in order to 'map' participants), their affiliation and the content of 
their language (again with regard to the key concepts) as well as for content. 
Other documents were also considered in this way, but the pattern of how 
ideas developed and were built up also formed part of the framework, thus 
taking into consideration how ideas such as partnership developed over time 
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from 'Across the Divide' (according to participants a séminal text; Howard et al 
1994) to TDT (1995) for example. 
The use of documentary sources was, therefore, pertinent because it allowed 
for the establishment of some chronological certainty about events 1 2 and 
provided the évidence of the actual policy décisions which were made, the 
language in which they were expressed and the way others responded to 
them; in this way they provided a background reality to the events and 
changes which respondents described. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Nievaard (1996:44) has suggested that: 
7f the qualitative interview is to be an adéquate method of discovering and 
understanding the meanings the informant attaches to the world around him, it 
is crucial that the interviewer ailows the informant to tell his own story.' 
Because the research was concerned with the telling of a story, albeit a story 
about social policy development and implementation, the interview schedules 
had to be constructed to allow participants to do this; thus to be able to tell 
their story about this period of social policy making and latterly about social 
policy implementation. Additionally the research was framed to take account 
of the potential importance of time and sought to make that explicit. 1 3 
Both questionnaire formats were devised after considérable literature review 
and reading around the issue of partnership policy, theorisation, research and 
practice. This 'concept attainment' is considered by some social researchers 
to be the \..most important mental process..: of the researcher (Nievaard 
1996:51). And Nievaard (1996) has suggested that the value lies in the 
development of lsensitising concepts' because: 
1 2 A l l h o u g h E l l o n (197:94 ) a lso adv ises cau t i on hère, Ibr c x a m p l e in i t ia t i ves may be announced w h i c h 
are subsequen t l y c a n c e l l c d . 
u T h e s em i - s t ruc tu r ed quest ionna i re format is s h o w n in A p p e n d i x A 
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.. they have a dual function. Firstly they are insight generating because they 
make one sensitive to the (theoretical) questions surrounding the field of 
research under considération. Secondly, by applying thèse concepts, the 
researcher can begin to form an image of his study object..: (Nievaard 
1996:52). 
The process of how the questionnaires were formulated and informed by the 
literaturę review and by thinking around research methods, will be explored 
using as an example, the semi-structured schedule devised for the interviews 
with the key national players. The process for devising and refining the 
schedule for local implementers was based on the same methodology. 
Semi-structured questionnaire design - national interviewées 
As a resuit of considération of other literaturę and what was known about drug 
policy formation during this period, the décision was made to adopt a structure 
which allowed for the pursuit of the story of DATs as partnership mechanisms 
for the delivery of drug policy. Furthermore, although a questionnaire 
schedule was designed and piloted, the intention was to be able to use the 
schedule consistently, but flexibly, allowing respondents to engage in recall 
and cite events which they considered important and thus take part in a 
dialogue about this period. The intention and reality was not to pursue a 
question and answer style of interview; the intention was to engage the 
attention and memory of respondents in order to aid recall and story telling. 
Nievaard (1996) has suggested a 'four-step model for the qualitative interview 
and this requires the use of literaturę review, the development of an 
'instrumentarium' (schedule ortopic guide), exploratory or piloted interviewing 
and more directed interviewing. This four-step model is a useful way of 
understanding the process which was used in the development of the semi-
structured interview schedule used for this study and to visualise the process 
by which it was informed and re-formulated as interviews were undertaken. 
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From the beginning, it was important to acknowledge my own prior knowledge 
and 'authority' in this area and to recognise how this might lbias' the 
research 1 4 . The intention was not to 'prove' a previously held theory, or my 
own intuitive response to the policy situation; rather the intention was to 
pursue and investigate the story ot policy design and Implementation in the 
drugs field. It was therefore necessary to devise a methodology and methods 
which allowed that to occur. Respondents may have begun to 'remember' the 
past in a 'habituai' way and, thus, it was important to ask respondents 
questions which might 'jog' them into thinking or remembering differently. This 
was attempted via questions such as, 'What has surprised you?' It also 
included attempting to lbe a good questioner1, as well as 'a good iistenef; thus 
ensuring that not only verbal eues and responses were noted, but also 'other 
non-verbal indicators such as the manner in which the informant may try to 
make an impression or his avoidance of a particular topić (Nievaard 1996:57). 
This process was also built in through a reflexive approach to the research 
process and this is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
However, the ability to allow respondents to think outside of a simple 
response mechanism and to reflect and re-focus on their own perspectives 
and expériences within the social policy drugs field was an integral and 
knowing feature with regard to schedule design. The ability to do this was 
enhanced by grounding the questionnaire in the literaturę concerning policy 
development and implementation and by reviewing its effectiveness as the 
research process unfolded, building in an ability to respond to and tailor 
questions with later respondents such that any emerging théories might be 
'tested'. Furthermore, the use of interviews was both an appropriate method 
and one which was essential to the reflexive and grounded methodological 
approach taken: 
I had w o r k e d as a D A T coo rd ina to r 1995-1997 . I then w o r k e d as a f ree lance consu l tan t i n the d rug 
p o l i c y i l e l d and l'or D r u g S c o p c d u r i n g 1998. In 1999 I becante a S e n i o r L e c t u r c r in C r i n i i n a l Just i ce 
w i t h substance m isuse as m y spec ia l i s t area and s ince 2 0 0 2 have been w h o l l y engaged in research in 
the s o c i a l p o l i c y and c r i m i n a l jus t i ce He ids . 
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'Face to face interviews offer the possibility of modifying one's line of enquiry, 
following up interesting responses and investigating underlying motives...' 
(Robins 1995:229) 
Thus, the schedule was developed in order to engage the respondents in 
telling a 'story' about social policy using their own meaning and logic. It was 
framed so that they would tell a 'story' specifically about drug policy design 
and implementation and to this end it was broken into three sections: 
1/ The development of the idea of partnership. This sought to explore the 
meaning and conception of the word to the interviewée. It attempted to do 
this within the historical, social and structural context. It also sought to draw 
out the interviewées' awareness of any key documents from that era. This 
was in order both to identify key policy documents and to flush out those 
whose significance might, in retrospect, have been overlooked. It also meant 
that it was possible to draw out whether documents which might more 
generally be considered to be important or séminal, were named by key 
participants and interviewées. 
Satisfactorily, the schedule has worked as intended in this regard and 
additionally allowed the identification of both sorts of documents. 'Across the 
Divide' (Howard et al 1994), a noted paper, was named by the majority of 
interviewées; however, it can be portrayed by some as a séminal or original 
document and by others as a reflection of thinking that was présent and which 
it drew upon and drew out: 
lAcross the Divide was very influential - it was the first thing I read 
(Respondent A) 
Interestingly another paper was referred to by three interviewées which had 
not been previously noted. It has, however, been possible to subsequently 
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identify this paper and to source it in other documents. 1 5 This document 
predated 'Across the Divide' and appeared to have introduced some of the 
concepts which it developed. This section allowed for the exploration of how 
the process of developing drug policy worked, who was involved and, in 
particular, how partnership came to be a key feature. 
21 Were DATs viewed as a success? The second part of the semi-structured 
questionnaire sought to draw this out and thus identify what participants made 
of early policy implementation. The intention was to pursue which issues 
emerged as important to implementation at this stage from the perspective of 
the centre, in comparison to those which were investigated and articulated by 
local policy actors at the next round of interviews. This section was, therefore, 
concerned with some theory testing of Levin's (1997) factors concerning 
policy implementation. It allowed for a considération of how the process was 
seen to be affected (or not) by the partnership mechanisms and for an 
exploration of how communication between the centre and localities worked. 
It also developed the thème of time spécifie components and the views and 
meanings attached to words and structures at a given period; it thus 
continued and developed the concept of time and place - a historical 
dimension (Elton 1970). The question of time was considered through 
questions such as; 
'What was your first reaction to the idea of DATs?' 
And 
'Have they achieved what you expected?' 
If DATs are seen and understood as a historical response to given social 
conditions, then it is important that the questions are able to draw that out and 
not leave such considérations to be inferred. Because of the wish to provide, 
in part, a narrative explanation it was crucial to allow the interviewées to tell a 
l 5 B a k e r & R u n n i c l e s (1991 ) C o o r d i n a t i n g D r u g s S e r v i c e s : ihe rôle o f régional and d is t r i c t d rugs 
a d v i s o r y commi t t e e s . L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t D r u g s F o r u m & L o n d o n Res ea r ch Cen t r e . T h i s paper was 
re ferred to by three interviewées and also featured as an ar t i c l e in D r u g l i n k Sep tember/Oc tobe r 1991. 
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story; a story of the policy process, development and implementation of DATs. 
In this regard it is also important to allow the interviewee(s) to suggest that a 
historical timeframe is not important in this instance: thus that DATs and /or 
this method of engagement with social issues have always been and will 
always be tackled in this type of way. 
3/ Did DATs influence or affect other areas of policy? The third and last 
section dealt with whether DATs were used as an example of structured 
partnership working and how 'knowingly' that experience was drawn upon or 
used; also, whether those networks extended across the social policy field. 
The intention was to explore whether partnerships were seen as a new form 
of governance, or whether interviewees considered policy structures 
essentially unchanged. This section provoked an interested response from the 
interviewees and was useful in allowing knowledge networks to be mapped, 
and helped in the consideration of whether or not, a 'continuous policy 
dialogue' (Knoepfel & Kissling-Naf 1998:344) had existed. 
The interviews therefore allowed for an understanding and exploration of: 
'The extent to which responses to interview...questions reflect or represent 
daily actions of a collectivity..: (Mischler 1986:24 Drawing on the work of 
Cicourel 1982) 
The interview process 
Interviewing is, of necessity, an interactive process between researcher / 
interviewer and researched / subject. Semi-structured interviews of the type 
which underpin this enquiry are, moreover, most frequently conducted on a 
face to face basis, as many of these were. The nature of this enquiry meant 
that there was just one interviewer so some parts of the 'interviewer effect' 
remained consistent throughout the interviews. This was important for 
consistency and provided the balancing factor against which it was possible to 
pursue a grounded and reflexive strategy. 
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The rôle I had played professional^ prior to this enquiry meant that at the 
initial stage most of the interview subjects (national respondents) were 
individuals with whom I had had prior professional contact 1 6. This may have 
been no more than a brief meeting, or short focussed contact, however it is 
possible that this prior contact may have had an impact. This might, 
therefore, be considered as having influenced my ability to gain access to 
important policy makers. 
As others have suggested in the interviewing process there may also be an 
interaction of person to person. Gender, race and other personal 
characteristics can affect this. When interviewing 'élites' for example senior 
civil servants and chief executives of voluntary organisations it can be hard to 
gain access (Duke 2003) and access may be dépendent upon the social 
relationships and / or perceptions of status and power of the interviewer or 
their connections. Düring the research interviewing process I was a university 
lecturer and used this as both a measure of status and as a descriptor of 
professionalism and objectivity. It cannot be said definitively whether this 
aided or detracted from my ability to gain access, as I did not ask interviewées 
that question. Many of them did comment on my current rôle and status. 
Some asked questions about it and appeared to show a level of concern that 
they might not be 'clever' enough, or be able to help me enough or to have 
reflected in a sufficiently 'académie' way to be of use to me. Given the status 
of most of the initial research subjects as senior (and, in some cases, rapidly 
rising) civil servants and senior members and chief executives of voluntary 
organisations this was of some surprise. 
The ability to remove ail 'interviewer effect' is perhaps both impossible and 
unwarranted: 
\,.ihe quest for équivalence of interviews in terms of interviewer-respondent 
interaction is misdirected and bound to fait'. (Mischler 1986 quoted by 
Smaling, A. 1996:19) 
l f l T h i s was not truc o f the loca l p o l i c y imp l emen te r s o f w h o m I. k n e w two and two were ' n a i n e s ' I 
k n e w . 
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Further Smaling (1996:19 and 20) has suggested that it may 'threaten the 
validiiy of the responses\ because the impact may be to depersonalise, 
decontextualise and potentially disempower. 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken in a face to face context with all 
but one of the national respondents. In all instances thèse took place in the 
interviewee's office. The interview usually lasted about an hour, although two 
were longer. All of the interviewées gave their attention to the process and 
there were no interruptions from others during the interviews. Of the second 
round of respondents, drawn with regard to implementation issues, 
approximately half were interviewed in person and half over the téléphone. 
Some of the face to face interviews took place at their place of work, but 
interview situations also included a café. Of the téléphone interviews all but 
one of the interviewées was at their place of work when interviewed; one was 
at home. The policy implementers appeared to be more time pressured than 
the national interviewées (who were more senior) and thus one interview was 
compressed because of these constraints and other interviewées made it 
clear that their time was valuable and could not be 'wasted' - this usually 
occurred in the conversation preceding the interview; none of the interviews 
were interrupted or disrupted however. The local policy implementers' 
interviews were shorter on the whole, usually lasting between forty-five 
minutes and an hour (although three were considerably longer and one 
shorter at half an hour). 
The semi-structured interviews were all recorded. Some were recorded 
manually and some were taped. The deciding factor was usually the 
agreement of the interviewée to be tape recorded or not. 1 7 On all interview 
occasions a detailed reflection was written as near as possible to the interview 
having occurred. In most instances this was undertaken immediately 
afterwards in a nearby café. These reflections have proved invaluable in 
looking back on the interview data and are particularly helpful in reflecting the 
O n onc o c c a s i o n the tape mach ine w o u l d not w o r k . 
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atmosphère of the interview and the feelings which were engendered at the 
time. 
From the first interview a lot of attention was given to the manual recording of 
responses, even where taping was also undertaken; this was particularly 
important for a number of reasons. Chief amongst them was my own 
professional background as 1 had previously worked for some eight years as a 
probation officer. Düring that time I undertook a large number of interviews in 
ail of which I manually recorded the respondents' answers; and old habits 
undoubtedly die hard. I found that in order for the research interview process 
to evolve as an unforced dialogue in which I could respond to their answers, 
but stay within the framework I had set, my ability to listen and write was 
invaluable and a well honed skill. It allowed me to reflect on their answers as 
we were progressing and meant that I was able to return to responses which 
had inîerested me. One interview subject, in fact, asked me to show him 
where it was in the interview that he had made a particular statement to which 
I had later alluded; it was important to us both that the hand-written notes 
provided a clear and contemporaneous record of the conversation. 
Further, manual recording was also important in providing distance between 
me and the interviewée. It was important for me not to sit in face to face, eye 
to eye contact with the interviewée. I found it aided my concentration, but 
also allowed the research subject some distance in which to remember and 
recall without my nodding and responding to their every answer. They could 
talk, I could record and then I could respond. It was a dialogue which allowed 
distance and reflection and was important for me and to the interviewées I 
would suggest. 
Finally, it has meant that there is consistency between the recording of each 
interview. Some are taped and transcribed, others exist as purely handwritten 
documentary records, or as a handwritten documentary record supported by a 
tape. As a research exercise the différent forms have been compared, to 
identify what might have been lost through the manual recording process and 
to ensure that any subséquent analysis is fair and accurate. What the 
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analysis of the two interview recording types showed was that the manual 
recording was highly accurate, fully reflecting respondents actual words and 
phrases; what was lost was usually joining sentences, 'asides' and 'ums' and 
'aahs'. 
The interviews have been approached from the perspective of a listener to a 
story which it is hoped the respondent will tell about drug policy design or 
implementation. In the telling of the story it is anticipated that the respondent 
will describe the meaning which they attach, for example to concepts such as 
partnership. Thus, how did they first recall hearing of it, in what sort of 
context, what did they think that it meant now? Maso and Wester (1996) have 
suggested that: 
'... the interview is a dialogue between interviewer and respondent, 
deiiberately structured by the researcher in such a way that respondent 
meanings and the meanings sought both are articulated: (Maso and Wester 
1996:12) 
Further, the intention is that the respondents have felt enabled to discuss the 
meanings they attached to their own and others' actions and that in some 
sensé therefore there is an 'integrity' to that discussion. Maso and Wester 
(1996:11) suggest that this is more likely to be possible when '...the 
interviewer gives them the idea that they can give freefy of their opinion 
without any 'négative conséquences'..:. For this reason it was also essential 
that respondents trusted that they would not be subsequently identifiable; with 
regard to the national respondents this was particularly important as they 
were such a smali and potentially identifiable group. This was, therefore, a 
key research concern and affected the respondents' agreement to be 
interviewed for example, or whether or not they would agree to be taped. 
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the local respondents were much less likely 
to be happy to be tape recorded than national respondents. 
It was also important for me, the interviewer, to be interested in the story to be 
told, for if: 
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'...me interviewer créâtes an interview situation in which respondents get the 
feeling that the interviewer is very interested in their story and takes it very 
seriousty, this will usualiy resuit in a greater belief in their own story..: (Maso, 
and Wester 1996:8) 
Smaling (1996:23) has suggested that this process can be deepened with a 
'dialogicai openness which requires (the interviewer) show a certain degree of 
open-mindness and open-heartedness'; certainly the research interviews 
were pursued with an intention of both. 
Because ail respondents were required to tell a story about drug policy 
development or implementation, it was crucial that they had played a rôle in 
one or both of those activities. The interview was, therefore, structured to 
draw out their expériences and included a séries of prompts which, it was 
intended, would 'structure the interview process by stimulating the informant 
to explore more deepty (Nievaard 1996:45) the issues under discussion. It 
was important also to ensure however that in so doing '...assumptions with 
the deceptive quality of familiarité (Nievaard 1996:47) were not made by 
either the respondent or interviewer which were not made explicit or fully 
understood. 
AH respondents were asked to identify others (usualiy peers) that they 
considered had been important to drug policy development or implementation. 
This 'snowballing' technique allowed for the identification of additional 
respondents, but also allowed for the considération of policy communities, or 
network formations and meant that the research was: 
'... organised in such a way that différent respondents who ha ve had the same 
kind of expérience tell the researcher about it independently of each other 
(and that) by comparing thèse stories and asking the respondents to clarify 
différences that émerge, an adéquate picture...can usualiy be obtained: 
(Maso and Wester 1996:8) 
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The interviews were therefore undertaken to ensure adéquate coverage of the 
necessary or représentative groups involved and thus to ensure that 'an 
adéquate picture1 of social policy development and implementation had been 
obtained. 
Initial contact with interviewées 
Initially, ail national interviewées were contacted by letter1 8 which said that I 
would call within the fotlowing week to arrange an interview with them if they 
were Willing. The purposes of the research, the anonymity of respondents 
and my professional status were all explained. When I called I usually 
(although not always) found that the interview was set-up by administrative or 
secretarial staff who anticipated my call. A similar process was pursued with 
local respondents although the letter was replaced with an email. Some 
respondents replied by email (or in one case the secretary on their behalf); 
others awaited my call. 
Most national and local interviewées wished to have some discussion about 
the interview and the research prior to the interview taking place and I had 
therefore spoken to most of them before meeting them; an overwhelming 
concern was the anonymity and the 'trustworthiness' of the process. 
Sample 
The sample included eight interviewées who were involved in the 
development of the first drug policy TDT (1995). F ive 1 9 were senior civil 
servants, one worked for a 'Quango' and two for voluntary organisations. 
With regard to the national interviews ail key national players were identified. 
Two others were also identified one of whom was seen to have played a 
significant rôle at the TDT (1995) stage and one a peripheral or disputed rôle 
at that stage, but to have been important at a later stage; neither of thèse 
See a p p e n d i x 
1 9 Th r ee were in différent and c o n s i d e r a b l y more sen ior posts lhan w h e n they had been enguged in 
T D T . 
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have been able to be interviewée!. One was a politician and some 
interviewées expressed the view that however crucial a politician's rôle might 
be at some stages in the policy process 'their memories are short and that 
they might not speak freely. I did write to this policy actor and mentioned that 
others had recommended I speak to him, no reply was ever fortheoming 
however and he has no published memoirs. The other respondent was not 
named by any other respondents as playing any significant rôle at the initial 
TDT (1995) developmental stage, which was in fact the key requirement, he 
did however play a rôle at a later stage of policy development but his 
autobiography has provided considérable testimony about that time. 
There were relatively few respondents who played a rôle in the development 
of TDT (1995) (according to respondents' testimony no more than six, of 
whom five have been interviewed) and thus the sample is both adéquate and 
comprehensive. Three of the eight interviewées appeared, following 
interview, to have played less crucial rôles; they were proposed by other 
interviewées, however, and that is why interviews were undertaken. Because 
of the small number of people involved in making the TDT (1995) policy it 
might be possible to identify interviewées, therefore ail respondents were 
assured that their identifies would be concealed, although it is accepted that it 
may be possible to work out who participants are because they were 
principally well-known players in this policy arena. 
Interviews were not sought with those responsible for the development of later 
stratégies (although four interviewées had been involved in the development 
of TDTBB: 1998) as the reason for interview was to look at the first stage of 
development of drug policy and in particular to discuss why the partnership 
approach had been chosen, whether that was considered a successful 
strategy and whether it was considered to have influenced subséquent policy 
developments. The next set of interviews - with implementers - was to 
consider implementation of TDT (1995) and how the subséquent policy 
developments shaped implementation and relationships between the centre 
and localities. 
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With regard to local implementation, the twelve interviewees were drawn 
equally from two regional áreas identified to provide some similarity, but also 
geographical difference, and variation in DAT structure. The regions were 
also important because of the move towards a more regionalised performance 
management framework under each subsequent strategy. One área was 
wholly urban with significant drug using populations and DATs based on local 
authority boundaries. The other región had áreas of high density, large 
substance misusing, urban populations, but also included some DATs which 
had rural populations and were county based. The sample size was 
originally flexible, although there was no intention to interview all coordinators 
from those two large regional áreas unless ¡t proved necessary. The sample 
was drawn initially through the identification of a number of coordinators who 
had been in post for some years; this was achieved through the comparison 
of oíd lists of DAT coordinators with current ones. The selection was 
purposeful to ensure that interviewees had experience of policy developments 
which had occurred over a number of years, to enable them to be able to 
reflect upon those changes. The intention was to capture a number of 
features - a sense of change and development, what it was like to implement 
social policy in a fast changing partnership environment over time, what this 
involved and whom. The initial sample was therefore drawn from identified 
long-serving coordinators; it was later expanded to include those identified as 
relevant by other speakers. Thus 'snowballing' techniques were again used 
and all interviewees asked 'who do you think I should speak to further about 
this región / topic?' Especial reference was made to the development of 
knowledge and experience over time. Just two local coordinators who were 
identified (one from each área) were not interviewed. In both cases this was 
because they had just left their posts; one declined to be interviewed on this 
basis and one could not be traced. 
The interviewees also carne to include those working in regional policy 
positions for the NTA and Government Office as a result of respondents' 
testimony regarding their role in policy implementation and their importance to 
the functioning of the local partnerships and vis a vis relationships with the 
centre. No additional interviews were undertaken once respondents began 
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consistently to tell similar stories; it was felt at this stage that 'saturation' 
(Ritchie et al 2003) had taken place and there were no further 'unexplained' 
áreas to pursue. As Maso (1996:34) asserted: 
.. qualitative researchers have no need for a iarge random sample...they are 
not concerned with the quantity but the quaiity of a phenomenon: 
Ethics 
The ethical issues and dilemmas in social research were approached from a 
position of expem'se which included the management of issues of consent and 
confidentiality. The research was driven by a view that maintaining high 
ethical standards went hand in hand with assuring the quaiity of social 
research, and thus such considerations were central to this study. The Social 
Research Association's (SRA) ethical guidelines (December 2003) and those 
of the University were adhered to 2 0 . Issues of data protection, access, 
informed consent and confidentiality were important and given full 
consideration. 
Prior to the interview participants were informed of the purposes of the 
research (both verbally and in written format). It was explained that the 
content of the interview would be confidential at all times and would not be 
discussed with anyone else. Interviewees were cautioned, however, that (in 
particular with regard to the national interviews) whilst participants' ñames and 
roles would be disguised it might be impossible for them to remain totally 
anonymous because of the small number of participants in that part of the 
policy making process, although every attention would be given to ensuring 
this. For some participants (especially those operating at a local level) it 
meant that they would only give consent to my manually recording (and not 
tape recording) the interview. Upon agreeing to be interviewed the participant 
was understood to have given informed consent and made aware they could 
withdraw at any stage from the interview. Interview tapes (where appropriate) 
S c c append i x for c o p y o f ethics f o rm 
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were marked with an identifying code and stored in a lockable filing cabinet, 
as were al! transcripts and paper records relating to and recording the 
interviews. 
Analytical framework 
The research sat within the theoretical domain of social policy which provided 
the overarching structure. As we have seen in Chapter 2 the work of Levin 
(1997) was particularly influential and his 'motivational', 'opportunity' and 
'resource' 'factors' (Levin 1997:65) significantly influenced the approach taken 
to the structure of the research process and the construction of the interview 
schedules and thus 'concept attainment' (Nievaard 1996). Levin was also 
instrumental at the final stage of analysis with regard to the conceptualisation 
of the activities of the policy actors interviewed. 
The nature of the enquiry with its focus on central policy development and 
local policy implementation also meant that a framework was required which 
explicitly investigated the vertical and horizontal links and flows of power. The 
work of Newman (2001) was particularly useful and has informed the review 
of documents undertaken and aided the construction of the interview 
schedules with policy implementers. Material relating to central / local policy 
implementation was then conceptualised and used to inform the final stage of 
the analysis. 
A reflexive analytical approach was adopted and this was ongoing throughout 
the research. Layder (1993), in arguing for his wider and more inclusive 
approach to theorising, writes; -
'...issues of power and history, the relation between activity and structure, the 
stratified nature of social life and so on are integral éléments...! have 
endeavoured to stimuiate dialogue between theory and research specialisms 
by insisting on the close relation between gênerai social theory and the 
Substantive theorising which forms an important part of research activity: 
(Layder 1993:199) 
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This sensé of ensuring a 'fit' between research activity, the way the research 
was structured and the necessity for dialogue between those activities and the 
researcher's own thought process and literature review was influential in 
ensuring that sufficient space was allowed between each stage for theory to 
émerge from the research process and not be closed off by it (Maso and 
Wester 1996:13). This has been particularly pertinent for example, between 
the interviews undertaken with the central policy developers and latterly the 
local policy implementers. 
Additionally, it allowed for theory génération during the research process 
which a sufficiently flexible research design meant could be pursued. 
Nievaard (1996:58) has suggested that ' . . .a number of qualitative researchers 
are rather apprehensive about formulating theoretical concepts..:, but is 
persuaded that this '...danger can be avoided if the researcher...élaborâtes in 
various ways upon the central theoretical concepts..: they discover. This he 
continued could be achieved through the modification of the interview topic 
list, which should be, '...continuously modified..: Clearly the danger in so 
doing is that one may sacrifice consistency and a systematic approach. This 
was avoided by the use of the same topic list, thus guaranteeing consistency 
(with for example those responsible for policy development) whilst including a 
prompt which allowed the interviewée to reflect on (or reject) an area which 
others had raised. This included the way, for example, partnership might 
have become a powerful discourse; national interviewées were asked if it 
would have been possible to say that partnership working was not an 
applicable method / structure. 
As well as question modification, theory génération could also lead to 
widening or refining one's scope of enquiry; for example, additional 
interviewées were included in the local implementation phase of the research 
in order to follow the story which was emerging and a theory which was 
developing concerning the rôle of mediating organisations such as the NTA. 
The interviewées (local implementers) appeared to suggest that particular 
organisations (such as the NTA) played a crucial rôle in policy implementation 
101 
post 2002; it would therefore, have left the research incomplete if additional 
interviews were not undertaken. Further, it allowed for consideration of the 
emerging 'theory' about the importance of 'new' agencies which were 
pursuing a national agenda, in a local context, and so, also allowed a further 
way to explore the flow of power between the centre and localities. 
The method used to structure and organise interview data was 'Framework' 
(Ritchie, Spencer and O'Connor 2003). All of the interviews were 
systematically read on a number of occasions and each time themes were 
noted. On each re-reading of the data the themes were refined, '...sorted and 
grouped under a smaller number of broader, higher order categories or main 
themes and placed within an overall framework (Ritchie et al 2003:221). The 
data was then broken down again and was re-constructed into lists and a 
chart which allowed the data to be categorised under the themes and for links 
between the themes to be explored. The themes drew on or reflected the 
actual language of the respondents in order for the analysis to remain as 
close as possible to the original source and potentially provide '...both 
illuminating and explanatory power: (Ritchie et al 2003:232). Finally, the 
themes were 'compared (Ritchie et al 2003:255) to the frameworks provided 
by Levin (1997) and Newman (2001) with regard to how one might approach 
and understand the development of policy and the process of implementation. 
In this way, it was also possible to be clear about whether an explanation was 
consistent and plausible in relation to other research in this area (Levin 1997) 
and to be overt about whether the conceptualisations and conclusions were 
'explicit' and thus generated by the interviewees, or 'implicit' and inferred from 
the data and from comparisons with the frameworks of Levin (1997) and 
Newman (2001) (Ritchie et al 2003:253). Levin (1997) has characterised this 
overall approach as 'analytic', recognising that the aim is to identify 
'consistency' and 'plausibility' within the findings which have emerged from a 
range of techniques and sources of evidence, that explanations of 'cause and 
effect' arise from conceptions of 'mechanisms' and 'factors' which were seen 
to have been identified and finally, that the discourse of the researcher is one 
which prioritises the words and meaning arising from the 'raw' material and 
not their own. This approach is consistent with the concern to allow the 
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participants to teil the story of drug policy development 1994-2004 and for this 
to be able to be located and placed within the social policy framework and 
concerns of this period. 
Concluding thoughts 
The thesis was informed by literature from a ränge of disciplines, and the 
inter-disciplinary background was appropriate because as we have discussed 
partnerships are theoretically connected to considerations of social complexity 
and entrenched problems across organisational and academic boundaries 
(Newman 2001; Stoker 1998). 
The thesis seeks to teil a story about social policy design and implementation 
within the drugs policy field 1994-2004. It asks 'how' and why' questions and 
has sought to specifically place the policy development and implementation 
activities in their time and place. The methodology was reflexive in order to 
allow for the emergent research findings to inform the generation of theory 
(Layder 1993) and this has allowed thoughts and ideas to be 'tested' through 
their wider exploration with the research respondents and through the 
interrogation of the documentary sources. The research drew solely on 
qualitative methods such as documents, literature and Interviews. If the 
methods used do not: 
'... look much like scientific activities (it is) perhaps because they are not much 
iike scientific activities and the misconception is to think that they shouid or 
couldbe.'(Hughes and Sharrock 1997:201) 
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Chapter four - Developing a drug policy -1994-1997 
Introduction 
This chapter looks in detail at the development of the drug strategy Tackling 
Drugs Together (TDT: 1995). It focuses on the factors which influenced the 
development of the strategy, including the differing analyses which emerged 
from the Conservative and Labour MPs about drug misuse preceding the 
policy. By the time of TDT (1995), however, the différences were subsumed 
under a broad acceptance that the strategy should be cross-party and cross 
departmental. In addition, the chapter considers earlier attempts to deal with 
the drug misuse issue and the areas highlighted by évaluations of those 
attempts. It is possible to see how thèse factors were addressed in TDT 
(1995); this included ensuring the attention of the centre and a clear focus on 
implementation. 
The chapter also considers the choice of partnership mechanisms for 
implementation and why this appeared to have been a populär choice during 
the late 1980s and early 1990's. In this way TDT (1995) was able to be many 
things to many people, an important factor in a policy which sought to address 
a difficult social policy area which crossed many departmental boundaries, but 
was the core business of none. The strategy sought to bring together criminal 
justice and health agendas to address an issue of ever greater social and 
political concern at a time of deep social and political divisions. Partnership 
appears to have been the principal mechanism for uniting thèse difficult 
divisions; a mechanism which allowed each area or partner to feel that their 
needs had been or could be addressed. 
This chapter tells a chronological story (along with Chapter 5 which focuses 
on 1998-2004); the focus in the later chapter is on subséquent policy 
development and implementation. Both chapters are based on documentary 
sources and consider the other social policy factors which contributed to and 
influenced the drug stratégies and the attempts to deal with social complexity. 
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This period was characterised by a number of features all of which have been 
previously outlined. These included concerns about the changing nature of 
drug misuse which prompted the development of the drug strategy. National 
political factors, such as the Conservative government's poor relationships 
with local government which affected the direction and nature of the strategy, 
as well as important 'shaping' factors such as the strength of cross party 
support, and international developments and relationships. At the same time 
the growth of a moral political agenda which was linked to the collapse of the 
welfare state, the development of managerialism and the growth in the 
popularity of partnership mechanisms for policy implementation and the 
development of new forms of governance, factored in the way the policy was 
developed and designed for implementation. 
Politicians and other policy actors appear to have moved towards a more 
strategic approach to the 'drug problem' in response to the social imperatives 
which were emerging and to have done so through the creation of a clear 
policy and structure for implementation with reporting mechanisms back to the 
centre. This new and defined approach sought to be radical and to bring into 
play some of the emerging social policy agendas of the time — partnership 
approaches and performance management in particular. These can be 
clearly observed in the TDT (1995) strategy where the partnership approach 
was built into the strategy and mechanisms for communicating between the 
centre and local authorities were instituted. The policy was also one shaped 
by the emerging central policy concerns with implementation and the ability to 
evidence this through the use of key performance indicators (KPIs) which 
would be subsequently monitored. 
The concern with drug misuse was shared across the political spectrum and 
so the need for a policy was largely uncontested. In addition, political 
cooperation continued throughout the period despite an emerging difference 
in attribution of the problem. The Prime Minister (John Major) lent his support 
to the strategy, which was influential with regard to how others might see TDT 
(1995) and how much emphasis might be placed on its adoption and 
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implementation. By the end of this period the changes and the formalisation 
of the drug policy agenda had been institutionalised, such that not having a 
drug policy would have seemed unthinkable. 
Changing analysis of social factors - 1994-95 
This period appears to be one in which it is possible to observe the impact of 
social factors and the apparent gestation of ideas, both of which impacted on 
drug policy. This suggests that there is some évidence of 'ideas' or people 
who sponsor those ideas, waiting until there is the 'opportunity' (as well as 
perhaps the 'resources') to further those opinions or aims (Levin 1997). 
The impact of HIV/AIDS 
Prior to this period drug misuse had been a rather neglected area. Attention, 
when given, had settled principally on régulation; thus the 1920 Dangerous 
Drugs Act, The Brain Report 1965 and the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. Düring 
the late 1980s and early 1990s this changed and drug policy began to be 
developed with a new emphasis on combating drug misuse problems as they 
impacted on society at large. 
British drug policy had, on occasions, been innovative and was offen 
characterised as différent from other European or Atlantic responses. There 
were also instances where changes in practice at a local level drove policy 
and were finally accepted and incorporated at a national level. An example of 
this was 'harm minimisation', developed in response to the transmission of 
HIV / AIDS infections amongst intravenous (IV) drug users. Britain later 
received much international récognition for this policy adoption and the 
perceived 'control' of the virus within the UK drug using population 2 1; but it 
was largely driven by a practical government need to control public health 
issues (Berridge 1996; 303). In this sensé the policy response to HIV / Aids 
and the incorporation of 'harm minimisation' can be seen to epitomise what 
has often been characterised as the 'British Model', which was a pragmatic 
and health focussed response to drug use (Stimson 1987). 
2 1 T h e r e were d i f f e r en t i a l impacts in e i t ies , for e x a m p l e E d i n b u r g h . 
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HIV / AIDS prompted two ACMD reports one in 1988 (ACMD 1988:1) which 
urged action to contro! against HIV infection and suggested that this was 
'more pressing or dangerous* than the drugs issue itself, whilst a subséquent 
report in 1993 which sought to 'update' the situation, suggested that 'greater 
effort' were 'needed to reduce the extent of drug use itself (Druglink 1994). 
The link between the two communities (those with HIV / Aids and intravenous 
drug users) was clear and acknowledged. This led the govemment to accept 
(although not necessarily wish to publicise) that the ability of drug misuse to 
damage the health of the whole population, through the spread of HIV/ Aids 
from intravenous drug users, through sexual contact with 'non users', was a 
threat perceived as so great that innovative and radical solutions, such as the 
provision of injecting equipment to intravenous drug users, could be 
contemplated and instituted2 2. This area was and continued to be sensitive 
and in 1995 in the Foreword to Tackling Drugs Together 'harm minimisation' 
(TDT 1995:vîi) was acknowledged as one of the four main areas developed 
during the consultation period. Nonetheless, the White Paper went on to 
make it clear that any information aimed at minimising harm to drug users 
'must be coupled with the unambiguous message that abstinence from drugs 
is the only risk-free option' and thus that: 'Harm réduction should be a means 
to an end, not an end in itseif. 
However, the HIV / AIDS 'threat' can also be seen to signify other changes 
which were taking place and in particular the way in which concerns were 
generalised beyond drug users per se and their dependency as a médical 
condition and increasingly focussed onto the impact of drug use, or the drug 
user, on the 'normal' population. HIV / AIDS transmission via drug users 
showed the potential that substance misuse held to 'spill ouf from a small and 
enclosed world and possibly 'contaminate' the gênerai population (Sherman 
1989; TDT 1995:23). In this way, it can be seen to have had an impact 
beyond the immédiate health concerns which sparked it; the one 
2 2 P e a r s o n . G . 1999:17 suggested that d r a w i n g o n h is w o r k i n 1991 :205 -207 that the ' a b n o r m a l l y h i g h ' 
H I V prev i i l ence in E d i n b u r g h . S c o t l a n d was the resuit o f po l i c e a c l i v i t y against h a r m m i n i m i s a t i o n 
p o l i c i e s before the conséquences were fu l ly und c r s t o od ; this a l so seemed to s h o w that the p o l i c y had 
w o r k e d c l s ewhere to cont ro ! H I V in f ec t i ons in I V d r u g users. 
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acknowledged most frequently through the introduction of harm minimisation 
policies and the other through the introduction of more widespread concerns 
about the impact of drug misuse on the general population. 
Political responses to drug misuse prior to Tackling Drugs Together 
The debates about drug misuse in the House of Commons prior to and during 
this period show an increasing concern with drug misuse issues. A Home 
Affairs Committee Report was published in 1984 which led subsequently to 
the creation of a Ministerial group concerned with the misuse of drugs 2 3 and to 
the first drug 'strategy document' Tackling Drug Misuse (1985) (Addiction 
2000). The characteristics of the Ministerial group and the response to drug 
misuse issues show what were to become core foundations for the 
implementation of all subsequent strategies, including the development of an 
analysis of what drug use was and how it could be tackled. Crucially, the 
Ministerial group included those from the Home Office, Department of 
Environment, Education, Health, Scottish and Welsh Offices, Defence and the 
Paymaster General and Solicitor General. With its broad sweep of 
departments it established one of the key features of all on-going drug policy 
in the UK - namely the cooperative nature of tackling substance misuse 
issues through the use of cross-departmental structures and cross-party 
support. Considering the Ministerial Groups' activities in 1989 in a speech to 
the House of Commons, five years after its inception, its Chair Douglas 
Hogg 2 4 reflected that: 
'The group's function is to act as a catalyst and as a means for co-ordinating 
policies across government because, by the nature of things, the policies 
span Departments. It has proved to be an extremely useful vehicle for 
changes in policy. ' 
23 -
The M i n i s t e r i a l S u b - C o m m i t t e e on the M i s u s e o f D r u g s w h i c h was cha i r ed by the L o r d Pres ident o f 
the C o u n c i l . 
A t that t ime (1989 ) Pa r l i amen ta ry Unde r -Sec r e t a r y o f State for the H o m e D e p a r t m e n t H a n s a r d 9 
June 1989 
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This was an endorsement of this approach and also demonstrated what Levin 
(1997:87) has characterised as a key feature of Thatcherite and post-
Thatcherite change within the policy field. That is the creation of small 
committees reporting directly to the Prime Minister (PM) or Cabinet Office and 
which allowed the PM to act as gatekeeper. The early stages of developing a 
strategic response to drug misuse in the 1980's, therefore, also showed what 
was to become another key feature of drug policies and which subsequently 
remained stable from inception, and that is the existence of Prime Ministerial 
support which has, on subsequent occasions, proved a powerful and 
influential factor. 
Ann Widdecombe (MP) reflecting on the work of the group considered that 
they had been 'extremely productive and considered that their activity was 
linked to 'mass media campaigns1 which had been undertaken and the 
Government's participation in international initiatives such as the 1988 United 
Nations convention 2 5; the suggestion is therefore that the existence of the 
group appeared to have promoted or supported other work on the issue of 
drug misuse. It is perhaps not surprising then, that this group was maintained 
by the 1995 White Paper with an initial remit until March 1996 to oversee and 
coordinate the strategy. In addition similar aims were repeated in TDT (1995) 
as had appeared in the drug strategy in 1985, namely a focus on 'reducing 
supplies, improving enforcement, improving treatment and prevention' 
(Addiction 2000:335). Another feature at this time was also an attempt to 
foster inter-agency work on the drug issue supported by the Department of 
health; these were referred to as the District Drug Advisory Committees 
(DDACs), which were also created in 1985. 
The level of change in drug misuse during the 1980s had prompted calls for 
action and this was summed up by Chris Butler (MP Warrington South) in 
June 1989 in a debate in the House of Commons: 
2 5 A n n W i d d e c o m b e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s debate 9 June 1989 H a n s a r d 
109 
'In the first half of the 1980s, new addicts increased at the rate of 25% a year, 
so that by 1988 the total number of addicts was five times that in 1978.'26 
The scale of change was sure to prompt action and might also have been 
accounted for by growing public concern: 
l..,a recent opinion poll shows that the British public believe that narcotic 
drugs are the greatest threat facing the United Kingdom: 27 
The response of the public was linked to the changing nature of drug use and 
both the public's concerns and the changing nature of use influenced 
increasing political interest. An interesting feature was, however, that this 
took the form of a 'non-political' response and led to cross-party support. 
Cross party support 
Cross-party support is evidenced in parliamentary debates during this period 
and in the run up to TDT (1995); different approaches and analyses of what 
drug use is, what causes drug misuse and how it can be tackled, are all 
framed within an atmosphere of co-operation and collaboration which the key 
contenders were in general keen to acknowledge. Thus in a debate on 9 
June 1989 in the House of Commons on drug issues an MP (Tim Rathbone, 
Lewes) apologised for making a party political point: 
7 fear that I must make one political comment - the one only.. : 
There are perhaps few debates to be had in parliament where party politicking 
is apologised for. Nonetheless not all would suggest that cross-party 
cooperation has been a helpful feature of British drug policy since the 
2 6 C h r i s B u t l e r M P W a r r i n g t o n S o u t h f r om H o u s e o f C o m m o n s debate o n d r u g strategy. H a n s a r d 9 
J u n e 1989 
2 7 C h r i s B u t l e r M P W a r r i n g t o n S o u t h f r om H o u s e o f C o m m o n s debate on d r u g strategy. H a n s a r d 9 
J u n e 1989 
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increasing concern about drug problems in the 1990s and some have argued 
that it, in fact, stifles debate and narrows the agenda. However, Labour and 
subsequently New Labour supported the Conservative policies to develop a 
drug strategy and commended the priority which they gave to the drug misuse 
issues 2 8 . In the run up to the TDT (1995) legislation a difference in attribution 
of the causes of the growth of the drug misuse problem can be evidenced 
from debates in the House of Commons. Both parties took a moral tone and 
in so doing linked the drugs issue into the wider social policy analyses. 
A moral engagement 
When seeking to illustrate the harm they saw drug misuse as leading to 
politicians and others often responded by telling 'a story' 2 9, which usually 
sought to link the concerns with substance misuse with their own experiences. 
The story might also draw on international experiences and comparisons, with 
the USA acting as a picture of what might happen in the UK if things were not 
dealt with appropriately. Thus, the period which preceded the introduction of 
TDT (1995), saw in the House of Commons, MPs comparing stories which 
usually had moral overtones and included social concerns. Tony Baldry MP 
(Banbury) described the 'horrendous nightmare30 he had witnessed in New 
York as the result of crack addictions. Further, Hugo Summerson MP 
(Walthamstow) talked about the 'rate of killings amongst drug dealers' in 
Washington which he described as 'quite terrifying! and asked the House to 
imagine what it might be like if 'drugs got such a grip on this country1^. 
Additionally, he linked the images of drug misuse in the UK to images of 
urban decay and fragmentation: 
'...I suspect that today many drugs are abused simply because people are 
bored. The reason is clear to those who visit council estates, with their high-
2 3 C h r i s B u t l e r M P W a r r i n g t o n S o u t h f r om H o u s e o f C o m m o n s debate o n d r u g strategy. H a n s a r d 9 
June 1989 
2 9 T h i s type o f ' s t o r y - t e l l i n g ' response appears c o m m o n and to con t inue after this p e r i o d : thus S u e 
K i l l e n , a sen ior c i v i l servant w i t h r e spons ib i l i t y for d r u g m i suse issues in g i v i n g e v i d ence to a Se lec t 
C o m m i t t e e on H o m e A f f a i r s i n 2001 used the same a p p r o a c h : F r o m M i n u t e s o f E v i d e n c e Se lect 
C o m m i t t e e o n H o m e A f f a i r s 3 0 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 ) . 
3 0 House o f C o m m o n s debate 9 June 1989 Hansa rd 
1 1 House o f C o m m o n s debate 9 J u n e 1989 Hansa rd 
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rise blocks and terrible staircases that peopie atways have to use because the 
lifts are broken down for the umpteenth time. No one ever parks his car in the 
underground spaces because they are vandalised or burnt and the car parks 
are used by the criminal fraternity for stripping stolen cars. There is évidence 
of drug abuse in such areas because the young peopie living there say, "What 
else can we do?...' 
In this the Labour MPs appeared to draw différent conclusions from the 
Conservative MPs. This différence in analysis about where drug misuse 
emanated from was further illustrated by two Conservative MPs in the same 
debate about substance misuse. Their concern was focussed on personal 
moral values and not with a sensé of économie disintegration as highlighted 
by Labour; they were, in fact, more concerned with what they perceived as 
social dislocation. They suggested that drug misuse stemmed from a 
'permissive société which had emerged as the resuit of social changes begun 
in the 1960's and which had subsequently led to the loss of 'traditional 
values'.32 John Marshall (MP; Hendon South) who made thèse statements 
was supported by Ann Widdecombe (MP; Maidstone) who stated that: 
' Our social climate is a product of the décade of disillusion - the 1960$ - and 
peopie are not expected to bear the conséquences of or take responsibitity for 
their actions: 
She posited that: 
'A natural conclusion of ail that is that peopie will think there is no real danger 
and that they have no responsibility to consider the question ofdrugs: 
Both Ann Widdecombe and other members also questioned the rôle of the 
média who appeared, in their view, to enjoy 'glamorising' drug use on TV and 
3 2 J o h n M a r s h a l l ( H e n d o n S o u l h ) 9 June I989 Pa r l i amen ta ry deba l c in the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s ; 
H a n s a r d 
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the drug use of famous personalities . Similarly Conservative MPs were 
more likely to attribute substance misuse to the gênerai population and to 
lifestyle choices -
"Drug taking is not the resuit of affluence totally and it is not the resuit of 
poverty totally....Surely drug taking is the resuit of aimlessness, 
hopelessness, lack of direction and lack of a feeling of a place in society. 
Surely thèse are the greatest causes of drug misuse, and are likely to span 
the entire economic and social spectrum." (Steve Norris MP Epping Forest 
1989: Hansard) 
Sherman (MP Huddersfield, Labour) sought however to make a link between 
drug use and poverty, apparently reflecting the work of Pearson (1987, 1991 
and 1995) which appeared (as discussed in Chapter Two) to provide évidence 
that ' a major heroin epidemie spread rapidly through a number of towns in the 
North of England and Scotland concentrated mainly in areas of high 
unemployment and social deprivatiori (Pearson 1991:167). In 1989, 
Sherman suggested that: 
The most party politicai part of my speech concerns the demand for drugs 
and the ways to reduce that demand....Some of the clearest information to 
corne out of the research into drug misuse is the link between drug addiction 
and poverty. The heroin epidemie of the 1980s has been concentrated in the 
most dephved inner-ctty areas. That is not to say others do not touch 
drugs but where heroin reached, it was concentrated among unemployed 
youth in poor areas. ' 
The différence in attribution between Conservative and Labour MPs is 
perhaps not unsurprising given the likely politicai perspective and thus 
underlying analysis of social factors which each politician might take. 
Nonetheless, it did not derail the cross-party support. Furthermore, the moral 
" 1 J A n n W i d d e c o m b e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s deba ie 9 June I989 H a n s a r d 
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undertones of the debate from both sides fitted with what we have seen more 
generally with regard to this period and the breakdown in the post-war social 
consensus (Donnison 1991; Harris 1989). The Conservatives accented 
Personal responsibility and Labour stressed a breakdown in social 
responsibility and the impact of drug use on the community (Deacon and 
Mann 1999; Donnison 1991). Both types of analysis can be seen to recur in 
drug policy with increasing emphasis over the forthcoming years and 
stratégies. 
Drugs and crime 
Clearly there was a perceived problem with drug misuse about which 
politicians and the gênerai public were concerned. There was a perceived 
international dimension and concerns about urban decay, boredom, the 
breakdown of social controls and community; there were also attempts to 
begin to link criminal activity, anti-social behaviour and drug misuse. Barry 
Sherman (MP Huddersfield) raised a number of issues which came to greater 
prominence once New Labour gained power in 1998. One of thèse is the 
issue of drugs and crime: 
'One aspect of drug addiction that has not been given a great deal of 
prominence is the link between addiction and crime. I do not mean 
international crime, but the type of everyday crime that we see increasing in 
the crime statistics year after year. One of the reasons we do not know a 
great deal about that iink is that the government have not published the 
research that they have commissioned in the past / am not being partisan, 
but even if the results are slightly embarrassing, we wouid like to see the 
Home Office's évaluation of the research into the link between drug addiction, 
anti-social behaviour and violent behaviour and crime.134 
He went on to talk about a need to concentrate 'scarce staff and scarce 
resources' on the 'really dangerous drugs1; preceding David Blunkett in his 
1 J B a r r y S h e r m a n . M P H u d d e r s f i e l d 9 J u n c 1989 Pa r l i a i n en i a r y debate in the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s : 
Hansard 
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speech regarding the reclassification of cannabis in 2004 by some twenty odd 
years. He also drew on proposals emanating from the ISDD 3 5 which were for 
a 'caution plus' type scheme, whereby police officers in Southwark might 
caution an offender if they were referred for treatment: an apparent forerunner 
of Arrest Referral schemes. Moreover, a potential precursor of the C A R A T 3 6 
teams was also heralded by Sherman's references to the need to 'improve 
treatment facilities in prisons' and the need to contain a potential source of 
contamination to the whole population; namely drug use, AIDS / HIV and the 
potential spread to the 'heterosexual population'. 
A partnership approach 
The 1985 Tackling Drug Misuse strategy document which resulted from the 
Home Affairs Committee Report of 1984 and the Ministerial Group on drugs 
was the first attempt at a strategic approach to the social issues resulting from 
drug misuse and it had five aims. These were concerned with reducing 
supply, increasing enforcement and deterrence, reducing demand through 
education and prevention and improving treatment and rehabilitation. It laid 
the strategic direction in terms of the focus on issues which were later 
reduced to three - enforcement, prevention and treatment. What was 
different about the TDT (1995) strategy was the emphasis which was placed 
on including all parties in the pre-White Paper consultation and consequently 
the focus on working in partnership. This emphasis was not (as we have 
seen in Chapter 2) entirely new or unknown in the social policy field, nor in the 
drugs field, where there had been District Drug Advisory Committees 
(DDACs) working on substance misuse issues in local health authority areas 
since 1985. These were the subject of two reports (discussed briefly below), 
the first by Baker and Runnicles (1991) and the second, by Howard, Beadle 
and Maitland (1993), which became known as 'Across the Divide', and was 
subsequently portrayed (as noted previously and discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six) as seminal to TDT (1995). The DDACs were largely portrayed 
"° Institute for S tudy o f D r u g Dependence was a s ister b ody to S C O D A (S t and ing C o n f e r e n c e on D r u g 
A b u s e ) . T h e y were the two l ead ing nat iona l ' v o l u n t a r y ' o rgan isa t ions for the study o f and 
c a m p a i g n i n g a r ound d r u g m isuse issues - they later b e came D r u g S c o p e . 
3 6 C o u n s e l l i n g - A d v i c e - Re f e r ra l - A s s e s s m e n t - T h r o u g h c a r e teams were es tab l i shed in p r i sons to 
m a k e a l i n k between pr i soners ' treatment in p r i son and the c o m m u n i t y . 
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as having failed (Mounteney 1996) and it can be surprising to think that TDT 
(1995) sought to re-create them in any way; as we shall see later however, it 
appears that lessons were learned from those reports and that the imperative 
to 'partnership' forms was for a number of reasons, strong. 
There were also reports on other aspects of work in the social policy arena 
which promulgated a partnership approach. Within the community safety 
arena (now known as crime and disorder) one such report, known as the 
Morgan report (1991) 3 7, received significant local authority support (in part 
because it suggested channelling work through them) but it did not receive 
backing from the Conservative government (in part because of the local 
authority focus). The community safety agenda was seen at the time as one 
which was becoming linked to the drugs agenda. In 1994, lan Waddle, a 
director of a drug treatment provider in Manchester, was quoted as saytng: 
'We're seeing a paradigm shift to crime prévention and community safety 
concerns, so I welcome the reports emphasis on community approaches.' 
(Druglink 1994) 
Whilst it is not clear why a paradigm shift to crime prévention and community 
safety should necessarily be more inclusive of a community approach than a 
harm minimisation one, it highlights how contemporaneously links were being 
made and how community and drugs issues were being seen as related to 
one-another across a number of political and practice agendas. 
In 1990, the Drug Prévention Initiative (DPI) was launched. It brought 
together a number of prominent issues, namely partnership and community as 
a means by which to tackle drug misuse. Phase 1 saw DPI teams operate in 
nine areas and this was later expanded to incorporate 20 localised teams. In 
1994, with the changing remit proposed in TDT the DPI was re-structured, 
emerging in April 1995 with 12 bigger teams, covering larger geographica! 
areas; this arrangement persisted for four years until March 1999. 
Ils real l i i l e was - H o m e O f f i c e ( 1991 > S a l e r C o m m u n i t i e s ; T h e L o c a l D e l i v e r y o f C r i m e Prévention 
T h r o u g h T h e Pa r tne r sh ip A p p r o a c h 
116 
The DPI, as a means through which the prévention strategy might be effected, 
was not wholly uncontentious and concerns were that it was 'a rather 
gimmicky initiative.'39 The contention was that the rôle 'to bring services 
together' should have gone to Local Authorities who 'should be given a key 
rôle in the partnership that must be formed. '(Sherman, 1989) 
As we have seen in Chapter Two this was unlikely both with regard to the 
création of the DPI and five years later in the drug strategy overall (TDT: 
1995) because relationships between the Conservative govemment and the 
local authorities were not in gênerai positive (Deakin 1994). However, post-
1998 New Labour did incrementally sîrengthen the rôle of local authorities 
within the drug strategy. 
In 1991, Baker and Runnicles reported that the District Drug Advisory 
Committees (DDACs), which had been established in 1985 following A C M D 
advice and a Department of Health circular, were not working. The original 
intention had been for them to be 'key agencies in the local and regional co­
ordination of drug services' but that this had not occurred in many areas. One 
reason given was that since their establishment the 'government has shown 
iittle interest (Baker 1991 b:12-13). In discussing the report, Druglink drew the 
conclusion that, the DDACs would need to find a way to work, because it was 
'highly unlikely that the DoH will attempt to regulatë them. By 1993 however 
the DoH had commissioned a report whose conclusions suggested that, in 
fact, thèse committees should be replaced by something more formalised and 
statutory with '...partnerships established to provide a stratégie focus for 
tackling the probleni (Howard, et al 1993). It is perhaps surprising that the 
Institute for the Study of Drug Dependency (ISDD) had not, in their journal, 
anticipated the potential development. Furthermore, just two years later, in 
1995, in the TDT strategy, there was a move to create significantly more 
strategically focused partnership forms, DATs. 
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In Chapter Six, the impact of the second report, 'Across the Divide', is 
discussed by policy makers and it is clear that it proved important in the 
development of TDT (1995). Certainly it would seem that both reports, that by 
Howard (1993) and Baker and Runnicles (1991), went on to play some parí in 
the new strategy and evidence from both documents appeared to have been 
taken forward - namely the potential usefulness of partnership structures in 
this área. However, they also argued, that centralised coordination, or 
interest, was inimitable to ensuring the delivery of a national drug strategy and 
keeping localised partnership structures functioning. It would appear that the 
lesson of the DDACs was learned and if central government wanted 'action' 
on drugs at a local level they needed a strategically placed, high level 
partnership form which could also control or command budgets (Mounteney 
1996). 
Following both of these reports the government instituted evaluations of the 
work of the DPI and, in December 1993, established a central drug 
coordination unit (CDCU) in order to review the strategy on drugs and make 
recommendations for how it might be improved. The outcome of the review by 
the C D C U was the Green Paper which heralded and opened consultation on 
the White Paper, Tackling Drugs Together. 
Tackling Drugs Together -1995-7 
The strategy 
Tackling Drugs Together, White Paper, sought for the first time through 
legislation to créate a more focussed and strategic approach to drug policy. It 
created specific mechanisms for delivery of those policies based on a 
partnership, multi-agency, cross-departmental philosophy. It opened a whole 
new era of increased attention and focus on drugs issues by a number of key 
players, including politicians at a sénior level and those working within the 
large state organisations charged with responsibility for drug issues. In all of 
these senses it answered the criticisms of the earlier attempts at policy and 
intervention. 
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As highlighted, the ideological imperatives for TDT were influenced by those 
which had driven other social policies forward in the Thatcherite era: the 
introduction of market économies into the state sector, increased central 
surveillance of local activity, a holding to account of local government for 
delivery of their local services and the introduction of performance indicators 
and monitoring for the service sector. 
Tony Newton, the Lord Président of the Council and Leader of the House of 
Commons launched the White Paper on 10 May 1995. The strategy was 
announced thus: 3 9 
'The Government today launched a tough new drive against the menace of 
drugs. This combines vigorous law enforcement, drug prévention in schools, 
action in local communities and initiatives in prisons.' 
The strategy incorporated a broad approach and in addition could be seen to 
have responded to the calls for a more explicit incorporation of treatment 
issues which had been made during the consultation period. The Executive 
Summary made it clear that the strategy sought to focus as forcefully as ever 
on enforcement and reducing supply, but that it also recognised 'the need for 
stronger action on reducing the demand for illégal drugś (TDT 1995:1), which 
meant that issues of éducation and health had also to be tackled. In this way 
the strategy could be seen to address the social issues which MPs were 
raising in House of Commons debates and which, it seemed, the public was 
reflecting in the fears expressed in opinion poils about the nature and impact 
of substance use in the UK. TDT (1995) had three principle areas - crime, 
young people and public health and thèse were explicitly laid out: 
To take effective action by vigorous law enforcement, accessible treatment 
and a new emphasis on éducation and prévention to: 
• increase the safety of communities from drug-related crime; 
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• reduce the acceptability and availability of drugs to young peopie; and 
• reduce the health risks and other damage related to drug misuse.' 
(TDT 1995:1) 
A cross departmental approach 
In launching the strategy the cross departmental approach was underlined as 
Tony Newton was accompanied by the Home and Education Secretaries and 
Ministers from the Department of Health, Customs and Excise and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Secretary for Health was not présent 
and the absence appeared to indicate that the department might not give the 
high priority to the strategy which was required and this contributed thereafter 
to a sensé amongst some commentators that the rôle and commitment of 
health to drugs issues was the subject of some doubt. As discussed there 
has been an ongoing tension between whether drug policy was / is / should 
be a health dominated or a criminal justice dominated agenda. Traditionally, 
a health based response has been charactehsed as one inclined to prioritise 
the individual and a criminal justice based response has been seen as one 
which gives precedence to the community. This is simplistic however, and 
also has ignored the sensé within health that substance misuse was a 
'Cinderella' area, not one for ambitious peopie or those seeking to make their 
names or careers. Further, it was a section perceived as one too small in 
budget terms and public health terms to be significant when compared, for 
example, to other health issues such as heart disease or cancer. Finally, the 
response of health based staff to substance misusers has always included 
those whose morally based perception is that it is a self-inflicted harm which 
should not be given priority in comparison to the 'truly' s ick 4 0 . The tension has 
historically not been wholly between a health and criminal justice dominated 
agenda, but also between a department deciding where to put its 
departmental priorities, its individual self advancement ones and its moral 
judgements. Thus, the issues of the pénal / health divide are matters which 
4 0 T h e latter is not w h o l l y an issue related to health based staff, a l though it is u s u a l l y mo r e acu te l y 
rea l i sed . for e x a m p l e in acc ident and emerg ency depar tments . Düring the 1980s h a r m réduction 
ph i l o soph i e s were s e r i ous l y debated w i t h i n the c r i m i n a l just ice arena 7 i n c l u d i n g p roba t i on and p o l i c e 
staff. 
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can be seen to recur throughout the stratégies, but which the partnership 
based philosophy sought, in part, to address. Partnership was able to do so 
by spreading the load across a number of organisations; it also addressed the 
issue in such a way that its status would be enhanced within any given 
individual organisation and yet would also contain (or make explicit through 
inter-agency debate) the moral judgements which might affect practice based 
responses. 
Tony Newton, when launching the White Paper, nonetheless, stressed the 
importance of the cross departmental nature of the strategy: 
lMy colleagues and I are determined to make every effort to tackle the drugs 
problem and the evit it brings. The White Paper is a co-ordinated effort across 
Government and is the culmination of a year long review of the drugs 
strategy:41 
Furthermore, the Foreword (TDT 1995: vii-viiî) ended with a stress on the 
Personal commitment of the signatories - Lord Président, Secretaries of State 
for the Home Department, Health, Education and Paymaster General - to the 
strategy and to 'working in partnership with others who are ready to contribute 
their efforts to tackle drugs together: 
Prime Ministerial attention and a focus on delivery 
The TDT législation was given attention at the highest level with the Prime 
Minister welcoming the strategy saying: 
'Drug misuse blights individuals' lives and damages whole communities. The 
strategy sets clear national priorities, objectives and timetables. It offers a 
C a b i n e t Press O f f i c e O P S S 140/95 10 M a y I995 ' C o v e r n m e n l A c t s to T a c k l e D r u e M i s u s e ' 
121 
basis for effective action in local communities. It is the most far-reaching 
action plan yet against drugs: 42 
It is of interest in the Prime Minister's comments that he picks out the 
objectives and timetables, demonstrating, in this short statement, the 
importance at this time, of being able to prove action and hold others to 
account. Major had himself, served as Treasury Minister for a period and had 
been seen as strong at holding others to account; it may, therefore, also be 
récognition of his own ways of measuring importance, or, may have been an 
important facet for gaining his support. The rôle the Treasury played in 
supporting this TDT (1995) législation is also discussed in Chapter 6, as 
described by the civil servant responsible for drafting the législation; Keith 
Hellawell (2003 304-305) also described the importance of their rôle and 
support in his memoirs, with regard to later stratégies. The Treasury had 
played a rôle in the Ministerial Sub-Committee from the beginning through the 
involvement of the Paymaster General and this rôle continued under the new 
strategy - TDT (1995). Through this involvement there was a direct attempt 
to ensure that monies being spent by the government and public 
organisations were clearly accountable and that there was a sensé of the 
need to achieve value. It is probable that this also helped to drive a focus on 
being able to évidence implementation. In addition, it emphasised the cross-
departmental nature of the strategy and the range of departments who had an 
input into it. 
The importance of delivery was further emphasised by Tony Newton, who 
when launching the strategy said that: 
'The White Paper provides a structure for delivering the strategy locally by co­
opération between ail the agencies with responsibilities in this fieid. The aim 
is to pursue the national priorities in the light of focal needs...We are making 
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over £8.8 million available to underpin these local structures and I shall be 
taking a close interest in their progress: 4 3 
The 'local structures' were the Drug Action Teams (DATs). As discussed 
previously, these were a new partnership structure whose purpose was to 
require key statutory agencies to work together on the drug misuse issue; this 
included health authorities (who were charged with calling the initial meeting), 
police, probation, local authorities, Customs and Excise and prisons. The 
money referred to was the 'development funds' which were set-up to 
'underpin' the local structures and which allowed for the creation locally of a 
coordinating structure to mirror, in some ways, that created centrally in the 
C D C U . This income was intended to pay for the 'administration' which 
surrounded the DATs, but was used by many at first to pay for someone to 
organise the work and the inter-agency relationships on which the local 
strategy relied. The staff that did this became known as DAT co-ordinators 
and, increasingly, the funding was used by most DATs to do this; eventually 
there was an expectation that this would be the case. The consideration 
which this aspect of the strategy had been given is highlighted because in 
order to safeguard the use of the monies, they had been ring fenced as part of 
the TDT (1995) legislation; this meant they could only be used for 
'administration', not to deal with the 'causes' of drug use or drug use itself 
which some felt they could be used to tackle 4 4 
The Executive Summary made the emphasis on delivery explicit: 
'A national strategy can only work if it is delivered on the ground...The 
government particularly supports initiatives where different agencies work in 
partnership: (TDT 1995:5) 
It then went on to lay out its proposals for action for the following three years 
which included the creation of the new structures - Drug Action Teams with 
4 3 C a b i n e t Press O f f i c e O P S S 140/95 10 M a y 1995 ' G o v e r n m e n t A c t s to T a c k l e D r u g M i s u s e 
4 4 T h i s is based on m y o w n k n o w l e d g e and m e m o r i e s o f that t ime. I w o r k e d as a D A T C o o r d i n a t o r 
be tween 1996-8 . 
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whom there was an explicit link to delivery which should be 'in line with the 
overall priorities of the national drugs strategy and in the light of local needs' 
(TDT 1995:5). This clearly sought to address the issues which had been 
raised by Barker and Runnicles (1991) and Howard (1993) in their reviews of 
the previous drug strategy with regard to the lack of delivery / action at a local 
level. Additionally, Annex D was dedicated to specific advice about how the 
strategy could be delivered locally. It stated: 
'Tackling Drugs Together, sets out detaifed and coordinated plans for central 
Government Departments but recognises that, if national objectives are to be 
achieved, coordinated local action is also vital, building upon existing statutory 
and operational responsibilities for tackling drug misuse and tailored to local 
circumstances and priorities. The White Paper therefore sets out the 
Governments plans for ensuring that effective multi-agency partnerships are 
in place throughout England'. (TDT 1995:57) 
A winning combination' 
Tackling Drugs Together (1995) has been portrayed as something of a policy 
success with regard to the way in which it was drafted. As illustrated, drug 
misuse has traditionally been an area in which there were dichotomous views 
both about the nature of the problem and the best way to tackle it. However, 
the policy appeared to have been widely welcomed and most local areas 
responded by calling initial DAT meetings and appointing Chairs; in all, 105 
DATs were established across the country. 
The 'Drug Action Teams (DATs) were set up across England with a remit to 
implement the strategy' and were expected to 'adapt the national stratégies to 
their local circumstances.'45, Given the variation in drug use, drug related 
social problems and perceptions of the key issues this was a 'winning 
combination'; the ability to appeal to différent audiences was an important 
feature of TDT (1995). This will be explored further in the évidence of the 
1 , 5 T h e W o r c e s i e r s h i r e D r u g A c t i o n T e a m in f o rma t i on webs i t e ; accessed v i a G o o g l e search 2 0 0 4 . 
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Speakers in Chapter 6, who, Coming from many différent perspectives, were 
involved in the création and development of TDT (1995) at a national level. 
However, it can also be seen in papers prepared in response to the strategy 
and is highlighted by those from two very différent lobby groups. In a paper 
written by Anni Ryan for a Release / Liberty Conference in 1995, drug use is 
described as one of the 'foremost social policy issues' for England in the 
1990s and the 'stratégie framework for deaiing with drug use in England' is 
welcomed along with the emphasis on a 'new partnership approach' (Ryan 
1995). More speeifieally she considered that TDT (1995) the strategy was at 
heart a 'repressive policy because it was essentially abstinence based and 
'its language depicts drug users as unhealthy and irresponsible' but still she 
welcomed it, for the 'opportunities for the advancement of the rights of drug 
users' and saw the 'emphasis on a mufti agency approach' as 'a testament to 
this' (Ryan 1995). In particular, Ryan (1995) portrayed the Drug Référence 
Groups (DRGs) 4 6 as a 'promising aspect of the stratège with their 'emphasis 
on partnership at a local leveV as it is recommended that they include the 
involvement of 'service users'. 
From a very différent perspective, the strategy was also welcomed by Alan 
Castrée writing as an Assistant Chief Constable and Secretary of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Crime Committee and Drugs sub-
committee. He said that 'credit is due to the CDCU (as this îs a) 
comprehensive document' (Castrée 1995). He added that the police felt that 
their views had been taken into account and this was visible in 'the finished 
document. He acknowledged tensions, for example, for the police 'harm 
minimisation ...can be a difficult concept' and that they supported abstinence 
as the 'only risk-free choicë. But he too picked out the multi-agency, 
partnership aspects of the policy as a positive, and saw TDT (1995) as giving 
the opportunity for organisations to provide: 
D R G s were desc r ibed by T D T (1995:60-61 ) as in tended to encompass ; a w i d e range o f l o c a l 
e xpe r t i s e 1 and l o ca l c o m m u n i t i e s : the former was in tended to inc lude membe r s o f the s ta lu tory 
o rgan i sa t i ons , as we l l as vo lun ta ry o rgan isa t ions and Pro f ess iona ls s u c h as pharmac i s t s and the la l t c r 
was in tended to inc lude c o m m u n i t y o rgan i sa t i ons , d r u g se rv i c e users and y o u n g peop le , 
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'A sound model for DATs and DRGs but there needs to be unity of opinion to 
make good progress on a number of fronts.... There is a need for strong 
leadership and co-ordination and a network and exchange of ideas..: 
(Castrée 1995) 
This period covers a time of considérable social, political and ideological 
division and thus the ability for TDT (1995) to unité factions as separate as 
Release and the A C P O in welcoming the drug strategy was quite an 
achievement. Moreover it was the same feature from which they drew 
comfort - the partnership approach. Aspects of joint party support and co­
opération was an unusual feature of social policy and drug policy was an area 
that was contentious, it was not, therefore, easy for a policy to be drafted 
which brought plaudits from a variety of key players. The ability to draw 
together and link those from a wide social and political spectrum was a 
surprising feature of this drugs strategy. This 'apple pie' image is considered 
in Chapter 1 and discussed further in Chapter 6. Furthermore, it is interesting 
to consider what the impact of being all things to ail people might have been 
on this strategy and whether this had any discernible impact on the re­
formulation that became TDTBB (1998) and the Updated Drug Strategy 
(2002) nearly 10 years on. 
Partnership - Drug Action Teams 
Between the Green Paper and the White Paper, TDT (1995), the changes 
made to the DATs, Drug Référence Groups (DRGs) and 'development 
fundingf were few, but presumably based on lobbying and included 4 7: 
• the création of more flexible local boundaries 
• Directors of Social Services as core members 
• the co-option of the voluntary sector 
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DATs' boundaries varied considerably for many years with some metropolilan 
áreas covering limited geographical spaces (for example a single London 
borough) whilst others, especially íhose with County Councils, covered whole 
County áreas and thus wide geographical spaces (for example, Essex, Kent, 
Cambridgeshire and Norfolk). The core membership included those from the 
pólice, health and local authorities, prison and probation services; but usually 
also those from Customs and Excise and the local DPI representative, where 
in existence. The core membership therefore embodied the central principie 
of the strategy through the creation / existence of the DAT - a multi-agency 
partnership framework for decisión making and action. 
The role of the DATs and the coordinators reporting to them was to prosecute 
the drug strategy according to local circumstances. The strategy sought to 
concéntrate on bringing together law enforcement, treatment and prevention 
agendas. How these were taken forward was for localised decision-making 
and agreement within the inter-agency framework of the DAT. There was an 
initial pressure on the DATs to co-ordinate some fundíng arrangements and 
some áreas combined small pots of money to facilítate small projects, one off 
arrangements or pieces of research. Increasingly, there was pressure on 
central government to make more centralised funding available or to allow 
DATs to hold and co-ordinate large sums of money. Additionally these 
arrangements contributed to a stock of debates which in tum led to the direct 
allocation cf monies to DATs or for monies to be spent under the direction of 
DATs; this was in particular a feature of TDTBB (1998) (Dale-Perrera 
2001:19-21). 
The role of the DATs, Chairs and DRGs were spelled out in some detail in the 
strategy itself and in Annex D. What was envisaged was that the DATs would 
be composed of sénior representatives of local public organisations who were 
responsible for the delivery of the strategy at a local level. In the achievement 
of this they would be assisted by the DRG who would provide the local 
expertise and the link to the community. The strategy laid out the terms of 
reference for the DATs, as well as their basic composition, boundaries, 
responsibilities to the centre, mechanisms for communication and reporting, 
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accountability and who they might call on for assistance. Their terms of 
référence should, it said include assessing the scale and nature of the local 
drug problem; ensuring a 'fit' between the stratégies, policies and opérations 
of each of the constituent member organisations; ensuring that a DRG was 
established and effective, and that appropriate action against the Statement of 
Purpose and national objectives of the strategy were undertaken in the light of 
local need (TDT 1995:58). It saw previous local arrangements for tackling 
drug misuse as being able to be incorporated into the new arrangements and 
suggested for example that where District Drug Advisory Committees existed 
they might 'form the basis of Drug Référence Groups' (TDT 1995:58). In so 
doing, the strategy allowed for prior arrangements which fitted with the new 
vision to be incorporated and for what was already working / delivering locally 
to be used; however, it also meant that it was possible to underline that the 
new DATs were meant to operate at a significantly more senior and stratégie 
level than the DDACs. Thus, it was possible to highlight and ring the 
différences between the old and new and underline once again the emphasis 
on change, seniority and implementation. 
The DAT Chair 
The Chairs of DATs varied considerably and most teams were, in the initial 
stages, chaired by those from Health Authorities, although Chairs also 
included Directors of Social Services, Chief Executives of Local Authorities 
and Chief Constables. Under the strategy, Chief Executives of Health 
Authorities had been 'given the responsibility for ensuring local coordination 
arrangements are in place because of their clear Unes of accountability to 
central government' (TDT 1995:58). Further they were required to report on 
the establishment of the DAT in their area by September 1995, thus within five 
months of launch. It was explicitly stated however that this did not mean that 
the agenda should be 'health-led but that all 'three Strands are 
interdependent and of equal importance (TDT 1995:58). 
Chief Executives of Health Authorities did not have to become the DAT Chair, 
but where they were keen to do so this gave them a leading rôle. For those 
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who were less enthusiastic, or where others in a local area were filled with 
enthusiasm, then other chairing arrangements were made. The strategy 
required someone with 'personal commitment, drive and leadership skills' 
(TDT 1995:60). This contributed to the 'success' of the strategy according to 
commentators: the ability for responses to be shaped locally and according to 
local circumstances and for there to be commitment. 
The rôle of the DAT Chair was a crucial one at the start of TDT (1995) 
strategy and influential in shaping and driving the nature of the DAT in that 
local area. DAT Chairs were initially drawn from very senior ranks and this 
was as a direct resuit of government expectation, based on the assumption 
that the only person who could drive something to happen in an organisation 
was the person at the very top (Mounteney 1996). This was highlighted within 
the strategy itself with an explicit instruction that 'représentatives from ail 
organisations should be in a sufficiently senior position not only to ensure 
their own organisational and service objectives in relation to tackling 
drug misuse are fulfilled but also to shape their own organisations' 
stratégies, policies and opérations to fit objectives agreed collectively 
by the Drug Action Team' (TDT 1995:59) 4 6. 
It was made explicit that the Chair was important for 'ensuring that the work of 
the Team is focussed and that they were 'responsible for reporting on 
progress to central government (TDT 1995:60). Further, that the Chair was 
'directly accountable through the Central Drugs Coordination Unit to the Chair 
of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on the Misuse of Drugs for the progress 
which the team as a whole makes towards the three aims...' (TDT 1995:60) 
As Leader of the House and responsible for TDT (1995) Tony Newton put a 
significant amount of energy into supporting DAT Chairs and visited local 
areas and held meetings with them about the implementation of the drug 
strategy. The C D C U also liaised closely with local areas and held 
conférences and events aimed at sharing good practice and disseminating 
information. The strategy gave opportunity for those in localities to have close 
E m p h a s i s o r i g i n a l . 
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and direct contact with the centre through the prosecution of the strategy. It 
also meant, however, that some local executives, who might have 
considerably devolved powers (for example Chief Constables of Pólice), could 
appear to be more directly accountable to the centre for some of their activity. 
Furthermore, it meant that the focus of the strategy on delivery against the 
three key aims at a central and local level was consistently spelled out and 
built into the very mechanisms which were created by the strategy. 
At this stage, support from the DPI was patchier because they existed in a 
small number of áreas in comparison with the national coverage of the 
DATs 4 9 . With the change to DPAS and TDTBB (1998) this was to change. 
Additionally, the strategy itself suggested that the DPI might opérate at the 
Drug Reference Group level, although in real terms it was more likely that the 
Team Leader (a relatively sénior civil servant) sat on the DAT and team 
members on DRGs. 
Drug Reference Groups 
Drug Reference Groups varied considerably across the country, in number, 
structure and make up (Duke and MacGregor 1997: Mounteney 1996). Some 
were based on geographical boundaries, especially where the DAT covered 
large swathes of country. In this instance they might represent district council 
áreas, where the DAT was based on the County council área. 5 0 In other 
áreas DRGs were based on the three target áreas for the strategy and drew 
membership from local relevant organisations. 5 1 In other áreas, 
arrangements varied, but a DRG might be composed of those who were 
responsible for ensuring the strategy happened locally and thus they would 
respond to given issues at given times and members might be co-opted 
where necessary. 5 2 The involvement of the 'community' was often limited, 
with key players on DRGs being local 'drug experts' and those working in the 
1990-95 there were 2 0 s m a l l D P I teams: in 1995 for Phasc 2 i h i s c h a n g e d to 12 la rgc r teams 
c o v e r i n g a w i d e r geog raph i ca l a rca , for e x a m p l e a county . 
5 0 Essex was based o n this m o d e l 1996-8 
5 1 Ca rnbr idgesh i r e was based on this m o d e l 
5 2 Herüordshire ran o n a mode l s i m i l a r l o this. 
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field, not necessarily, or typically, those living in the communities affected by 
or experiencing drug misuse. In some areas, particularly where they were 
based on local authority boundaries, DRGs included local counciltors as 
représentatives of the local Community; this was quite frequently an area for 
concern, however, for staff from those local authorities.5 3 
TDT deschbed the rôle of the DRG as one which should have a lbroad 
membership which will help forge close working relationships wiîh a wide 
range of local expertise and with local communities' (TDT 1995:60). It laid out 
who might form members of the DRGs, and this included local voluntary 
organisations, the business sector, G P s , pharmacists, treatment services, 
educationalists, courts, schools and youth services. It was explicit however 
that it did not seek to 'prescribe the exact membership' and in order to engage 
the wider Community DATs should explore a 'range of approaches* (TDT 
1995:60). Unlike DATs, the Voluntary' nature of DRG membership was 
stated. The terms of référence for the groups included advising the DAT on 
the appropriate measures to take to effectively asses the scale and nature of 
local drug misuse issues. They also included providing a local forum for 
exchanging information about good practice and new initiatives and involving 
communities in action against the three Strands of the strategy (TDT 1995:60). 
However, there were few examples which met Anni Ryan's hopes of direct 
involvement of user groups in D R G s 5 4 . In fact, the involvement of the 
voluntary sector and communities proved controversial; for example, some 
DAT members feit it was inappropriate for commissioners of services and 
those being commissioned to sit on the same body (Mounteney 1996) 5 5. The 
C D C U did pursue their involvement for some time, but there were few DATs 
who achieved it and where the voluntary sector was involved it was usually at 
DRG level. 
5 1 T h i s is aga in s o m e t h i n g 1 k n o w f rom my o w n expérience d u r i n g 1996-8 as a D A T coo rd ina to r . 
5 , 1 T h i s is an area, w h i c h is e x p l o r e d in ihe f i e ld research unde r l aken w i t h D A T s . 
" I was pe r sona l l y party to many o f thèse sorts o l c onve r sa t i on as a D A T coo rd ina t o r and was aware o f 
the c o n l r o v e r s y at that t ime . I k n o w some research / audi t was c o m m i s s i o n e d to c h e c k the l eve l o f 
i n vo l v emen t but have been unab l e to locate it so far: it s h o w e d as a r e c a l l that. v o lun ta r y sec tor 
i n vo l v emen t in D A T s was l o w . 
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The DAT coordinator 
The DAT coordinator was most often housed in the same organisation as the 
Chair and carne from a range of backgrounds; those from health 
management, professional or managerial backgrounds, probation officers and 
those from local authority management structures were most common. This 
range of expertise had been supported by the strategy where it was outlined 
that adminístrative support was not envisaged as being filled solely by a 
'health service empioyeé (TDT 1995:2). The nature of the positions and the 
job descriptions meant, however, that people had to come from a background 
where they could demónstrate previous knowledge of working with those from 
a variety of professional groups and, because of the nature of the DATs 
(especially in the early stages), those from a range of levéis of seniority, 
including the most sénior Chief Executives. 
Although the strategy had not specifically designed or outlined this role as it 
had with DATs and DRGs, it did devote specific funds for the 'deveiopment of 
local coordination arrangements' - which thereby made it possible for 
resources to be devoted to the deveiopment of the coordination and 
partnership arrangements. It was explicit that the funds could be used for 
'adminístrative support, research, advice, training, commissioning local needs 
assessments and mobilising community involvement'. It also stated clearly 
that whilst it was for the DAT to decide 'how best to use this fundingf, the 
resources could not be used for 'direct service provisiorí. In addition the DAT 
Chair was 'required to account for the use of the deveiopment funds when 
reporíing through the Central Drug Coordination Unit to the Ministerial Sub-
Committee...' (TDT1995:62). In this way, central government wrote into the 
strategy from the very beginning mechanisms for the operation and oversight 
of the strategy at a local level. 
The community and partnership 
The role for communities and the parí they were to play in the drug strategies 
is an interesting one, for there is often mention of the necessity for their 
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involvement, but then a much less clear focus on how they might be included. 
The early establishment of the DPI and their community focus and 
functioning, via their support for small, localised projects which were 
community based, provides some évidence of the intention to involve and 
engage with local communities with regards to the drug strategy, at least at 
the centre. However the review of their functioning undertaken by Teresa 
Williams in 1998, suggests that this engagement with communities was varied 
and that some DPI teams acted, in fact, on a 'stratégie' basis, engaging with 
senior policy makers at a local level. This may have been because, as the 
research also reported, the DPI teams' links with the community could be a 
'double-edged sword (Williams 1998:70). 
When the DPI metamorphosed into DPAS in 1998 their focus changed and 
more clearly became one of supporting and facilitating the driving forward of 
the government's drug strategy, through a 'command and controP system 
related to the DATs. The report by Teresa Williams (1998) on the functioning 
of the DPI teams was highlighted by the C D C U in 1999 as having been 
'infiuentiai in informing the development of the successor arrangements ... in 
support of ...TDTBB: (Williams 1998: Foreword) 
With regard to the vision of TDT and how it was interpreted by some at the 
time, there does seem to be a commonly held assumption that 'community' 
was important to the interprétation and functioning of the strategy. It becomes 
difficult to track the meaning of it, however, and it is hard to disentangle how it 
links to the drug strategy at this time, because it appears to be a word used by 
those from both sides of the political spectrum and those from differing 
'pressure' groups operating around this agenda. As drug misuse stratégies 
themselves have, on occasions, been portrayed, community becomes as 
discussed previously, an 'apple pie and motherhood' term which is 
indisputably a 'good thing'. This function of the term was noted by Duke et al. 
(1995:10) when they undertook a comparison of community development 
approaches for the Home Office focussing on two DPI teams. As noted 
earlier, TDT (1995) was launched at a time of considérable political tension 
and when, politically, the notion of community and what constituted one, was 
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an increasingly contestée! sphère with a variety of meanings attributable to it. 
Duke et al. (1995:11) warned against the 'tendency to focus on particular 
communities', in particular those who were poor or déviant. Most frequently 
however, commentators enlisted the term 'community' to conjure a sensé of a 
localised and geographically based group of people who were 'innocent' and 
somehow 'done to' or 'victimised' by drug users and dealers and those who 
would disrupt their area (Duke et al. 1995:94). The drug users themselves 
were 'others' who were not generally seen as members of that community 
(thus not potentially the sons, daughters or parents of those being victimised), 
nor were they (the drug users) portrayed as a community themselves with 
needs which might be also be locally based. In seeking to draw out good 
practice Duke et al. (1995:103) highlighted the need for the community to be a 
'partner and participant in the process' and not regarded as lan object on 
which to target worK. 
In terms of attribution of the drug problem with regard to community, social 
and environmental factors, TDT dealt directly with the differing perspectives, 
suggesting that: 
'!t is a matter for conjecture what causes an individual to misuse drugs. The 
social environment may be relevant in one case; personal inclination in 
anothef (TDT 1995:54). 
In this way they embraced both the Conservative and Labour positions 
without explicitly denying either. Nonetheless, the strategy went on to assert 
that: 
'Drug misuse is not confined to particular social or economic conditions. 
Poverty will not lead necessarily to drug misuse. Prosperity will not prevent it 
(TDT 1995:54) 
In this way, the link between drug misuse and poverty, and drug misuse and 
crime was less explicitly positioned within the strategy than might be the case 
in later responses. The position was congruent, however, with the view of 
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Conservative MPs preceding the drafting of the strategy. Concessions were 
offered to the social and environmental 'lobby' through the acknowledgement 
that the strategy would also be linked to lother Government poliáes and 
programmes, such as those concerned with housing, employment and 
economic regeneratiorí (TDT 199554). Whilst the assertion was that these 
issues were not 'primarily directed to drug misuse problema they might 
'nevertheless help to deal with theni (TDT 199554). In this way, TDT (1995) 
again managed to demónstrate its ability to cross over difficult political 
boundaries and disputes in a way which ensured that the policy continued to 
be cross-party and cross-departmental. In so doing, it could draw in the broad 
range of political, social and activist opinión needed to be implemented 
effectively. 
Tensions were drawn out, however, at the time by some commentators, such 
as Dennis O'Connor 5 6 at an ISTD conference in 1995. He discussed the 
changing analysis of the drug situation at that time and the role of the A C M D 
in shaping this. In so doing he also picked up on the theme of community, 
suggesting that for pólice torces the 'tensions between concerns for the 
individual and the community were being overeóme' through the practice of 
multi-agency co-operation and a visión of harm reduction which '/s not limited 
to concentrating on misusers, butgoes beyond including considerations ofthe 
wider community who are also harmed by drug misuse'57. This tensión 
between the rights and responsibilities of the individual and the community is 
one which can be seen to intensify over the whole period under consideration 
and under each subsequent drug strategy. In 1995, Duke et al. (1995:15) 
suggested that the 'appearance of endemic drug use and the increased scale 
of the problem' meant a new focus on non-users and recreational users and 
thus on drug prevention work, with the focus of this work being community 
based and aimed at creating drug resistant communities. Under New Labour 
and subsequent strategies, the view of a wider community who were also 
harmed by drug misuse became more powerful and pervasive. 
5 6 A t the t ime D e p u t y C h i e f Cons t ab l e o f K e n t and a lso a r easonab ly we l l k n o w n c o m i n e n t a l o r o n d r u g 
issues in the I990s . 
5 7 Denn i s O ' C o n n o r taken f rom a 'Repo r t o f a Con f e r ence o r gan i s ed b y the I S T D " l M a r c h 1995 E d . 
C a r o l M a r t i n 
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The rôle of the DAT Chair in involving the community is an area as yet 
unexplored. It is not clear whether there was variation in this according to the 
organisation from which the Chair was drawn. As they were overwhelmingly 
drawn from one of three large, bureaucratie organisations, such as the police 
force, health authority or local authority it may not have had a significant 
impact, but it is an area which might be of interest. Further, Teresa Williams 
(1998) in her research discussed the suspicion that many locally based policy 
makers felt towards the involvement of the community in drug strategy. She 
saw this tension as manifested in the rôle of the DPI teams who were most 
likely to champion the local récognition of the potential part communities can 
play in TDT(Williams 1998:69). Her quotes from local players highlighted the 
key areas; namely the concerns which drug agencies themselves felt about 
direct engagement with local communities because of potential objections to 
their work; or the Director of Social Services who felt that the active 
engagement of the community would disrupt the 'clear vision about what we 
see to be the rôle of community groups'; or concerns about managing 
community expectations so that they were 'realistid and finally that: 
Local authorities see it as a threat if you are seen to be empowering 
communities, because they are used to having control, they don't iike letting 
things go. (Williams 1998:70) 5 0 
Williams (1998:5) suggested that without the input of a strategically planned 
and 'dedicated local resourcë such as the DPI, it was unlikely that drug 
prévention work at a community level would be sustained. Clearly, therefore, 
from the start of the strategy and the évaluations of it, with Duke et al. in 1995, 
to Williams iater in 1998, there is évidence that the relationship between 
community and drug strategy is by no means a straightforward one, with a 
complexity which makes it difficult to unravel. In addition, it was an 
engagement which was perhaps harder to measure than some and where, as 
TDT (1995) spelt out, engagement should be 'voluntary'. In a policy designed 
T h i s is a quote f r o m a Sen i o r D e v e l o p m e n t O f f i c e r in the D P I taken f r om W i l l i a m s 1998 
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to be deliverable and measurable it may well have been inevitable that, this 
being the case, the area would eventually gain less attention. 
A policy designed for implementation 
Tackling Drugs Together (1995) was a target driven policy which could be 
monitored for success. DATs and their constituent agencies were required to 
submit annual reports and to measure their performance against Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). As discussed in Chapter 6 this was a newly 
emerging area for government policy and one with which the Treasury were 
closely associated. It was a business idea that transferred to the civil service, 
government and policy making. In so doing, it provided a challenge to those 
attempting to find ways to measure activity meaningfully and to demonstrate 
impact. There was considerable central and local discussion about the 
meaning of terms, such as 'outputs' and 'outcomes', which many found 
confusing and distracting5 9. The positives of this approach for those 
implementing policy was, however, demonstrated in a report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General to Parliament on 15 July 1998. Sir John 
Bourn, the head of the National Audit Office, reported that Customs and 
Excise had far exceeded their targets for drug seizures and had thus 
prevented the importation of drug shipments into the U K 6 0 . As the agency 
with lead responsibility for this facet of the strategy they were able to 
demonstrate their success with the seizure of drugs worth £3.3 billion and 
having 'dismantled' 130 drug smuggling organisations. 6 1 
Mechanisms were put in place which required DATs to report collectively on 
their activity and that of their constituent members against the strategy's three 
key aims to the C D C U . Appendix B was dedicated to how local performance 
" I a m aware o f this f r om m y o w n l ime as a D A T coo rd ina to r at this pe r i od and f r o m r u n n i n g 
i n f o rma t i on sess ions and h o l d i n g d i s cuss i ons in D A T meet ings and other f o rums to i n f o r m peop l e o f 
the d i f f e rence be tween the two and to c ons id e r h o w K P I s might be cons t ruc ted and h o w ac t i v i t y m igh t 
be measured . 
6 0 N a t i o n a l A u d i t O f f i c e Press N o t i c e H M C u s t o m s and E x c i s e : T h e P reven t i on o f D r u g S m u g g l i n g . I ? 
J u l y 1998 
6 1 T h i s is an area ( r epor t ing on 'targets ach ieved ) w h i c h has been sca led b a c k in 2 0 0 4 : d i s c u s s i o n 
centres o n whe the r this is due to popu la t i on fat igue: that peop le don ' t ' b e l i e v e ' the success , etc. 
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indicators could be developed and laid out that it was 'essentiaf that Drug 
Action Teams are in a position to evaluate their progress in Une with the 
Statement of Purpose and local prioritieś (TDT 1995:65). This évaluation 
needed to incorporate 'appropriate performance indicators which will 
supplément at a local level, the key performance indicators which 
Government departments will use to monitor overall progress on the strategy1 
(TDT 1995:65). Reporting of activity in a collective way meant that it tied 
constituent organisations into working together so that they were then in a 
position to be able to demonstrate they had done so. This was also a new 
phenomenon and one which required mechanisms for reporting and 
evaluating the activity as well as structures for coordinating the information 
and collecting it. Further, it allowed for those mechanisms to be developed 
subsequently for ever greater levels of performance monitoring. 
In addition, the individual organisations that formed the DATs had their own 
performance targets which they were expected to meet and report on. This 
was explicitly stated in the strategy where it was made clear that the Chair 
was accountable for the 'progress which the Team as a whole makes towards 
the three aims...' but that in addition each member of the team would be 
'accountable to their own agencies... for their individual contribution to the 
collaborative work... and the resources which are depioyed to fulfii the joint 
action plans of the DAT (TDT 1995:60). The explicitness of the 
responsibilities were therefore laid out - the organisation was required to act 
collectively as a part of the DAT and individually. Further, central government 
would be monitoring and auditing this activity and looking for évidence that it 
had occurred and for its' impact against the national stratégies objectives, as 
well as against local need. The information reported on via the DAT or 
individual organisation could, therefore, range from the number of drug 
misusers recorded on the Régional Drug Misuse Database (MacGregor 
2006:404) to a whole thematic inspection of the Probation Service by its own 
Inspectorate against 'a number of taskś set the 147 services in England 
between the years 1995-8 by TDT (HMI of Probation 1997:9). 
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The scale of the performance measurement, the collective responsibility and 
the pursuit of information by central government was new and challenging for 
all concerned. Clearly, the intention was that the strategy would be 
implemented and that this activity would be performance monitored; TDT 
(1995) was a clear, signposted move, therefore, towards demonstrably 
implementable social policy. 
The ability to monitor performance and report on 'success' is, of course, 
important to governments who need to feedback to the electorate every five 
years on the success of the strategies which formed part of their election 
manifestos. Social policies which combined elements of measurement later 
became increasingly important and, for New Labour, in 1997 this became a 
key feature of many of the policies which were introduced. It was a platform 
on which they hoped to demonstrate success across a number of target 
areas, from children's educational achievements, to anti-social behaviour, 
particular sorts of crime and drug misuse. It was an area immediately picked 
up on by Ann Taylor in her announcements to the house regarding TDTBB 
(1998), as discussed in Chapter Six. 
Conclusions 
TDT (1995) was an innovative policy which was seen to be able to unite 
disparate political, policy and practice agendas. It used partnership in a new 
way, linking it to innovation and delivery. The mechanism also allowed, 
however, for the policy to be seen to be flexible and adaptable to local 
circumstances. It permitted the Conservative government to 'go round' local 
authorities with whom they had negative relationships. In addition the 
partnership approach made possible the development of central organisations 
such as the C D C U who could oversee the implementation of a national 
strategy in a direct way. The evaluations of the TDT (1995) strategy may 
have influenced the New Labour response, which was to change the strategy 
whilst building on the basic structure which had been created by TDT (1995) 
and the emphasis on implementation. Thus, the effects of New Labour were 
to increase the managerial and centralised aspects of the strategy, along with 
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the levels of funding. Changes to the 'architecture' of the policy were made 
but thèse essentially strengthened (at least at first) what was originally 
created. 
The changing nature of drug misuse and welfare provision, the moralised 
political agenda, the growth of managerialism and partnership can be traced 
through the development of this policy and were reinforced under New Labour 
who were elected to government in 1997. In 1998, with their own strategy 
TDTBBB (1998), they changed the emphasis of the drug strategy subtly but 
perceptibly. The link between drug misuse and crime was strengthened and 
there was a greater emphasis placed on Class A drug use and, in particular, 
links were made which suggested that both contributed towards the decay 
and disruption experienced in communities. The emphasis on the community 
was strengthened which provided another strong discourse alongside that of 
partnership. We will explore this further in the next chapter. 
140 
Chapter five - Implementing drug policy -1998 - 2004 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the period after New Labour took power ¡n 1997 and 
introduced their first drug strategy in 1998. Its focus is on how drug policy 
was implemented post-1998 and in particular the changing emphasis in the 
drug strategies; this includes the proliferatíon of the partnership approach and 
the use of performance management in an attempt to evidence policy 
¡mplementation. 
Along with Chapter 4 (which focuses on 1994-1997) this chapter tells a 
chronological story and is based on documentary sources. It also seeks to 
consider how other social policy factors contributed to and influenced the 
strategies adopted fortackling drug issues. 
New Labour built on and referenced Tackling Drugs Together (TDT, 1995), 
but also made subtle changes in emphasis. These included giving more 
attention to investigating a link between drug misuse and crime, the effects of 
drug misuse on communities and links between Class A drug use, crime and 
urban deprivation. In addition, New Labour sought to 'join up' policy initiatives 
aimed at tackling a number of complex social issues. 
The partnership approach embodied in TDT (1995) was expanded and 
incorporated into a whole series of other initiatives - particularly those 
concerned with complex social policy áreas where a number of agencies were 
involved. This proliferatíon has latterly led some academics and 
commentators to begin to suggest that there has been an observable change 
in the nature of governance from that period and that it might be possible to 
trace the emergence of new institutional forms (Newman 2001). 
Additionally, New Labour placed lan increased emphasis on ¡mplementation' 
and the ability to evidence it through the development and use of tighter 
performance management structures (Modernising Government 1999; 
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Lowdnes 2005); those structures also gave central government an opportunity 
to more closely oversee implementation (Davies 2005). The concern with 
implementation was also présent in other social policy areas and built into 
devolved government functions such as government offices and 'ad hoc' 
structures such as a specially created 'special health authority', the National 
Treatment Agency (NTA). 
As we have seen, during the 1980's and 1990's there had been a political 
reaction to the perceived change in drug misuse in the UK and this had 
incorporated a number of practical responses such as the development of 
harm minimisation in the treatment and care of IV drug users, through to the 
création of a special Ministerial Sub-Committee devoted to the considération 
of how best to respond to the new drug misuse situation. The political 
response had been to create a drug policy which was cross-departmental, 
incorporated cross party support and was based on a concept of partnership. 
This appeared to be a winning combination and the strategy, TDT (1995), was 
widely welcomed. In addition, the strategy sought to address criticisms of the 
previous attempts to work in an inter-agency way with regard to the substance 
misuse issue and thus it incorporated high level support, central oversight of 
the strategy and clear expectations about delivery. Evaluations of component 
parts of the strategy (Williams 1998; Duke and MacGregor 1997) indicated 
that the basic structures were functional and could be built on; it appears that 
New Labour took this advice on board when devising their own strategy. 
New Labour also acted in accordance with an analysis which emerged from 
the Labour benches during the 1980's and 1990's, and this was to draw a 
stronger link between drug use and crime and drug use, deprivation and the 
impact on communities. The strategy was, therefore, able to fit in with New 
Labour's wider moral emphasis on personal social responsibility and ideas of 
communitarianism. 
No-one at this point questioned the need for a drug strategy; it had, by then, 
become an important part of the fabric of social policy ideas and as such was 
142 
embedded in the moral thinking and stratégie plans for implementing social 
change (Blair 1998). 
Changing analysis of social factors 1998-2004 
Tackling drugs under New Labour- a 'new angle' 
New Labour needed a 'new angle' (Hellawell 2002:295) on drugs policy and 
whilst Tackling Drugs To Build a Better Britain (TDTBBB, 1998) shared many 
similarities with Tackling Drugs Together (TDT, 1995), it contained those 'new 
angles' too. It brought in a Drugs Czar, an increased emphasis on treatment, 
an enhanced rôle for DATs and a new emphasis on social and environmental 
factors. 
The appointment of a Drugs Czar 6 2 was a direct borrowing from the US. Keith 
Hellawell described the téléphone call he received seeking his 'thoughts' on 
the création of such a post prior to the élection: 
'Düring the lead up to the 1997 General Election I received a call at home 
from one of Tony Blair's personal aides..."Tony's giving a speech on drugs in 
Aberdeen tomorrow," she said. "He's iooking for a new angle, and wouid Hke 
to say that if he's elected hell appoint a Drugs Tsar. What would be your 
response?" (Hellawell 2002:295) 
Hellawell reported that he knew of the mixed expérience of such an office in 
the USA and so asked what the role would entail, only to be told: 
1 We haven't got that far yet. We just want to know if you would support the 
idea ornot? (Hellaweil 2002:295) 
He duly applied for the post once New Labour were elected and took up post 
on 5 January 1998. As Druglink wrote: 
6 2 T h e t it le was in tact the U K A n l i - D r u g s C o o r d i n a t o r but the post was c o m m o n l y re ferred to as the 
D r u g s C z a r , a l so s ome t imes spe i t Tsar , 
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'It carne as no surphse...but on 14 October Keith Hellawell was anointed as 
Britain's first Drug Czar3 (Druglink 1997). 
Hellawell had been around the drugs world for some time and sat on the 
ACMD. As Chief Constable of West Yorkshire he had also acted as 
spokesperson for the Association of Chief Pólice Officers (ACPO) on drug 
issues. 
The need for a Drugs Czar to drive forward the strategy was, at the time, 
debateable and New Labour's apparent 'discarding' of the Czar by 2002 may 
lend credence to this view. The Czar was to nave 'no new resources...no 
specific powers to change or challenge practice or resources' (Druglink 1997) 
and thus it was an unusual appointment; it combined seniority and 
powerlessness, a fact which Hellawell reflected on in some detail in his 
autobiography - The Outsider. Nonetheless in his personal statement 
supporting TDTBB (1998) the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had linked his 
determination 'to tackle the drugs problem'63 as the reason why he had made 
the appointment. 
Hellawell was also joined by a Deputy, which had not been anticipated. The 
appointment of Mike Trace, who emerged from work in the treatment sector, 
led some to conclude that there was a visible attempt to be seen to 'join' the 
crime and treatment divide so often described in the drug world. From the 
beginning, commentators such as Anna Bradley, head of ISDD at the time, 
commented: 
'The difflculty inherent in making the entire drug field devetop and hold to 
shared objectives and budgets should not be underestimated.' (Druglink 
1997) 
6 3 T o n y B l a i r A Pe r sona l S ta tement 27 A p r i l l u 9 S : c m 3 9 4 5 . 
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The Drugs Czar was responsible for coming into government, reviewing the 
outgoing drug strategy (TDT, 1995) which was due to finish in 1998 and 
reviewing the resources and focus necessary for the next strategy. Hellawell 
described this process and how, once appointed, he discovered that it 
seemed impossible to discover just how much was spent on drugs, how many 
people received treatment and exactly what was being undertaken. This was 
despite the fact that the strategy was to build on the previous one, TDT 
(1995), which had been in existence for some three years. As highlighted that 
strategy had been specifically developed with the ability to monitor Outputs, 
measure progress against the strategy and report against nationally agreed 
KPIs for both DATs and individual organisations. The absence of detail and 
the drive to achieve it led to some difficultés for the Czar and Hellawell 
described the attempt to obtain information thus: 
'In order to bring about change, I needed to identify exactiy what was 
happening and establish how much money we were spending on the problem; 
this proved to be more difficult than I expected, first because of paucity of 
information, but principafly due to obstruction from civil servants' (Hellaweil 
2002:299) 
Hellawell considered that placing someone so highly in a semi-government 
position with direct responsibilities for policy, may have been interpreted as 
offering a challenge and a threat to senior civil servants (Hellawell 2002:299, 
300 and 301). He gave a detailed account of this poor relationship and this 
may have contributed to his later isolation. However, as noted in Chapter 2, 
New Labour Ministers such as David Blunkett (2006) have described similar 
issues with regard to accessing information and dealing with civil service staff 
(in particular senior staff) on occasions and thus Hellawell's difficulties may 
not have been related to the unusual nature of his position, but might, in part, 
be due to nothing more than attempts to exercise power and obtain 
information within large bureaucratie organisations, or central government. 
Nonetheless, the difficulties in obtaining information and thus évidence about 
implementation were undoubtedly instructive and it is probable that this was 
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influential on the re-drafted strategy Tackling Drugs To Build a Better Britain 
(TDTBB, 1998). 
TDT (1995) nad been designed with implementation and monitoring in mind. 
What appears to have been found however was that the KPI's and information 
obtained were not spécifie enough. It would seem that the resuit was that 
performance monitoring came to play an even greater role than in the 
previous strategy. 
A moral engagement - respect, communities, drugs and crime 
Another part of the 'new angle' taken by New Labour with regard to the 
development of their strategy was their analysis of substance misuse issues. 
The resuit was a more explicit emphasis on social and environmental factors. 
Thèse were approached from an ideological perspective which placed 
philosophies focussing on communities at their heart; idéologies which were 
linked to communitarianism and those placing an emphasis on personal and 
social responsibility were particularly influential: 
'Respect is a simple notion. We know înstinctively what it means. Respect for 
others - their opinions, values and way of fife. Respect for neighbours; respect 
for the community that means caring about others. Respect for property which 
means not toierating mindless vandalism, theft, and graffiti. And self-respect, 
which means giving as well as taking. 
Respect is at the heart of a belief in society. It is what makes us a community, 
not merely a group of isolated individuais. It makes reai a new contract 
between citizen and state, a contract that says that with rights and 
opportunities corne responsibiiities and obligations.64 
This emphasis directed by the Prime Minister himself has been reinforced 
since 1998 and can be seen to permeate the TDTBBB (1998) strategy and in 
T o n y B l a i r S u n d a y N o v e m b e r 10, 2002 T h e O b s e r v e r f r om G u a r d i a n U n l i m i t e d webs i te 2 0 0 4 
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particular responses to drugs and crime. Environmental and social factors 
and Community issues were particularly linked to the issue of drugs and crime. 
This was a change from the TDT (1995) strategy which had argued (as we 
have seen) that it was a 'matter for conjecture' (TDT 1995:54) whether social 
and environmental factors were more or less relevant than personal 
inclination as causes of drug misuse. Linking social and environmental 
factors, personal social responsibility and Community issues meant that the 
issue of drugs and crime also became a more central concern; crime to fund 
drug use, the impact of crime on poor communities and in addition the 
prevalence of drug users in the criminal justice System and the criminal justice 
System as a way to access drug users and divert them into treatment. As 
discussed some Labour MPs (for example, Barry Sherman) were trailing 
similar ideas in the House of Commons debate in 1989. In 1998, just over ten 
years later, they were drawn on again as features of drug use by Tony Blair in 
his personal Statement in support of the TDTBB (1998) strategy. In his 
Statement, Blair said that 'the fight against drugs' is a 'pari of a wider ränge of 
policies to renew communities and ensure decent opportunities..: This was a 
'fight which was 'not just for the government' but for 'everyone who cares 
about the future of our society.65 
The ideological analysis which linked crime and drug use was supported by 
research which had been funded as a part of the overall development of drug 
policy which led to the TDT (1995) strategy. This research was known as the 
Effectiveness Review and it had been commissioned in April 1994 by the 
Conservatives as part of the development of the Strategie response to drug 
misuse; the intention was to look at evidence about the effectiveness of drug 
treatment approaches. It was comprised of 'people from a wide ränge of 
backgrounds to reflect Ministers' wishes that the review should bring a fresh 
perspective to the treatment of drug misuse' and not simply reflect the views 
of 'the drugs (obby, a self-interested professional provider interesf 
(MacGregor 2006:404). The review which was published in May 1996 
concluded that 'treatment works' which MacGregor (2006:405) has suggested 
T o n y B l a i r A P e r sona l Statement 27 A p r i l 1998: c m 3 9 4 5 . 
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was a direct counterpoise to the popularised political phrase 'prison works'. In 
this sensé, the review supported an approach which incorporated and funded 
treatment as a way of effectively combating drug use and which took a social 
and environmental focus. Research from the National Treatment Outcome 
Research Study (NTORS: 1996) which had formed a part of the review 
suggested that a substantial number of drug users were funding their drug 
use through offending and this appeared to provide explicit évidence of a 
'direct' link 6 6. This cohort study of a thousand drug users began in 1995; its 
findings suggested a treatment effect which was to reduce criminal activity 
and, by 2001, they reported that improvements noticed at year one were: 
' ...maintained at the 2 year and 4-5 year follow-ups. Many of the greatest 
réductions in criminal activity occurred among the most active 
o ff enders: (Gossop et al. 2001:3) 
Thus the approach undertaken by New Labour in 1998 was, in part, supported 
by research évidence which at that time was émergent and the emphasis 
would be subsequently strengthened over the period; this linked drug use and 
criminal activity and made the assumption that attempts to fight crime needed 
also to tackle drug use. New Labour used this 'évidence', as a 'validation of 
the ethos and direction of the government's new drugs strategy...£? Of the 
four main findings highlighted in a press release by Tessa Jowell from the 
Department of Health about the findings from the third NTORS Bulletin (1998) 
three highlighted gains made as the resuit of treatment and the fourth drew on 
the 'savings to société which resulted from a réduction in criminal activity 
following treatment - it used what came to be a powerful and often quoted 
figure: 
T h e estimâtes suggest that for every extra £1 spent on drug misuse 
treatment, more than £3 is saved on costs of crime'68 
W h e t h e r dr t ig usc and c r i m e arc causa l l y re la ted or c o - e x i s t i n g factors is the subject o f c ons i d e r ab l e 
a c a d e m i c and prac t i ce based debate. 
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A partnership approach 
The new drug strategy retained the notions of 'partnership' and their 
embodiment within those stratégies, DATs. Ann Taylor described a 
'partnership approach' as 'essentiaf69 and linked this to consistency of 
message and action across the whole range of government, statutory and 
voluntary sector agencies, as well as community groups and individuals. 
Partnership was, therefore, seen as integral to the structure of the strategy, 
and the way in which the policy would function across the whole social policy 
spectrum. The introductory pages which highlighted the key éléments of the 
strategy, laid out lthe problerri, 'the vision', 'partnership' and 'resources': the 
notion of partnership was, therefore, both integral and significant within the 
strategy and this was linked both to central government arrangements and to 
localities, with DATs described as: 
'...the critical link in the chain, ensuring that the strategy is transiated into 
concrète action' (TDTBB 1998:3). 
TDTBBB (1998) was to also significantly add to the 'power' exercised by 
DATs through their increased control of budgets and sphères of influencing 
other purchasing mechanisms, such as joint commissioning. This is 
considered in füll detail later in the chapter. 
Moving from TDT to TDTBBB 
There was clear acknowledgement that TDTBBB (1998) built on and learnt 
from TDT (1995), which was described as 'the first genuinely stratégie 
response in England to the complexities of the drugs problem' (TDTBB 
1998:9). The cross party support which it reeeived was also said to have 
been contributory to the 'coordinated approach' which had been sustained 
and it was highlighted that as: 
A n n T a y l o r S la tement o n T D T B B to House o f C o m m o n s 27 A p r i l 1998; pr inted speech as 
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..all 88 of the tasks required in that White Paper have been completed(this) 
indicates good progress. ' (TDTBB 1998:9) 
The implication was, therefore, that progress had been able to be monitored, 
but perhaps not as thoroughly as key players might now wish. The criticisms 
which the new strategy levelled at TDT (1995) were that it had been too 
focussed on 'structures rather than results', and had a lack of focus on 'other 
social and environmental factors'; further it had advocated partnership 'without 
making sufficient structural and fiscal changes to support if and that it was 
'too short term' (TDTBB 1998:9). 
The key criticisms clearly reflected New Labour's concerns with the impact of 
drug use on communities and the perceived link with inequality and social and 
environmental factors. Additionally, it was important that they could évidence 
progress and engage the public through the dissémination of what had been 
achieved (Mowlam 2003). Consequently, there was a perceived need to focus 
on structures and resources which would enable évidence to be collected and 
ensure that it was possible to communicate the results. A requirement of the 
new strategy was that it be structured to allow this to happen. 
Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain 1998-2002 
The strategy 
The new strategy was launched on 27 April 1998 and was devised as 'a ten-
year strategy precisely because of the complexity of the problem'70. The 
news release prepared for its announcement used the language of action and 
toughness. It heralded 'piloting drug treatment and testing orders for 
offenders' and reducing drug misuse with an emphasis on 'shifting resources 
away from reacting to the problem to preventing it..:7\ Thus, prévention too 
was linked to crime and engagement with offenders, as well as educational 
interventions targeting young people. 
' u N e w s Re l ease 27 A p r i l 1998 C A B 107/98 
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Of the 'tacts' listed about drug misuse the focus was on cost and scale and 
the 'key objectives' listed réductions in access to and use of drugs; what both 
séries of bullets also included was an emphasis on the links between drug 
use and crime and two of the four key objectives included reducing drug use 
amongst offenders and increasing their participation in treatment. 
The new strategy was explicitly linked to TDT (1995) by Ann Taylor in her 
statement to the House of Commons. She outlined that 'much has been done 
in récent years' and that TDT (1995) had been lan important step forward and 
drew 'in particular1 on the existence of DATs as an illustration of this. She 
saw however, that 'the problems...remain acutë and suggested that a 'more 
stratégie responsë had been required based on a 'rigorous assessment of the 
problem, of what works and of what needs to be done to have a real impact72. 
Although TDTBBB (1998) continued to say, as TDT (1995) had done, that 
there were no 'easy answers', the 'visiori which it promulgated was that drug 
misuse was located within a wider social policy context: 
'Drug problems do not occur in isolation. They are often tied in with other 
social problems.' (TDTBBB 1998:2) 
The link from this policy to other social policies was therefore explicit and 
often reiterated; for example the Prime Minister referred to how the new drug 
strategy was connected to a 'wider range of policies' and the opportunity 'to 
renew our communities../3. This also demonstrated once again how drug 
misuse was placed within the context of social inequality and that this was 
consistent within the various ways in which the strategy was promulgated -
thus within the strategy itself, and the news releases and speeches 
surrounding the launch. 
7 2 A n n T a y l o r Statement o n T D T B B l o House o f C o m m o n s 27 A p r i l 1998 : pr inted speech as 
d i s t r ibuted w i th news release package by C a b i n e t O f f i c e Press O f f i c e 
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The change in emphasis between TDT (1995) and TDTBBB (1998) was not 
confined to a sensé of drug misuse as a social and environmental problem, 
but also concerned with a heightened sensé of danger and of '...threat to 
heaith, a threat on the streets and a serious threat to communities..: 
(TDTBBB 1998:2) The Prime Minister referred to the 'fight against the evii of 
drugs..:74 in a cabinet press reléase, and in his personal Statement at the 
Start of the strategy he talked about 'the vicious cycle of drugs and crime 
which wrecks iives and threatens communities' (TDTBBB 1998:1). This is 
palpably différent from TDT (1995) where the emphasis had been on 
presenting a calm and non-judgemental response to 'containing the drugs 
problem' which it too had acknowledged was a long term issue, to which the 
Prime Minister (John Major) attached 'a very high priorité (TDT 1995: V) and 
which involved government, individuáis and communities. TDT (1995) had 
discussed the link with crime and the impact on communities, but had done so 
in annex A on page 38 of the strategy; in TDTBBB (1998) the link was drawn 
on page one by the Prime Minister. It is not, therefore, that the language, 
issues or context were entirely new in TDTBBB (1998), it was the emphasis 
which changed; an emphasis on threat and danger and the Wecking ' of 
communities. There was also a reduced concern with individual drug users 
and an increased sensé of the drug user as a threat, an underminer of 
communities whose drug using behaviour was linked to other anti-social and 
criminal behaviour. Related to this, there was a more explicit focus on the 
drugs which '...cause the greatest damage such as 'heroin and cocainë 
(TDTBBB 1998:3). Overall, TDT (1995) can be read as a discussion 
document which presented arguments for its viewpoint and gave reasons why 
it was taking this approach. TDTBBB (1998) tells the reader what the problem 
is and what must be done; responding to drug misuse is no longer a 
debateable policy option, there is clear and signposted direction 7 5. 
" ¡ N e w D r u g S t ra tegy P u b l i s h e d ' N e w s Reléase 27 A p r i l 1.998 C A B 107/98 
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The TDTBBB (1998) strategy had four éléments: 
1/ Young people - to help young people resist drug misuse in order to achieve 
their fuil potential in society 
2/ Communities - to protect our communities from drug related crime 
3/ Treatment - to enable people with drug problems to overcome them and 
live healthy and crime free lives. 
4/ A vailability - to stifie the a vailability of illegal drugs on our streets. 
Three of the four objectives referred explicitly to crime or illegality even though 
two of the éléments are ostensibly about treatment and communities. The 
'underlying principles' of the strategy were described as 'intégration, évidence, 
joint action, consistency of action, effective communication and accountability' 
(TDTBBB 1998). Integration was defined as recognising that 'drug problems 
do not occur in isolation' and the link with inequality was again directly made. 
The strategy was, as noted, explicitly connected to the other government 
stratégies aimed at combating social inequality, and the Social Exclusion Unit 
was specifically mentioned. 
Thus, although the Strategy was attributed to the Czar, there was a clear and 
identifiable link with thèmes related to Labour's analysis of the drug problem 
over the preceding years and with New Labour's analysis of the social policy 
setting; namely the issues of social exclusion, the impact of crime in gênerai 
and on poor communities in particular and individual and social responsibility. 
The appointment of a Czar who came from an impoverished background and 
who had clearly been driven to 'achieve', may, when combined with his 
professional background as a police officer, have seemed bound to serve to 
reinforce and enhance theîr own analytical and policy position. As such it may 
have also seemed likely to enhance the appearance and fabric of the 
Strategy. In some ways, Hellawell may have seemed an embodiment of New 
Labour's social policy analysis of what was possible with the right level of 
social policy development and implementation. 
7 6 D i r e c t l y quo l ed f r o m T a c k l i n g D r u g s T o B u i l d a Be l t e r B r i l a i n - the G o v c r n m e n t ' s t e n - Y e a r 
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Noël Towe, a seasoned commentator from the drug scène at this time , 
wrote for a European audience about the Strategy and explicitly developed 
the link between drug misuse and social inequality. He suggested that this 
would be achieved by coordinating 'the activity of government departments' 
and confronting 'the problem on a national and international levé! as well as 
supporting the work ofthe DATs'. He went on to describe the work of the 108 
DATs in England a s : 7 8 
'identifying the prohlems associated with drugs and developing plans to deal 
with those problems. Each DAT...submits thèse plans to the Cabinet Office 
Anti Drugs Co-ordination Unit which oversees the strategy.' 
He went on to discuss how the English strategy could influence the European 
one for 2002-4 and talked of a European acknowledgement that there should 
be less concentration on the supply side and more concentration on demand 
réduction, as had occurred within TDTBBB (1998). He suggested, 
furthermore, that there was also within Europe an: 
'edging...towards a strategy on illicit drugs that recognises the links with the 
social exclusion agenda' (Towe 1999). 
Thus, it would seem that there was a change in both the English and 
European stratégies which included a new willingness to embrace 
environmental and social factors in the analysis of the causes of drug misuse 
and the subséquent stratégies for action. The thème, however, was one 
' Noël T o w e , P o l i e y O f t icer for the L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t A s s o c i a t i o n and expert adv i s o r to E u r o p e a n 
U n i o n ' s C o m m i t t e e o f t h e Régions and E c o n o m i e and S o c i a l C o m m i t t e e Paper for E U 1999 accessed 
f r om D r u g S c o p e webs i te 2 0 0 4 : w w w . d r u g s c o p c . o r g . u k 
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linked to the rhetoric of 'tough on the causes of, but also tough on the 
actuality of crime. Ann Taylor stated that: 
'Action will be comprehensive, combining firm enforcement with prevention. It 
will be linked to our wide reaching programme to get people off benefit and 
into work, with reforms in the welfare state, education, health, criminal justice 
and the economy and with work to tackle social exclusion: 79 
A clear and explicit link was made between drug misuse and social exclusion 
issues by New Labour, which, as they pointed out in their introduction to the 
strategy was new. This clearly identifiable difference in analysis can be 
traced throughout the debates of the 1980's and 1990's as we have seen. 
However, it was not linked to a desire to excuse or explain drug misuse, 
criminal or anti-social behaviour as a result. There was a sense that poverty, 
poor housing, unemployment and lack of access to adequate education and 
health was not an excuse for drug misuse and that strategies aimed at 
combating these would not offer these as potential sources for doing so. 
Additionally, it drew on the theme of personal responsibility, which had 
previously been highlighted by Conservative MPs such as Ann Widdecombe. 
In so doing, the themes of degeneration, regeneration and a need to re-focus 
on a moral agenda which were present across New Labour's social policy 
spectrum were also to be found in the drug strategy; again an indication of 
how well the Strategy had become integrated within the wider social policy 
agenda. 
New Labour thinking which associated economic and social deprivation with 
issues of personal and social responsibility was often linked, especially in the 
early period following the election, to the fact that 'the drugs problem is 
A n n T a y l o r Statement on T D T B B to House o f C o m m o n s 21 A p r i l 1998; p r in ted speech as d i s t r i bu t ed 
w i t h news release package by Cab ine t O f f i c e Press O f f i c e 
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complex . This complexity was usually subsequently joined to a need for a 
'partnership approach': 8 1 
'Because of the complexity of the problem, partnership reaily is essential at 
everylevei: (TBBB 1998:3) 
Over the next five years an increased emphasis on the responsibility of the 
individual and the destructiveness of the drug user, especially where drug use 
was linked to crime (Stimson 2000) and an increased emphasis on the 'moral' 
agenda can be seen to émerge in the Updated Strategy (2002). 
A cross departmental approach 
As highlighted, New Labour referred to the difficulties of dealing with drug 
misuse, as the Conservatives had, by referring to the 'complexity' of the issue. 
TDT (1995) had taken a cross-departmental and inter-organisational 
approach which brought together the various Strands of social and pénal 
policy in order to ensure that the issue could be tackled broadly enough. 
However, earlier criticisms of previous inter-agency fora (Howard et al. 1993) 
had, as we have seen, highlighted the fragmentary and insufficient responses 
which could resuit from this type of approach and suggested that work needed 
to be better coordinated and receive attention from the centre of a sufficiently 
high level. TDT (1995) had attempted to tackle thèse issues through the 
création of the DATs, and other attempts included the DPI and the C D C U , 
and the personal interest of the Prime Minister, John Major and the 
concentrated efforts of Tony Newton. When evaluating the impact of TDT 
(1995) and seeking to gather évidence for the new strategy the Czar and his 
deputy had, however, purportedly found gaps in knowledge and had been 
unable to identify what was done by whom, when and for what cost (Hellawell 
2002:299). The new strategy sought to directly address thèse issues by 
fi0 A n n T a y l o r 1 9 9 8 T D T B B B S p e e c h l a u n c h i n g ihe strategy i n the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . H a n s a r d . 
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continuing with the inter-departmental (if renamed) and inter-organisational 
approach, but also sought to ensure that the reporting mechanisms to the 
centre were strengthened. Thus the news reléase for the publication of the 
new strategy referred explicitly to thèse issues: 
'The White Paper "Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain" is a new cross-
Government approach to a compiex problem.e2 
In the bullet points which followed the importance of target setting and 
évidence was also drawn out. In her speech to the House of Commons Ann 
Taylor highlighted that: 
T h e drugs problem is compiex. it has many différent aspects which require 
responses at différent levéis. Responsibility for action lies with many différent 
Government Departments, statutory services, voluntary agencies, businesses, 
Community groups and individuáis:93 
This point was linked to the fact that it was considered that 'action is patchy, 
uncoordinated, short-ierm or based on inadéquate knowledge of what works 
or what others are doingf94. TDTBBB (1998) highlighted the weaknesses in 
TDT (1995) which included a lack of bringing together 'common research, 
information and performance bases' (TDTBBB 1998:9). Nonetheless, it also 
cited as an 'important development' the: 
'Strengthened links between a wide range of agencies, working together to 
achieve collaborative goals on drug prévention/éducation and enforcement -
an approach confirmed by récent reports from the statutory Inspectorates..: 
(TDTBBB 1998:9) 
The importance of the cross-departmental and inter-organisational approach 
was both accepted and drawn out as a direct need in order to deal with the 
" ' N e w D r u g Strategy P u b l i s h e d ' N e w s Re lease 27 A p r i l 1998 C A B 107/98 
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'complex' social policy issue; this demonstrated direct continuity with TDT 
(1995). However, an important feature was the need for an increased 
emphasis on evidencing impact - performance monitoring. 
Prime ministerial attention and a focus on delivery 
As discussed previously, a criticism levelled in the past at inter-agency 
attempts to tackle drug misuse and which TDT had sought to address, was a 
lack of attention from the centre to progress in localities. In particular, it was 
suggested that attention from the highest level had been absent. TDTBBB 
(1998) again sought to learn from thèse criticisms and to follow the example 
TDT (1995) set. The new strategy opened with an address from the Prime 
Minister - which was headlined as a Personal Statement. This outlined how 
he was 'determined to tackle...'(TDTBBB 1998:1) drug misuse and drew out 
how this was linked into the wider social policy issues and the broader 
agendas of communities, modernisation and welfare reforms. He stamped his 
authority on the whole issue by making it clear that he had appointed the 
Drugs Czar as a sign of his détermination to 'tackle the drugs problem. 
(TDTBBB 1998:1). The Prime Ministerial Statements in the two drug policies in 
1995 and 1998 were not wholly dissimilar, both drawing on ideas of the 
greater good, but the emphasis was différent. In TDT (1995) the présentation 
from John Major was focussed strongly on coopération and the strategy as a 
response to 'constructive advicë (TDTBBB 1998: V); that from Tony Blair 
concentrated on the harm of drug misuse, the wider social policy context and 
his personal authority. 
Partnership - Drug Action Teams 
Drug Action Teams had been created by the TDT (1995) White Paper and 
TDTBBB (1998) stated that: 
'The création and development of Drug Action Teams (original emphasis) 
and their Référence Groups ... had been very encouraging, with substantiaiiy 
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greaier cohésion of effort and sharing of resources amongst health and local 
authorities, criminal justice agencies and other key players, agreed action 
plans and better priohtisation of local needs. ' (TDTBBB 1998:9) 
As an endorsement of the continuation of the approach it was, therefore, 
substantial. In addition, (in the news release to announce the strategy), Ann 
Taylor was quoted as saying that the strategy had 'partnership and common 
purpose at its heart..:&s In her speech to the House of Commons she 
described the 'partnership approach' as 'essentiaf because of the complexity 
of the drugs problem and the involvement of 'many différent agencies; as a 
resuit she drew out the role of the DATs 'who will be responsible for 
implementing the strategy on the ground and who would work in conjunction 
with the Drugs Czar who would link local and central issues ensuring that 
'anti-drugs work is relevant and effective*6 The Drugs Czar himself says in 
his memoirs that: 
lWe were determined to ensure that our Community based programmes were 
co-ordinated and defivered adequately at a local ievel...DATs had been 
created for this purpose under the previous Conservative Government, and 
now ihey came under my responsibiiity. They comprised the heads of the 
local police, health, éducation, social services, prisons and the local 
authorities. My initial impression was that they were little more than talking 
shops: although highly committed people they had little direction and were 
uncertain what they were supposed to do. This was a huge waste of 
Potential..: (Hellawell2002:323) 
It is not clear if this reflected a government view at the time, as DATs are an 
area which the TDTBBB (1998) strategy picks out as a success for TDT 
(1995); and for which, it was suggested, that there was évidence they had 
successfully achieved 'greater cohésion of effort and sharing of resources1 
across 'key players' than had heretofore been the case (TDTBBB 1998:9). 
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Therefore, although Hellawell's comments may represent feeling at the 
centre, they might also have been motivated by his own wish to appear to 
bring about change within the DATs, for ne continues: 
'Together we developed a much more focussed agenda, which included 
setting performance indicators, targets, annual plans and reports which 
mirrored mine at national levei. ' (Hellawell, K 2002: 323) 
Thus, as with the strategy overall, it may have been that in the first three 
years of TDT (1995), DATs achieved an unprecedented coordination of effort 
at a local level on drugs issues, but that it had not been possible for effort to 
be as fully recorded as the centre wished. The next stage therefore which 
was begun by TDTBBB (1998) was to refine and increase the level of 
performance monitoring which was undertaken. This highlighted and 
underlined the détermination to ensure implementation of the drug strategy 
and to see DATs as the partnership conduit through which to achieve this. 
The role of DATs was therefore essentially unchanged by TDTBBB (1998). 
They remained central to the strategy and to local implementation as they had 
been under TDT (1995); they were to continue to be the principal means of 
communication between the centre and localities on drug issues and the 
means by which action would be taken locally. 
In addition DAT partnerships were expected to 'link up' with the other 'local 
partnership initiatives (TDTBBB 1998:32) which went across the social policy 
spectrum. This was in line with the exhortations outlined elsewhere in 
TDTBBB (1998) which saw drug misuse as a complex social policy issue 
which had to be tackled through a number of pathways. The strategy made it 
clear that there was a need for 'a continuing focus on local drugs problems' 
and that other 'social partnerships' should 'contribute to that wortf(TDTBBB 
1998:32). Simultaneously, therefore, drug misuse policy became integrated 
into the wider social policy domain in a way that had not been achieved 
previously. 
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DATs, funding and performance management 
TDTBBB (1998) highlighted that the earlier strategy had 'advocated 
partnership without making sufficient structural and fiscal changes to support 
if (TDTBBB 1998:9) and thus it suggested that these would now be further 
developed. As a part of the announcement of the new strategy, Ann Taylor 
described how a 'detailed resource framework' would be announced later in 
the year. This was to demónstrate that the 'Government had shown its 
commitment to resources for fighting drugs'. She stated that this had entailed 
reversing proposed cuts to customs staff and also included: 
'support from the SRB for 44 projects which include the prevention of drug 
misuse as part of their objectives€7. 
Once again in this sentence an explicit link is made between action against 
drug misuse, community based projects and strategies aimed at social 
exclusión and poverty. There was also the provisión of demonstrable and 
significant sums of clearly allocated monies. The new strategy acknowledged 
that TDT (1995) enabled 'increased collaboration on resources', but stated 
that spending thus far 'is considerable but poorly coordinated' 8 8. It detailed 
how expenditure in 1997/8 was estimated at £1 Abi l l ion, in comparison with 
£500 million in 1993/4. It suggested however that this was probably the result 
of a better and more accurate assessment and that most of the costs were 
enforcement related. What was proposed was a more strategic targeting of 
resources. It also stated that an: 
A n n T a y l o r 1998 T D T B B B Speech l a u n c h i n g the strategy in the H o u s e o í C o m m o n s - as re leased 
by news reléase to l a u n c h the strategy. 
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'announcement of funding will be made later in the year, following the 
outcome of the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review.' (TDTBBB 
1998:30) 
Structural and fiscal changes were, therefore, seen as key to the 
implementation of the strategy in a way which sought to acknowledge past 
learning and thus seek to avoid repeating similar mistakes. The attention 
given to this area was exp!icit and a whole section of the new strategy was 
devoted to the resourcing and management of the work. Within this section 
the role of the DATs was stated as: 
'the principal mechanism by which agencies will develop the resource 
partnerships outlined ... and wili assess regularly whether the spending plans 
and projected outcomes of all agencies represented on them are aligned 
explicitly to the new strategy.' (TDTBB Strategy Document 1998:32) 
The increased levels of funding were driven by spending reviews at the 
centrę. DATs became nominally responsible for these budgets (a role which 
they had not previously held) and this was an area of significant change. 
Incrementally, this role expanded to one which, it might be argued, changed 
their focus from co-ordination to direct control and commissioning. The 
impact of this might be seen to significantly influence their development and 
lead to their later increasing bureaucratisation. 
Evidence of this can be found within TDTBBB (1998) which added that the 
DATs should ensure locally that expenditure was monitored for value for 
money 'against outcomes' and that securing partnership funding should be 
given 'high priority'(TDTBBB 1998:32). Thus the DATs' role became one 
which included local coordination of activity on drug misuse issues and more 
explicitly a mechanism through which performance monitoring activities could 
be channelled. The activities of local agencies could be monitored against 
nationally set objectives, and these individual agencies could be held to 
collective account through the DAT whose success might be judged against 
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their commitment and activity. It is possible to trace the development of the 
'control' function of the DATs, who were increasingly required to 'report' on 
the activity, achievements and spending plans of their constituent, 
partnership, organisations. In so doing they were also required to develop the 
mechanisms necessary to achieve this. The detailed nature of this reporting 
and the ability of DATs to achieve this in a climate of almost constant change 
and re-organisation was reflected on by Dale-Perrera: 
1 While ail this is going on DATs are now required to submit treatment plans for 
ratification by the UKADCU and Drug Prévention Advisory Service: (Da\e-
Perrera 2001:19) 
This quote also alludes to the growth and strengthening of a network of new 
'organisations', such as the Drug Prévention Advisory Service (DPAS) 8 9 , part 
of whose brief was explicitly to monitor the implementation of a centrally 
directed strategy at a local level; DPAS, therefore, provides proof of efforts to 
monitor and évidence implementation at a local level of the drug strategy. As 
it may be recalled, on the launch of the strategy the Chief Executive of the 
ISDD (Anna Bradley) had commented that lthe difficulty inhérent in bringing 
together and to account agencies and organisations across the drugs field 
lshouid not be underestimated90. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that 
mechanisms were developed through which this could be achieved. 
The link between resourcing, monitoring and evidencing outcomes was, as we 
have seen, a feature which was présent in TDT (1995) but which was 
significantly strengthened in TDTBBB (1998). Thus, there was a clear and 
overt intent to resource the strategy and ensure that it was possible to 
account for those resources publicly through the development of monitoring 
Systems which could accurately reflect outcomes. Ann Taylor when 
announcing TDTBBB (1998) had emphasised the importance of a targeted 
D P A S was a réorganisation and expans ion o f what vvas f o rmer l y the D P I . 
A n n a B r a d l e y D r u g l i n k N o v e m b e r / Decembe r 1997 I S D D 
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drug strategy, and stated that the importance of ensuring that the 'structures, 
resources and performance mechanisms' are right, is to ensure public 
accountability and 'dispassionately and objectiveiy track progress'(JDTBB 
1998:11). The whole structure of reporting and accountability created was 
closely related to the spending of identified montes. Hellawell described the 
change: 
'DATs were also given more control over spending, an initiative resisted by 
civil servants in Whitehall. These groups of people are now a powerful link in 
implementing the drugs strategy in the UK..: (Hellawell 2002:323) 
TDTBBB (1998) went further ¡n making explicit the link between reporting, 
accountability and resources when it described how: 9 1 
lDATs must develop as the mechanism for ensuring local resource 
coliaboration in Une with this strategy. Their corporate plans will provide the 
benchmark for disthbuting resources from 1999/2000 onwards: (TDTBB 
1998:33) 
TDTBBB (1998) focussed on implementation, evidence of implementation, 
providing the funding and 'proving' that the resources were wisely used, and 
this was clearly linked to DATs and expectations on them to be able to deliver 
the drug strategy. Thus DATs become key factors in the delivery of an 
important strategy for New Labour. In addition, they are an early example of 
the partnership mechanism which was expanded by New Labour across the 
social policy spectrum. Because of the significance given to delivery and their 
key role, DATs became subject to performance management systems which 
became increasingly sophisticated over this period. The link between DATs 
and implementation is explicitly stated within the strategy: 
'Drug Action Teams ... have worked well in most parts of the country in 
forging partnerships against drugs amongst the key local agencies. The time 
9 1 T D T B B Strategy documen t C M 3 9 4 5 1998:33 
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is right to step up a gear in relation to this partnership activity, so that a 
sharper focus is brought to bear on implementing this strategy.1(TDTBBB 
1998:32) 
The role of DATs as the implementation arm of the strategy is explicit. They 
became both the strategic coordinator of all activity aimed at combating drug 
use at a local level, the principal mechanism for communication between the 
centre and localities about this work and the means through which 
expenditure was channelled, monitored and outcomes reported. Their role 
was therefore strategic, but one also concerned with resourcing and 
monitoring anti-drugs activity and about implementation of the aims - working 
with communities to reduce drug related crime, assisting young people to 
resist drugs, facilitating treatment which helped people to overeóme drug 
problems and reducing crime and stifling availability of drugs on the streets. It 
is perhaps, therefore, of no surprise that post-TDTBBB (1998) DATs 
expanded significantly and became much larger bureaucratic structures. 
Performance management and evidencing implementation 
TDTBBB (1998) was a strategy designed for and ultimately concerned with 
implementation, as we have seen above. This centrally driven and controlled 
policy needed to be able to be implemented at a local level and TDT (1995) 
created the structures through which it was anticipated implementation would 
be achieved: DATs. It was also ¡mportant to find mechanisms by which New 
Labour could evidence 'results' which were tangible and publishable. In 
essence, this led initially to the adaptation of existing structures such as 
DPAS which took up the mantle of liaison and performance management 
alongside the UKADCU which was a 'transformed' C D C U . Eventually it led to 
the creation of new structures such as the National Treatment Agency (NTA: 
2001) whose remit was very clearly concerned with performance monitoring 
the strategy and DATs. There was an inherent tensión between the ad hoc, 
devolved and regionalised structures and the concepts of performance 
management. This tensión aróse from the need for 'control' of organisational 
performance (Otley 1999) signified by performance management and the 
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rhetoric of dialogue between the centre and localities which dévolution, 
régionalisation and partnership suggested. This area has been considered in 
Chapter 2 and has been given some attention in other areas of récent social 
policy under New Labour (Davies 2005; Newman 2001); it has, however, 
received very little attention with regard to drug policy. 
In the period between New Labour taking power and the création and 
adoption of TDTBBB (1998) there had been (as we have seen) a review of 
activity and achievements by the Drugs Czar, his deputy and government 
departments. This exercise appeared to show that information about actions 
against the strategy were not detailed or robust enough and it is probable that 
this too influenced the development of the new strategy. In addition, the focus 
on implementation and évidence explicitly formed part of New Labour's 
'modernisation' agenda (Modemising Government 1999). From the first, the 
intention with regard to monitoring performance was made elear by Ann 
Taylor in her speech to the House of Commons: 
'This year, we shafl draw iogether elear, consistent and rigorous national 
targets against which to measure progress towards these aims. One of our 
early pńorities will be to estabiish elear baselines for these targets: 92 
TDTBBB (1998) mirrored this emphasis with the same terms about 'elear, 
consistent and rigorous targets1 being used on page 3 of the introduction, 
alongside a statement that: 
'The performance of the Government and its agencies therefore will be readiiy 
measurable against these targets: 
The Prime Minister in his personal statement opened with linking the strategy 
to the 'promise of change upon which New labour were elected, to the 
modernisation of Britain and to their wider social policy agendas. The strategy 
was évidence that 'we are delivering: (TDTBBB 1998:1) on those promises of 
5 2 E m p h a s i s o r i g i n a l . A n n T a y l o r I998 T D T B B B Speech l a u n c h i n g the strategy in the H o u s e o f 
C o m m o n s - as re leased by news release to l a u n c h the strategy. 
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change and modernisation. The placing of TDTBBB (1998) within the key 
wider social policy framework which included issues of régénération, 
communities and modernisation made it clear why there was an emphasis on 
evidencing the impact of the strategy on those areas. This was made explicit 
on page 5 of TDTBBB which outlined the government's strategy 
diagrammatically. This clearly showed how the drugs agenda linked at the 
top into the wider social policy agendas; it then showed each aïm and how it 
was linked to 'activité which would be 'implemented' through central 
government and DATs and that this activity would be 'resourced through a 
variety of departmental expenditure and monies emerging from the 
Comprehensive Spending Review and that ail of this would be 'monitored 
through the 'Coordinators Annual Report and Plan of Action; DATs reports to 
Coordinator, individual agencies' performance monitoring; independent 
évaluations.' (TDTBBB 1998:5) 
The role of performance monitoring was integral to the strategy and to its 
'vision'. This was broad enough to encompass all activity aimed at delivery 
and to be reported on through a variety of means which were to be drawn 
together at the centre by the Czar. Thus, in his report the Czar outlined that 
within a year of launching this strategy he expected 'all agencies' to lrealign 
their priorities, resources and operational focus in line with this White Papef, 
as well as realigning funding 'in support of the plari and to ldevelop corporate 
and individual performance targets and measures: (TDTBBB 1998:7) 
Furthermore, the strategy had a whole section devoted to lresourcing and 
managing the worK (TDTBBB: 1998:29). This section laid out how each of 
the principal organisations should prioritise and direct their resources and, in 
so doing, be guided by the principles of moving 'away from reacting to the 
conséquences of the drugs problem and towards positive Investment in 
preventing and targeting it.: and that this would also guide the national 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), alongside targeting resources on 
collaborative projects. For each organisation it explicitly stated how they 
should consider directing their resources and by which plan and performance 
indicators this redirection would be subsequently monitored (TDTBBB: 30-31). 
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This section also identified the necessity for régional coordination which would 
'ensure stratégie cohérence (TDTBBB: 33) to the DAT planning processes 
and outlined how the ability to do this would lprovide the basis for attracting 
additional resources' (TDTBBB: 33); thus régional coordination, liaison and 
the monitoring of performance might also have a 'carrot' in the form of 
additional funding. 
Within this section, audit and évaluation are also included and it is explicitly 
stated that 'objective and rigorous assessment of the effectiveness of 
impfementing this strategy wilf be a central feature of its deveiopment..: 
(TDTBBB: 1998:35). The lkey components of this process' were listed as the 
Drug's Czar's annual reports and those of individual DATs, but also included a 
wider organisational spread including 'statutory fnspectorate reports' and 
'quality indicators for the core statutory agenciez, as well as other aspects of 
research and évaluation. Thus the rhetoric of 'joined up' government was 
also applied to the performance monitoring of TDTBBB (1998). It included a 
focus on the directly accountable bodies such as the Czar and the DATs, but 
also sought to ensure that individual constituent organisations would and 
could be held to account through their own performance and quality indicators 
and Inspectorate reports. 
The Updated Drug Strategy 2002 
By 2002, the ten year TDTBBB (1998) strategy was being learnt from, built on 
and adapted, ostensibly because the: 
'one single change which has affected the weil-being of individuals, families 
and the wider community over the last thirty years is the substantial growth in 
the use of drugs, and the hard drugs that kili in particuiar. The misery this 
causes cannot be underestimated.' (Blunkett Home Secretary's Foreword 
2002:3) 
The language of the Updated Strategy (2002) is harsh about drug misuse and 
the social and environmental associations. Within his first paragraph the 
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Home Secretary suggests that drug use affects health, family and 'turns law-
abiding Citizens into thieves..: (Blunkett Home Secretary's Foreword 2002:3) 
The link with crime is thus explicit and morally loaded; in this sensé the 
Updated Strategy (2002) also builds on and goes further than TDTBBB 
(1998). Thus, one can see a slow trajectory from TDT (1995) to 2002 such 
that the focus on Class A drugs, the social and environmental harm caused by 
drug use and users and the links with crime are drawn ever more strongly. It 
is not apparent from any language or arguments within the strategy that the 
changes in emphasis arose from any particular events or significant change in 
drug use patterns at that time. The report acknowledges other political activity 
in this area such as the Dindings and recommandations of the Home Affairs 
Committee and the work of the Audit Commission, the ACMD, the Health 
Advisory Service, the Police Foundation' (Updated Strategy 2002:6), ail of 
which shows the range of interest in drugs misuse policy and activity and 
highlights how this had grown since 1995. Some of the reports were related 
to the progress and impact of the stratégies and others (such as that by the 
Police Foundation) focussed on specific aspects of drug policy such as the 
classification catégories of substances and whether there was a case for 
review - in particular with regard to cannabis. However, David Blunkett (as 
Home Secretary) suggested that 'drug misuse contributes enormousiy to the 
undermining of family and community life - more...than any other single 
commodity or social influence: It was for this reason ne said, that 'getting it 
right matters so much..: (Blunkett Home Secretary's Foreword 2002:3) 
The strategy retained the focus on treatment, prévention and éducation and 
enforcement with ' y ° u n 9 people' highlighted as a priority with regard to a 
broad prévention strategy. On page 4 the Updated Strategy (2002) laid out 
what was 'new', the first of which was a 'tougher focus on Class A drugs' and 
specifically crack use with a 'national crack action plan', more resources, 
expansion of prévention and treatment within the community and the crîminal 
justice system and, overall, a focussing down onto 'communities with the 
greatest need. The strategy no longer sought to take a gênerai, broad brush 
approach, but was focussed on the harm of drug use particularly within its 
social and environmental context with a sharply moral tone. This was further 
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highlighted on page 5 of the strategy which described how the 'unparalleled 
investment to tackle the harm drugs cause communities, familles and 
individuafs will be focussed in the most damaged communities: Further, that 
the 'fuit range of éducation, prévention, enforcement, treatment and harm 
minimisation wiil be brought to bear.. : (Updated Strategy 2002:5) 
The strategy was focussed on an abstinence model with little 
acknowledgement of a harm minimisation approach; 'a// controlied drugs are 
dangerous and no one shouid take therri (Updated Strategy 2002:7). It made 
less of how drug misuse linked into the wider social policy programmes than 
had TDTBBB (1998) and so it was a less explicitly a 'joined up' approach. 
However, this may have been because it was more directly concerned with 
the links between drug use and crime, drawing thèse two agendas closely 
together - lin view of the close links between drugs and crime,.: (Updated 
Strategy 2002:62). It is not clear if this arose when the responsibility for drug 
misuse stratégies moved to the Home office in 2001, when the Home 
Secretary became Chair of the Cabinet Ministerial Sub-Committee on Drugs 
Policy, and away from the Cabinet Office. This may have been seen as the 
'sign' of an institutional 'marker' being laid upon it. This is the key change 
between TDTBBB (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002) and the reasons 
for the move to the Home Office are not entirely clear. Mo Mowlem, who had 
responsibility for the strategy between 1999 - 2000, described leading the 
Cabinet Office as difficult. She said it was hard to gain a clear sensé of 
direction because of the addition of spécifie policy or action 'units' over the 
years which had 'grown like Topsy (Mowlam 2003:320); it is in this context 
that she described her drugs work and that of the U K A D C U . She presented 
Cabinet Office as a myriad of responsibilities and unrelated work which had 
been added to over the years as a resuit of the interests of a particular 
responsible Minister. She also saw thèse 'layers' as added to and arising 
from interests of the Prime Minister (2003:314 and 320). Further, she 
described Prime Ministerial interest with regard to drug issues which added its 
own pressures during this period. She concluded that in gênerai there was a 
belief that the strategy was 'a// progressing ok, but new initiatives kept being 
added ait the timë (Mowlam 2003:321) and that this and 'the constant 
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pressure to be seen to be tough ort all drugs' (Mowlam 2003:322) and to 
produce results which lpeople could see and feef (Mowlam 2003:321) 
affected progress. However she also described her inability to get 'real back 
up' (Mowlam 2003:324)for example with other Ministers and the Treasury and 
thus described the constant 'chiwyinçf over money as ldulF and probably 
attributable to her weakened political position in général and with the PM in 
particular. She gave as an example the fact that it ltook almost a year ... to 
get the money out of the Health Department for the National Treatment 
Agency' (Mowlam 2003:325). Mowlam's autobiography would suggest, 
therefore, that work on the drugs strategy was run, up to 2001, by the Cabinet 
Office and that this did involve inter-departmental negotiation and 
collaboration, but that this was always subject to other political vagaries and 
pressures. It is clear that drug policy was an area where a keen Chair of the 
Cabinet Ministerial Sub-Committee on Drugs Policy, such as Tony Newton 
(Chair during TDT 1995), could take the 'opportunity' offered to a Minister with 
'motivation'. However, 'resources' (Levin 1997) might be partly dépendent on 
one's political influence, power and the support of the P M . This resulted from 
the PM's residual political authority and the Cabinet Office's institutional role 
in coordinating and joining up responsibility for issues across departments, 
alongside direct access to the P M ; however it institutionally had little specific 
leverage and resources in its own right (Mowlam 2003). 
More specifically, Mowlam suggested that the influence of the PM on the 
'moral' position on drugs issues was strong and that there was little room for a 
Minister charged with responsibility for the issue to take a différent view 
(Mowlam 2003:350). It may be, therefore, that it was for political and personal 
reasons that a powerful Minister close to the P M , such as David Blunkett, 
ultimately assumed responsibility for drug issues in 2001 following the général 
élection and upon his assumption of the role of Chair of the Cabinet 
Ministerial Sub-Committee on Drugs Policy. Personal links to the P M and 
political power through personal, political and institutional authority may have 
been seen as crucial in order to drive forward an important policy. This was 
also a probable factor influencing the move to Blunkett, as Mowlam had found 
it hard, on occasions, to make progress because of access to resources: the 
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example being the funding of the newly devised NTA. Factors of personal 
and political authority may therefore have been as influential upon the 
décision to move responsibility to the Home Office, as an analysis of drug 
misuse which was now dominated by a penalogical approach. Nonetheless, 
the outcome in the Updated Strategy (2002) released approximately a year 
later, was that the Home Office was clearly flagged up throughout the 
document as the lead institution at the centre and there was a strong 
emphasis on drugs misuse within a penalogical framework. The strategy did 
however outline where services for young people had been developed such 
as the Connexions Service, Youth Offending Teams, DATs' improvements in 
treatment services for young people and 'Positive Futures' (Updated Strategy 
2002:7); initiatives ail aimed across the éducation, prévention, treatment and 
the criminal justice system. Similarly, initiatives aimed at reducing supply 
stressed what had been achieved internationally and the use of other policy 
arenas, such as the création of the 'Asset Recovery Agency', which as the 
resuit of the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) would allow for money made from 
the illegal trade in drug use to be recovered following conviction and directed 
back towards fighting drug use. Policing activity was also highlighted as 
focussed on 'areas mostaffected (Updated Strategy 2002:7). 
Reducing drug related crime and its impact on communities accented the use 
of arrest referral schemes, Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs), 
JobCentre Plus initiatives, Communities Against Drugs Action (CAD) fund and 
the further development of thèse and related schemes, such as increased 
drug testing on arrest and in prison. Finally, the Updated Strategy (2002) laid 
out initiatives for treatment to reduce drug use and minimise harm and 
reiterated that 'treatment works' and quoted that £1 spent on treatment related 
to a saving of £3 in the criminal justice system. It outlined an expansion of 
treatment and that this should be able to be accessed more quickly, the 
création of the NTA 'to oversee the expansion of high quality drug treatment 
programmes' (Updated Strategy 2002:11) and the réduction of drug related 
deaths and the increase in needle exchange programmes. It was less explicit 
about how this related to other programmes and initiatives although the key 
targets set were to improve services for crack and cocaine users, reduce 
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waiting times overall, improve health, increase referrals through the Criminal 
Justice System (CJS) and improve prison based provisión. 
Performance Management and the Updated Strategy 
The Updated Strategy (2002) laid out a delivery and resourcing plan. The 
targets were described as lchallenging but achievable' (Updated Strategy 
2002:60) and involved reducing: 
• the use of Class A drugs; 
• the frequency of use of any illicit drugs by those under 25 years; 
• the availability of ¡Ilegal drugs in circulation (through targeting criminal 
groups and recovering drug-related criminal assets); 
• opium production in Afghanistan; 
• drug related crime (to be measured by a reduction in the number of 
offenders testing positive on arrest);and 
• Increasing the numbers of problem drug users in treatment by 55% by 
2004 and 100% by 2008 and improving rates of retention in treatment 
programmes and completion. 
Certainly the testimony of the interviewees for this study would suggest that 
these were perceived as real targets, with, for example, the meeting and 
achieving of those related to treatment as essential. 
The strategy outlined the 'delivery mecharitsmś at both a national and 
regional / local level. The former outlined the 'cross-departmentaf nature of 
the strategy and the range of government departments involved, although it 
made clear that overall responsibility now sat with the Home Secretary 
(2002:60). The performance monitoring mechanisms for the centre were spelt 
out as being integrated into each department's 'public service agreements 
and supporting service delivery agreementś and it was made explicit that 
these were 'drawn up in conjunction with the Prime Minister's delivery unit and 
kept under regular review by Ministers and officialś (Updated Strategy 
2002:60). There was, therefore, a specified emphasis on the monitoring of 
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delivery which showed an apparent sophistication with how intégration into 
the detailed workings of individual departments and policies was managed 
and reported. This appeared to build on the earlier stratégies where 
monitoring through individual agencies and departments, through the use of 
Inspectorate reports for example, was referred to. TDTBBB (1998:31) had 
also stated that individual agencies l$hould ensure that parînership work is 
reaffirmed strongly in their service pian and ...consider...the development of 
objectives with performance indicators aiigned expiicitiy to the new strategy. 
Thus, TDTBBB (1998) had increased the level of monitoring expected and 
suggested how this should be done for individual agencies; the Updated 
Strategy (2002) went further by building specific expectations around 
performance into the key core work of each agency, which, for example for 
PCTs , might affect their star rating and thus funding for the whole of their 
work. 
Furthermore, there was a clear attempt to integrate the civil service into a 
concern with policy delivery through the Strategie Planning Board which, it 
was specified, 'supports this structure at civil service officiai levef (Updated 
Strategy 2002:60) and reflected the membership of the Cabinet Sub-
Committee. Again this was a change and it might be seen to originate from 
an attempt to influence the orientation of the central functions of the civil 
service from policy development towards implementation; the autobiographies 
of the Drug Czar and two Ministers responsible for drug policy during this 
period all suggest that this was an issue with which the govemment needed to 
get to grips in order to ensure the policy delivery they sought (Hellawell 2002; 
Blunkett 2002; Mowlam 2003). Thus, where it had been previously clear that 
the role of UKADCU or the C D C U was to give administrative, bureaucratie 
support to the Cabinet Sub-Committee for example, the role of the Strategie 
Planning Board appears to have been to engage the senior civil servants in 
cross-departmental discussion in order to ensure their engagement and thus 
policy implementation. 
Finally, the strategy described project specific cross-departmental groups who 
worked towards stated aims within the strategy, such as the réduction of 
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supply, and thus a group would be convened and 'chaired by a senior officiai 
from HM Customs and Excise (Updated Strategy 2002:61). The new 
arrangements at the centre more closely mirrored those at a local DAT level; 
the Cabinet Sub-Committee appeared to play a similar role to the DAT; the 
Strategie Planning Board the DAT Coordinator and team: the subject specific 
and 'expert' cross-departmental groups the DRGs. 
The strategy also drew out the role of the newly created NTA for whom staff 
were still being recruited. It specifically mentioned that they had been set up 
in 2001 to: 
'...ensure equality in treatment; increase the capacity and compétence of 
the drug treatment workforce; increase quality and accountability at ail 
fevels of the drug treatment system; improve the availability of drug 
treatment in ai) areas of the country and increase the effectiveness of drug 
treatment: (Updated Strategy 2002:61) 
Thus, the balance with the treatment side of the strategy was Struck through 
the mention of the work of the Special Health Authority, and in so doing the 
British balance between the pénal and health agendas might be seen to be 
maintained. But ît is also obvious that the work of the NTA was to be 
focussed on effectiveness, accountability and delivery of the stratégies aims; 
ail key features of New Labour's modernisation agenda. 
At a local level the strategy outlined that partnership remained the key factor 
and that this had been the case (through the opération of DATs) since 1995. 
Again it is specified that every 'DAT is supported by a co-ordinatof and by 
'one or more drug référence groups\ but the line of responsibility back to the 
centre had now changed and each DAT 7s accountabie to the Home 
Secretary (Updated Strategy 2002:61). However, the mechanisms by which 
DATs were to account for their work was not specified in detail which was 
surprising and this is différent from TDTBBB (1998) where there were very 
clear Systems for the monitoring of DATs' collective performance outlined 
within the strategy which included a 'template' which would be 'provided by 
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the UKADCU (TDTBBB:32). The reasons why it was less explícit may nave 
been because these sorts of activities were now expected and the Updated 
Strategy (2002) drew out that: 
lEach year DATs report on their work by providing statisticai and qualitative 
data on young people, treatment, communities and suppiy1. (Updated Strategy 
2002:62) 
Thus ¡t may have been that providing detailed information on how collective 
partnership activity would be monitored was no longer noteworthy or 
remarkable; although it was highlighted that DATs now provided information in 
an electronic format which was a 'success story for the Government's e-
business strateg^ (Updated Strategy 2002:62). This, once again, underlined 
how integrated into general government business the drug strategy was. 
Further, it showed the level of reporting and monitoring which was possible 
and the sophistication which governed the performance management of this 
área, such that the strategy could state that as a result of the data being 
provided in an electronic format there was now a datábase which included the 
lmost comprehensivo local information to date on the delivery of the drug 
strategy and the tracking of expendituré (Updated Strategy 2002:62). In 
addition, it was drawn out that 'the NTA and other regional representatives' 
would be responsible for lsetting and monitoring standards of performance 
and assessment of partnership plans'. This drew out the growing importance 
of the regional agenda and appeared to medíate the direct link to the centre. 
Given that the strategy was now 'owned' by one of the powerful central 
departments in the cross-departmental strategy this may have been a helpful 
factor. It is probable that a Chief Executive of a Health Authority might have 
felt differently about cooperating with and reporting to a cross-departmental 
Cabinet Office as Chair of the DAT, than being responsible and accountable 
to the Home Office /Secretan/ in this role. 
The strategy also stated that in order to 'opérate more effectively at regional 
levef DPAS was to be integrated into the regional Government Office 
structure and that this would also 'support closer links' between the 
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Governments other related policy agendas (Updated Strategy 2002:61). In 
addition, the document drew out the 'close links' between the drugs and crime 
agenda and suggested that, in order 'to reduce local bureaucracy and 
duplication and operate more effectively, 'new and closer working 
arrangements' would be put in place through the Police Reform Act in the 
following year. This would give the police, Primary Care Trusts and Local 
Authorities statutory responsibilities 'to formulate and implement a drug 
strategy (Updated Strategy 2002:63). These changes appear to support a 
common view amongst long serving DAT coordinators who were interviewed 
and who believed that DATs had been under threat during this period and that 
David Blunkett had not supported them. It is certainly possible to read this 
section of the strategy as indicating the possibility of such an outcome. Of 
interest is that this closer integration between DATs and C D R P s was also 
perceived by most interviewees as a 'takeover' by C D R P s which was resisted 
and effectively 'seen off'. Given the new Home Office responsibility for the 
strategy there was undoubtedly some internal logic to such a merger; to have 
achieved this, however, would have placed the drug strategy at a local level 
(as well as at a central level) more closely within a penalogical framework and 
less clearly within a shared partnership approach. Whether or not this was a 
possibility, and despite specificity on targets and delivery, the strategy did 
outline that 'substantia! resources had been made available for work against 
drug misuse and that this placed 'even more importance on the need for high 
standards of delivery, and that this would need to be supported by 'improved 
systems for monitoring and evaluating progress and the use of resources; 
strengthening capacity; and developing a greater focus on outcomes' 
(Updated Strategy 2002:63). Again this drew out the link for New Labour 
between policy delivery, targets, monitoring and resources. 
Conclusions 
New Labour post-1998 took drug policy and made it their own. They brought 
their concerns with implementation, evidence and performance monitoring to 
both of their strategies, TDTBBB (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002). 
Their analysis of the causes of drug misuse strongly featured a link between 
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drugs and crime and this became more apparent over the period. In addition 
their analysis included a strong association between substance misuse and 
social and environmental factors and this meant that drug policy was more 
closely integrated into other social policies. They considerably increased the 
level of funding which went to tackle drug misuse and strongly linked 
resources to monitoring and performance; the criticism which TDTBBB (1998) 
made of TDT (1995) was that it had focussed on structures and failed to make 
available the level of resourcing required. They clearly did not wish to repeat 
what they saw as this failing. The trajectories of evidence, policy integration 
and funding would all therefore point to the likelihood of the drug strategy 
becoming a heavily performance managed one. It is probable that this would 
need to be seen to occur in order to justify resourcing and demonstrate 
impact. 
Partnership remained a key feature of the drug strategies however and at a 
local level DATs remained essentially untouched and became strengthened 
through an increasing level of funding. They also became subject to much 
greater external scrutiny with a growing number of regional organisations to 
whom they were accountable. By 2002, the DAT links to the centrę were 
apparently less elear as their reporting and over-sight was largely managed 
by the regionalised drug teams and the regionalised NTA. Nonetheless, the 
centrę remained a powerful force with the Prime Minister's own delivery unit 
being cited in the Updated Strategy (2002) as concerned with performance 
and target setting. 
The reasons for the change of overa)l responsibility for the strategy from 
Gabinet Office to the Home Office are unclear. It could have been the result 
of powerful personal political alliances. Alternatively, it may show an 
increasing penalogical analysis of the drugs agenda. However, the creation 
of the NTA and the significant resourcing of treatment options suggested that 
personal, political alliances remained a key feature. Furthermore, although 
the Police Reform Act (2003) suggested a merging between the drugs and 
crime agendas at a local level this was effectively resisted by most DATs and 
the structures remained independent, if 'joined-up\ 
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Over this period, therefore, although there were some changes to the policy 
architecture thèse were minimal and at a local level where drug policy was 
implemented they are essentially untouched. The changing analysis of drug 
misuse linked the issue into the wider social policy agenda and yet also 
promulgated a strong link between drugs and crime and linked this to 
Community and environmental factors. The intégration of drug policy into the 
wider social policy arena was a new feature of this period and yet it can be 
seen to have become unremarkable. Individual agencies were held to 
account in core target areas, and new technology made it possible to hold 
detailed national data on performance in each DAT and the strategy outlined 
where and how it was integrated with other policy activity. Similarly, the 
Community became strongly featured, particularly as they were seen to be 
impacted upon by drug misuse; in this analysis, the individual rights of the 
drug user might be seen to become subsumed under the community's needs 
to be freed from the 'scourge' of substance misuse. These are clear 
analytical frameworks whose development can be traced from Labour MPs in 
Opposition in the 1980s and 1990s. 
New Labour's response to drug misuse was, therefore, predictable as it built 
on the past; in terms of their own analysis of substance misuse, their 
concerns with Community and personal social responsibility and their drive to 
modernise government, bring about and évidence change. 
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Chapter six - National interviews - developing drugs policy 
Introduction 
This chapter is based on interviews with eight of those involved in developing 
the Tackling Drugs Together policy for England in 1995. It is perhaps hard to 
recall now but the policy was, at the time, innovative; creating partnership 
bodies composed of the most senior local représentatives of the key statutory 
organisations. It brought powerful local organisations and their 
représentatives together in 'partnership' to work on drug matters, perceived 
by many to be a fringe issue, sitting as it did within ail of their agendas but as 
a minor part, attracting no significant funding or interest from the centre. 
Requiring Chief Executives of Health Authorities and Chief Constables of 
police to meet together to forge a local strategy to combat drug misuse with 
in-put (although little new funding) from the centre was perceived as a radical 
departure. 
This chapter looks at who was involved in developing Tackling Drugs 
Together (1995) and how that came about. It does this through interviews 
with the individuáis concerned and considers how they were motivated to use 
the opportunités and resources which subsequently came their way. Finally 
the chapter looks at the émergence of partnership as a policy framework, 
where the idea originated, why it was subsequently copied for other complex 
social policy áreas and how DATs were created and responded to by localities 
and other key players. 
The chapter is based on original interviews with those responsible for 
developing drug policy during this period. AN interviewées have been 
anonomised and to further achieve this, ail are described as 'he'¡ this has 
been done because very few women played a senior role in the development 
of drug policy at a national level and therefore they could be more easily 
identified if their gender was given and to use 'she' for ail respondents would 
give a very false picture of the gender of most key players. 
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A small number of key players recur at the early stage of policy development 
(eight of them were interviewed and one other was not interviewed). They are 
a mixture of individuals - civil servants, those from the voluntary or 
campaigning sector and politicians. It suggests that the ideas for the policy 
were generated initially by a few people who were then able to bring in 
enough other individuals and organisations for the policy to be adopted. In 
addition interviewées drew out the importance of the Prime Minister (John 
Major) at the developmental stage of the drug policy. Later under New 
Labour when changes were being made to drug policy and at the point of 
ensuring implementation, Tony Blair's rôle was seen as important. 
There is significant testimony about the strength and importance of cross-
party support for the strategy throughout the period under considération. It 
would seem that drugs was a policy issue whose time had corne; however, 
the way that policy was developed and shaped was affected by a range of 
individuals and other circumstances which the interviews explored and help to 
explain. The actors appear to have been fully aware of being involved in the 
development of a new social policy and there emerged from the interviews a 
sensé that people knew they were doing something new and différent and that 
they found that exciting. 
Developing drug policy 
Policy génération 
As we have seen TDT (1995) incorporated ideas about using partnership 
mechanisms to tackle drug issues which were, at the time, radical, particularly 
because of their incorporation of senior bureaucrats for whom drug matters 
were fringe issues in comparison to their core business. In terms of the 
génération of ideas behind the policy, several speakers expressed a sensé of 
ownership and illustrated how that had corne about. In particular two 
speakers talked about how they had spent some time campaigning around 
this issue and one described how he had spent '10 years conïmuously in the 
drugs field...stayed in that fieid'; he compared this to 'civil servants (who) 
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change all the timë (Respondent B). The significance of this appeared to 
relate, in particular, to the building of relationships with those in government, 
formulating ideas and perhaps becoming a 'respectable mouthpiece' as one 
senior civil servant described some of those consulted with regard to policy 
issues. The importance of occupying this position is outlined by Respondent 
B with regard to drug policy and how he (and others interviewed) had sought 
to encourage someone in government to pick up the issue / ideas: 
'getting those ideas off the ground - encouraging Tony (Newton,) to take it 
into government - then it went out of our control because it was a manifesto 
commitment in 1993?3 - they didn't expect to get in - but then they needed to 
establish a strategy and then it went into the Cabinet Office - that was 
important.' 
This excerpt highlights the factors described by Levin (1997) as important to 
the policy development process: 'motivation', 'opportunity' and 'resources'; 
although Levin had applied them to politicians in particular. Here, although 
the rôle of the speaker is outside government, motivation and opportunity can 
be seen to have played a rôle. Respondent B needed to rely on others in 
government or in the civil service to create further opportunités and identify 
resources. What he and others described was a 'motivation' to bring about 
change in the area of drugs policy and to do that required raising the profile of 
the issue and attracting the notice of someone able to 'champion' the 
proposed policy changes in government. The 'motivation' for two 
interviewées arose principally from their paid rôles in the non-statutory 
campaigning sector and they can be seen to have successfully engaged 
politicians on this issue and to have maximised their 'opportunités' which led 
to the incorporation of commitment in the Conservative manifesto. The profile 
of the drugs issue was raised, as discussed, in a number of ways, including 
through the Home Affairs Committee Report (1984) and two 'independent' 
reports: Across the Divide (Howard 1993) and that by Barker and Runnicles 
(1991). Interestingly, however, it is described that at this point in the policy 
0 J L e v i n stresses the impor tance o f c o m m u n i e n t a n d the i m p l i c a t i o n s this can have (1997:231 and 238) 
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process those promoting policy change 'lose controf, because the issue once 
taken up became part of the party's policy machinery. Once the elections 
were over however and there was the motivation and by then, the 
commitment to act, the voluntary sector again became involved, but at this 
point as consultées, with the opportunity to influence the agenda, but no 
longer with direct ownership. This is an interesting factor of policy 
development. It highlights how policy is a process but one in which the 
outcomes may be unknown for campaigners and any key policy developers 
as a result of the myriad complex factors involved. This is congruent with 
Levin's (1997) analysis that policy is a process which can be observed, 
contextualised and understood. However it also helps to highlight Darke's 
(undated) concern that it can be too variable a process 'to offer a generalised 
mode!. The interview evidence would suggest that there was a discernible 
pattern within an overall framework but that within individual factors, such as 
motivation, the detail might vary - thus, motivation might be a factor in the 
process of policy making, but what inspired motivation might be an unknown, 
or ungeneralisable factor. 
In this case, amongst the myriad complex factors which affected the policy 
trajectory were, for example, a small number of MPs from both sides of the 
House, who respondents described as interested in drug policy; many of 
whom had personal family reasons for this interest. In addition, as previously 
noted, there were seen to be a number of international and national factors 
which prompted the issue to rise up the social policy agenda. A number of 
interviewees talked about the impact of HIV / Aids and, in particular, how this 
had generated extra funding, interest and multi-agency working in the drugs 
practice arena. Respondent B summed this up by saying that around the 
1990's 'drugs was (sic) sexy - there was political excitement about it. He 
suggested that it was also 'sitting on the back of the HIV7 Aids debate', which 
people thought was 'about to destroy the world with the concomitant 
response that 'we need{ed) to throw money at it and this involved drugs 
policy and agencies, because 'injecting equalled a method of passing it on'. 
This, as we have seen, was considered particularly worrisome because it 
involved a way of the disease passing into the mainstream, heterosexual 
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population and concerns arose, therefore, about the impact of drug use on the 
wider community. In its turn it provided a conceptual link with other analysis 
about the cause and possible wider impact of substance misuse and linked 
this to environmental and social policy issues, such as poverty, poor housing 
and the breakdown of communities and with an increasingly moralised 
perspective (Mott 2000; Macgregor 1998; Green 1998; South 1996; Dunlap 
1995; Pearson 1987; Stimson 1987; Himmelstein 1978). 
In response to being asked, 'was there anyone who you think was important 
in taking the ideas forward', Respondent B named himself, Tony Newton MP, 
Ian McCartney MP, Mike Watson MP and a leader of a voluntary sector 
organisation 9 4. Tony Newton's role is a key and well known one once TDT 
(1995) was developed and legislated for, but it might also be recalled that Ian 
McCartney was a key speaker for Labour in the 1980s and the speeches he 
gave in the House of Commons often showed evidence of briefing, particularly 
for example, in his apparent use of the research of Geoffrey Pearson (1987). 
Levin's (1997) analysis regarding policy development is applicable to this 
period, and in particular that which suggested that 'feelings of sympathy or 
altruism' (1997:60) were important in the creation of channels of 
communication, creating 'levers which can be used to open up opportunity 
and thus create commitment. Certainly it fits with Levin's (1997:63) 
suggestion that policy is a process which results from a 'selective response to 
a number of competing interests and, thus, that the engagement of the 
'Individual and inter-personal' are important, as well as the political. 
Additionally it lent further credence to the idea that a policy might wait some 
considerable time before it emerged with enough support to be taken up and 
developed; thus the speeches of Ian McCartney in the House of Commons 
occurred in 1989 and Respondent B described his 'ten years' of campaigning. 
Both Mo Mowlam (2003) and David Blunkett (2006) described in their 
memoirs how a personal commitment to or interest in a given issue could stay 
with them throughout their political career and how this might motivate them to 
take up an issue at a later date. What was indicated by interviewees therefore 
9 1 1 have named the M P s as they are people whose v i ews are in the p u b l i c d o m a i n , I have not n a m e d 
c i v i l servants because they are intended Lo be a n o n y m o u s actors w h o effect g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y . 
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was that there were individuals whose activities could be described as those 
of 'instîtutional entrepreneurs' (Lowdnes 2005) or 'Autonomous Policy 
Leaders' (Wallis and Dollery 1997); those waiting in the wings to further a 
given policy idea and who took the opportunités offered to them when they 
arose. This, it would seem, was a particularly important factor at the stage of 
ideas and policy génération. 
The testimony of interviewées suggests that over a period during which policy 
is developed there might be a number of policy communities or networks 
which form. For example, a policy Community or network might be formed in 
order to 'tout' a proposed social policy and this may take a long-time and 
précède the idea being taken into government and the process of the actual 
policy development. The interview findings provide évidence of pressure 
groups having made 'a mark on government policies and measures' through 
their 'direct iinkages either to ministers...or officiais' (Levinl997:234). After 
that the policy Community might or might not include the 'original' ideas 
generators, perhaps depending upon how successful they were at becoming 
a 'respectable mouthpiece'. The role of politicians (according to those 
interviewed) at this stage of drafting would also appear to be negligible. 
Politicians appeared to be seen to be influential again at a later stage, once 
the policy was drafted and they were needed to broker and negotiate within 
and outside of their party; this was drawn out by Respondent A who attributed 
much of the success of legislating for TDT (1995) 'to the Lord Présidents 
skifls in brokering with his Cabinet coileagues...1 It may be, therefore, that 
whilst policy is a 'process', it is essential to comprehend what a long process 
that might be and how some parts of it - particularly around idea génération -
might be hidden from view by later activity. Further that 'policy network' might 
be too broad a term on many occasions when one might be witnessing a 
séries of policy network formations at différent stages of the policy process. 
In addition, any given network may be composed of relatively few people; it is 
their motivation, exploitation of opportunity and access to resources which 
may be the key factors. 
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Policy development 
Following idea génération and the acceptance of the need for a policy in a 
particular area, those ideas might appear 'newer', perhaps, to those in the civil 
service, than to those in voluntary, lobbying or other sectors outside of the 
government. However, as noted, once embedded within the government 
processes the 'ideas' appeared to go out of the control of the campaigning 
sectors. This was demonstrated by a key civil servant responsible for 
developing TDT (1995) who described how his engagement was not with the 
matter at hand, but with developing a policy which was useable: 
7f was not that it was about drugs, but it was starting at the point at which the 
outcome wouid be delivered. (Respondent A) 
Nonetheless, once engaged with developing the policy the civil service and 
others might then take ownership and consider that the policy ideas belonged 
to them. Thus, in response to where TDT (1995) had originated, and in 
particular the three aims embracing health, crime and éducation, Respondent 
A said: 
'From me - they were mine. I based that on all what i had read, i had done 
that from the beginning, from the first day. I then took them out'. 
And Respondent G also considered that TDT (1995) was 'very much a 
centraily driven modei - it didn'î corne from outsidë. What Respondent A and 
G also highlighted was the importance of making the policy which was being 
developed 'work' and acceptable to a wider central and local community of 
policy developers and implementers. The interviews demonstrated the 
différent rôles which those involved in making policy play - those of ideas and 
commitment génération, and those of talking, listening, drafting and 
legislating. Respondent A described how, in the early stages of developing 
TDT (1995), following government commitment to do so, it was important to 
go out and meet with key people at a central and local level: 
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7 had to be able to hear and understand and they had to be abie to hear and 
understand the three goals.. . ' 
This was based on what he portrayed as a changing concept of policy making 
and which was influenced by a number of ideas. In particular this included a 
sensé that policy should be developed which could subsequently be 
implemented and that this involved 'listening' to ensure you could take the 
influential people with you enough to ensure delivery; in reality this meant 
making sure that government did not just say: 
"7777 a partner", but (then) realiy act(ing) as though you are the boss. Like that 
there is no listening. Changing that means it is no longer something I cal! 
government by circular' (Ttespondent A). 
It incorporated business ideas into a civil service framework; ideas which 
came from civil servants who had been placed outside of government and 
within private sector consultancy companies. It was a style attributed to 
having been imported from business by the principal civil servant responsible 
fordrafting TDT(1995): 
/ used a formula from consultancy - Whitehall should go ouf and harvest 
ideas - what can we do / not do. Then articulate 2 or 3 goals and then seil 
them to a market where the ground has been prepared and it is therefore 
easiertogain co-operation'. (Unattributed95) 
This showed a concern with policy implementation and suggested that it was 
necessary to have ideas which were generated from the field and were then 
re-focussed in a way that could engage key participants within and outside of 
government. Thus, 'I thought we should have 2 or 3 clear goals and build up 
from the bottom: Politicians were 'very réceptive to this idea 'but it was new 
in the civil service and they were pleased but surprised that I gave them an 
T h i s is a quote d r a w n f rom m y interv iews . I l is unat t r ibuted because to d o so w o u l d p r obab l y 
ident i f y the Respondent . T h i s is the case w i t h a i l quotes in the thesis w h i c h are unat t r ibuted . 
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action pian. The starting point was 3 aims - then 3 stratégie outeomes that 
everyone couid see theirpart in: (Unattributed) 
This respondent clearly held the view that policy should be able to be 
delivered and be shown to have tangible outeomes and that thèse should be 
considered when the policy was being framed. Further that developing policy 
involved going out and talking to people - 'we travelled a lot and visited 
everyone - there were a lot of people you couidn't expect to corne to 
Whitehalf. The suggestion was that they went beyond the 'respectable 
mouthpiece people - not to do them a disservicë who were accessed from 
lists drawn up by inviting people through the main bodies...- it was a very 
bureaucratie way...but the second ripple were much better- because we got 
them through people saying you should meet x who works way out doing a 
really interesting pièce of work. (Respondent A) 
Nonetheless they required, 'évidence - otherwise you base everything on the 
last person you spoke to\ Thus speakers testified that trying to get the drug 
policy off the ground also fed into the development of research projects: 
1 We were influential in getting agreement to pay for some research on drug 
testing everyone who was arrested.96 There was a lot of opposition to that in 
government - but you have to relate your views back to the évidence...We 
also infiuenced the Department of Health to start some on-going research 
looking at outeomes:97 (Respondent A) 
Thus the research was linked to two of the 'outeomes' in the White Paper -
that related to investigating links between drug misuse and crime and that 
concerned with treatment outeomes and effectiveness (NTORS). The third 
aim - éducation was also importante linked to 'évidence': 
) b Benne t et a l (2001 ) became k n o w n as N E W A D A M : F i n d i n g s 148: H o m e O f f i c e 
Dep t o f H e a l t h (1996) T h e T a s k Force to R e v i e w S e rv i ces for D r u g M i s u s e r s - i n c l u d e d research 
a lso c o m m i s s i o n e d re ferred to as N T O R S and referred to as such and re ferenced as s u c h i n this thes is . 
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7 said they would have to take my word for this as it would take at least 10 
years and we could do it or we could do nothing - but that was getting drugs 
éducation into the national curriculum: (Respondent A) 
In essence, the three aims appeared to break the dichotomy of the health and 
penalogical divide seen historically to dominate the drugs agenda. Whether it 
achieved this is debateable (and considered later in the thesis), but at the very 
least it (perhaps cleverly) disguised or avoided this dichotomy. Further, going 
beyond drug issues, it would seem that the development of policy had a 
number of new thèmes - working in partnership, going out and talking to 
people, a concern with delivery and outcomes and finally that there should be 
évidence which did, or would, show what worked and how. The focus 
appeared to be therefore not just on civil servants 'thinking great thoughts' 
(Respondent A) - but on ensuring it was a policy which people wanted, would 
work and could be shown to work. 
Dialogue and policy development 
Respondent A talked of the 'ground being prepared when developing and 
drafting TDT (1995) and this appears to suggest a dialogue between the 
centre and localities; at least involving a flow of information and discussion in 
the vertical policy sphere. In the first place it might indicate that dialogue was 
about 'iistenincf but also about giving out messages about what might happen 
and checking to whom and in what ways that might be acceptable. Secondly, 
that this preparatory work of listening (but also speaking) might lead to a 
consensus about the policy which was being developed - specifically, this 
might account for the lack of opposition to TDT (1995) which, given the 
complexities of this policy area, was remarkable. It might have arisen 
because the ground lhad been prepared and thus as Respondent A stated -
'the Green Paper held no surprises'. 
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However, the interviewées all named one another as the key people who 
were involved in the génération and development of TDT (1995) 9 8. They 
described what appears to be a small, 'hub-rini of interested parties who 
effectively formed a 'pressure group' and who drove social policy change with 
regard to drug misuse in the mid-1990s, in what might also seem to be a 
vacuum of opposition. Some of them, particularly those from the voluntary 
sector had been around for some time, others, such as civil servants, were 
new to drugs misuse. Of interest, however, those civil servants working on 
drafting the drugs policy were familiär with 'new' ideas about the importance 
of policy implementation. It would also seem that any potential Opposition had 
been derailed by large scale changes (and internal fighting as a resuit of 
those changes) in a key voluntary organisation whose role was to represent 
drug treatment agencies (SCODA): 
'SCODA had been through major changes and provided a reasonabiy 
accommodating fie/d.'(Respondent F) 
Additionally, other organisations such as the NHS, local authorities, Social 
Services and others were possibly distracted by the 'reforms' with which they 
had been deluged at this time (Brown and Sparks 1989; Harris 1989); and 
that, in fact, many were 'looking' elsewhere when drug policy happened. 
Respondent H (who had been working in localities at the time TDT was 
drafted, although also playing a national organisational representational role) 
suggested that localities were, in part, given a 'surprise by TDT (1995). This 
indicated therefore that at this stage the discussion may have flowed in a 
vertical direction between the centre and localities, but not hohzontally, or 
uniformly hohzontally, although this might not be apparent to the centre. Thus 
Respondent A reflected that: 
' practitioners were incredibly pieased to be asked to form a policy from an 
early stage and thanked (us) for the opportunity: 
See C h a p l e r 3 for a l u l l d e s c r i p t i on o f this. 
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Going out and engaging 'in dialogue with operational services about what 
needed to happen and how it could be achieved (Respondent A) 
demonstrated the information flow which occurred vertically at this point of 
policy development. Once dialogue had occurred, however, it was perhaps 
not always clear to those in localities what would, in the end, contribute to a 
policy. Further, the contributions might not necessarily be recognisable once 
they had been through the drafting process. This may account for some 
'surprise' in localities at TDT (1995). 
In addition as Levin (1997:53) has argued it '...is important to iook ... for the 
absence of linkages, for cleavages" and a possible cleavage may have 
existed between those making policy and the différent groups who might have 
opposed the direction of the new drug policy at this stage and later. This may 
have included an absence of linkages between the health sector and social 
service sectors at a senior national level and those drafting policy. This was 
suggested by interviewées either directly, or by the absence of naming 
anyone from those areas as having been influential at the ideas génération 
and policy drafting stage. Respondent F said that only the probation service 
and the police had any form of participatory représentation at a national level, 
and he named the two people he saw as key from those organisations at that 
t ime 1 0 0 . This he contrasted to other public services by saying there was 'no-
one in health, no-one in social services.' In addition, Respondent H had 
identified the A C M D as perceived at this point as 'a doctors talking shop -
rather negative outfit - managed to marginalise itself and thus the implication 
was that this sector was outside of the policy 'hub' or network and possibly not 
in tune with, or simply missed, the new thinking which was developing around 
the drugs issue. This is supported by Stimson (1987:484) who has argued 
that the A C M D appeared not to have been involved in the changing debates 
and policy emphasis which surrounded drug misuse policy during this period; 
in particular, he suggested that they seemed not to have recognised the 
increasing politicisation of the sphère and a move towards a more pénal 
E m p h a s i s as in o r i g i n a l , 
1 0 0 O n e o f w h o m was interviewée! and one was not; bo th went o n to p lay nat iona l ro les under N e w 
L a b o u r . T h e one not in t e rv i ewed has wr i t ten Iiis au tob i og raphy and this has been used as a référence. 
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agenda. In this regard it is also possible to draw a parallel with alcohol policy 
where the health and scientific sector have been described as less welt-
networked in comparison to the public order lobby (Berridge 2006). 
Interestingly, it also suggests that despite formalised consultation structures 
(such as the ACMD) policy development and formation may take place 
outside of them; this appears to have been because they were perceived as 
less useful, or less engaged with a wider understanding of current policy 
imperatives, by central government in particular. 
Interviewées also suggested that some other public sectors were looking to 
expand their social policy rôle because of what they saw as a diminishing 
sphère of influence under the Conservative government at the time; one 
speaker from the probation service described how he 'saw it as an 
opportunity...to get influence and resources' for the probation service. 
Another suggested that local authorities were 'beginning to re-focus their 
attention on the total welf-being of the Community - not just emptying bins' 
and that an involvement in 'crime, economic régénération and healthy 
communities' offered this opportunity. In addition it was suggested that the 
police were 'beginning to recognise the 'social context of policinçf in part 
because of the complexity of social probiems such as mental health and child 
protection which the respondent suggested meant they had recognised 'they 
coutdn'ipolice their way out..: (Respondent H). 
TDT (1995), therefore, appeared to émerge from a drive for social policy 
reform generated by some sections of the voluntary sector and by politicians; 
this drive met with civil service change and new ideas about how to design 
and implement policy. Key players from elsewhere in the public sector appear 
to have been Willing to engage with the partnership ideas which emerged at 
the point of consultation for their own organisational reasons; interviewées 
suggested this was particularly the case with those from the pénal sphère and 
within local authorities. If policy is the sum of the organisations and the 
individuals who play a part in it (Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf 1998) then it goes 
someway to explain why TDT (1995) took the shape it did. It retained a 
balance between three aims across the health, penalogical and educational 
192 
sphère and it was connected to research which was commissioned to better 
understand the links between those three areas and substance misuse. The 
policy was framed as a discussion document of what might be the factors 
leading to drug problems and despite the Conservative government's 
apparent rejection of the environmental and social causes it did take steps to 
investigate them and the aims broadly embraced a conception that thèse 
might be factors. This would appear, therefore, to provide évidence of 
pressure groups having made 'a mark on government policies and measures' 
through their 'direct linkages either to ministers... or officiais' (Levin 1997:234). 
Respondent B talked about how there was little opposition to the policy, 'no 
real fundamental national pressure group' and attributed this, in part, to the 
civil servant responsible saying: 
X was a very clever Operator....He had a capacity to listen to a wide range of 
people and synthesise what he heard into a workable mode!. If you think 
about the range of pressure groups around drugs, he produced something 
which didn't get opposition. ' 
Thus, the policy did not appear to grow out of lconflict between State 
agenciez (Duke 2003:13) but rather an absence on the part of the health and 
social services sector. This may have been for a number of reasons which 
included: the reported lack of key individuals operating at a national level who 
were Willing or able to campaign on this issue, and the fact that the area was 
weakened by changes to the statutory and voluntary sector and by the 
apparently negative perceptions of some 'respectable mouthpiecë 
organisations such as the ACMD. Nonetheless, although no-one described 
any opposition to the ideas in the White Paper, Respondent H (who at the 
time the policy was developed worked in the localities although also holding a 
national remit) said 'people were surprised by it when it came out'. This might 
suggest that whilst it was considered that a great deal of consultation had 
taken place and that civil servants had been able to get beyond the 
'respectable mouthpiecë people', essentially, it was still really only 'the 
movers and shakers' who had been consulted and not necessarily those 
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working in localities without strong links to the centre. Thus Respondent F 
said - there were 'no local people - great movers and shakers - local product 
champions'. In essence therefore TDT (1995) was a centrally designed and 
driven drugs policy. This was summarised by Respondent G as the 'unsubtle 
and unspoken message' of CDCU Visits to local DATs. 
TDT - a policy designed for implementation 
There was a strong sensé (particularly from the civil servants interviewed) that 
TDT (1995) was a policy designed for implementation. The importance of this 
was that it was linked to governmental concerns to demonstrate delivery and 
value for money and in particular to a sensé of policy making which Simon 
and Feeley (1996) have characterised somewhat sceptically as 'pragmatic'. 
Thus the assumption is one of low ideological in-put and high practicality. It is 
therefore interesting that such views have been espoused by ideologically 
driven governments such as that under Thatcher (Mishra 1990) and New 
Labour; and such views feature strongly, for example, in the memoirs of 
Blunkett (2006) and Mowlam (2002) with regard to the need to ensure policy 
implementation. Further, policy as a pragmatic response to current issues 
was a view which was consistently reiterated throughout both sets of 
interviews (as we shall see also in Chapter 7) and which those making policy 
- i.e. developing and implementing it - took. That is, that making policy 
began to be associated with ideas of delivering to the tax payer what a party 
had promised in its manifesto. Thus: 
'the beginning of thinking that government gets money and needs to be able 
to show, to those who are the source of it, what has been done with that 
money. More recently this government (New Labour) has placed a great deal 
of emphasis on 'delivery' - this leads to a more holistic approach: 
(Respondent A) 
There was a clear link made between the growing concepts of government's 
need to show financial accountability and the development of this into a 
concern with also being able to account for policy 'delivery'. This, as we have 
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seen, was built into the TDT (1995) structure from the beginning but 
considerably strengthened by New Labour. The accent was on developing a 
policy which could be implemented, as illustrated by the civil servant with 
ultimate responsibility for developing and delivering TDT (1995), who said: 
'Outcomes certainly drove me hard - I was driven by deliverables'. 
(Unattributed) 
The link was also explicitly made by another interviewee, who said that TDT 
had 'a strategy for government and implementation and local government and 
implementation' (Respondent G); thus it was also understood that the policy 
needed to be able to be implemented at both levels - at the centre and within 
localities. In particular, respondents drew out that they sought to learn from 
what had not worked in the past; this included civil servants with 'big brains' 
who could think up 'really good theoretical policy which was 'extremely logical 
and clever' but that 'they are missing the whole point, which is that it (policy) 
should really wor/c^Respondent A). Seeking to learn from these lessons was 
directly related to actions which were then taken, so that during the policy 
development phase the civil service team included 'a secondee from the 
National Audit Office to work with us on what could actually be measured -
performance indicators'. Achieving this had been 'a big negotiation' but it had 
been important for two reasons, firstly the auditor realised how difficult it 
would be 'to measure the outcomes of a multi-agency approach' and secondly 
because: 
'It earned respect for us that we weren't just mouthing these glorious, great 
strategic goals, but that there were measurable things that all of them could 
recognise'. (Respondent A) 
Policy development therefore attempted to achieve 'buy-in' from the important 
facets of policy making at that time, among which was evidence and 
measurement. It is in this way that the language of managerialism and 
performance management became linked to drug policy because it was an 
integral part of the first strategy - TDT (1995). As such, it was an attempt to 
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deliver a measurable, implementable drug policy; it sought to ensure support 
from the wide-range of government departments responsible for delivering it 
and characterised by the civil servant, as the 'five departments of state' and 
the increasingly important National Audit Office. Further, setting measurable 
outcomes gave status to the policy itself because it was radical and displayed 
a familiarity with the new policy-making ideas. 
TDT (1995) came with relatively little funding; Respondent B reiterated that 
drugs had been a 'minority area' where monies were 'not ring-fenced'. He 
suggested that this had affected the status of the issue because 'Health 
Authorities are acutely resources-focussed: However, most interviewees also 
underlined the general importance of money to any policy issue; 'you have to 
attach some money - even some (Respondent A). Initial funding was 
focussed on the localities and directly on smoothing implementation of the 
strategy: 
'There was not a lot for DATs, but the some (money) made it easier and it was 
particularly important that it had paid for DAT coordinators and the 
administration of it: (Respondent A) 
Perhaps the issue of funding is to some extent a relative factor - it would 
seem obvious that it counts that you have it and it appears that the more you 
have, the more important you are perceived to be as an organisation. Clearly, 
drugs was perceived to be a 'peripheral or 'minority budget issue for most 
organisations and this is considered in the following section on DATs. 
However the low levels of funding might, in the beginning, have permitted a 
slight disregard for any loss of power, or territorial encroachment, as they did 
not present the DATs as a large threat bolstered by huge sums of money. 
Latterly, the coming of TDT (1995) would indicate that there was a territorial 
encroachment on health within the drugs arena and that DATs took over 
areas of work (for example the commissioning of drug services was affected 
and eventually this work was lost entirely to DATs). The small initial sums 
may, therefore, have made the changes seem unimportant to an extent, but 
were significant enough to bring in people to make the strategy 'work'. 
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Significantly, at this stage, the small amounts of funding meant that 
performance management functions of TDT (1995) were not developed in 
order to manage and account for cash-flow. The focus was on developing 
measures for inter-agency partnership collaboration; performance 
management of activity and spend would come under TDTBBB (1998). 
The role of the Prime Minister and ensuring political commitment 
Interviewees suggested that it was possible to drive this policy through 
because there was (and has been subsequently) support from the Prime 
Minister (PM). Respondent B said that Mrs Thatcher was an early influence 
at the point when the ideas were taken up and into govemment because of 
her international commitments. Respondent A said that at the point of policy 
development: 
'John Major (PW\) was driving it. He wanted something done... The push carne 
from No. 10 and that was important if it was to be successful. (The CDCU) 
had a iot of ciout and (yet)... were a tiny unit.' 
Additionally, Respondent D picked out the contribution of Tony Blair at the 
point of policy development when looking for change and with regard to 
implementation; this was achieved through his 'A/o 10 get-togethers: 
Interviewees attributed the interest of each PM to different reasons: Thatcher 
because of her international interests and commitments; Major because he 
wanted movement on the drug issue because of the apparent worsening 
situation; Blair because of a moral imperative and latterly a concern to 
evidence implementation. Thus 'motivation' may be a factor which influences 
policy adoption and development as described by Levin (1997), but the 
reasons which lie behind that motivation may be infinitely variable. The 
complexity of gaining the motivation and then commitment of a PM may, 
therefore, be considerable. 
It would seem it was possible for a number of individuáis at different stages of 
the policy making process to get the ear of the P M . As a result it is perhaps 
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no surprise that drug issues have had the focus that they have since 1995. It 
might also lend support to Levin's analysis which has suggested that the rôle 
of top level support, especially that of PMs, allows the création of structures 
(Levin 1997:231) around which policies will be formed or transmitted and that 
this is important, for once committed (pp237) it will ensure the necessity of 
being seen to be 'moving in a direction' (pp225). 
Respondent G also highlighted how a key civil servant understood the 
importance of this commitment and ensured that it was generated as a part of 
the consultation and development process. He described how the civil 
servant 'put a lot of thought into the strategy and engaged 'with what he 
regarded as key peopie - movers and shakers: This also involved lgetting 
ministers properly engaged - fairly intensive discussions'. 
In addition, the rôle of Tony Newton (the Lord President with Cabinet Office 
responsibility for drug issues) was drawn out by most speakers who attributed 
to him considérable skills in championing and steering the TDT policy through 
the political process. Respondent A said: 
'...in the end I think it was down to the Lord President's skills in brokering with 
his Cabinet colleagues a policy which met everybody's needs and wishes - I 
mean he was tough when he needed to be tough and conciliatory when he 
needed to be - he was extremely determined - he spent endless amounts of 
time and effort - and he had the ear of the Prime Minister....if he had been a 
différent personality - the sort who just wanted it for his personal ego - or 
some completely lazy person - couldn't have done it - so that was pretty 
significant. ' 
In addition Respondent F said of Tony Newton that 'he was the sort of 
individual to eut through department professions'] given that TDT (1995) 
sought to adopt a partnership approach and was given a cross-departmental 
remit and based in the Cabinet Office this would, of course, have been a 
crucial factor. Nonetheless, Respondent G cogently argued that it was 
essential that 'conceptually and politically it (the policy,) needed to have meriV 
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Thus, the implication might be that however much an idea might 'have its 
time', or a policy issue be pushed up the agenda and steered by a significant 
and forceful player, without the policy itself being seen to be of value, no-one, 
and particularly it might seem Ministers, would put their name to it and publicly 
support it. As Respondent H said, 'their main agenda is to protect 
themselves'. 
Cross-party support 
Cross-party political support emerged strongly from the interviews as a key 
issue which had allowed TDT (1995) to be formed as it was, and that this 
contributed to the way in which it was able to be 'incrémental developed 
later into TDTBBB (1998). Respondent B thought the level of coopération was 
almost unprecedented and that the reason was 'because the issue (drugs) is 
perceived as a national threaX. This accords with MacGregor (1999) who has 
suggested that the drugs issue gained currency at this time because of the 
end of the Gold War; it became an international policy matter on which diverse 
countries could agrée. 
The importance and strength of cross-party support was summed up by 
Respondent B who commented that it was: 
'significant then and continues to be significant - we said it shouid be so, 
though couldn't make it so. I know that the White Paper was shown to 
George Howarth who was the Shadow Minister before publication - that's 
strong: 
Respondent A considered that cross-party co-operation was, in part, the 
achievement of Tony Newton, as he considered he 'had the qualifies of a 
statesman - not a party political person - he really wanted to progress a major 
public policy issue...but of course he was interested in the issue.' The key 
civil servant in drafting TDT (1995) described how he was allowed 'to brief the 
opposition - and to make a cross-party effort - which was unusua\ - but we 
did - it wasn't actually about party politics'. Respondent F agreed that there 
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was 'absolutely cross-party support and that this was because Tony Newton 
built consensus9. The role of the Lord President appeared, according to the 
testimony of interviewées, to have been a key factor in creating and 
sustaining cross-party support. Further, cross-party support was seen to have 
been pursued vigorously, leading to the sharing of information in a way which 
was unusual. 
Respondents were therefore not surprised that New Labour had developed 
drugs policy using the same basic framework, as they did with TDTBBB 
(1998) because they had been 'generally supportive in opposition' 
(Respondent G) and thus, 7'f's what we would have hoped because in 
Opposition they had supported the approach' (Respondent A). Additionally 
the impact of the partnership approach may have had unintended 
conséquences. It brought health and the criminal justice agencies into 
partnership over substance misuse and so laid the foundations, upon which 
New Labour's concerns with drug misuse and communities and the impact of 
the former on the latter could be built. Thus, the structures were already in 
place by the time of New Labour and TDTBBB (1998) which would allow the 
movement of drug policy into a more firmly rooted criminal justice and socially 
and environmentally focussed agenda, rather than a health and individual 
treatment based one. 
Nonetheless, the picture which respondents built was that drug policy became 
a cross-party issue and in so doing became almost outside of the party 
political arena. Respondent H described it thus: 
' There is cross-party support for this way of working and remarkabie cross-
party support for the drug strategy... consistent... for over twenty years. ' 
Partnership: a policy idea 
An area explored in the interviews was why partnership structures had been 
used by TDT (1995) to deal with drug issues. Respondent F constdered the 
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¡deas had been linked for some time and cited a Department of Health (DoH) 
circular in 1986 which had established DDACs; although he suggested that 
the problem there was that it did not 'really didn't give them any sîeeragë. 
The DoH subsequently commissioned the Local Government Drug Forum and 
Nacro 1 0 1 to independently review thèse structures as they were seen to be 
'failingf; ¡t was feit that ideas contained in 'Across the Div ide' 1 0 2 were 
precursors to TDT (1995). Another report considered by some respondents to 
have been influential was the Morgan report (1991 ) 1 0 3 which had looked at 
how Community safety issues might be managed in localities in a partnership 
way. This report built on ideas popular within the Home Office at that time 
about the use of partnership structures as part of a crime prévention approach 
(Home Office 1984; Home Office 1989) These reports were known to the civil 
servants and one responsible for drafting TDT commented on 'Across the 
Divide' that: 
'it was very influential; it was certainly the first thing I read. ' 1 0 4 
The influence of thèse reports appeared to be because they argued for policy 
delivery in local areas on a subject that crossed a number of organisational 
boundaries (community safety and substance misuse). Nonetheless, it may 
seem somewhat surprising that the same style of approach (partnership) was 
developed in a policy which was being driven forward by some committed and 
enthusiastic civil servants and the Lord President, when it had apparently 
been seen to fail in earlier forms, such as the DDACs. However the approach 
had the benefit of bringing together the range of agencies concerned with the 
issue. Other examples of early partnership work cited by respondents were 
also focussed across a broad range of agencies and included complex social 
policy areas where there were also perceived policy and organisational fault-
lines, such as child abuse enquiries which found systemic organisational and 
1 0 1 N a c r o was an indépendant ehar i ty w o r k i n g w i th ofïcnders and ex -o f f enders w h i c h had a 
consu l t ancy sec t i on . B e c a u s e o f H o m e O f f i c e a c l i v i t y o n c r i m e prévention and latter ly the T a c k l i n g 
C r i m e C i r c u l a r i n 1989, the idea o f partnership was f am i l i a r in the c r i m e arena. 
1 0 2 W r i t t e n by Roge r H o w a r d w h o at the l ime w o r k e d for N a c r o and w h o was to l a l c r head D r u g S c o p e 
( f b rmer l y S C O D A ) 
1 0 3 It was o f f i c i a l l y - H o m e O f f i c e (1991 ) Sa fer C o m m u n i t i e s : T h e L o c a l D e l i v e r y o f C r i m e Prévention 
T h r o u g h T h e Pa r tne r sh ip A p p r o a c h 
l w 1 cannot ident i f y the R e s p o n d e n ! hère, as to d o thaï w o u l d take a way the i r a n o n y m i t y . 
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inter-agency failures (Respondent H). Additionally, Respondent H suggested 
that it allowed organisations who feit that they could not solve the social 
Problems with which they were faced on their own, to engage with others over 
the issues. Respondents also linked the idea to social action and community 
projects, particularly from the 1970's and 80's. They characterised those 
responses, however, as ones which had involved significant tensions between 
key players - in particular the police (Respondent D). The Morgan report 
(1991) had advocated that local authorities acquired a statutory duty to 
coordinate crime prévention activity, linking it to local accountability and 
démocratie structures (Hughes 1997). It was not implemented however, and 
this led some to suggest that it was unpopulär with the then Conservative 
government because of difficulties in the relationships between central and 
local government during the 1980's and early 1990's. Düring this research, 
one interviewée commented on thèse difficulties directly: 
'Morgan argues that local authorities should have responsibility, the Tories 
rubbished that...' (Respondent F) 
He concluded that was also why the Green Paper gave responsibility for 
DATs tothe Health Authorities. 
Respondents did not consider that they had been influenced by académie or 
theoretical texts on partnership such as communitarianism: 
'ifyou are asking if ! read great tomes - no- though I probabiy should have 
done (Laughs)!' (Respondent A) 
Instead Respondent A suggested that the approach did have a link to 
traditional civil service philosophies - 'the doctrine of local community 
responsibility is an old one - something the Home Office have always tried to 
awakeri and which the earlier circulars regarding crime prévention might bear 
out. Despite this, interviewées suggested that whilst partnership was imposed 
on the localities by TDT (1995) there was no tradition of it in central 
government. Respondent H suggested that the culture within central 
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government was antithetical to partnership working - because 'civil servants 
serve their department, not government interests' and 'their main agenda is to 
Protect themselves...'(sie); he asserted that 'those two dynamics make 
partnership in government impossible'. He also said that 'no government 
minister ever got promoted working on a cross-government strategy and thus 
suggested that neither the interests of civil servants nor those of politicians 
were truly geared towards supporting and developing highly functional and 
successful models of partnership and cross-departmental working because 
this would actually be against their own best interests. The autobiography of 
Keith Hellawell (2003:328-333) suggested that in this area both civil servants 
and politicians did, on occasions, pursue activités pereeived to be in the 
interest of their department, rather than a government wide strategy of co­
opération around drug misuse issues. These difficultés were also alluded to 
by a senior civil servant who, in interview, said that civil servants had been the 
most difficult group - defensive, territorial and cynical. TDT (1995) may have 
attempted to deal with this through the Cabinet Office and C D C U funetions 
and TDTBBB (1998) retained essentially the same architecture with cross— 
departmental coordination a key funetion of the Cabinet Office (Mowlam 
2003). However, the only direct attempt to enforce cross-departmental, 
partnership style working onto senior civil servants on drug issues is in the 
Updated Strategy (2002). 
Respondent D argued, however, that the partnership approach partly 
emerged because the 'drugs issue (had been) a minor probiert then there 
was the 'escalation of figures - the Addicts Index - huge problem'. It was 
interpreted that 'structures that were pre-existing were not effective - the CJS 
was not working - a revolving door - treatment agencies were overwhelmed: 
This was supported by Respondent B saying that drugs had gathered its own 
momentum, because of 'increasing avaiiabiiity', a pereeived 'drugs and crime 
link, a 'drugs and Community safety link and because it was a 'minority areä. 
Respondent A expanded on this: 
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'Drugs were a natural candidate for this approach, they didn't fall to one 
department - nobody 'owns' it. But they needed a lot of clout at the centre to 
implement it because drugs were a second order issue for them. Other 
natural candidates are now at the social exclusion unit' 
He added that: 
'Drugs had been a major factor in social policy problems and not to have a 
policy was a glaring gap'. 
The suggestion was, therefore, that there were imperatives to act which were 
based on perceptions of changing drug misuse patterns, alongside concerns 
about systemic failures within large organisations and specialist bodies. This 
was akin to other 'complex social issues' which eluded 'traditional approaches 
to governing..: (Newman 2001:11) and made partnerships appear a more 
attractive option, allowing government to draw on the lplurality of 
interdependent institutions and actors drawn from within and beyond 
government' (Newman 2001:12) Further, there was récognition of the 
'second order nature' of drug misuse as an issue for many organisations 
charged with responding to it. Partnership was a partially tried and apparently 
thus far ineffective method of dealing with this issue, however. Nonetheless, 
Respondent G suggested that there was 'no real opposition' to the policy 
direction, because 'no-one could argue against partnership'; and it had, in 
fact, become 'one of those buzz words - that (it) is a good thing1 (Respondent 
H). Further, as Newman (2001) and others have argued the issue of 
governance was one which governments, civil servants and others were 
seeking to address in other sphères at this time. Respondent G suggested 
that the threat to the implementation of TDT (1995) had lain in the possibility 
of 'indifférence, not outright opposition'; clearly, therefore, those developing 
TDT (1995) had rightly sought to engage with this potential issue by building 
in KPIs and developing structures which sought to bind the centre and 
localities together over implementation. Further, they had recognised the 
importance of central récognition and support if the idea was to be taken up in 
localities and this was built into the strategy as an intégral feature. 
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Drug Action Teams - mechanisms for delivering policy and partnership 
in action 
'DA Ts was the most interesting bit of the White Paper; a motherhood and 
apple pie type message with KPIs! A notion of a practical mix - centraiised 
policy and local structures. It was the meat of the strateg^. (Respondent G) 
The quote draws out many of the key issues with which this thesis is 
concerned. It Highlights the radical nature of the DAT structure through the 
way in which the partnership approach was used within the strategy. It also 
continues to suggest that policy was a pragmatic response to circumstance in 
this era and makes it clear that this was a 'centraiised policy1 which was to be 
delivered within localities. DATs can, therefore, be seen as early évidence of 
the influence of fashionable policy trajectories which used devolved and 
horizontal forms of government (Davies 2005; Lowdnes 2005; Newman 
2001). 
DATs were the centre of the TDT (1995) strategy and have remained 
essentially unchanged in each policy development; if anything their role has 
been strengthened. They were the physical embodiment of the partnership 
theory. They were also the source through which government policy was 
disseminated to the localities and through which government expected to see 
policy implementation. This is summed up by Respondent G who held the 
view that DATs were 'agents' of 'centrally driveri government drug policy. He 
added that, in his view, the C D C U 'wouid have got Ministers involved if things 
in the DATs were not shaping up as intended. The commitment from the 
centre to the strategy was clear and the intention was to ensure 
implementation. The way in which this intention was worked into the strategy 
was highlighted by Respondent A: 
'....the name Drug Action Team was quite symbolic, that we didn't expect a 
talk shop, we expected action. We did know that Chief Constables and Chief 
Execs weren't going to do anything themseives, but they were the ones who 
were going to make sure that something happened. ' 
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Thus the other key area, from a central policy-making perspective, was who 
would chair the DATs, who would broker them and how they would be held 
accountable. Respondent A said: 
'from the beginning it was very loose in terms of who would chair and 
geographica! locations. There were a couple of big issues that had to be 
sorted beforehand. One was actually laying responsibility on the Chief Execs 
of the Health Authorities - they didn't have to chair them or fund them - but 
someone had to make sure these things happen so that was a significant 
piece of negotiation. 
The Suggestion was that the Health Authority Chief Executives agreed to do 
this because of the support for the strategy from the Secretary of State for 
Health, despite there being very little additional funding. A senior civil servant 
said: 
lwe managed to do it so that they were quite pleased to be asked. Yes at first 
it was like no, no, we don't want it - and then, yeah, alright well do it - that 
was quite clearfy important - somebody had to make it happen. It had to be 
clear that this was not voiuntary, this was linked to funding for drugs work -
you had to have a stick as well as a carrot. 
Thus although respondents expressed some surprise that DATs then formed 
as quickly as they did, it suggests that local policy actors respond to initiatives 
pragmatically when they perceive them as strategically significant (Miller 
1998). Respondent A feit that this was because: 
lif you set the police and the Health Authorities and others a job to do they 
will do it, uniess it is against their culture. I think it was a mixture of 
enthusiasm and working with the grain of their professional goals, plus a 
certain expectation that public servants would do what was wanted'. 
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Respondent G said that a 'civil servant in Implementation mode would have 
worked in bureaucratie terms - not necessarily outeomes', but felt that 'policy 
Parameters were sufficiently flexible for everyone to be comfortablë, thus 
there was little opposition. This indicated an understanding from the centre of 
how to 'negotiate' with localities in such a way that emphasised a consensual 
approach (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1995). The respondent also suggested that 
the centre had tried, in his opinion, 'to be DAT focussed and engage and be 
accessible; and another thought 'DATs would work because of a new public 
service paradigm, with a direct link to a Minister - a politicai priorité. 
Respondent F added that 'Tony Newton developed a close rapport with DAT 
Chairs - it was unique - that direct access to a senior Cabinet Minister' This 
suggested to him that the centre 'had done their homework regarding local 
areas well and thus 'everyone did it although it was voluntan/, but he felt that 
there had, overall, been 'not enough thought to leadership', so that the resuit 
had been 'letting a thousand fiowers bloom'. Once again this emphasised the 
consensual approach to the flow of dialogue between the vertical and 
horizontal forms in the development of TDT (1995). In his opinion this 'all 
changed in 1997. Interestingly this interviewée would suggest that the model 
of partnership created by TDT (1995) and implemented for three years was 
one which veered towards a decentralised system which most closely 
resembled Newman's 'Open Systems Model' (2001:97) of 'innovation, 
flexibility and local diversité with a 'monitoring of outeomes with responsibility 
for how thèse are devolved to those on the ground. His suggestion is that 
under New Labour and TDTBBB (1998) this changed. 
Centre / local relationships 
The C D C U was the central administrative arm of TDT (1995) and was 
responsible for co-ordination of the strategy and liaison with the DATs. One 
of the civil servants who worked for the C D C U at this point said that they had 
'felt like guardians and drivers of DATs', and that if DATs had not been 
supported by them in the way they were, then they 'wouldn't have happened. 
This support was manifested through 'lots of DAT Visits'. Knoepfel and 
Kissling-Naf (1998) have argued that it is essential for vertical authority to be 
exercised in order to sustain the 'new' institutional forms. 
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Interviewées reflected on the development of DATs and some suggested that 
despite the attention from the centre there had been 'uneven development of 
DATs across the countn/ (Respondent B). This would appear to support 
Lowdnes (2005) who has argued that 'top-down and bottom-up institutional 
influence interact in important ways to produce an uneven patterning of 
uniformity and diversity. Respondent B considered that some areas had 
been 'capable of doinçf, but that 'others still can't do it, because in those 
areas people take their bail home'. He ascribed this principally to a lack of 
leadership from the Chair and not to the rôle of the coordinator, however he 
considered: 
'that (the centre) will drive people to work in partnership because they can't 
spend their money without it; mechanisms therefore will allow that to be 
imposed. 
Respondent H also described very différent working arrangements in three 
separate DATs, but felt that many of the issues had been resolved over time 
so that most now realised that1self-interest is the glue to make it work...value 
placed on trust and that becomes functional partnership'. He went on to say 
that there was 'cliché stuff about the whole being more than the parts, but the 
stratégie view, the long term is that (my organisation) will get more if (I) keep 
the faith than if I stitch them up - there is a long term gain'. This is suggestive 
of Lowdnes' (2005) analysis that there is an empirically observable change in 
the way localities do business such that the new institutions (such as 
partnerships) are now no more than the 'rules of the gamë with 'consciously 
designed and cieariy specified rules for behaviour and engagement. This is 
perhaps further evidenced by Respondent B who felt that there had initially 
been 'some discomfort from the private and voluntary sectof at the onset of 
DATs, 'possibly (due to) a sensé that they were going to be more reguiated. 
Rather than suggesting that this had led to conflict, interviewées 
overwhelmingly portrayed localities as having got on with the job of 
partnership in hand, demonstrating a pragmatic acceptance and a willingness 
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to display what was currently perceived to be appropriate behaviour (Miller 
1989; Newman 2001). 
Respondents B and C held very différent views about what partnership 
working was. Respondent B suggested that DATs were a 'model at the front 
of Labour thinkinçf in the 1995 manifeste-. However Respondent C 1 0 5 
suggested that partnership was 'not a mode! of work, but a 'working style, a 
culture, an approach': 
It is a 'thorny issue...making good practice compulsory, because it is what 
they bring to it'. (Respondent C) 
This différence of view about partnerships is of particular interest - is 
partnership a 'model' or a 'method' of work which can be transferred to other 
policy areas, domains, régions and work sphères? Or is it a working style, a 
culture, an approach which means that, perhaps more fundamentally, it 
requires more change within institutions and individuals to be successfully 
implemented? These questions are, as we have seen, reflected in other 
research and literature in this area (Wong (1998), Miller (1999) and Knoepfel 
and Kissling-Naf (1998) and Lowdnes (2005). Essentially they raise a key 
area of debate with regard to social policy implementation: can one simply 
require partnership working and provide the model, focus and impetus, or is it 
something which is concerned with a working culture developed over time, 
and which includes shared values and a history of successful interactions? 
Are the two somehow inter-related with a requirement for some sort of 
professional or cultural change in order for the partnership model to become 
functional? Overwhelmingly, interviewées suggested that partnership working 
within localities could be legislated for if there was enough direction and 
interest from the centre; once the interest of the localities was engaged the 
policy was not apparently conflictual in its relationships between localities and 
the centre. 
~ RespondenL C was not a key p layer a l an ear l y /deve lopmenta l stage, but was in te rv i cwec l upon the 
r e c o m m e n d a i i o n o f otie o f the other interviewées. H e was an observer o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n howeve r . 
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The radical nature of DATs and the drug policy was underlined by 
interviewées who said that it was important to remember that 'in 1995 there 
was very Utile other promotion of partnership working - crime prévention stuff 
had been neutered and this was a voiuntary activity - a drive in a vacuum' 
(Respondent F). They characterised TDT (1995) as a first step and in this light 
Respondent D said that 'TDT faid the basic foundations' but that 'TDTBB was 
a more focussed strategy with 'a better expression of expectations' which 
'channelled DATs'. Respondent G developed this further and said that if New 
Labour had thought TDT (1995) was rubbish 'they would have changed it. 
He described drug policy 'under Tony Newton' as a 'consensual 
approach...but the Labour manifesto was différent... felt more dynamid. 
Ail of the interviewées considered that partnership working increased once 
New Labour were elected in 1997 and that the DATs provided a model for this 
development. Respondent G argued that partnership working had undergone 
'incrémental development and was now 'too absorbed into the mainstream of 
policy makingf to be lost, but that there were still key issues to be resolved -
'money, accountability and legal status.' It was clearly the view that the DAT 
model had been developed and used with regard to other policy areas not 
concerned with drugs, but where a number of agencies needed to work 
together, or with regard to some of the 'big' social issues of the day. Areas 
referred to are concerned with youth behaviour, Community safety, and 
concerns about inclusion. 1 0 6 With regard to the idea of DATs as a 
transferable concept, Respondent A said: 
'...I think the Youth Justice Board is a bit sniffy about DATs and think they 
were a bit amateurish and I think that's probably fair....but in a way they are a 
legacy from the DATs it is just that they have huge resource and a great deal 
of focus and energy right from the beginning and ioads of money... ' 
Respondent A also described the work of the Social Exclusion Unit as a 
development of the DAT model, describing it as [ a better example....I don't 
W e w i l l re turn to this issue o f ' i r ans f e rab i l i t y ' later in this C h a p t e r . 
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know if they felt they learnt something, but that is the area....all that area of 
performance and innovation'?07 
In this quote the respondent again linked the concept of partnership to 
performance and innovation, new ideas and a link to outcomes. This 
respondent also described not only how New Labour had replicated the ideas 
in other fora, but how they had also developed it: 
'What they did, which you could either take as criticism or praise, was that 
they upped the anti - they threw resources at it - raised the profile - all sort of 
bigger and richer'. (Respondent A) 
Conclusions 
In the case of TDT (1995) it is suggested that there was a meeting of a 
political commitment (the manifesto), combined with a political imperative to 
be able to account for governmental expenditure, which converged with a 
dawning civil service energy for implementable, deliverable, outcome and 
evidence focussed policies. These changes had 'infiltrated' the civil service 
as a result of initiatives which had been introduced by Thatcher. The ideas 
about 'deliverables' had come in from the management sectors. In addition 
there had been lobbying on the drugs issue for over ten years and this was 
matched by a growing concern with drug misuse. The combination of these 
factors with the Conservatives win in 1993 led to the appointment of this new 
breed of civil servants in some sectors who were concerned to get the job 
done and who did it through consultation and management consultancy 
inspired strategies. This directly influenced the development of the TDT 
(1995) strategy and through this the direction which drug policy was to take; 
additionally it allowed partnership to emerge within a centrally driven social 
policy. One described by Respondent G as a 'high profile policy with a local 
government model as the agent of government policy1. 
1 0 7 T h e issue oí' pe r f o rmance is a key concept in this area w h i c h w i l l he d i s c us s e d later w i t h i n this 
chapter and w h i c h features heav i l y in the imp l emen ta t i on chapter w i th D A T co - c oo rd ina t o r s and others 
at ' m i d d l e ' l eve l p o l i c y imp l emen ta t i on . 
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Partnership was an idea which had been on the periphery of a number of 
social policy areas for sometime, but had not been taken up or made to work 
in any consistent way. It appears to have emerged in drugs policy because it 
was a way of bringing together the divergent organisations and interests 
which were inimical to the substance misuse issue. Further, various reports 
on the work of partnership organisations can be seen to have influenced the 
way partnerships (DATs) were structured in TDT (1995). Thus, there was an 
intention clearly signalled from the beginning that the policy was intended for 
implementation and that there would be in-put at a senior level from the 
centre. Those workîng in the area and devising the policy saw what they were 
doing as radical and dynamic. 
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Chapter 7 - Local interviews - implementing drug 
policy 
Introduction 
This chapter tells the story of implementation within the localities of three drug 
policies, Tackling Drugs Together (1995), Tackling Drugs to Build a Better 
Britain (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002). As we have seen the ideas 
îorTDT (1995) originated trom the centre and the following two policies were 
largely devised there; as we have seen therefore, DATs have been described 
by some central policy makers as 'the agent of government policy' 
(Respondent G). 
The chapter focuses principally post-1998 but does look back reflectively, 
through the use of interviews, to TDT (1995); it considers the change in focus 
during this time and the way in which the scale and range of initiatives 
concerned with drug policy were developed 1998-2004. Overall, the changes 
are viewed by those implementing policy as a narrowing down of the agenda 
at each policy development. This is explored in some depth. Over this time 
(1994-2004) the considérable number of policy changes required people in 
middle government and local policy positions to interpret and develop ways of 
responding to and implementing them at a local level. Within the policies 
there were an even greater number of initiatives and this required those 
working in local areas to respond to and interpret those initiatives and funding 
streams; and to encourage and support those developing and delivering 
services in a fast changing environment. In addition, there was a significant 
growth in the size of the drug sector and a changing profile of those 
concerned with drug issues from a policy and implementation perspective. 
This also meant that there were a broader number of organisations whose 
performance was judged against drug related criteria. The interviews 
undertaken with coordinators, and which form the bulk of the chapter, 
consider thèse issues and their impact on implementation. 
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The story of the implementation of the drug strategies also considers the 
themes which have emerged elsewhere in the thesis. This ¡ncludes why 
drugs and crime became inexorably linked; the growth and expansión of 
DATs as partnership forms, the impact of New Labour and the growth of 
performance management systems to a point which some might describe as 
micro-management. The chapter also looks at how localities have interpreted 
implementation and learned to transíate government initiatives to meet local 
needs, the 'room' for such local interpretation and the overall development of 
the relationship with the centre, including the impact of regionalised forms of 
governance. 
The chapter ¡s based principally on interviews with those implementing, but 
also developing and interpreting policy within the localities within a centrally 
devised and driven series of drug strategies. The twelve interviewees were 
drawn equally from two regional áreas and are collectively referred to (in 
general) as coordinators; however four did not work within DATs but at a 
regional level and are thus described differently1 0 8. The interviewees have 
been anonomised and in this section are numbered in order to differentiate 
them from the national interviewees. They have also been referred to 
generically as 'she', although in fact the respondents were drawn equally from 
both genders; this decisión was made to further aid anonymity and again to 
differentiate this group of interviewees from the national respondents. 
Developing policy 
Moving on from TDT 
TDT (1995) was described by those who devised it as generally welcomed, 
with cross-party support; despite this they also portrayed it as a radical policy 
for a number of reasons, one of which was that it sought to engage 
strategically and with considerable influence from the centre on the drugs 
issue. It created DATs, taking partnership as a principie. The DATs were 
See C h a p t e r 3 for a d i s cuss i on o f the methods and in te rv i ewees . 
214 
composed of the most senior representatives of statutory Services and local 
authorities in the localities and supported administratively by a coordinator. 
When New Labour were elected in 1997 they supported TDT (1995) and it 
was therefore unsurprising to those involved that although they sought to 
make changes, they kept the same basie strueture in TDTBBB (1998). 
Respondent G (a senior civil servant) recalled that this had been a 'consciouś 
decision in order to keep a 'broadly based model of partnership' in order to 
'drive (the policy) centrally to local government'. The criticisms which 
TDTBBB (1998) made of TDT (1995) were that it had focussed on struetures, 
reeeived insufficient funding, been implemented in too patchy and short-term 
a fashion and failed to bring together information about performance and 
knowledge of what worked. The Suggestion was that TDTBBB (1998) would 
tackle these issues. Further the analysis of what caused drug misuse 
changed between the strategies and whereas TDT (1995) had presented the 
issues as broadly 'for discussion', TDTBBB (1998) was much more certain. It 
drew direct links with social and environmental factors and linked the 
implementation of the strategy with other policies across the social policy field, 
in particular drawing out the links with other areas of social exclusion. In 
addition, it was much harsher about what it considered to be the impact of 
drug use on communities; and it highlighted social responsibility within a 
moral framework. The inclusion of other policy areas and a wider ränge of 
social policy thinking was unsurprising to national and local interviewees and 
Respondent G considered that: 
'Most government policies are aiways amalgams. (Civil servants and 
politicians) are magpies, they nick something from here, there and 
everywhere, (they) relate it to experience, practicality, ideology, particularly 
New Labour'. 
New Labour also increased the funding available to tackle drug misuse issues 
and linked this directly to performance, that of DATs and that of the individual 
constituent organisations. Reporting and monitoring were to become 
increasingly sophisticated over this period, with targets becoming integrated 
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into core performance features for individual organisations, such as star 
ratings for Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and Health Authorities, for example. 
Respondent 6 in keeping with all other respondents characterised the períod 
since TDT (1995) as one which had 'changed vastly1 with lgovernment 
focussing down onto smaller áreas oí concerrí. She characterised TDT as 
'very wide', but said that ¡n 2004 drug policy had become a 'focussed 
operatíon against those committing crime'. She characterised her DAT as a 
functioning DAT with a good reputation and said that the good thing about the 
level of demand from the centre was that it 'actually brought partners 
togethef. Her DAT knew that 'eisewhere there was a lot of infernal 
squabbíingf but in their busy rnetropolitan área there was a 'joined up 
approach'. Further systems were portrayed as increasingly 'mature' and this 
lead to the 'mainstreaming' of performance management systems which 
extended beyond the DATs into the performance measures for the partner 
organisations themselves. 
Drugs, crime, environmental and social factors 
TDTBBB (1998) and subsequently the Updated Strategy (2002) are largely 
considered by coordinators as more focussed than TDT (1995). There was a 
sense of development between the strategies that went from one portrayed as 
an early wish-list, to something which carne to include concrete plans and 
concerns about delivery of specific services. There was also a perception 
throughout the interviews that drugs and criminal justice issues had become 
increasingly interlinked. As we have seen Labour MPs had been drawing 
these links for some time, including Barry Sherman (MP) in a House of 
Commons debate in 1989 which appeared to have been influenced by the 
work of Geoffrey Pearson (1987). After that, these ideas appeared to be taken 
up within a wider New Labour analysis which placed drug misuse in a social 
and environmental context and focussed on the impact on communities 
(Stimson 2000; Green 1998; Himmelstein 1998). TDTBBB (1998) is full of 
references to the other strategies with which it joins and to the overall social 
policy agenda which New Labour pursued. By drawing the links between 
drug misuse and social and environmental factors it also meant that it 
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'mainstreamed' drug policy into a holistic, socially focussed agenda, not one 
concerned with individual needs and responses. This gênerai shift in 
perception has been represented as a 1 demedicalisation of drug problème 
(Stimson 1987) or alternative^ an attempt to see 'the influence of social and 
environmental processes' on the drug user (MacGregor 1998). However, it 
also appeared to suggest that drug users were not 'of the community, that 
individuals had a duty to behave responsibly within their communities and this 
added to a sensé that community had (as a concept) become morally loaded 
and might only be positively perceived (Skidmore and Craig 2004); thus 
linking the portrayal more widely to New Labour adoption of communitarian 
thinking (Etzioni 1995; Field 1996) and tothe 'Respect' agenda. 
This shift in emphasis to a drugs / crime link was a philosophical one which 
had a direct practice impact. It was reflected in the language and direction of 
TDTBBB (1998) and thus affected the way in which policy was to be 
implemented. This was explained by Respondent 7: 
7 think there is a thème and it's got stronger. Ok, the emphasis initially was 
much more on prévention, éducation and young people and l think that 
gradually out of the four main objectives from TDTBB only crimina! justice has 
really remained intact. Prévention and éducation évidence base has 
foundered...Enforcement thing has died on the vine - the police accept the 
impact they can have is marginal, although you have to keep up the 
appearance. So from a very wide base it has narrowed and narrowed to 
effectively drug treatment and linking that with the crime agenda. From TOT 
crime not at the forefront, to TDTBB more of it and the Updated Strategy is 
almost entirely to my mind about crime: 
She attributed this focussing down onto the crime agenda to the \..PM and 
advisors...and a very naive assessment of what those links are about: This 
was linked to the NTORS research (1998) and the widely vaunted 'for every 
extra £) . . . ' analysis of the link between expenditure on treatment and crime 
réduction. This directly linked the importance of treatment as a crime 
réduction initiative, thus highlighting a community, rather than an individual 
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gain from an individualised treatmenî package. It is important to recall that 
the PM had introduced the TDTBBB (1998) strategy by referring to 'the 
vicious cycle of drugs and crime which wrecks lives and îhreatens 
communities' (TDTBBB 1998:3). Such an emphasis might be seen to justify 
expenditure which treated individual drug users if it could be seen to have a 
community outcome / impact. Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, 
however this focus was supported by most respondents in the localities who 
contended that regardless of the aim, the impact had been to improve drug 
services and thus drug treatment. Respondent 8 demonstrated this: 
There has been an lincreasing emphasis on drug treatment as a way of 
improving individual heaith and community safety and reducing chminal 
behaviour. I think it is now in the process of working. ' 
Respondents also reflected that there had been a move away from concerns 
about individuals, to concerns about communities. Thus for those 
implementing drug policy there was a shift in expectation about where the 
focus lay with regard to drug misuse and treatment. It appeared to have 
become more important to think about the impact of drugs on communities, 
and within that framework, individuals whose behaviour aftected them and for 
which they required treatment. The key lever was, however, that their drug 
taking was believed to cause crime and anti-social behaviour and that needed 
to be stopped in the interests of the wider community, or 'greater good'. We 
have traced the development of this political philosophy in Chapter 2 and 
there is a palpable shift which was reflected throughout most interviews. This 
would appear to be in keeping with an analysis suggested by MacGregor and 
Lipow (1995:17), although about a différent period. They suggested that the 
impact of the policies of Thatcher and Reagan was that they achieved a 
change in the language of debate which affected lhow we tafk about a 
probiem, how we imagine its solution..: Under New Labour it is possible to 
suggest that the moral tone and the changing focus from drug misuse as a 
probiem for individuals was successfully undertaken, shifting the concern onto 
the impact on communities, but in so doing placing a duly on individual drug 
users to reform for the greater good. Respondent 9 developed this further: 
218 
'Coming from a health background was a positive step. We had lots of 
philosophical debates in the DAT...health with an individual focus and 
concerned about confidentiaiity, and criminal justice for the good of the 
Community and neighbours and that being most important, more important 
than the individual and sharing information to reduce crime. We talked it 
through and feit that the two are complimentary ...the différence has rapidly 
diminished and there are some complex issues...need to treat the individual 
and that helps communities and need a holistic approach...more in common 
than différent. ' 
Additionally, some respondents saw the shift in emphasis to a focus on crime 
and treatment as presenting a more holistic or fairer response. Thus, 
Respondent 1 who was also originally from a health background supported 
what she perceived as an increased focus on criminal justice issues in the 
Updated Drug Strategy (2002). Her reasons for this were that: 
'for me it made perfect sense...it seemed to me we iooked after nice drug 
users, but chaotic users couldn't get a service and that annoyed me and they 
were the ones doing the damage to communities and to themselves..:. 
This is of interest as this approach is rarely reflected in académie work and 
represents a shift from a portrayal of enforced or penal-led treatment services 
as discriminatory or unfair to the individual, to a conception of it forcing the 
inclusion of the 'not so nice' users with whom services then had to engage. It 
is also interesting because, whilst the focus on communities undoubtedly 
impacted on drug users, most of the coordinators interviewed who were 
responsible for implementing drug policy in two large regional areas with 
significant drug problems, would suggest that the drug users were in fact 
those who gained as the resuit of considerably improved drug services. It 
would seem, therefore, that the emphasis on communities appeared in the 
language to moralise, isolate and seek to force drug users to change their 
behaviour, but in the main it is suggested that the impact has been benign or 
positive, providing vastly improved services and adding to capacity. 
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The move away from a wider agenda with a number of targets which focussed 
on young people, prévention and éducation appeared, in gênerai, to be 
popular with coordinators: 
7 V e never been convinced by the young people's prévention agenda, l've yet 
to see any évidence that stuff that they do in schoois works..,.l've more time 
for targeted work with vulnérable groups, it makes more sensé: 
This was mirrored by a number of speakers and it was usually linked to a 
sensé that there was no 'évidence' regarding prévention; Respondent 4 
described how 'young people's élément has fallen way back...funding has 
never grown... - and évidence base to that is not a great winnef. It may be 
that in a world which is performance measured and concerned with 
implementation the concrète, measurable and achievable gains priority. For 
those responsible for reporting on performance there may be a wish to focus 
on areas where it is considered achievements can be demonstrated. 
Local / Centre Relationships 
However, although the gênerai direction of the strategy was overwhelmingly 
supported by coordinators and régional représentatives, traditional tensions 
between cross-departmental working, central support and drive and the 
balance between a health or pénal led agenda, had not wholly disappeared. 
Some respondents considered that thèse issues were relevant to both the 
centre and localities, but that they played out différente in each. They 
considered that the issue at the centre was principally about both commitment 
and control, and thus the interest and the impact of the responsible minister. 
Their views were formed by how they perceived this impacted on them; thus it 
was considered that there was a négative impact when the lead minister was 
disinterested in drug issues and did not have the 'motivation' to support the 
strategy, exploit potential 'opportunities' and ensure they attracted the 
necessary 'resources'. This is illustrated by Respondent 5 who said that life 
had been difficult for DATs under 'Cunningham (who) was not interested and 
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that this had allowed the Home Office under Jack Straw (who was interested 
in drug policy) to 'pick it up and play for it. This allowed, in their opinion, for 
the agenda to move over time to the Home Off ice 1 0 9 . Nonetheless, once this 
had been achieved, Respondent 2 considered that the situation worsened, 
because David Blunkett had, (in her view) little interest in the drugs issue as 
Home Secretary. This view would appear to be supported by his memoirs 
where he makes little reference to drug policy issues and does not discuss 
them in the detail given to other matters, such as immigration. For example 
he refers to the launch of the Updated Strategy (2002) thus: 
'Meanwhile I published the Updated Drugs Strategy which, it has to be said, 
was pretty widely welcomed..: (2006:422) 
He then talked immediately about other matters. Similarly his references to 
the reclassification of cannabis are concerned with the media presentation of 
such matters and how he was (in his opinion) unfairly considered as trying to 
hide the initiative (2006:312 & 313). 
Local policy implemented are, therefore, aware of policy as a process issue 
and think about how central arrangements impact, for better or worse, on 
them. Locally, the same issues were portrayed as about 'the ethos of the 
different professional backgrounds' (Respondent 4) which led to 'most of the 
barriers being ideological' (Respondent 7); this could affect the advancement 
of partnership working on occasions, or the atmosphere, because debates 
which people thought were finished with kept having to be had. As we have 
seen, Miller (1998) has suggested that history and values are key facets of 
partnership working and that these can affect its progress and functioning. 
Similarly, Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf (1998) argued that value issues could be 
supportive of, or destructive to, a partnership structure. Respondent 7 
expanded on how this might manifest itself: 
A l t h o u g h this d i d not happen un t i l D a v i d B l u n k e l t was H o m e Secre tary . 
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'Nothing has 'surprised' me, but things do frustrate me. Or the surprise is that 
you'd expect battfes to be won and things to move on - but you still encounter 
the same battfes'. 
This related in particular to some health based concerns that a move to a 
more criminal justice focussed treatment System might iead to a skewing of 
services, or for drug users to need to behave in certain ways in order to gain 
help. This related to traditional health / pénal discussions about whether 
criminal justice based drug services gave access to those who would 
otherwise have been denied them (as research suggested and as 
Respondent "1 believed - see above) or whether they adversely affected drug 
taking behaviour, linking it more strongly with offending and giving access to 
services via that route. Respondent 7 continued to iilustrate how this might 
affect practice issues with a description of a conférence she had attended. At 
the Conference a drugs worker had said that: 
'people commit crimes to get treatment - (but Respondent 7 said) / don't 
beiieve it, never have - the surprise is that its' still Coming round 
again.. ..fewer people make them and less vociferous, but people will hang on 
to firmly heid beliefs and (are) prepared to quote anecdotal information 
despite the fact you have lots of research and qualitative information to the 
contrary: 
The frustration was that professional philosophies did, on occasions, 
resurface to affect practice debate when the respondent considered that that 
this had been resolved. This tension between long-held beliefs which 
continued to re-surface within a partnership framework was a more generally 
held view and discussed by many of the respondents. It frustrated 
coordinators and regional managers alike, perhaps because their role was to 
achieve consensus and move the partnerships forward in line with the current 
philosophies. Further, it was feit that the centre did not always help. The 
large departments of State such as the Home Office and Department of Health 
were viewed by both the central policy makers and local policy implementers 
as continuing to work in a departmental way, only embracing cross-
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departmental working when forced. This lack of joined up working between 
DoH and the Home Office at the centre was seen to impact on implementation 
and this was illustrated by Respondent 4 who said that: 
'community justice and health are uncomfortabfe bedfellows and this is 
mirrored nationaliy at the moment - for exampie NTDMS and DIR data110 
can't be shared because the Home Office and DoH had not worked out a 
proper protocol to share data between them before the data coifection 
began....this showed the haste, iack ofthought and uneasy relationship..: 
Downe and Martin (2006:470) have suggested that in other policy áreas within 
localities the same sorts of issues can be manifested. Thus, they have 
argued that the 'persistence of sectorally based funding regimes, performance 
management systems and inspectorates combined with fierceiy independent 
professional networks..: has meant that 'local agencies still struggle even to 
share, iet alone coordínate their actions..:. The impact of the centre on 
localities with regard to implementation is that the lack of joined up work 
between departments in the past can have a real and tangible impact on 
implementation and the example of data collected by localities which could 
not be compared because of a lack of a protocol agreement, provided 
evidence of this. For those charged with collecting data, feeding back to the 
centre and being judged on this performance, such a lack of central 
coordination and forethought is extremely frustrating. It is probable that it is 
incidents such as this which led to the creation within the Updated Strategy 
(2002) of a new group, the Strategic Planning Board, which specifically 
mirrored the composition of Cabinet sub-Committee and 'supports this 
structure at civil service official levef (Updated Strategy 2002:60); it was 
constituted of sénior civil servants whose role was to ensure coordination and 
joint working between their departments. Joined up working between 
departments at the centre would appear an important but often missing factor 
(Downe & Martin 2006:470); further concern about this lack was a feature of 
the testimony of the national interviewees and those working at a local level 
B o t h n e w l y de visee! databuses. 
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and ¡t was considered that it ¡mpacted negatively, on occasions, on 
implementation. The biographies of Hellawell (2003) and Blunkett (2006) 
support these views and suggest that cooperation between departments was 
often missing and competition was an ever present factor. Ensuring the 
attention and commitment of large departments appeared to be also about 
securing their political interest. With key players such as DoH, it appeared 
implementation needed to become 'mainstreamed...into parí of their 
(individual organisation's) performance management framework; realiy woken 
up heaith to that...nowparíofhealth authority rating...you use what ieversyou 
cari (Respondent 10 - regional manager). She argued, in addition, that it 
was important to achieve this level of performance review because 'Tony Blair 
- he's very interested. 
Role of the PM 
As we nave seen in earlier chapters the role of the Prime Minister has also 
been portrayed as important to the drug strategies both under the 
Conservatives and New Labour. This was attested to by both sets of 
interviewees with regard to Tony Blair who was considered to have been 
important both to the advancement of the drug strategy and to the focus on 
the crime agenda. Interviews with those charged with implementing drug 
policy at a local or regional level were acutely aware of the impact the support 
of the PM had and this was raised by a number of speakers, particularly those 
with strong links to the centre. The examples of how this support was 
manifested ranged from, why the strategies had attracted so much new 
money since 1997, to examples of members of the PM's Strategy Unit 
attending DAT meetings in order to see how they were intending to implement 
a particular ¡nitiative, advising on target setting and returning to review 
progress. Respondent 4 described her surprise at: 
'..the political interest and the zealous holding to account on spend and the 
monthfy reports and then every three months reporting to the PM and the very 
enthusiastic notice from the centre.: 
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The level of interest and attention for some high profile DATs was 
considérable and also linked into the focussing down onto particular 
communities and issues. Nonetheless, the attention was across the whole 
agenda and Respondent 7 commented: 
'Much as it might pain me to admit this - the reason so much happened and 
so many resources went to criminal justice treatment is simply because the 
PM is interested in criminal justice based treatment and with the current 
administration if Tony says he wants it to happen, it will happen. But the 
minute he is no longer interested is when the money will dry up and it will 
change. He continues to have quarterly stock takes on CJIP even in the 
context of international crises.. : 
She illustrated why she thought drugs issues had caught the political 
imaginations including that of Tony Blair: 
'...if not for the PM l'd say NTORS - almost frightening - NTORS came out 
with what I thought was a ridiculous équation, £1 treatment, £3..; but what is 
important is not whether it is true or not, but if people - important people -
believe it. Yet flawed, narrow, research, but "treatment works", has been the 
foundation of drug poiicy since the proclamation was issued, been the basis of 
policy and been prepared to commit millions of pounds to treatment. If you 
want a pivotai moment, I think ifs that. And when they stop believing that, 
you can see it all going..: 
In addition she considered that the key people at a national level with whom 
DATs had to link were: 
'The Prime Ministers Strategy and Delivery Unit who pay close 
attention....Directorate of Drug Strategy Unit and ...head of CJIP...they are 
the people who hold the money1. 
Thus, the power was seen to be based with the P M , and two bodies linked to 
the criminal justice agenda and based within the Home Office. This illustrated 
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the impact of moving support for the drug policy to the Home Office and away 
from the Cabinet Office in 2002 and suggested that there was less cross-
departmental attention given to the strategy, otherthan via the PM himself. 
Impact of the centre 
The centre was felt to impact directly on the localities and, as we have seen, 
the view from the centre amongst some key sénior civil servants was that TDT 
(1995) had been a centrally derived strategy which was 'driven1 to the 
localities. The relationship between the two with regard to the implementation 
of drug policy was, therefore, pivotal. There were a number of factors which 
localities perceived affected this 'drive' from the centre, amongst which were 
who was perceived to be 'in charge' of the strategy. Tony Newton as Leader 
of the House and with overall responsibility for TDT (1995) appears to have 
received almost universal respect. It would seem that the strategy was clearly 
perceived as under his control and that its placing was a crucial mirroring of 
'inter-departmental working-a realsign...'(Respondent 5) which impacted on 
Chief Officers who 'did not know how to deal with it because it broke the oíd 
rules and departmental hierarchies. Further it was an 'opportune time and a 
good DAT coordinator couid ... get things through' (Respondent 5), which 
again suggested that it was possible at this moment to get beyond 
departmental and organisational boundaries, or that there was an expectation 
that this would be sought. At this point there was, therefore, a perception that 
politicians and other policy actors had moved towards a more strategic 
approach to the 'drug problem' and had done so through the creation of a 
clear policy and structure for implementation with reporting mechanisms back 
to the centre. As we have seen, this approach sought to be radical and to 
bring into play some of the emerging social policy agendas of the time -
partnership approaches and performance management in particular. These 
can be clearly observed in the TDT (1995) strategy where the partnership 
approach was built into the strategy and mechanisms for communicating 
between the centre and local authorities were instituted. The policy was also 
one shaped by the emerging central policy concerns with implementation and 
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the ability to évidence this through the use of key performance indicators 
(KPIs) which would be subsequently monitored. 
Interestingly however, the testimony of the coordinators often mirrored that in 
the autobiography of Keith Hellawell which characterised considérable in-
fighting for power and control during the New Labour period, which they felt 
had, to a degree, destabilised the drug strategy 1 1 1. In some sensés, 
therefore, this offers a contrast with perceptions of New Labour's 'over control' 
of stratégies. Downe and Martin (2006:473) have portrayed a similar pattern, 
however, with regard to other policy issues in localities where it was 
considered that 'divisions within the Government exacerbated the sensé of a 
lack of clear direction and that this was unhelpfuf. This is seen as particularly 
problematic as localities were in a 'décade of unprecedented change and 
thus felt that the government were introducing 'too many policies too quickl/ 
(Downe and Martin 2006). The pattern for DATs was remarkably similar with 
a séries of new initiatives and a considérable uplift in funding post 1998; 
consequently, a lack of clear direction or control from the centre was 
considered to be destabilising, particularly within a partnership framework. 
Thus, Keith Hellawell was portrayed as a 'face that went on Richard and Judy 
(Respondent 2) although this was, to some extent, seen as a useful rôle, 
which brought récognition to the drugs issue. Additionally, Respondent 5 
suggested that at first 'when the government changed it stayed the same and 
Anne Taylor and Hellawell brought the centre together weil. However, she 
considered that they had 'ignored DATs and it was the start of the rot'. This 
was characterised by a lack of trust between DPAS and DATs with the 'Home 
Office using DPAS to lever the strategy in'. Hellawell's lack of interest in 
DATs is somewhat surprising given he went into central government directly 
from the localities, however, his own memoirs make clear his time was spent 
involved in considérable in-fighting at the centre and that he appeared to 
show little respect for or connection with DAT chairs, of whom he had been 
one (Hellawell 2003). 
' " W h e n a sked . j u s l one o f the coo rd ina t o r s - Respondent 2 - had read the au t ob i o g raphy a l the l i m e o f 
in t e r v i ew , su it w o u l d not appear to have d i r e c t l y in f luenced their o w n o p i n i o n . 
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The responses from the local interviewées about this period are interesting 
because they appear to show that divisions at the centre brought less 
connection with the centre, although this was also impacted upon by New 
Labour control of strategy which was not happy to leave things to be 
interpreted locally. This mixed pattern can be seen in other government 
policy initiatives under New Labour and some suggest that it is a deliberate 
effect 'designed to maintain support for 'change' across a range of groupe 
(Downe and Martin 2006). Thus, interviewées in the localities described the 
'levering in' of stratégies at locality level through long-handed bureaucratie 
structures, such as DPAS and latterly the regional Home Office drug teams 
and the NTA. However, it would also seem that there was a perception that 
under New Labour the focus was really on the centre, although the 
implementation was to take place in the localities. The driving force behind 
this was seen as New Labour's need to be able to évidence implementation to 
the public and demonstrate the impact of their Third Way' stratégies. Thus, 
although the rhetoric of New Labour was more pro-locality based décision 
making than the outgoing Conservatives, the reality was, on occasions, quite 
différent (Downe & Martin 2006; Lowdnes 2005: Davies 2005). TDTBBB 
(1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002) did not, as it was suggested TDT 
(1995) had done, let a 'thousand ffowers bloorri (Respondent G). 
Further, the Drugs Czar was perceived as not having the power centrally to 
effect strategy or to make an impact: 
7 know there was a big debate about the Czar. I iiked Keith Hellaweil...I know 
it was a media machine, but ultimately for a DAT Chair there were key lead 
individuels that you could bring in when someone was dragging their 
heels...The Drug Czar didn't work because he didn't have political clout and 
you won't get anywhere without it: (Respondent 3) 
Respondent 5 described this lack of impact by the Czar with a telling 
illustration: 
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'Hellawell got all the Ministers to send a letter to Chief Officers, but the 
DFESS sent a letter and put on the bottom, but only if you have time. So to 
the Chief Execs of Education this signalled a message. It needs to be a 
common message; they will dance around if you don't have it; if it's not their 
driving issue or personal interest it won't happen. ' 
In this sense, the confusion and struggles for control which Hellawell 
portrayed in his autobiography appear to have mirrored that felt in the 
localities and which DATs appear to have experienced at this point in time. 
Respondent 2 characterised it thus: 
'about two years ago112 it was really hard for DATs, it was nearly a case of 
being airbrushed out of history... Blunkett saw DA Ts as a development but not 
as addressing areas he wanted addressed: 
Respondent 5 described: 
'Mo Mowlem wanted to keep it in the Cabinet Office, but after that the Home 
Office got it, for DAT coordinators you didn't know who was in charge - it was 
very confusing. We were all lobbying for the coordination to be under one 
roof, but they put it all under the Home Office and they have never been able 
to understand local decision making.' 
Respondent 3 suggested that the difficulties and changes which occurred as a 
result had led to a point in 2004 when: 
'no-one now is really quite sure who the key links are...I think it should go 
back to the Cabinet Office, it helps everyone to see across the whole agenda'. 
She developed why she considered this the case and used an interesting 
example: 
1 1 2 A b o u t 2003 
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l..lt's always been the debate - thaï it is ail about crime, and it is not. We 
have the best treatment we've ever had, but because of the iead rôle, people 
get a bit confused and maybe lose some enthusiasm and so we have to win it 
back: 
This is an area which has clearly been problematic from the beginning and 
which has not been wholly resolved. Some saw the tensions over the drug 
issue between the Home Office and Department of Health as related to which 
department was most able to 'profit' by it. Thus: 
\.for the Department of Health it is right at the bottom of their priohty list -
there are no votes ... in more money going to junkies - but for the Home 
Office there is money to say there are more coercive approaches and 
treatment to lessen crime: (Respondent 7) 
Other equally sweeping changes were perceived by interviewées. 
Respondent 6 considered that a lot had 'changed over the last ten years -
less local initiative and more and more centrally driven.' She feit that in some 
parts of the country this was needed, but within her area they 'work(ed) weit 
together and thus there was a 'need to be able to respond to local areas'. 
There was a sensé which developed during the interviews and when seen as 
a whole, that New Labour had increasingly, over the course of its own two 
stratégies, begun to relate to DATs more individually, recognising those that 
worked well and intervening directly with those that did not. This appeared to 
have become a regional issue and one that was driven by a concern to 
implement policy. It would seem from an analysis of the interviews that 
regional relationships have principally replaced direct contact with the centre 
and we will consider this again later in the chapter. In some sensés this is 
supported by the empirical work of Downe and Martin (2006:485) who have 
suggested that other New Labour policies and approaches to local 
government can be viewed as having: 
230 
'the hallmarks of a classic evolutionary strategy which has been fine-tuned 
and adapted over time as circumstances have changed and the weaknesses 
of some of the initiai proposais have become evident: 
This suggests what we have seen elsewhere in the thesis: that there is an 
increasing sophistication which cornes through what can seem rather blunt 
and ail encompassing policy ideas and approaches. The links with regional 
government may be responsible for developing the level of detailed 
knowledge and contact that allows this to occur, mediating the relationship 
with the centre. Others have argued that the différent ways in which policy 
implementation is resolved in response to local variations and partnership 
styles of working has effectively returned power to local authorities who were 
'...increasingly expected to play a stratégie rôle in coordinating différent 
initiatives' (Wong 1998). The impact of the centre, issues of leadership and 
attention are clearly felt within localities and are important to the advancement 
of the partnership agenda because of the need to achieve 'buy-in' from a 
number of organisations who have to be able to see this as within their own 
organisational, as well as partnership, interest. Within this the numbers of 
initiatives to which individual organisations and partnerships had to be able to 
respond could be seen to place a bürden on them (Downe & Martin 2006) and 
this was difficult where direction was required about local priority setting, 
which was also in line with local needs, organisational needs, partnership 
needs and demands from the centre. The findings in this thesis appear 
however to be in line with Powell and Exworthy (2002) who have noted that: 
'The effects of change programmes do not flow directly from the intentions of 
those designing modernisation programmes or specific policy initiatives, but 
from the way competing pressures are resolved on the ground: 
Or perhaps, are resolved by a negotiation between the horizontal and vertical 
policy dialogue; thus by the centre and localities. 
231 
Implementing policy 
Speed and scale of change 
7f is unbefievabfe what has happened - the huge investments'. 
(Respondent 4) 
This view was in general reflected throughout the interviews. TDTBBB (1998) 
detailed how expenditure in 1997/8 was estimated at £1.4.billion, in 
comparison with £500 million in 1993/4 and, by 2002, the Updated Strategy 
(2002) announced that nearly £1.5 billion would be spent 'directly tackling the 
probfem of drug misusé in the year 2005/6 and gave a detailed budget 
breakdown. Equally, the sums of money handled by DATs changed 
considerably. Following the period under review, on 21 June 2006, the NTA 
issued a press reléase saying that the 'NTA receives a substantial uplift for 
drug treatment which amounted to £385 million to be distributed to DATs via 
PCTs - an increase of 28% over 2005/6. The press reléase said that since 
lMarch 2002 central funding for drug treatment has grown threefold. This 
demonstrated the scale and size of the growth of this sector in general and in 
particular since the early 1990s. It also highlighted some of the issues 
referred to in other research on partnerships, which is that funding continued 
to be lfunnelled through 'silo-based' funding streams and inspection regimes' 
(Downe and Martin 2006:482), consequently leading to some organisational 
confusión about priority setting and negotiating demands. For DATs, central 
government began to 'ring-fence' monies so that they could not be lost in 
generic health budgets and while performance targets measured spend, the 
NTA tracked expenditure. However, this provided DATs with some stresses 
because of the partnership base with organisations having their own demands 
and targets to meet as well as the DATs. 
As we have seen there is, in general, acceptance that this period was, for 
localities, 'a decade of unprecedented change..: and this had 'profound 
impücations for the governance of locaf communities and management of 
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local services.' (Downe and Martin 2006:466; Lewis 2005) Respondent 3 
described it for DATs thus: we 'live in a very fast moving social policy agenda 
world'. And Respondent 6 considered that on occasions the 'number of 
initiatives has been mind-boggling:. This pace was clearly reflected on as: 
'very stressful - more so over the years, not because of managing the team, 
but because of the number of initiatives and because of the performance 
management and KPIs they build around them all the timé. (Respondent 6) 
Again a link was made, not just with the development of policy which was then 
pushed out to localities, but on the expectation and demands from the centre 
to implement policy and deliver results. The level of this demand was 
highlighted by Respondent 2 who said at one 'period I was getting ...12 
emails from the NTA and GO (Government Office)...in one da/. She 
indicated that the 'pace of change has slowed down a bit recently' but that 
DATs still 'don't get notice - just get a roll out quite quickiy. Her particular 
DAT dealt with this by meeting the 'deadlines ...because it's easier to, but 
there is a lack of feeling about what is important / not important. (Centrally, 
there \s) no récognition of local issues..:. 
This lack of responsiveness from the centre on occasions, or concern about 
the impact of this scale of change and the incessant demands placed on 
localities has been demonstrated in other studies (Downe and Martin 2006) 
and was also voiced by Respondent 9 who gave an example of how this 
might impact: 
'..sometimes the guidance comes too late and you're told to do things too 
quickly and you get the detailed guidance after you've started and they 
actually wanted data and you have coilated the wrong information..' 
This example helps to ¡Ilústrate how localities have sought to respond to 
government demands and initiatives and Downe and Martin (2006;471) have 
demonstrated how this has impacted more generally on local authorities who 
have been required in other areas to 'submit scores of statutory plans and 
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provide data on hundreds of statutory performance indicators.' Further, the 
example serves to highlight general concerns across the interviewees and this 
was voiced by Respondent 4 as: 
'(there are) some concerns that we may be pushing on too many fronts'. 
Respondent 5, however, talked along with others, about how the 
implementation process had matured as the centre began to understand that 
lthey couldn't just say it would happen, and it wouid...One year we had 74 or 
75 new plans - they were ail over the place.' Again, as discussed above, this 
did indicate an increasing sophistication on the part of the government which 
is in line with other research findings (Downe and Martin 2006). It seemed to 
show that central government was beginning to understand the need for a 
differentiated response to individual localities, although within a more general 
framework. This appeared quite often to be managed by the performance 
management 'overseers' ín the regions, namely government office teams and 
the NTA; this is considered in more depth later in the chapter. 
Thus for many working on implementation there have been the issues of 
speed of change, the scale of change and the demands to feed information 
about implementation back to the centre. Additionally, localities are 
constantly facing and responding to central concerns and not necessarily 
those arising from their own local issues. How this might impact was 
demonstrated by Respondent 8 who said: 
'..sometimes we are at odds with what happens nationaily - when you're in 
the Home Office and at a distance from it you can get knee-jerky and so 
locally you can get siphoned off into áreas that aren 't a local priority...' 
Furthermore, the detailed reporting mechanisms have become workloads in 
themselves and there is a 'chain' of holding to account; Respondent 3, 
commenting on her last Action Plan described the '53 KPI's, and that's what I 
hold people accountable to - government offices ring me and performance 
manage me...'. 
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Speed and scale of change - and the impact on the voluntary sector 
The speed and scale of change also affected the voluntary sector that has 
been largely responsible for developing and delivering drug treatment 
services in communities and within the criminal justice system more generally. 
New Labour came into power determined 'to build a culture of partnership with 
the voluntary and Community sector, as part of its détermination to improve 
the delivery of public services..: (Lewis 2005:121) and they have played a 
significant role in the development and provision of drug treatment services in 
particular since 1998. This role was reflected on at some length by most 
coordinators and capacity was seen as a particular issue. Respondent 4 said: 
'...voluntary sector organisations have suffered from all the interest in this 
area...and the services just can't be staffed - there are not enough 
experienced and quaiified people - there is a resource gap in all - 8,000 extra 
Jobs have been created nationally, of course there weren't the people. ' 
This arose from a need to cater for demand which had been created by the 
speed and scale of change and by a commitment for service provision to 
corne from the voluntary sector as part of the governments' wider agenda 
(Lewis 2005:123, 4,5). Specifically, the voluntary sector played a role in 
programmes 'designed to take forward the government's commitment to 
tackle the problems of 'social exclusion and to promote opportunity and 
responsibility in the so-called 'active weifare State...'(Lewis 2005:123) and, as 
we have seen, this was exactly where New Labour saw the drugs strategy as 
sitting in policy terms. The impact appeared, from the perspective of the 
interviewées in the localities, to have placed a demand on voluntary sector 
services with which they could not cope. Respondent 6 described the 
government's approach thus: 
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'they pianned the war withouî the peace and not realiy evaiuated if the troops 
on the ground couid deliver,U3 
Most respondents considered that voluntary organisations 'mushroomed 
overnight (Respondent 6), but that training and staffing levels had been 
inadéquate to the demand and that consequently treatment services were 
undermined by thèse factors. As commissioners of thèse services 
coordinators had some concerns about the demands which they were 
required to place on the voluntary sector: 
'...independent sector haven't realiy developed...and weak leadership; some 
organisations spend their time fund chasing but not sustainable development'. 
(Respondent 2) 
The speed and scale of change therefore brought distinctive benefits, 
increasing the level of resources and attention which the drugs sector 
received, however it also brought disadvantages. The centre made demands 
on localities which they found difficult to cope with on occasions and they, in 
turn, placed a demand for service provision on the voluntary sector who also 
found it difficult to meet those demands. In this atmosphère it is perhaps no 
surprise that Lewis (2005) would conclude that the voluntary sector have, in 
the main, remained unequal partners in New Labour's 'broader aim of 
démocratie renewaf in part because in order to respond to the demands for 
service provision, they have seen 'substantial growth' and consequently 
remain largely instrumental providers of services and not equal partners within 
a partnership framework. 
, n T h i s was an issue about w h i c h there had been c o n c e r n v o i c e d l'or a number o f y ca rs . 
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DATs and partnership 
The rôle of the coordinator and the DAT structure 
There was a clear sensé throughout the interviews that DATs had changed 
considerably during the three stratégies. In earlier DAT development it was 
considered that no-one from the centre had taken cognîsance ot the skills 
needed 'to stand up and explain policy and broker deals across agenciez 
(Respondent 5). In her view 'DAT coordinators were originally champions for 
the drug policy and had to be...they were people who knew how to get things 
done: In this analysis Levin's (1997) motivational, opportunity and resource 
factors appear most applicable because coordinators had the space to 
interpret policy and to act as the driving force for drug policy locally using the 
available procédures and structures and taking the opportunités which were 
afforded with the authority of a drug strategy and a powerful and interested 
centre in the C D C U and Tony Newton. Under New Labour's stratégies 
however interviewées saw a massive expansion of DATs tasks, 
responsibilities and resources, but appeared to be more constrained in their 
powers of interprétation of policy for implementation. This was described by 
Respondent 6 who suggested that the impact was that DATs were 'more and 
more engrossed in bureaucracy and less out there in deiivery; it constrains 
our imagination and we are drilled into delivering tasks'. It could, on 
occasions, feel that there were 'so many lords and masters', who comprised 
the NTA, PCTs and local authority (Respondent 6). Additionally, Respondent 
5 characterised CJIP as a policy point when change could be pinpointed. The 
introduction of this initiative included ail sorts of structural factors which were 
given by the centre to the localities, and which they had to put in place; thèse 
included détails like salaries and the person and job descriptions which had 
accompanied CJIP managers' rôles. 
If we consider whether Levin's theorising helps in the deconstruction of the 
key factors regarding drug policy development and implementation between 
1994-2004 we can see that it appears useful at différent stages in 
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understanding how policy is developed. At the implementation stage in DATs, 
however, the most critical time appeared to be in the early stages when 
coordinators had most flexibility and thus the ability to exploit factors such as 
motivation and take opportunities and tap into resources as they became 
avaüable. This analysis also fits with Respondent A's description of how TDT 
(1995) was envisaged, which was as a policy which was flexible enough that 
people could adapt it, but constrained enough that there were tasks which 
they had to undertake. This is supported by other research which has 
suggested that many of the local government policies which have been 
adopted in récent years contain an 'initial vagueness and subséquent 
vagaries' which are useful tools when policy is to be implemented and it is 
unclear 'what will work best (Downe and Martin 2006: drawing on Geddes 
and Martin 2000). The suggestion is that this has also occurred under New 
Labour and coordinators did reflect on how this was achieved within what 
clearly became more constrained policy structures. 
DATs as local implementation partnerships structures 
Respondent 6 characterised her DAT as a functioning DAT with a good 
réputation and said the benefit of the level of demand from the centre was that 
it 'actually brought partners togethef. Her DAT knew that 'elsewhere there 
was a lot of internai squabblinçf but in their busy metropolitan area there was 
a 'joined up approach'. Respondent 3 described how her DAT Chair 
considered: 
'DATs to be the cheapest partnership structures in the country'. 
Whilst Respondent 8 thought that: 
'...if partnership doesn't work it wouid be a bit fike saying "you're crap at your 
job", because that is your job to get them to work in partnership and not in 
their silos'. 
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The view from most respondents was that 'leadership' was required to make 
DATs functional. Respondent 5 described how they had 'resolved the 
leadership issues' within her DAT and subsequently other DAT members 
lneed to respond to that. Where DATs had been less functional there had 
clearly been stratégies which the NTA or G O had been involved in developing 
to change that situation. Thus, Respondent 1 suggested that when she came 
into post her DAT was 'known as a Virtual DAT because they nevermet; there 
was no stratégie overview - people were cobbling bits together..: Her job 
was to change that and she was now '...consolidating the structure and 
setting up joint commissioning..: Further, Respondent 3, had for example, 
been seconded from a functional DAT into another one in her région in order 
to bring expertise into what was seen as a failing DAT. 
Respondent 8 made a clear link between national strategy and local delivery 
when she said: 
'The rôle of the DAT is the vehicle by which the national drug strategy gets 
translated into local policy and take that and focal problems and develop a 
strategy to fulfil local need and the drug strategy'. 
The example which she gave to highlight how this worked in practice was that 
they had interpreted the CJIP strategy to allow them to further develop rapid 
access into drug services for someone who was charged with a trigger crime 
and tested positive for drugs. They had, however, developed this to include 
those charged with 'low end crime such as shoplifting and begginçf; because 
those crimes were also 'why (the) Community hate drug users, because of 
their antisocial behaviour1. So in this DAT area, they had also adapted an 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister's rough sleepers initiative to local 
circumstances in order to fund rapid access services. This sophisticated 
manipulation of a variety of initiatives was visible in a number of the areas 
which appeared highly functional and had been over time. The benefit of 
operating in this way was that they were 'doing what the government want 
and what local communities want (Respondent 8). This adaptation of a 
number of différent government initiatives to local circumstances, and the 
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identification and utilisation of différent funding streams, is a sophisticated 
advance from TDT in 1995 and clearly fits within Levin's (1997) analysis of the 
policy process. It is also congruent with Downes and Martin (2006) who have 
suggested that if one looks at 'intended outcomes raîher than the means of 
achieving theni during the New Labour period of locality orientated policy 
then it is possible to discern 'a remarkable consistency1 in ministerial 
speeches, statements, govemment reports and guidance. This is true of drug 
policy where New Labour clearly pursued a vision of how to tackle drug issues 
in the UK. They did this by increasing resources, diffusing direct relationships 
with the centre through régionalisation (as with other locality based social 
policies) and apparently issuing more directive implementation requirements 
to localities. However, where DATs were functional it appeared that they 
were much more likely to be allowed to adapt policy initiatives or to take the 
initiative to do so; and this was a new policy sophistication. Where DATs 
were not seen as functional, the regional structures were brought in to provide 
another tier of management to ensure implementation. 
Thus the 'one size fits ail bureaucracy* (Respondent 2), which some 
respondents described as the more recently permissible approach to the 
current drug strategy, appeared to be particularly related to the performance 
management functions which had been foisted onto DATs and through which 
they were heavily managed. However, within this framework there was some 
room for manoeuvre for those who found a way. Thus Respondent 2 also 
described how they had been able to respond to some of their own local 
needs through the formulation of a Khat 1 1 4 community consultation exercise 
and had also put together some work around cannabis, with the intention to 
'link it to early interventions and dual diagnosis'. There was a sensé therefore 
that where DATs were functional there was the possibility within the 
performance management framework to respond to some central direction; 
they 'tell you what to include but not interfering so much' (Respondent 2) and 
as a resuit it was possible to build spécifie localised responses within the 
current stratégies. Wong (1998) also found in his research that partnerships 
1 1 4 A m i k l s l i m u l a n t w h i c h is nul illégal and is used by par t i cu la r c o m m u n i l i e s , for e x a m p l e the S o i n a l i 
c o m m u n i t y . 
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increasingly leamed lhow to manipulate the game rules' and this might be 
seen to have made confident coordinators more relaxed about the overall 
agenda. Thus Respondent 8 felt that DATs could influence the central 
agenda and suggested that: 
'... things can change... tend to not see things as a permanent barder...' 
Respondent 3 described however how: 
'me and some colleagues got very angry a few years ago. There was lots of 
media coverage of ...The Home Office thought DATs didn't work and actedas 
though we were all the same and it was when a push went for intégration with 
CDRPs and there are just as many weaknesses in that style..: 
DATs have successfully lobbied against this being a requirement since that 
time and there were a number of DATs which appeared to be highly 
functional. Further, there were areas of implementation which respondents 
characterised as 'spectacularly successfu! (Respondent 6), such as the 
bringing down of waiting times and thèse were described as buying DATs 
considérable goodwill and support at the centre; this was particularly related 
to the PM and his team. Once again, therefore, the évidence would suggest 
that Powell and Exworthy's (2002) assertion that the 'effects of change 
programmes ...flow directly from...the way competing pressures are resolved 
on the ground' is visible within the implementation of drug policy; and that the 
policy process from the time of policy development to implementation results 
in 'an uneven patterning of uniformity' (Lowdnes 2005). 
'Professionalisation' of partnership 
Partnership styles of working have been represented as new institutional 
forms because they incorporate 'consciously designed and clearly specified 
(Lowdnes 2005) rules for behaviour and engagement, such as a structure and 
performance plans or agreements. Interviewées reflected on how this sensé 
had developed over the course of the drug stratégies from TDT in 1995 
241 
where: 
7 was advised when I got invotved in drug issues that it was seen as a 
narrowing down of your options; but now it is seen as working across 
agencies and peopie are siarting to realise it's more oí a skili and that (some 
things) can oniy be deüvered aroundpartnership structures and DATs were in 
the vanguard...' (Respondent 5) 
This provides an example of how partnership working has, to some extent, 
been 'professionalised' over this period in a whole range of social policy 
settings, but particularly around drug issues. TDT (1995) can perhaps be 
characterised as a naive exhortation to partnership working with a small 
budget to allow for the coordination and administration of those functions; 
perhaps an expression of an earnest wish. However, under New Labour 
there was a sense that this exhortation became structured and channelled 
into a demanding and rigorous performance management structure and 
expanded across a whole range of social policy forms, thus becoming more 
generally applicable (Downe and Martin 2006; Newman 2001). However, 
New Labour have done little within each strategy to affect the role and 
structure of DATs. They have more closely aligned them to local authorities, 
but for some this did not improve their links with other organisations. They 
have also tied them into C D R P s and Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and 
other reporting functions. This could be interpreted as making them more 
community centred and structurally embedded; or it might be interpreted as 
weakening their links with some other agencies and subsuming them beneath 
other strategies. 
In terms of the DAT delivery team, however, Respondent 3 said she had a 
Ve /y strong team' and attributed what she saw as the success of her DAT to 
their linfrastructure' which she thought they had achieved lby defauit, as the 
government did not díctate a DAT structure' and thus they had spent some 
time considering what their structure needed to look like in order to implement 
the government's strategy. Respondent 1 who managed a DAT in a very 
different geographical setting from Respondent 3 also considered the DAT 
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delivery team as a key part of their functionatity. She described how she 'had 
hand picked my own team and we are seen as very dynamic and get things 
done - we have made new in-roads: In thís sense DATs have been able to 
respond (or not) to their local circumstances and perhaps this is one área 
where they have been able to retain a localised identity; through the creation 
of a staff team and a structure which are responsive to local need. 
Although New Labour have not dictated structure ñor made DATs statutory, 
they have aligned them with other partnership functions, and have continued 
to use DATs as the mechanism for implementation of drug policy. 
Additionally, as the demands around implementation have increased, so have 
the size and responsibility of DAT administrative teams and the role of the 
coordinators. Respondent 5 described how around 1997/8 she was 'torced to 
become a fulltime coordinator with administrator, making just two of them. 
This changed, however, so that the DAT team she had worked for then, now 
had eight staff and her current team 1 1 5 had 'twelve, probably growing to 
sixteerí. The DAT team working to Respondent 6 constituted fourteen people 
and they were currently recruiting a further five people, making a team of 
nineteen. Amongst that team there were three 'sénior managers* who 
reported to the coordinator. The DAT was chaired by a 'Chief Executive of 
the Board who was a member of the DAT and amongst this group the post 
'mainly moved round and they have all chaired for a year'. This pattern was 
the same in a number of DATs, for example that of Respondent 8 and the 
original team of Respondent 5. However in some áreas there was a move to 
paid Chairs and this was true of the current team of Respondent 5 and 
Respondent 3. Further, all of the coordinators interviewed had been in post for 
some years and were all now in sénior local authority or Health Authority 
management posts. 
The increased level of bureaucracy contained within the performance 
management systems developed, has undoubtedly driven much of this 
expansión, with the need for people to manage different funding streams and 
1 1 5 T h i s c o o r d i n a t o r had been t empora r i l y seconded f r o m one D A T l o another 
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respond to the various requests for data. The rôle of the coordinator has, to 
some extent, expanded to include being a 'broker1 between agencies and a 
'champion' of drug issues locally, as well as being a senior manager with a 
significant budget. Respondent 3 described her post as: 
'My rôle is to get in there and keep Chief Officers working to the strategy - to 
kick ass on occasions... DA T is about the partners, my rôle is about leadership 
- it could be as a trouble shooter or getting people to corne on board... One of 
the most overused phrases is 'hang on l've got a day job' my rôle is to get 
them to see this is crucial and getting it mainstreamed... ' 
Additionally Respondent 3 said she saw her: 
. .job as about doing - it's where I disagree with some of my DA T coordinator 
/ manager colleagues - we bring in the expertise and do the work or we won't 
get the job done - I have a responsibility - the partner's add a lot of money to 
our structure at the end of the day. 
Although she characterised herseif and her team as more proactive than 
some coordinators considered appropriate, in fact ail of the interviewées 
described their rôle in a similar way. Respondent 6 saw her key rôles as to 
ensure: 
'that ail partners are signed up to the national strategy and that their policies 
reflect those key national policies and that we wed ail of those pians and that 
a substance misuse agenda is in there and that partners see us as a 
resource..: 
What differed was how much some coordinators and their teams advised 
partner organisations but left the tasks to them, and how much they used their 
teams to undertake the tasks themselves. Thus, for example, whether the 
writing of Action Plans and KPI setting was undertaken by partner 
organisations under DAT guidance or whether the DAT staff team wrote them 
and they were subsequently agreed to by members. However, with the 
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increasingly large staff teams most appeared constituted to undertake spécifie 
roles and to include those skilled in a number of areas. Thus, one DAT had 
five managers who worked to the coordinator with responsibilities ranging 
across CJIP, commissioning, training, young people's commissioning and 
criminal justice and partnerships. The managers also had staff teams working 
to them, for example a team used only for training purposes. Additionally, a 
DAT team might include an information officer, a user and career advisor, as 
well as administrative and support staff. 
Furthermore, the inter-linking of stratégies and the 'mainstreaminçf of KPIs 
into organisations' own 'home' agenda also appeared to be occurring with 
more frequency. This may be a sign of increasing policy sophistication with a 
whole framework of performance management Systems coming into play and 
inter-linking a variety of différent initiatives or funding streams. This would be 
a positive innovation and is at odds with criticism of other social policy 
stratégies delivered in the localities, where it has been considered that the 
performance management functions and funding streams have remained in 
'silos' and not been mainstreamed or adapted across the partnership 
functions, thus weakening implementation (Downe and Martin 2006). 
Respondent 10 described how she considered it part of the NTA role to 
achieve this mainstreaming and so making sure that you 'use what levers you 
can...'. Additionally, Respondent 4 highlighted how practically this was 
achieved; thus the number of G P s providing primary care to drug users and 
the number of people in drug treatment now form part of that PCT's 'star 
ratingf. She commented that 'it is interesting how embedded the stratégies 
are getting now with things like star ratings and how complex working out 
thèse crossovers between agendas must bë. The role of the regional 
organisations in forming and negotiating thèse links appeared to be 
significant. 
DATs, régionalisation and other partnership links 
In general, throughout the interviews, the NTA and to a lesser extent GOs 
were well considered. The coordinators interviewed were drawn from two 
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regional áreas and there was a noticeable pattern with one área eliciting more 
positive responses. However, Respondents 1 and 5 were from the same 
région and differed in how positively they considered the regional teams were 
able to provide the support and advice - which was their functional role; this 
was despite the fact that both were in DATs that were or had been, less well 
functioning. 1 1 6 However, Respondent 9, also from the same région, 
considered that NTA and G O regional managers could be useful as lsome of 
their managers are very good at problem sofving and...help to broker things 
with the centre.' 
Linked to the issue of régionalisation was also the issue of 'coterminous 
boundaries'. There was a mixture of views about whether it was or was not 
helpful for DATs to become coterminous with local authority boundaries. In 
general this response was influenced by whether it made them coterminous 
with other agencies such as the police and health, or whether by the change 
they 'lost coterminosity1 (Respondent 9). Respondent 3 considered that it 
lmakes it much stronger and links u$ in' by introducing the local authority 
boundary link and that this was a benefit because there was a 'consistency 
with 149 DATs and loca! authorities' and with other stratégies such as 
C D R P s . 
However, the coordinators interviewed covered a mixture of 'County DATs' 
and borough-wide ones. A typical response about the issue of coterminous 
boundaries and with regard to other issues, about which they had sought to 
influence the centre, was that they had: 
tried to explain that a one size fits all national solution wouldn't help and 
asking for a flexible solution, but that did not prevalí...'. 
This represents an apparent change from TDT (1995) where Respondent A 
had said that the principie behind the strategy 'ivas loóse and flexible - quite 
prescriptive about the reasons, but not at all about how.' 
1 1 6 O n e o f these coo rd ina t o r s had been soconded to the less w e l l f unc t i on ing D A T f rom a f u n c t i o n i n g 
one for this reason. 
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The ability to affect policy making at the centre or mitigate the local impacts 
affected other policy arenas too. Thus Respondent 1 described how current 
drug policy was essentially an urban policy and that it was difficult to get the 
centre to appreciate this: 
'Sparsity is our prob!em...funding is still dominated by deprivaîion factors but 
it needs reviewing because it is twice as expensive to deliver services in a 
rural area and so it is very, very costly and problematic' 
Respondent 5 talked less about the impact of régionalisation itself and more 
about the gap in support she feit there had been throughout ail three 
stratégies. In some sensé this represented a gênerai mood amongst 
coordinators in feeling less directly connected to the centre and less consulted 
and more required to respond and deliver. She described it thus: 
'DAT coordinators have been really feft out in the cotd with very little support: 
She was concerned that DATs were now responsible for managing very 
significant sums of money and 'a very complex agenda - we are équivalent in 
size to the (focal) Probation Service. Chairs were still largely voluntary, 
although there were two paid Chairs in the DATs areas where interviews took 
place and one of the interviewées was a paid Chair. One of the paid Chairs 
was situated in a highly functional and well-connected DAT and one in a 
dysfunctional, but very visible DAT area and here the paid Chair was part of a 
response to the problems and drift which was perceived to have occurred in 
that DAT. Some coordinators also considered that DATs should be statutory 
organisations and this is an argument that has exercised opinion almost from 
the point of formation; the mixture between partnership and voluntarism and 
between compulsion to act and statutory responsibilities. It is, in part, a 
response to a need to make sensé of the new institutional forms and perhaps 
a need to see partnership as something more concrète than lthe rufes of the 
gamë (Lowdnes 2005 citing Huntington 1968). Respondent 3 said: 
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'big, big agenda - my Chair and l beiieve DATs shouid be a staiutory body in 
their own right and we get that status now from CDRP, but aligns us to the 
crime agenda..:. 
This issue was not discussed by all coordinators. However, the issue of 
merger, or alignment with C D R P s generated a range of views. Across the 
DATs there had also been a range of responses to the suggestion from the 
Home Office that they shouid / could align with the C D R P s . Respondent 9 
deschbed the response within her area as an 1evolutionary approacft and 
some DATs had made a definite décision not to align the two. For example 
Respondent 8 considered 'it would've been a retrograde step to merge the 
two ...because drugs is such a priority issue... (here)...and health are a very 
important partner..'and the issue was that whilst they and the PCT played a 
key role in the DAT they had missed both meetings of the C D R P since they 
were made statutory members. Additionally, Respondent 5 voiced concerns 
that any merger would lead drug issues to 'lose championship'. Where there 
was concern or opposition it was more likely to be in a functioning DAT area. 
Further, it was usually centred on a view that the alignment placed drugs 
issues too firmly in a purely criminal justice arena and would lose the key 
aspects which flowed from the involvement of health based organisations. 
Respondent 8 said that the 'Home Office are quite flexible about it all now, 
you just need évidence that the two are working togethef. In her view the 
requirement to merge had been because the government thought: 
'...DATs were working weil and saw that health were involved and so they 
wanted those lessons from partnership brought into Community safety. 
Additionally she considered in some places there were issues about a lack of 
joined up working between the treatment and enforcement sides of the 
agenda which were pursued through the différent groups. What may be 
shown is that by drug policy sitting under a Home Office remit it was possible 
in this instance for departmental priorities to appear to have been prioritised 
over a partnership strategy linking health and criminal justice functions. It 
would seem, therefore, that flexibility was wrung out of the circular regarding 
248 
alignment, but it is not clear whether or how the regional teams played a part 
in what appear to have been purely local DAT based décisions. Essentially, 
therefore, the regional teams appeared to work most as a conduit for 
information and instructions to flow from the centre to the localities. Many 
coordinators reflected their frustrations that they had not been able to make 
the centre take on what to them were key local issues which affected 
implementation. Nonetheless there had been movement from the centre on 
issues such as joining / merging with the C D R P s and thus there clearly was a 
flow of information which had an impact on implementation and the course of 
the strategy. 
Achievîng implementation? 
Two initiatives within the drug policy frameworks were raised in interviews by 
interviewées and were used by them to highlight what they felt had worked 
well in policy terms and what had not. There was significant overlap in how 
thèse two initiatives were considered and they will therefore be used to 
demonstrate how policy initiatives were considered by localities and how they 
impacted on them and were made more, or less, easy to implement. 
Communities Against Drugs 
In response to the question: 'can you describe what has not worked well' 
there was a gênerai view that the initiative Communities Against Drugs (CAD) 
had not worked. Respondents described it both as a 'surprise' and a 'lost 
opportunity'. Respondent 1 said: 
'CAD didn't work well in two-tier authorities....Any money seemed a lot .... 
and it was difficult to implement because they all thought it was their money 
and some of that is still going on. It was also difficult to influence that spend. 
it was very frustrating; some of the money was spent on things that were so 
off the wall.' 
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Respondent 1 described how the different sections or wings of the 
government Offices were unable, at this stage, to bring unity or joined up 
working: 
'Government office was split into communities and drug work and the DAT 
was meant to sign off the money (CAD) and when we challenged it and said it 
didn't fit with the strategy they said the Community section supported it'. 
She highlighted that this 'shouldn't have happened and went on to describe 
how she considered that GO would now have a more joined up approach. 
However, the 'surprise' at the sums of money suddenly on offer for drugs work 
and the sense of a wasted opportunity are palpable and mirrored by 
Respondent 2 who stated: 
'the amounts of money changed massively...it couid have been used as an 
Investment bank....we would have got more tangible results...' 
This sense of what could have been achieved, the legacy of not having got it 
right at the time and the impact that continued to have locally was reflected on 
by Respondent 3: 
The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) hasn't ring-fenced what was 
CAD monies - now it is all in the Community safety pot - it was a real lost 
opportunity - now we spend time and money debating where bits of money 
go'. 
This is developed further by Respondent 6 in her quote which shows the 
ränge of initiatives introduced in a reasonably short period of time. Thus she 
said that 'CAD had really rolied out locally1 but: 
'then that money stopped and became 'Building Safer Communities' and then 
they merged all streams and we got less money and so all projects had Safer 
and Stronger Communities Fund and that may also mean less money, 
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initiatives fall-off and insufficient work down on the ground and we have been 
trying to saivage and save some of thaf. 
Respondent 6 thus characterised what the impact on localities is when central 
governmenî drives a policy agenda in which 'the number of initiatives has 
been mind-boggling1 (Respondent 6). 
The importance of funding and money is reflected on throughout the local 
interviews and in this sensé mirrors the national interviews. Additionally 
respondents focussed on areas where opportunités had been lost or were 
unable to be capitalised on and the effect that had had or continued to have. 
This latter emphasis is différent from the national interviews; perhaps because 
most of the interviewées were in posts which they had held for some time or 
were continuing to work within the drugs policy field. In this sensé, they more 
closely resembled the voluntary sector and campaigning organisations at a 
national level in holding a longer term view. Additionally they continued to 
have to work with the organisations that were affected by the boom and bust 
type spending initiatives. 
Community Justice Intervention Programmes 
The expérience of being surprised by government policy, receiving too much 
money in a short period, not having the mechanisms to spend it or 
subsequently having initiatives disrupted or spoiled by changing funding 
streams, is reflected throughout the coordinators interviews. It contrasts 
however, with the comments on Community Justice Intervention T e a m s 1 1 7 
(CJIT) which were created in 2004. The coordinators who had been in post 
for some years largely responded to the CJITs as 'a good idea'\ 'CJiP was 
something we wanted (Respondent 6). It would seem, therefore, that like 
TDT (1995) its introduction had been managed or heralded so that local areas 
anticipated its advent. Further, the micro-management which accompanied it, 
though onerous, also brought focus. In a sensé, therefore, CJIP 
" 7 CJIT was the term for the l o c a l l y bascd teams w h o were created as a resuit o f CJIP. 
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characterised what had been learnt at a central level about policy 
implementation and thus brought with it features good and bad. Furthermore, 
whilst coordinators complained about the burdens of reporting, the highly 
onerous Systems which accompanied CJIP did not stop it from being 
presented almost universally as a good policy initiative. This suggested that 
local policy actors will often agree with the current orthodoxy (Sullivan et al 
2002) and demonstrate a pragmatic acceptance and willingness to display 
appropriate policy behaviour (Miller 1998), particularly if this facilitâtes their 
professional goals and allows them to implement policy. 
CJIP was heralded as 'an integrated approacfi by the N T A 1 1 8 which was 
promoted as a response to the Updated Drug Strategy's (2002) 'aim to join up 
initiatives in the crimina! justice system more effectiveiy. Thus: 
'under a new criminat justice intervention programme supported by the Home 
Office and NTA, 25 DATs covering areas with the highest levels of acquisitive 
crime have been asked to adopt a mode! of working which would seek to 
develop a 'Virtual' or dedicated, Community based criminal justice drug team 
for their area... (it) should where possible buitd on work and arrangements 
already in place..: (NTA website as note 11 : accessed June 2006) 
The justification for this new model was said to be the 'strong Unk between 
drug misuse and crimes..: and thus it was considered 'important, both for 
those individuals, their familles and their victims that their drug misuse is 
tackled."9 
Respondent 12, represented CJIP as 'hugely bureaucratie' and described a 
reporting structure which comprised the NTA and the Home Office at a central 
government level; in addition two people from government office within the 
locality were involved, one from the NTA and one from the Home Office. 
Within the DAT responsibility lay with her line manager, the DAT coordinator, 
and her own role which had been speeifieally created (as was required) to 
" s ' C r i m i n a l j u s t i c e based in te rvent ions : A n integrated a p p r o a c h ' N T A webs i te : accessed June 2 0 0 6 . 
1 1 9 N T A . C r i m i n a l just ice - treatment for o f fenders w i t h drug a d d i c l i o n . web page. A c c e s s e d 29 .06 .06 
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manage the CJIP. Additionally there was a specially appointed data manager 
and other potential staff to be recruited. She characterised the reporting 
structure as one in which: 
lthe centre (NTA) puts pressure on government office for information, who put 
pressure on the DAT, who put pressure on service providers... .everyone feels 
nervous, feef their job is on the Une'. 
In her opinión, this hampered decisión making because everyone was 
'anxious about making the wrong decisión' (Respondent 12). This sense of 
demands being piled on to local staff from the centre was something that most 
coordinators reflected on. Usually, where the DAT was functioning well, the 
suggestion was that things had got better over time; where the DAT was not 
doing well pressure was clearly felt. Regardless of the DATs functionality the 
demands were considerable. Respondent 6 hazarded that CJIP was 'stili very 
much in its infancy, it has a iot to offer, but the government want too much out 
of it too quickiy and suggested that they were not giving ¡t lenough time to 
bed dowrí. She also described how it was 'performance managed to a micro-
levef but that this took 'so much time, it's killing the goosé. She described 
how they had undertaken a recent staff audit and found that l40% of their time 
is spent on filíing in forms, getting them back and chasing them etc'. 
It was not all perceived negatively however and Respondent 5 described in 
detail how the relationship between the centre and localities worked and how 
the micro-management of DAT tasks by the centre could or had been useful. 
She suggested that the management of policy was therefore becoming 'more 
maturé and that this showed because they could also 'now set local targets' 
but thought it would be 'interesting to see it they take notice of local targets'. 
Thus, although most coordinators supported CJIP and considered the 
initiative better thought through than most, there was still the issue of the level 
of demand from the centre which placed a heavy burden of reporting on the 
DATs and prioritised central demands over local need. This 'performance 
management' was referred to strikingly often by respondents in this section 
253 
and this was clearly a factor in the management of social policy in the 
localities; the raison d'être being to demónstrate policy implementation. 
Performance management 
The issue of performance management is, as we have seen, a key feature of 
drug policy since 1998 and one that has become increasingly strong. 
Considerable sums of money have been ploughed into drug treatment via 
DATs amounting to £385 million per financial year for 2006-7 1 2 0 . Because of 
the non-statutory status of DATs they cannot be grant holders in their own 
right and thus monies are distributed to DATs via PCTs (previously it had 
been to the local Health Authority). The initial learning was that sums of 
money never made it to drug treatment but were lost into main agency 
budgets 1 2 1 with DATs voicing considerable frustration and anger. One 
conséquence was that money that was distributed became much more closely 
monitored by the centre with areas of potential spending clearly highlighted 
and controls made explicit. Within this remit of performance managing 
functions and spend are the NTA and G O regional teams. Respondent 10 
explained it thus: 
'...so undoubtediy funding made a significant différence, but we performance 
manage the spend of that money; so I can put my hand on my heart and say 
the money for drug treatment has gone into drug treatment and so any 
attempt to divert money into other bits of the PCT... (is picked up)... ' 
She went on to say that their ability to do this was 'unique because within 
health it was often hard to account for monies; 'they can't irack it the way we 
can...'and that because of the NTA's detailed knowledge of budgets, partner 
organisations 'can't reduce mainstream monies' from drug treatment / policy 
because they would also note and monitor that. 
1 2 0 N T A Press reléase 21 June 2 0 0 6 
1 2 1 A n e e d o i a l but we l l sourced and m u c h k n o w n . 
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Additionally Respondent 4 considered that the additional monies to drug 
treatment were a sign that: 
'because the NTA were successful on waiting times reductions that it is an 
organisation that deiivers and from a central government perspective it could 
be trustedand therefore it got money*}22 
Respondent 10 considered that this was perhaps both a key feature of 
success and for success, because we 'couidn'! have made the strides we did 
without new money.' This was because it allowed for improvements in 
services through increased funding, but also because as Respondent 7 
commented: 
'pooled treatment budgets has been a vehicle through which the NTA can 
control the way money is spent in line with the strategy. 
Interestingly, therefore, Respondent 10 considered that the NTA were part of 
an implementation framework for policy, rather than simply just a performance 
monitoring organisation or a conduit for information between the centrę and 
localities: 
'Regionai teams of the NTA are a really important area of the treatment part of 
the drug strategy - they have a elear remit to implement. They are 
responsibie for ...numbers in treatment, retention and waiting times targets 
and the whole sits in retation to the policy of deiivery of government targets: 
Perhaps not surprisingly Respondent 10's role was with the NTA, but the 
comments are telling in several ways. They highlight that for regionai teams 
the issue of being seen to deliver policy is not just about reporting on the 
functionality and ability of their local DATs, but is also about their own 
performance; thus implementation. Further, it appears from the interview the 
issue is about regionai teams delivering central govemment policy locally, not 
T h i s quo t e dates f r om the i m e r v i e w in 2 0 0 5 and re la ted to increased f u n d i n g then. bu l is perhaps 
ecjually a p p l i c a b l e lo the 2 0 0 h announcement . 
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about interpreting or responding to local needs or issues. As Respondent 4 
highlighted: 
'dysfunctional partnerships in some áreas have to implement regardless of 
their dysfunctional partnership and people not taking responsibility for their 
area: thatis hard: 
However, Respondent 3 reflected how over the years her views had changed 
with regard to the performance management regime. She considered that it 
did help: 
'failing DATs to get puiied up' and thus she saw that 'as a good thing - it is 
probably the legacy of being around a long time - i am a lot less tolerant. i 
thinkyou can use hard targets to drive hard on delivery.' 
Additionally Respondent 10 characterised NTA involvement thus: 
'on the whole we have less intervention where it is well organised and the 
right level of seniority and good infra-structure and investment in infra-
structure and shared visión...' 
She talked in terms of 'diagnosingf what was 'failing- in a DAT area and 
tempering the level of intervention to meet that perceived need; this might 
include seeking to 'escálate within their own organisation to make sure they 
engage..: or making it elear to DATs that they have contracted work with 
frontline organisations and that the NTA will 'expect them to act to ensure 
compiiance' with that contract in terms of delivery. In her view: 
'as we have matured and developed...come to grips with performance 
management and moved from performance monitoring and through 
performance management to quaiity assurance...' 
Thus there was a elear sense from respondents that the NTA was and 
continued to be an organisation concerned with the delivery of drug policy and 
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ensuring that occurred. The intensity of political and centrally driven policy 
which needs to be seen to be implemented and upon which a particular 
organisation, such as the NTA, may feel it ¡s judged and depends on for 
survival, can, however, also lead to a cynicism in the localities. Respondent 
2, who worked in the same región as Respondent 3, commented that 'the 
agenda of central managers is about kudos and justifying their existence'. 
When asked for an example she cited their 'eight different reporting streams 
within a month..: and that, on occasion, when asked to respond to the impact 
of this sort of performance management regime they would respond lparrot 
fashion with what the Home Office says: She considered 'interference from 
the centre' a barrier to implementation because of the sheer size of the 
bureaucracy which had been created, so that many DAT functions had 
become: 
'form filling, quarterly returns, treatment pians... they comment on them, you 
change them, they re-comment:'. 
She considered that this altered what she saw as their main lines of 
responsibility; lour main accountability is to the DAT and PCT - localised 
accountabiiity'. 
However the focus on considerable amounts of data and reporting streams 
did not necessarily mean that service delivery was not improved; ñor was it 
automatically unhelpful to local implementation. Respondent 1 described in 
detail how support was offered to her DAT when they were perceived to be 
failing on the waiting times targets. She said they were 'invited to be part of 
the Open Doors programme and that looked at service mapping and the 
involvement of all stakeholders...: and during that process they realised their 
system was very bureaucratic with service users: 
'assessed and reassessed and because we hadn't stood back from it and so 
we were enabled to do that and went through the whoie process and 
negotiated what we could take out....had to get through cultural things, Le. 
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one service accepting the assessment of another sen/ice and therefore made 
radical changes to the way services are run..:. 
In thís example there was significant improvement in implementation and the 
regional NTA team were able to assist via a programme designed specifically 
to facilítate the waiting times agenda. There were, moreover, benefits for 
services and service users from this being achieved and it also meant that this 
particular DAT went from being 'definiteiy the worst in the región in 2001 to 
now being within the national waiting times'. 
This example is, therefore, in some contrast to other coordinators' negativity 
about the role of the NTA and G O with regard to their performance 
management functions. This negativity was usually related, however, to a 
perceived inability or unwillingness to appreciate the level of demand that they 
were putting on DATs or the impact this might have. This appeared to be as 
likely to be voiced by functioning DATs as those who were not functioning. 
Respondent 2 said that this was added to by an apparent lack of a joined up 
approach between and within these organisations, such that she might 
receive a 'teiephone cali chasing up and asking for things that another part of 
GO aiready have..: However, as Respondent 4 brought out, the climate was 
one in which 'Information and data has become much more critical over the 
years: 
Respondent 2 felt that the NTA díd not have 'a public health angle' and, thus, 
to an extent they were misnamed or misrepresented. She considered that 
they were in fact a 'Home Office front and that they should have focussed on: 
'job descriptions, templates for SLA123 agreemenis, and so (I) would have 
expected them to do some more groundwork to support the strategic working 
of DATs'. 
S L A s - Se r v i c e leve l A g r e e m e n i s - a Ibrm o f c on t rae ! about serv i ce d e l i v e r y 
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This ¡s obviously ¡n direct contrast to the example given by Respondent 1 
where there does appear to have been a public health angle to the 
intervention from the NTA. It may be that regional responses from the teams 
differed, but it may also be that the needs of DATs affected this response. 
Respondent 8 drew out how the performance management functions of the 
NTA could impact on DATs but how this was also motivated by an apparent 
desire to bring about change in the delivery of treatment responses. She 
suggested that there had: 
'been too much proliferation in the upper echelons and, to a certain extent, ali 
performance management staff - some of it is bonkers - but you generally 
have to do ¡L...CJIP is heavily performance managed and being made to feel 
the squeeze but the NTA - they are onto it and a/so because they want it to 
work. 
The pressure in this high profile DAT was further demonstrated by her as she 
continued the discussion about the focus on the performance of her DAT and 
the extent to which this was overseen: 
'af our first CJIP meeting the PM's advisor was there...they were saying there 
wasn't enough buy in and one of the reasons (they were so interested) is 
because of the election and they want to be able to say this works'. 
In response to a question about whether the issue of drugs or drug policy was 
really that ¡mportant to the electorate, she responded: 
'I/Ve have just done a crime and disorder audit and ...people say crime and 
disorder is the worst thing about living (here, ano)...where New Labour are 
successful is tough on crime and the causes of crimen24 
Performance management of strategies within this framework is clearly a key 
aspect of being able to demónstrate centrally and to the electorate that you 
1 2 4 She went on to l ink the c r i m e and d i so rde r w i t h w h i c h people were c once rned as s p e c i f i c a l l y d r u g 
related. such as d r u g tak ing . d r u g parapherna l i a and hegg ing o n the streets. 
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have successfully implemented your policies; in this scénario drug policy may 
be as important as other more obviously and traditionally significant policies. 
In this atmosphère it may be inévitable that there will be 'less local initiative..: 
and that policy may become '...more and more centraliy driven.' (Respondent 
6) 
Régionalisation 
As we have seen earlier in the Chapter the mechanisms and structures 
through which DATs have had to report to the centre have changed with each 
strategy. Under TDT (1995), DATs were coordinated and led by the Central 
Coordination Unit (CDCU) based in the Cabinet Office and under the 
responsibility of Tony Newton. With the accession of New Labour and the 
création of TDTBB (1998), DATs were coordinated by the UKADCU who had 
various civil servants leading it throughout the period, as well as a number of 
political leads. In 2002, they became the Drug Strategy Directorate and 
moved to the Home Office to be nominally led by the Home Secretary, but 
also with interest coming from the Prime Minister's Office in the form of his 
Strategy and Delivery Unit. 
Under TDT (1995) there was in-put from the DPI, Drug Démonstration Units in 
areas which had them 1 2 5 and under TDTBBB (1998) this was expanded into 
each local area and became the Drug Prévention Advisory Service and was 
part of the Home Office. As we have seen, DPAS became absorbed into 
Government Offices with the move to régionalisation and became the Drug 
Strategy teams. With the création of the NTA as a Spécial Health Authority in 
2001 a régional manager was also appointed to each Government Office. 
Initially, thèse were single posts, but rapidly grew to include a deputy and in 
some occasions bigger teams. Thus, there were often two teams working 
within Government Offices with responsibilities for drug issues; as well as 
community safety support teams or managers within government office, 
where, on occasions, responsibilities crossed. 
i 2~ T h e y d i d not c o v e r the w h o l c c o u n l r y g e og raph i ca l l y . T h c i r o r i g i n a l remit was l o ca l i s ed w i t h i n 
régions; la l e r w i t h e x p a n s i o n they were g i v e n a more régional rôle. 
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However, there had been more continuity in the form of personnel than the 
many changes in architecture would suggest. Thus, in 2005 'seven of the 
nine deputy regional managers' for the NTA were staff who had previously 
'lead treatment in DPAS. There appeared to have been considerable cross-
over in these central/local management functions and in the view of 
Respondent 4 this was positive; it had allowed a health and criminal justice 
inter-link and had allowed individuáis to 'build trust over the years' and this 
was valuable to allow them to act as a 'broker - professional standpoint and 
middle way..\ 
Essentially what all of the central organising and coordinating functions such 
as C D C U , UKADCU and the DSD have had in common is an attempt to 
provide the conduit through which Communications about drug strategy are 
held between the centre and localities. With the C D C U this was a direct 
relationship which led to the building of personal communication and 
knowledge between this central function and local DATs. Additionally, Tony 
Newton, the Minister responsible spent time visiting DATs and meeting 
Chairs. The relationship appears to have become more distant under 
subsequent arrangements and none of the coordinators talked of any 
personal rapport with staff at the DSD for example; instead they talked in 
particular about their links with the NTA regional manager or with Government 
Office. The reason for this would appear to be the result of a move towards 
an increasingly regionalised relationship and thus a central/local dialogue held 
at something more of a distance. 
All coordinators talked in some detail about their relationships with staff drawn 
from the NTA and GOs and how that had changed in recent years. Their 
inter-actions with government office staff related primarily to performance 
management functions, and Respondent 4 talked about how a DAT would get 
an 'NTA talking-to regional!)/ if they did not deliver. However, some 
coordinators did also talk about the supportive functions which were also 
played on occasions. Respondent 1 described this change: 
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'UKADCU did have targets, but once we had the NTA and DSD there were 
expectations on DATs to achieve those targets. It was very directive - targets 
were set - you couldn't not do what they asked you to because you were 
being monitored. ' 
She described how 'most peopie did compiy, but actuaiiy the NTA had no 
teeth and nothing they could do if we didn't - but most DATs did it: She 
accounted for this by saying that their regional manager was 'very good, and 
lhat the NTA 'do corne, do provide support, do provide review and do try and 
work with DATs to make sure services are in ordef. Overall, she considered 
that 7'n general peopie welcomed them' and that they achieved this because: 
' The NTA set out a stall about improving drug services and most peopie could 
see it made sensé, although they might not have liked their ways of working.' 
Within this context it is again possible to see that the key factor for most of 
those implementing policy in the localities was the usefulness of the person, 
structure or initiative. If there was a clearly perceived agenda, or one which 
could be effectively adapted to meet local need, then there was, in general, a 
pragmatic acceptance of it (Miller 1998), be it a change in reporting structure 
from direct relationships with the centre to one of régionalisation or 
responding to highly structured and onerous performance management 
System. This perhaps demonstrated the ability of partnership working in 
general to tap into 'the human yearning for larger social purposë (Davies 
2005:327 quoting Stone 1993:25) 
Conclusions 
What is not clear is what will happen in forthcoming years to the interface 
between DATs and other partnership structures and drugs and criminal justice 
issues. They have now survived as partnership structures for ten years and 
have therefore been an established part of the social policy scène for some 
considerable time. A whole range of other functions such as G O and the NTA 
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have been adopted and adapted to work with them and DATs can be seen to 
have responded to other policy initiatives such as régionalisation and the 
development of the community safety agenda. Additionally, they have almost 
been a test vehicle for the development of partnership performance 
management functions; the intensity of this has been such that central 
government have been able to require monthly reporting on the 
implementation and delivery of key policy factors. They have, therefore, been 
illustrative of changes in the mechanisms for social policy implementation and 
delivery in the last twenty years. 
Respondent 5 summed up some of the key issues covered in this chapter by 
suggesting that a barrier to effective implementation of the drug stratégies had 
been the: 
'centre and relationships with local DATs - making sure messages are 
consistent coming down the silos - needs to be a common purpose centratly 
and locally: 
This illustrated some of the key issues in this chapter with regard to the 
mixture of messages emanating from some of the key partner organisations at 
a national level on occasions and the need for there to be a more cohesive 
approach from the centre. Given this it seems possible to characterise TDT 
(1995) as having been structured at the centre in such a way that it gave a 
consistent and mirroring image of partnership working and sensé of 
togetherness with regard to strategy, although it was open and, some 
suggest, unfocussed towards exactly what needed to be achieved by whom. 
Under TDTBBB (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002) there has been 
disparateness at the centre both at a political level and between key 
organisations such as the Home Office and DoH. However, there has been 
an increasingly focussed message and this has centred on the implementable 
and the deliverable. 
There was also a strong sensé from respondents in this chapter that there 
was, in general, support for the govemments re-orientated emphasis. This is 
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simplistically seen as criminal justice agenda, but the support from 
coordinators, is as we have seen more complex. It recognised the community 
orientated emphasis of the response and saw the criminal justice System as a 
way of accessing problematic drug users, on this basis compulsion was 
acceptable. Coordinators could give examples of why they thought this was 
appropriate and how this had been implemented. Thus, Respondent 8 gave 
an example of how this applied to rough sleepers considered to commit anti­
social behaviour in the community view: 
'They126 have joint targeting meetings with the police and go out and target 
them and offer them rapid access to treatment etc and if you don't do this we 
willASBOyou..: 
and with regard to treatment: 
'increasing emphasis on drug treatment as a way of improving individual 
heafth and community safety and reducing criminal behaviour. I think it is in 
the process of working - it's hard on treatment providers but they are 
gradually coming on board. ' 
Others, as we have seen, thought that the focus on criminal justice and 
access to treatment via this source allowed the not so 'nice' drug users to get 
access to treatment, which, it was suggested, had not previously been the 
case. 
Respondents did, however, have concerns, which they highlighted, that there 
was not enough expertise within the voluntary sector to support the demands 
made upon it by central government in terms of service delivery. Thus central 
government had pushed things out to the voluntary sector which was simply 
not in a position to cope with the demands. Also because of the fast 
turnaround of many of the funding streams or the political urgency with which 
initiatives were pursued there was a sensé that many organisations had spent 
T h e y ' b e i n g the Street S e r v i c e t eam. 
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too much time chasing funding and not concentrating on service development 
and delivery. Other respondents such as Respondent 7 talked about the 
need to develop the workforce. 
The testimony of the respondents raises the question of whether the strategy 
has also narrowed to the implementable and achievable, for example 
delivering treatment within a criminal justice setting, but no longer focussing to 
the same extent on drug education and prevention responses. It is hard to 
know if this was inevitable, for government undoubtedly wishes to show it has 
achieved objectives set. However, one might suggest, that the current focus 
is on the 'same oíd suspects', namely the poor. Nonetheless, many 
coordinators supported the focus and considered that it offered a welfare 
alternative. Thus it suggested that the oíd treatment paradigms were in 
themselves inherently discriminatory or unfair. 
Clearly the drug strategies have been able to be delivered by DATs and it was 
suggested that in some áreas, such as drug treatment and waiting times, that 
there had been an acknowledged 'spectacular success'. Considerable 
performance management systems have ensured delivery on key central 
government targets such as waiting times, but have perhaps detracted from 
DATs further engagement with communities and other local issues. In addition 
it would seem that the ability to interpret policy to suit local need is, in parí, 
dependent upon the willingness of the partnership to exploit the factors of 
motivation, opportunity and resources which have been described by Levin 
(1997) as a part of the policy process. This appeared to have been mediated 
further by a willingness to accept such adaptation to local circumstance by the 
centre where DATs were perceived to be functional, and to intervene and 
demand compliance where this was not the case. 
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Chapter eight - Conclusions 
Introduction 
This thesis has looked at the development and implementation of English 
drug policy 1994-2004. It has sought to understand why partnership was the 
chosen form for delivery of policy and what the impact of that approach has 
been. The key research questions drove the enquiry and form the sub­
headings for this chapter. The chapter highlights how drug policy was 
developed, beginning with Tackling Drugs Together in 1995. It looks at DATs 
as the embodiment of partnership within the strategy and considers what the 
impact of those mechanisms has been on policy implementation. The 
working relationship between the centre and localities is examined, and in 
particular the potential for autonomy, choice and regional or local flexibility is 
discussed. Finally, consideration is given to whether we have witnessed the 
creation of new forms of governance, and / or institutional resilience. 
The research strategy was influenced by Clarke (1996) who argued that it was 
important not to accept 'organisational change' at 'face value', as though it 
were just a 'technical solution(s) to the problems of organising social welfare 
provision..: He suggested it was important to consider the historical and 
social circumstances and factors which contributed to the development of 
TDT (1995) and led it to be shaped in the way in which it was. Looking at the 
development and implementation of drug policy over a decade has meant that 
it has been possible to consider the impact of change over time (Lowdnes 
2005, drawing on Pierson 2003) and to separate the reality of policy 
implementation from the rhetoric of documents and speeches. Without this, it 
would be possible to view drug policy over this period as one dominated by an 
increasingly harsh penal agenda, with a highly restrictive performance 
management of the localities by the centre. Consideration of the strategies 
and the reality of implementation would, however, suggest a different picture. 
It is, for example, possible to see dominance of a penal influenced agenda, 
but within this, treatment approaches have seen considerable expansion. 
Despite the rhetoric it is now more possible for any drug user to access 
treatment. The micro-management of drug policy is also a reatity, but it also 
brings benefits to localities and it is possible to see it as évidence of central 
government having understood the realities of policy making. 
The advent of partnership has successfully broken down the traditional 
dichotomies of drug policy because, by and large, DATs are functional; 
nonetheless, interviews indicate that those dichotomies can still be seen to 
manifest themselves in debates at a local level. DATs can, moreover, be 
portrayed as 'new institutions' (Newman 2001) which have changed the 'rules 
of the gamë (Lowdnes 2005) although there is also considérable évidence of 
institutional resilience, with the large organisations of state adapting to the 
incrémental changes which partnership has demanded (Klein 1993). 
Certainly it is possible to see partnership forms, such as DATs, as having 
educated 'people to see the worfd différente (Donnison 1991) and thus, one 
might argue, that TDT (1995) and subséquent drug policies over the décade 
have, through the use of partnership forms, delivered the innovation which 
those designing it hoped for. Donnison (1991) has argued that the ability to 
help people see the 'world différente through policy design is the sign of a 
more 'important occasion' on which 'new public policies' are proposed, and in 
this case implemented. According to this, it is possible to see TDT (1995) as 
an example of an important change in policy direction, which can be seen to 
have impacted upon and provided évidence of changes in forms of 
governance in UK social policies in the last décade. 
How was drug policy developed? 
TDT (1995) was developed by a small group of people who successfully 
exploited the opportunités open to them and who were observed to have 
used ail of the 'factors' identified by Levin (1997) in their capacities, as civil 
servants, politicians and members of the voluntary and campaigning sectors. 
They were motivated to achieve change (from their institutional, personal or 
organisational position) and used the opportunités and resources open to 
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them to do that. Thèse included exploiting their access to sympathetic 
politicians; knowledge of new forms of policy development; an acceptance to 
work within the current philosophical boundaries and to co-opt and work with 
whoever would be helpful to them in achieving their aims. This small group 
of people were able to identify one another and describe the rôle they 
considered that person had played; moreover, the documentary records show 
the involvement of those individuals. Despite this, the research does not 
suggest that thèse people formed, or saw themselves as having formed, a 
'policy network' (Berridge 2006; Duke 2003; Sabatier 1998; Wong 1998; 
Hughes 1997). At least they did not do so in any knowing or formai sensé: 
they simply exploited the opportunités open to them and worked with those 
who were similarly motivated to achieve the same ends. With hindsight they 
were able to recall who had been important at the point of idea génération, 
policy development and drafting, but it was this that seemed to provide the 
linking factor - thus active involvement and a shared sensé of having worked 
together on something quite exciting. They were not motivated as a group by 
moral imperatives or any other shared characteristics other than that they had 
sought, through their rôles, to reach the same ends; their involvement was 
rôle spécifie - they might best be deschbed as having been good at their jobs. 
Those responsible for idea génération were a small, self-constituting group 
who did not seek to draw in a wider group of players. The communication 
channels at this stage were largely centralised and horizontal. Once the 
policy idea was taken up and into government the rôle of those outside 
government diminished, or changed; at this point the civil servants saw 
themselves as the generators of the principle ideas - such as the partnership 
mechanisms - DATs. At the point of policy drafting, consultation was 
widened and became vertical. Individually, some interviewées considered 
that they had, at this stage, sought to advance their own organisational 
agendas as a part of the policy development and it was notable that there was 
an absence of key players from health based organisations. This may have 
influenced or reinforced the requirement for DATs to be 'multi-agency' to the 
extent that they were, with responsibility given to Health Authorities to call the 
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first meeting, but beyond that there was no further expectation that they were 
the most important player at the table. 
The findings indicate that a small, but changing group of key players were 
engaged at différent points of the policy process and that their rôle became 
more, or less, significant, at différent points of that process. To suggest that 
what had occurred therefore formed a policy network or community would be 
to impose a meaning upon those relationships which those participating would 
not recognise. However, this is not to suggest that the involvement of 
particular players was not influential in shaping the policy which emerged - it 
was. 
The research highlighted the role-specific nature of key players at différent 
and recurring points of the policy process and the need in the analysis to look 
at this in more depth. It drew out the crucial aspect of policy development as 
a 'process' (Colebatch 1998), and how this involved a number of important 
people at différent stages, whose importance might go 'up' or 'down' 
according to the stage in that process. Thus, initially, the people who worked 
to gain an interest in this area only included those lobbying from the voluntary 
sector and politicians themselves; the latter appeared to be responding both 
to their own personal sphères of interest and to issues arising in their 
constituencies. 
Policy was a process which could be investigated and to which there were 
core éléments identified by Colebatch (1998). Those core éléments can be 
summarised with regard to policy development as ownership, commitment, 
and a proposed course of action with a degree of specificity (Colebatch 1998); 
each of thèse éléments can be seen below to have been brought into play. 
Further, whether dialogue was vertical or horizontal was influenced by the 
point in the policy process. At the point of idea génération, conversations and 
relationships were clearly horizontal and focussed on the centre; policy 
drafting and development was vertical and horizontal and required the centre 
to engage in, listen to and negotiate with localities, as well as consult with 
others at the centre. 
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The development of TDT (1995) can be seen to have been influenced by a 
number of historical social factors, such as the rise of drug misuse (Mott 2000; 
Stimson 1987; Parker et al 1987), concerns about HIV and anxieties about 
deprivation and the breakdown in communities (Pearson 1995); the last 
aligned to a moral agenda which focussed on social welfare issues and was 
common to both the Conservatives and Labour (Deacon and Mann 1999; 
Field 1996; Donnison 1991). Additionally, international factors have been 
suggested as contributory, such as the end of the Cold War and the apparent 
ability of drug issues to unité nations (MacGregor 1998), alongside the close 
relationship between Thatcher and Reagan, which meant that Britain wished 
to be seen to take on drug misuse issues. 
The structure of TDT (1995) was influenced by factors such as a changing 
social policy agenda which sought to reduce dependence and curtail the 
growth of the large welfare institutions, promoting an ethos of compétition and 
value for money (Brown and Sparks 1989; Harris 1989; Deakin 1994). It was 
also affected by economic difficultés and the poor relationships which 
subsisted between local authorities and the Conservative government in the 
late 1980's and early 1990's (Deakin 1994). The confluence of thèse factors 
appears to have allowed those lobbying on the drugs issue to gain an 
opportunity to influence government policy, such as Wallis and Dollery (1997) 
have described as constituting Autonomous Policy Leaders, or Lowdnes 
(2005) as 'institutiona! entrepreneurs1. This was attested to by interviewées 
and outlined by Respondent B with regard to drug policy and how he (and in 
particular one other interviewée) had sought to 'get(ting) those ideas off the 
ground - encouraging Tony (Newton,) to take it into government.' This drive 
for social policy reform generated by some sections of the voluntary sector 
appears to have met simultaneously with an interest amongst some politicians 
and provides évidence of pressure groups having made 'a mark on 
government policies and measureś through their 'direct iinkages either to 
ministers...or officiais' (Levin 1997:234). However, Respondent B also 
identified, how, once they had successfully achieved the taking up of the issue 
by government, control was then lost: 
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- then it went out of our control because it was a manifesto commitment in 
1993127 - they didn'î expect to get in - but then they needed to estabiish a 
strategyand then it wentinto the Cabinet Office...: 
This excerpt strongly highlights the 'factors' described by Levin (1997) as 
important to the policy development process: 'motivation', 'opportunity and 
'resources'. Levin had developed his 'factors' through studying policy as 
acted upon by politicians and in particular policy at the stage of development. 
It has been of interest to see if they can be applied to other groups active in 
the policy process and at other points: and they can. However, for example, 
the 'factors' described by Levin (1997) were mediated by the rôle of 
Respondent B quoted above, for he was unable to go beyond the idea 
génération stage because he came from the voluntary / lobbying sector; 
beyond the point he deschbes, he was reliant on others in government, or in 
the civil service, to create further opportunities and identify and exploit 
resources open to them. His own 'motivation' was to bring about change in 
the area of drugs policy and he actively sought to raise the profile of the issue 
and attract the notice of government. For this speaker and another, their 
'motivation' arose principally from their paid rôles in the non-statutory 
campaigning sector and they can be seen to have successfully engaged 
politicians on this issue and to have maximised their 'opportunities', leading to 
the incorporation of commitment in the Conservative manifesto. By this stage, 
therefore, the 'policy' as it was being developed had core éléments présent of 
ownership and commitment (Colebatch 1998; Levin 1997). 
This 'hub rim' of interested parties who drove policy development on TDT 
(1995) then came to include a small group of civil servants who were 
responsible for drafting the policy. It was, in gênerai, considered that they had 
done this most effectively, minimising conflict and résistance, such that a 
policy in a small but complex and difficult area achieved cross-party support, 
as well as that of the various key players in the field and the Prime Minister. It 
1 2 7 L e v i n 1997:23 I and 238 a lso stresses the impor tance o f c o m m i t m e n t and the i m p l i c a t i o n s this c a n 
have. ) 
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would seem that they díd this through wide consultation and the incorporation 
of some 'new ideas'. These included partnership, an emphasis on delivery, 
outcomes and KPIs. Those involved considered that what they were doing 
was radical and different; they brought in ideas from the private sector and 
were motivated to change the approach to policy development to one which 
drafted policies that would be ¡mplemented, rather than drafting policy which 
was technically clever. They were cognisant of the current political 
imperatives ensuring the co-option of a member of the Treasury to their team 
in order to devise workable KPIs. All of this gained the policy political support 
and gave it status; it developed a course of action and contained the required 
'degree of specificity' (Colebatch 1998). The civil servants portrayed 
politicians as positively welcoming of such an approach and they were also 
able to engage key players in the voluntan/ sector, but they saw other civil 
servants as their greatest hurdle. The need to bring in all key players from the 
'five departments of state' and the increasingly important National Audit Office 
demonstrated an understanding of the importance of the use of 'levers' and 
the development of 'communication channels' as part of the process of 
developing policy (Levin 1997). It meant that TDT (1995) was, at an early 
stage, able to secure access to resources and support, with individuáis 
motivated to support it (or not wishing to be seen as out of step and not 
support it). 
The role of Tony Newton (then Lord President with Ministerial responsibility 
for the policy) was drawn out by most national interviewees; they highlighted 
his brokering and management skills at both the development and 
implementation stages. This can be seen to have been important vis a vis 
Levin's (1997) 'factors' showing motivation, the exploitation of opportunity and 
an ability to access resources, both financial and in terms of support, for 
example that of the PM. The support of the latter was especially important, 
for as Levin (1997) has demonstrated, the support of the PM allows for the 
creation of structures around which policies can be formed and transmitted, 
ensuring that the government is committed to action. 
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The findings suggest that Levin's (1997) factors aid understanding of the 
process of policy development and are applicable to a wider range of policy 
actors than he developed them for. However, they can perhaps best be 
deschbed as 'role descriptive', with motivation, opportunity and resources 
being closely allied to the role of the particular policy player. This is useful 
because it helps us to see policy making more clearly, disentangling some of 
the confusions. Darke (undated) has argued that policy is too variable a 
process 'to offer a generalised model', but the interview évidence suggests 
that certain key factors can be discerned in that process, although thèse will 
be affected by the players' role. Thus, motivation was a présent but variable 
factor for each interviewée / policy player: ranging from personal commitment, 
to a drive to push their agenda higher up the governmental one, and / or a 
wish to develop and deliver a radical policy drawing on 'new' ideas. It is, 
therefore, possible to suggest that there are generalisable factors within the 
policy process which are common to all policy players, but which, crucially, 
are also role specific. The récognition of thèse aids analysis of the policy 
process. It makes explicit the way in which policy players exploit the 
opportunités presented to them in order to achieve their role specific ends; 
this is what happened in the development of TDT (1995). 
Why were partnerships chosen as the mechanism of policy 
implementation and what was the impact? 
Partnerships have been linked to areas of social policy complexity (Sullivan et 
al 2002), where a range of organisations are involved and the issue at hand 
does not appear to be easily resolved. As we have seen, partnership forms 
were not entirely new to the drugs arena but had not been successful in the 
past. It is perhaps, therefore, of some surprise that this form was suggested 
by those generating ideas about how to get to grips with the issues, chosen 
by those drafting the policy and agreed to by those who were supporting it. 
The évidence would suggest that, in part, 'partnership' was an idea whose 
time had come. Historically, it was the right point for the idea to be taken up. 
Evaluations of the existing partnership structures had looked at why they had 
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not worked and suggested ways in which this might be overcome; these 
included strong links to and attention from the centre. The issue of drug 
misuse appeared more pressing and there was a need to be seen 
internationally and nationally to get to grips with it. There was a historical 
dichotomy in the approach to substance misuse coming from a pénal or 
médical perspective (MacGregor 1999; Stimson 1987) - partnership clearly 
offered the opportunity to combine both. The then Conservative government 
had poor relationships with local authorities (Hughes 2002) and ad hoc 
partnership structures offered a way round those. In addition, the policy was, 
from the outset, designed with implementation in mind; the partnership 
structures which were created belonged to no one organisation or elected 
body - which meant that the centre could engage in a direct, vertical 
relationship with localities and require reporting on delivery straight to the 
centre which would circumvent traditional organisational and institutional 
forms. Partnerships met a lot of the needs of the time - for a focussed, 
directed and accountable policy which involved the centre and localities in a 
direct dialogue. In their very essence, therefore, they sought to avoid the 
points of conflict in the Systems of policy delivery. 
The way in which DATs were created and structured, with mechanisms for 
reporting directly into the centre and Cabinet Office was viewed as a sign of a 
particularly well-drafted and thought through policy. An example given was 
the use of Health Authorities as conveners of the first DAT meeting, but 
without especial responsibility. This was regarded as clever, bringing them in 
when they were not strongly engaged at this point, but not giving them too 
much to do, because neither they nor the Department of Health were seen as 
strongly motivated. Involving health in this way appeared to seek to mend a 
'cleavage' (Levin 1997) which seemed to have occurred in the génération of 
ideas and the development of the TDT (1995) policy. It also did not distance 
other more engaged players, who would have felt ignored or pushed out had 
Health Authorities immediately assumed chairing responsibilities for DATs. 
This was important, for, as we have seen, localities were attuned to the ideas 
of partnership working for a variety of reasons and this included those from 
the pénal sphère and local authorities; support for this style of work was 
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especially strong amongst those who had been supporters of the Morgan 
report (1991). 
Over time it was found that the policy worked and during the first strategy, 
TDT (1995), links between the centre and localities were strong, with Tony 
Newton seen as influential in having ensured this. The existence of this direct 
link to an interested and powerful Minister was seen as one way of grabbing 
the attention of localities and an array of important players from a range of 
organisations. This could not have been achieved with a broad range of 
players had the Minister corne from the Department of Health or Home Office; 
for example, a Chief Constable would not have wished to be seen to be 
reporting to the Secretary of State for Health. It also meant that DATs' 
reporting mechanisms went through the C D C U which worked to Newton and, 
thus, it was not directly conflictual with their organisational responsibilities and 
lines of communication. It allowed TDT (1995) to develop reasonably 
sophisticated reporting mechanisms for the time with in-built KPIs, for which 
organisations constituting the DAT were collectively responsible. The 
weakness of this approach was that where the Minister responsible in Cabinet 
Office did not have personal authority and direct links to the P M it could be 
hard to make progress and obtain resources, because of the need to 
negotiate centrally with a number of departments (Mowlam 2002) (although 
drug policy has largely avoided the 'power struggles' which are seen to have 
affected other attempts at partnership work, (Newman 2001:110). As we 
have seen TDTBBB (1998) and latterly the Updated Strategy (2002) have 
gradually changed the lines of communication to less personalised, more 
bureaucratie, devolved, regionalised ones. In addition, the reporting 
mechanisms have been increasingly more detailed and sophisticated. What 
has remained is the requirement for organisations to report collectively on 
partnership activity; thus, action on drug issues remains the collective 
responsibility of the DAT. The reporting mechanisms and areas of 
responsibility at the centre have also moved; something apparently caused by 
Blunkett's assumption of the Chair of the Cabinet Sub-Committee. The long-
term impact of this move at this stage is unclear and it may indicate nothing 
more than the ability of a powerful Minister with strong links to the Prime 
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Minister to affect structure. However, it has allowed drug policy to appear to­
be more dominated by a pénal agenda. 
If, as Knoepfel and Kissling -Naff (1998) have argued, policy is, in part, a sum 
of the organisations that have played a part in it, then it was perhaps 
inévitable that TDT (1995) took partnership to its heart. Its three aims 
reflected a penalogical, médical and educational focus; the latter 
acknowledging the responsibilities of an important department of state and 
also strategically making the balance between three aims and not two 
traditionally dichotomous approaches. Research was commissioned to better 
understand the links between the three areas and substance misuse; the 
policy, therefore, also sought to bring in an 'évidence base' which could be 
used for the future. 
The 'multi-perspectived' approach led interviewées to suggest that the 
argument which portrayed a 'split' between the pénal and médical approaches 
was simplistic. They argued that despite the rhetoric of govemment policy 
post-New Labour, the actual impact of more enforced treatment services has 
been to engage the 'not so nice' drug users who had previously found it hard 
to access treatment services. Thus, the suggestion from interviewées 
working at a local or regional level was that, post TDTBBB (1998) and the 
Updated Strategy (2002), a much wider range of drug users now had access 
to considerably improved treatment services in a much shorter space of time, 
which could be accessed from a broader spectrum of referrers. Partnership 
forms, therefore, appeared to have influenced the direction and appearance of 
drug policy. But it was not a case of a simple dichotomy, one approach being 
'good' and facilitative and one 'bad' and constraining; the évidence from 
interviewées was that treatment services which were accessed via the 
criminal justice System were, on occasions, fairer than those which had 
existed in the past. Again this highlighted the importance of looking at the 
policy developments over time, looking beyond the rhetoric of policy to the 
actual impacts of implementation; the suggestion from interviewées was that 
the latter showed that the impact had been overwhelmingly benign, with vastly 
improved services and greatly enhanced capacity. 
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Partnership was, within TDT (1995), largely an activity for the localities, not 
one for central government. Interviewées responsible for drafting that policy 
suggested that other civil servants were amongst the most difficult to engage 
on cross-departmental work. Hellawell (2002), Mowlam (2002) and Blunkett 
(2006) have also described in their autobiographies the difficultés of working 
across departments at the centre. Interestingly, therefore, more récent 
changes under the Updated Strategy (2002) have sought to enshrine 
partnership working amongst central senior civil servants working on the drug 
strategy. The new arrangements at the centre appear to mirror those at a 
local level; thus the Cabinet Sub-Committee should play a similar role to the 
DAT; the Strategie Planning Board to the DAT Coordinator and team; the 
subject specific and 'expert' cross-departmental groups, the DRGs. These 
changes at the centre would appear to suggest that the partnership form is as 
necessary and persuasive a form for drug policy to take now as it was back in 
1995. 
In addition, TDT (1995) was a policy which had cross-party support, to the 
extent that interviewées suggested that dealing with drug issues had been 
effectively depoliticised. As such, it was no surprise that New Labour 
supported the gênerai approach once they were elected in 1997. Additionally, 
the use of partnership mechanisms had unintended conséquences, providing 
the opportunity to link New Labour's concems with drug misuse issues and 
the Community. The composition of DATs and the direct links between the 
centre and localities over the direction and implementation of the stratégies 
meant that the structures were in place by which these ideas could be taken 
forward. The partnership mechanisms were adaptable to the changing 
emphases of TDTBBB (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002) and were, 
therefore, the means by which those changing emphases could make an 
impact in the localities. Interviewées cited how the link with drug misuse and 
crime and drug use and communities under New Labour, was directly 
applicable to the communities in which they worked and how they were able 
to focus on this issue via government policy, also adapting other political and 
policy initiatives to this end. Interviewées in the localities appeared, in the 
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main, to be in tune with the government's position and to represent drug 
misuse as impacting negatively on communities and to accept the New 
Labour position that drug users might have a responsibility to others within 
their Community to change their behaviour. The potential contained within this 
analysis is that from this position, it can seem acceptable to compel an 
individual to accept treatment (were they were unwilling to do so voluntarily) in 
the name of the greater community, good. 
Partnership has, as Glendinning and Powell (2002) have argued, been in 
danger of becoming a 1 humpty-durnpty terni - meaning everything and 
nothing. Within TDT (1995), however, it was given a clear structure within 
localities (DATs) and thèse were charged with policy implementation. DATs 
have survived each policy development (TDTBBB 1998 and the Updated 
Strategy 2002) and this is undoubtedly because they have been found to 
deliver. The strong reporting mechanisms and links 1o the centre have, 
moreover, shown what was drawn out by one of the interviewées: that TDT 
(1995) was a centrally designed and driven policy and that this was the 
'unsubtle and unspoken message (Respondent G) of Ministerial and C D C U 
Visits to DATs was that. From the outset, therefore, drug policy was designed 
for implementation, central govemment wished to ensure it and DATs, as the 
partnership structures in localities, were there to implement it. Partnership 
was the means by which to achieve implementation because of the 
complexity of the issue and the peripheral nature of drug misuse for each 
individual organisation; it gave central government the means by which to 
ensure that it was directly relevant to each organisation. 
How have relationships between the centre and localities 
worked? 
Relationships between the centre and localities formed a considérable part of 
the subject matter of the interviews; this was true of those working at a central 
and local level. In gênerai, relationships were positive and were seen to be of 
critical importance to the strategy and how effectives/ it functioned. Under 
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TDT (1995) there were strong personal links between the centre and localities 
and this was remembered fondly by interviewees at both levels. Whilst DAT 
visits by Tony Newton might have been the lunsubtle and unspoken' 
(Respondent G) message of central government exercising control over a 
strategy devolved to localities, they were, in general, popular. Attention from 
the centre had been highlighted as a facet which might be crucial to the 
success of partnership forms in the localities and this seems to have been the 
case. Equally, it was suggested that TDT (1995) worked by 'letting a 
thousand flowers bloom' (Respondent G) despite the visits from the centre 
and the required reporting. At all stages, a key aspect which kept localities 
'onside' was that through the visits they could demonstrate delivery. There 
was also a reported 'focussing down' over time, so that whilst reporting 
requirements under TDTBBB (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002) might 
increase and appear more onerous, the range of issues which a DAT was 
expected to tackle became narrower and perhaps more deliverable. Further, 
through the reporting mechanisms they could show to central government and 
to their own community that they were delivering. The importance of the latter 
has been highlighted by Wilkinson and Craig (2002). Those who were doing 
less well or struggling with the partnership aspect of their work knew that they 
would get central government attention and latterly this became quite directed 
advice and support. This was particularly the case because it was known 
under each strategy that the PM was interested in progress. Under New 
Labour the role of Tony Blair came to replace the personal interest of Tony 
Newton; Blair's interest might be demonstrated at one stage removed through 
the presence of his own advisors, but it was known that the area was one of 
particular interest to him. It was perceived that it drove funding levels and the 
demand for delivery. The interest exhibited by the centre and the way in 
which this and the reporting mechanisms were increasingly structured were 
also evidence that there was, at the centre, an understanding of how policy 
was implemented. Blunkett (2006) has argued that this came from many 
years in opposition working in local government. Certainly TDT (1995) was 
designed for implementation and this was clearly drawn out by its chief 
architects; the structures which were created allowed for a watchful eye to be 
kept on progress in the localities by the centre, under New Labour those 
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mechanisms were honed and adapted to allow a sophisticated micro-
management of elements of the strategy. 
Delivery was important for DATs and for their constituent organisations. Over 
time and under each of the strategies the reporting requirements became 
increasingly sophisticated and mature. As a result performance management 
systems have become mainstreamed and extend beyond the DATs 
themselves. Weaker partners, or less engaged organisations have been 
brought into line by the linking of drug policy indicators with their own 
organisational performance which is then linked to their own individual funding 
opportunities. This has included the use of drug policy objectives in the star 
ratings of PCTs, for example. In addition, the level of interest from the centre 
and the focus on delivery has meant that DATs have been able to use the 
performance management systems to bring errant partner organisations into 
line. Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf (1998) argued that the authority of central 
standardisation might be an important factor for local partnerships which 
enabled them to 'bring about ceríain solutions' and the interviews indicated 
that this was, on occasions, the case. Where performance in an área was 
being affected by the failure of partner organisations to engage, other partners 
might be delighted for the centre to become involved and, once that occurred 
(via the regional structures) there was an expectation that this issue would be 
resolved. 
Under TDTBBB (1998) and the Updated Strategy (2002) being able to 
'deliver' was important to further funding opportunities, to DATs as partnership 
forms and to particular organisations, such as the NTA whose very existence 
carne from the strategy and was justified by evidencing effectiveness. 
Sophisticated players were as we have seen able to adapt central 
government initiatives to their own local ends (Wong 1998) and this was 
accepted where they were doing well. 'Choice' was a strategy open to the 
successful, not the failing. In this way there was room for local adaptation and 
flexibility and performance was a key factor in this; this was recognised by 
speakers working at a central and local level. This is in part represented by 
what Downe and Martin (2006) have referred to as 'a classic evolutionan/ 
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approach to social policy under New Labour. It is interesting because it 
showed how stratégies might appear heavily micro-managed by the centre, 
but had in fact been 'fine-îuned and adapîed over timë to local circumstances. 
Lowdnes (2005) has characterised this as being visible in other social policy 
areas, particularly those based on partnership forms. She has suggested 
that: 
'Top-down and bottom-up institutional influences interact in important ways to 
produce an uneven patterning of uniformity and diversity across iocal 
government: (Lowdnes 2005:294) 
Certainly that would appear to be the case with DATs and this has not 
changed as the resuit of regionalised governance structures. Direct links to 
the centre appear, in the main, to have been weakened by the regional 
approach, with this level effectively constituting a third or mid way level, 
neither the centre, not the locality. This 'déconcentration' (Davies 2005) 
appeared to dénote a delegated form of managerial power which did not 
amount to a décentralisation of political power; the devolved forms, the NTA 
and government office drug teams clearly saw their responsibility and 
authority as principally emanating from the centre. They needed to be able to 
deliver a central government policy in their régions. This did not necessarily 
lead them into conflictual relationships however, although this could occur on 
occasions; when it did it was usually related to the levels of pressure with 
regard to reporting that they placed on an individual DAT. However, they 
were equally likely to be portrayed as supportive and facultative, giving the 
DAT access to resources and ideas which would enable them to more 
effectively implement the policy. Their rôle did not, therefore, appear to have 
affected the ability of localities to negotiate the patterns of 'uniformity and 
diversity (Lowdnes 2005) between their localised needs and the demands of 
the centre. 
The policy sophistication in the localities, linking stratégies together or 
adapting them to local needs was a definite change over time. It demonstrates 
the adaptability of localities (Stoker 2002) and their ability to learn from and 
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grow with government policy. It also meant that although TDTBBB (1998) and 
the Updated Strategy (2002) had set a more specified direction over time to 
DATs, so whilst a thousand flowers might not be blooming, it is probable that 
in functional areas a wide variety of spécimens might be flowering. This is a 
subtle but important point, because this range of development can often be 
portrayed as implementation failure and this was clearly not the case - it was 
instead a sign of implementation sophistication. Downe and Martin (2006) 
have portrayed this slightly differently, arguing that if one looks at 'intended 
outcomes rather than the means of achieving therri during the New Labour 
period it is possible to discern a 'remarkable consisteriez. As this relates to 
policy delivery, the findings from this research would suggest that there has 
been consistency. It has highlighted, however, the need to look at policy 
developments over time (Lowdnes 2005) and to do so empirically, gathering 
évidence from those responsible for policy implementation. To have drawn 
solely on the policies, or a short period of time, would, in this area, have 
suggested that drugs policy has been wholly controlled and micro-managed 
by the centre, with relationships between the centre and localities likely to be 
conflictual. The reality detailed in the interviews was quite différent. It 
suggested a much more consensual relationship (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; 
Stoker 2002) based on negotiation and an ability of localities to exercise 
'choice' (Davies 2005) in the extent to which they responded to policy 
direction. Thus, whilst reporting could be onerous and policy direction in the 
past had jumped about too much, the attention from the centre was clearly 
welcomed. There was a sensé of direction and localities, particularly highly 
functional ones, felt they were doing a good job in a fast moving and exciting 
social policy area. Further, that policy was adaptable to local need, about 
which the centre and the PM were aware and that this brought benefit to 
them, their constituent organisations and their communities. This findtng was 
congruent with Miller (1998) who suggested that localities might view their 
engagement pragmatically, and as being strategically significant and in which 
they, thereby, became 'winners'. 
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Have partnerships become a new form of governance? 
Partnerships were found to have become new forms of governance. They 
changed the way people saw and thought about doing business on drug 
issues. They changed the rules by which people thought they should 'play the 
game'. DATs can be viewed as 'new institutions' because they incorporate 
'consciously designed and clearly specified rules of behaviour' (Lowdnes 
2005) which were laid down in TDT (1995) and have been refined and 
developed since then. They have been the constant factor in a fast changing 
government agenda on drugs. Under Blunkett's stewardship of policy they 
acted collectively to 'see off', what they viewed as a challenge mounted by the 
crime and disorder lobby. DAT coordinators were clear that this is what they 
had seen happen and certainly the advice about DATs and C D R P ' s merging 
changed to one which required evidence that they were working in tandem 1 2 8 . 
In this way they demonstrated an ability to act collectively and out of self-
interest and thus like an 'institution'. 
The interviews undertaken for this thesis provided evidence of the 'success of 
Labour's conceptions of 'Modernising Government' by 'the language of 
evidence, pragmatism, 'what works', of goals, targets and outcomes, of 
joined-up government and partnership' which 'permeate(ed) the discourse 
of...civil servants, managers and professionals...' {Newman 2001). DATs had 
changed the 'rules of the game' (Lowdnes 2005) and this was evidenced in 
many ways in the centre and in localities. Firstly, it could be seen in the 
creation of formalised partnership structures at the centre which required and 
put in place the mechanisms by which senior civil servants had to work more 
closely on drug policy (Updated Strategy 2002). Secondly, 'patterns of 
behaviour- (Miller 1998) altered over time, so that it had become permissible 
for individuals to work collectively and collaboratively, sharing information and 
perhaps resources with other organisations within a local area. Subtly, the 
expectations of appropriate organisational behaviour have changed; not being 
" T h e ev idence for the ' success ' o f this appears to be the C i r c u l a r letter to D A T s and C D R P s 2 6 J u l y 
2 0 0 2 
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prepared to work collaboratively in a partnership way within localities would 
now be seen as evidence of a failing organisation or professional. 
DATs have impacted on policy development and implementation in particular 
and it is probable that they have changed the balance of drug policy in favour 
of penal and managehal approaches because criminal justice orientated 
organisations were allowed a greater level of influence (Duke 2003). It is not 
possible to say this definitively because of the existence of other factors which 
were also driving drug policy in this direction; namely the analytical 
perspective taken by New Labour, research findings which appeared to show 
a drug crime link (Hough 1996; Bean 1994; Anglin 1990 and NTORS 1996) 
and a concern with and amongst communities. New Labour did appear to 
have successfully brought about a change in the conception of the social 
responsibilities of drug users. This was evident from the interviewees and 
related in particular to the impact of drug users and drug use on local 
communities. There was considerable sympathy with Blair's assertion of 
'rights and responsibilities1 (Davies 2005) and this philosophy was directly 
linked by interviewees to the idea of the drug user as the 'underminer' of 
social cohesión; support for this view was attributed by those in localities to 
the experiences of their communities. This philosophy has, as we have seen, 
been strongly linked to New Labour and to MPs who were responsible for 
poor, traditional, working class neighbourhoods. This research found, 
however, that there was a more general acceptance of this view and that this 
was particularly strong amongst those working at a regional level and 
coordinators who worked in large urban áreas with mixed populations and 
income levéis. The impact of this approach was to introduce a generalised 
moral tone to the approach to drug users; from this basis it became possible 
to compel drug users to receive treatment (DTTOs) and the anti-social to 
reform (ASBOs). This approach is subtly different from considering that this 
group require 'management' (Feeley and Simón 1996) and it was one which 
held sway amongst interviewees. It is not clear whether this was the result of 
working in a partnership and gradually conceiving of things collectively, thus, 
that philosophies could cut across organisational and professional 
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boundaries, or whether it was the resuit of a prolonged government discourse 
to which localities ascribed. 
Those organisations who were concerned to use DAT structures to further 
their own organisational aims may have gained an opportunity to do so 
(Berridge 2006; Sabatier 1998; Wong 1998; Hughes 1997) or to influence 
drug policy in line with those aims. Those who appeared to take a back seat 
at this time may have lost control of the agenda. For example, the 
involvement of éducation has been low, although it was one of the three 
original key aims, and over time the educational agenda has clearly become 
less important in each strategy; it is not clear if this is directly related to their 
involvement (or lack of it). The two principal agendas have remained those of 
health and the criminal justice System. There was a strong sensé that despite 
an académie view that there had effectively been a pénal hegemony over the 
drugs agenda in the last décade, in gênerai, drug users and treatment 
responses had been the overall 'winners'. DAT coordinators who came from 
a health background were equally likely to be supportive of the current 
government position and direction of the strategy, as those who came from a 
criminal justice background. This suggests a 'normative emphasis' to support 
government policy direction, and / or that once people were working within the 
partnership forms, they 'lost' their traditional way of viewing things and moved 
to a new, partnership perspective; if the latter it too would indicate that DATs 
have become new institutions. 
It would appear too simplistic to ascribe current approaches to drug use and 
users as dominated by a pénal agenda; the reality is significantly more 
complex with philosophies derived from a number of social policy areas and 
strongly iinked to moral approaches which prioritise the virtue of social 
responsibility and the rights of the Community. It is not clear how much this 
can be ascribed to partnerships and how much to the dominance of a central 
government agenda. Through linking community and partnership, building 
both and using a variety of approaches to achieve their social and drug policy 
ends, New Labour can be seen to have challenged the 'traditional institutional 
framework" of social policy delivery that governed the interactions between 
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local and central government (Lowdnes 2005). The diagram below draws on 
the work of Newman (2001) and considers how some of the changes might 
'fit' into the forms of governance she has described. It offers a way to 
consider how that 'institutional framework' may have been affected. It shows 
a 'mixed' pattern which she has suggested will resuit in a less cohesive policy; 
however, it is also possible to see how policy has adapted over time and used 
the various forms as appropriate and still draws on thèse as necessary. It is 
also of interest that the two most dominant forms move towards a more 
decentralised System; the quadrant which seems least used is the hierarchy 
model and this fits with the overall analysis: 
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Drug policies use of différent forms of governance 1994-2004 
(adapted from Newman 2001) 
Powell et al (2002) suggested that partnership, networks and other similar 
forms have become, in many instances, inter-changeably used and thus 
indistinct. They argued that, as a resuit, most partnerships are a 'quasi-
network' composed of the 'mutual benefit, trust and réciprocité usually 
associated with a network. Thèse factors were identifiée! by interviewées as 
présent in many of their DATs, but were portrayed by them as ones 
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associated with a functional DAT and as an element of partnership working. It 
is not necessarily clear, therefore, what defines the two working forms; more 
traditionally networks have been seen as self-forming and sustaining, clearly 
this is not the case with DATs. They are a partnership form imposed by drug 
policy. In general, they are a functional way of delivering that policy, with a 
degree of flexibility to local need and enough uniformity to meet central 
government ends. Trust was identified as a key issue which was identified as 
necessary to the partnership style, along with a willingness to engage 
effectively and collaboratively with others for a common end. In this, they 
demonstrate similarities with Levin's (1997) 'factors' - the need for motivation, 
opportunity and resources to be present. Successful DATs appeared to have 
highly motivated coordinators who were aware of the local issues and the 
national policy picture. They brought their knowledge about these things 
together in order to maximise the opportunities and resources open to their 
DATs. They were most likely to have effective communication channels with 
the centre and latterly with the regionalised structures - successful DATs 
talked to those operating the performance management requirements, they 
did not distance themselves from them. Finally, they were the least likely to 
have 'cleavages' in their channels of communication vertically or horizontally. 
Levin's (1997) analytical framework was, therefore, also useful in the 
understanding of how policy implementation (as well as policy development) 
might be effectively undertaken, which appeared to work in terms of vertical 
and horizontal dialogue. Essentially Levin (1997) identified key 'factors' at the 
central policy stage, but this research would indicate that those factors will be 
found throughout the policy process and that when they are, it usually 
indicates functionality. 
Partnership forms require the same policy skill set as other forms of 
governance. They require a consensual policy style, but can draw on forms of 
enforcement (for example the NTA around performance) where necessary, 
although this is largely avoided by all players. Davies (2005) has argued that 
a model of governance 'based on a consensual premise' in which 'diverse' 
people will be enticed to 'sign up to a common agenda' is somewhat 
optimistic. The empirical evidence from this study suggests that it is not. The 
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'common agenda' has not been universally embraced and there are some 
individuals who have and will drag their heels. However, this has not been 
organisationally specific on a national basis, nor does it seem to have any 
other common format (Miller 1998; Wong 1998; Knoepfel and Kissling-Naff 
1998). Resistance to the partnership form has been low and this would 
indicate a 'normative emphasis' (Wilkinson and Craig 2002) amongst 
organisations and individuals within the localities; thus reflecting the findings 
of other empirical studies which have noted a tendency for local policy actors 
to agree with the current orthodoxy (Sullivan et al 2002). This was also noted 
by one of the architects of TDT (1998) who described how surprised, but 
pleased they were with they way in which localities responded to TDT (1995) 
and how, essentially, he considered staff were well-motivated and wished to 
do a good job and if that required getting to grips with partnership forms then 
they would. 
It may be that, on occasions, academic work has overlooked the excitement 
which new ways of working can generate 1 2 9 ; that sense was present amongst 
interviewees. Furthermore, there was a feeling of dynamism that came from 
all interviewees, a feeling of having worked on a policy (or, in many cases, 
three policies) which was interesting, new and in which there was 
considerable political interest. Overall, those working in social policy arenas 
appeared motivated by a consensual will towards the common good. 
Partnership is no longer, however, a discourse of 'apple pie and motherhood. 
Policy players are too used to it and confident of it for such an approach; it is 
possible that this dialectic currently has an internal mechanism of its own 
which at this time and for this policy, means it is commonly perceived as a 
'good thing! (Wilkinson and Craig 2002). Nonetheless, it does not mean that 
traditional organisations or institutions have necessarily been weakened, in 
fact there is evidence that they have effectively adapted to the new rules. 
Thus, the Home Office and Department of Health have maintained their 
N e w m a n ( 2001 :122 ) noted that pract i t ioners m igh t "welcome a release from, traditional 
organisational constraints'. 
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principal interest in drug policy through their regionalised structures, 
government office teams and the NTA. 
Has institutional resilience been demonstrated? 
The research indicates that there has been evidence of institutional resilience 
throughout this period, with the large organisations of state, local authorities 
and key professional groups adapting to the changes demanded by 
partnership. As such they have embraced change and brought it in. These 
findings are in line with the arguments of Klein (1993) that the West, and in 
particular Europe, have negotiated their problems with the welfare state over 
time by managing change, not seeking to elimínate it. This means that they 
have been able to avoid serious challenges to the status quo demonstrating 
institutional resilience through the absorption 'over time of marginal, 
incrementai changes.' Partnership would seem more than a 'marginal, 
incrementa! change; there is, as we have seen, evidence that it constitutes a 
new form of governance and a new institutional form. However, it is also 
possible that over time and as part of a 'bígger picture' it might be possible to 
conceive of these changes in this way. Certainly, at this time, there is also 
evidence that the established institutions have adapted to this way of 
implementing policy and, in so doing, have remained resilient to more 
thorough or formal challenges. This has effectively been a demonstration of 
'adaptability' and, over time, the DoH and the Home Office have resumed 
ultímate responsibility for the strategy through their devolved sections, the 
NTA and government offices. Additionally, use of Klein's (1993) analysis 
would suggest that the approach taken to drug users constitutes evidence of 
institutional resilience; over the decade, changes to drug policy have 
increasingly targeted drug users and placed them outside of or in conflict with 
the wider community, however, drug users have been compensated for this 
through the provisión of improved access to treatment. 
The memoirs of those who were members of the first two New Labour 
governments are packed with references to the slowness of central 
government mechanisms, to their inefficiency, to the civil service lack of 
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concern with delivery and to New Labour's own concerns to be able to make 
change and ensure policy implementation (Mowlam 2002; Blunkett 2006). 
This discourse can be linked to the rise of a managehal agenda across 
différent sphères of social policy. However, it does not in itself provide 
évidence of a govemment obsessed with centralising and control; perhaps 
more of a govemment ultimately concerned with delivering and implementing 
its policies and evidencing that to the electorate. As we have seen, TDT 
(1995) was policy designed from the outset with a focus on delivery. This met 
the needs of the then Conservative govemment to évidence value for money 
in public services; subtly différent, it was suggested by one of the architects of 
the policy, was New Labour's emphasis on delivery. Partnership mechanisms 
offered New Labour the opportunity to go round the old institutional forms and 
methods of communicating, in the same way as they offered to the 
Conservatives the possibility to by-pass local authorities. DATs have 
changed the channels of communication, strengthening those between the 
vertical and horizontal across a range of organisations; those channels of 
communication are now policy focussed, not institutionally focussed - this has 
been an important change. Perhaps in récognition of this new imperative, the 
old institutional forms at the centre do appear to have more latterly engaged in 
this form of policy implementation - especially through their new regionalised 
structures. 
With regard to implementation, the same factors of ownership, commitment 
and a proposed course of action which has within it a degree of specificity and 
authority have shown themselves to be présent. TDT (1995) created 
structures by which the policy would be achieved; as the point of action. Very 
few of those working at a local level were involved in the génération of ideas 
which led to TDT (1995), but they were 'consulted' about the form it should 
take and changes were made as a resuit. Larsen, Taylor-Gooby and 
Kananen (2006) have argued that this is an increasingly common facet of 
policy making because the emphasis on delivery has brought with it 
récognition that '...targets atone cannot secure successful implementation...' 
Again, however, this would suggest that TDT (1995) was an early example of 
a changing approach to policy making. Architects of the policy also made it 
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clear that whilst seeking to do things differently, they had to ensure that they 
took cognisance of the traditional ways of doing things and brought in key 
players, such as the five departments of state and National Audit Office. The 
'action' required for implementation might similarly be affected by factors 
(such as institutional resilience) which mitígate towards the status quo. 
Some fairly remarkable findings emerged from the interviews about making 
drug policy. It emerged that despite the highly divisive nature of the 1990s 
and the depth of animosity which subsisted between Thatcher / Conservatives 
and local authorities, and between pólice and probation and health, that those 
developing TDT (1995) were able to bring political parties and all sorts of 
organisations and the centre and localities together, in a surprisingly 
consistent, consensual way with few divisions and no outright arguments. It is 
important not to forget this historical element. It is, in itself, a significant 
finding and one not much reflected on. As such, it holds some really 
interesting lessons for social policy making in the future and demonstrates 
that consistency and consensus can be pursued even at the most unlikely and 
improbable times, where all parties are together on considering an issue 
important enough. It would seem that there was also a fortuitous coming 
together of a highly competent civil servant and politician and other social and 
historical factors which worked in favour of the policy being able to made and 
implemented. In part it might also account for the demise of the Czar as part 
of the TDTBBB strategy (1998) - an innovation in drug policy which quickly 
faded. It may be that the appointment of an advisor appeared to politicise the 
issue too much, without adding to the overall benefits; in addition, Hellawell's 
(2003) own biography would suggest he made enemies of important 
individuáis and oíd institutions at the centre. 
Within the literature there are different types of analyses which relate to 
partnerships as forms of governance. These can be concemed with how the 
mechanisms of partnerships opérate (Davies 2005), or with seeking to 
analyse whether partnership can be seen to have effectively changed the 
'institutions' of local government and thus become a new institutional form in 
itself (Lowdnes 2005). Although these may not sound acutely dissimilar they 
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each reflect a different área of concern, as well as taking a different focus 
either at the vertical or horizontal level. The first is concerned with the 
mechanisms by which partnership or networks inter-face with central 
government and which has the most (or least) authority (Davies 2005; Stoker 
1998) and the second with whether there is an empirically observable change 
in the way local government does business (Lowdnes 2005). This thesis has 
considered both aspects as part of the implementation of government drug 
policy. What has been indicated, as we have seen, is that partnerships have 
impacted on the way in which central government communicates with 
localities about drug policy; new mechanisms of communication have come 
powerfully into play and have portrayed themselves as highly functional with 
considerable central clout overseen by the P M . Additionally partnerships 
have also changed the way local government does business. There was a 
concern voiced by a minority of interviewees that there was a 'democratic 
déficit' in their way of working because it did not directly relate to elected 
representatives in localities. However, DATs were portrayed by all 
interviewees as having changed expectations of how business was done 
locally and suggested that they had influenced other partnership forms which 
had developed later. Partnerships offered organisations at a local level an 
opportunity to change - as one respondent had suggested in the early 1990s, 
they were looking to lre-focus their attention on the total well-being of the 
community - not just empty bins' (Respondent B) - partnership gave them 
this opportunity; once again, this might provide evidence of institutional 
resilience with local authorities remaking their image and adapting to new 
ways of relating to the centre. 
The performance management approach through which central government 
has recently sought to communicate, coordinate and manage the 
implementation of policy within localities, is largely a deconcentrated one, 
relying on the intercession of regional bodies. Overall, however, the aim of 
performance management appears to be driven not by a desire to impose the 
will of the centre onto localities, which is essentially conflictual, but from a 
desire to ensure implementation (Blunkett 2006), and is essentially 
consensual. Thus, although the apparent overall impact might be the same, 
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the intention is palpably different. This is evidenced by the resigned 
acceptance of the necessity of the reporting requirements exhibited by DAT 
coordinators, or by their more positive comments which focussed on the 
benefits which flowed to them and their localities from being able to show 
implementation. The building in of performance management mechanisms to 
organisational targets has shown a sophistication which is new and has come 
particularly from New Labour post TDTBBB (1998). It has, however, also 
more effectively tied the oíd institutions and organisations into the 
performance of the new institutions and as such is evidence of an impact on 
forms of governance. In order for localities to be seen to deliver on a range of 
organisational targets they have also to deliver on partnership ones. The new 
institutional forms have, therefore, worked by exploiting the opportunities 
opened to them by reporting mechanisms, thereby working the levers of pre-
existing organisational forms. Performance management is not necessarily a 
'bad' thing, ñor Machiavellian in design, it might simply demónstrate an 
understanding of what drives policy implementation and evidence a focus on 
delivery. 
By 2004 drug policy in England was unremarkably a partnership form; DATs 
had become new institutions which had changed the way the centre 
communicated with localities about policy implementation. The channels of 
communication were now policy, rather than ¡nstitution focussed. This is not 
to suggest that institutional resilience was not demonstrated; the key 
departments of state and local authorities have taken DATs to their heart and 
adapted their ways of working to incorpórate them. Current policy and 
institutional responses show evidence of policy sophistication, adaptability 
and the exercising of choice; overall they indicate that policy development and 
implementation in this área has been largely consensual. 
Where to next for drug policy? 
The next drug strategy is due to be launched in 2008 and the consultation 
document - Drugs: Our Community, Your Say was launched in July 2007. It 
outlines progress to date against the Updated Strategy (2002) and considers 
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areas for future focus. The title in itself is interesting, placing 'community' 
right at the heart of the drugs issue; in this it also demonstrates continuity with 
New Labour concerns since 1997. The consultation document highlights the 
expansion in treatment services since 1998 and says that 'drug îreatment is 
the corner stone of the présent drugs straîegy..: (2007:15). Public comment 
on the consultation document so far also acknowledges the progress to date 
in this area (DrugScope 2007; UKDPC 2007; RSA Commission 2007). The 
future focus for the strategy continues to be multi-faceted: 
• Reducing the harms drug use causes to the development and well-
being of young people and families 
• Bringing the füll force of law enforcement to bear on drug dealers at ail 
levels 
• Reducing the harm drugs cause to the health and well-being of 
individuals and families 
• Reducing the impact of drugs on local communities - reducing drug-
related crime and anti-social behaviour (Homeless Link Briefing 2007) 
Making early public comment, DrugScope urged a lmuch greater emphasis on 
drug misuse as a pubiic health issue..: (DrugScope press briefing 2007) and 
UK Drug Policy Commission (UKDPC) in their response to the consultation 
have focussed on the need for the forthcoming strategy to build on and 
incorporate the gathering of 'évidence' about 'what works' in tackling 
substance misuse (UKDPC 2007). The RSA Commission has urged a 
wholesale review of the focus of current policy suggesting a move away from 
a 'moralisation' of drugs as an issue (RSA Commission 2007:13) and a move 
towards focussing on reducing l as far as is humanly possible the great harms' 
that drugs might cause (RSA Commission 2007:22). The reflections on the 
stratégies in the last ten years, however, also shows the range of innovations 
and interventions which there have been. 
The 'good news' about substance misuse issues as they are currently being 
reflected on, seems to be that the growth in drug treatment appears 
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undisputed, with drug use among the gênerai population remaining stable 
since last year and showing an overall downward trend for the last ten years, 
as well as a fall in drug use amongst those aged 11-15 years. These factors, 
however, are set against the backdrop of drug use in the UK still being the 
highest in Europe, and an apparent trend towards a 'maturing and expanding 
cocaine market (DrugScope 2007). The pattern remains one, therefore, of 
complexity. This issue is picked up by the UKDPC with regard to the 
importance of 'strong, national leadership' and the difficulty with knowing 
where best to locate such leadership in the centre (UKDPC 2007). This 
appears to indicate unhappiness with the current location at the Home Office 
and to suggest a préférence for a non-departmental form, such as the original 
Cabinet Office. They say, however, that they remain 'ambivalent about 
where leadership should be located, but urge a review of the structure at a 
central and local level, noting that only a single review of DATs has taken 
place in 1997. The RSA Commission shows no such hésitation, urging a 
move for drug policy leadership, away from the Home Office and to the 
Department for Communities and Local Government. They are specific in 
desiring a move a way from 'branding' drugs a 'crime issue' and in wishing to 
'reinforce the view that drugs are primarily a social issue' (RSA Commission 
2007:20). Further, they call for DATs to become statutory bodies 'with an 
enhanced status and profile' (RSA Commission 2007:20). 
The responses to the strategy and in particular those published in response to 
the consultation thus far highlight the lack of knowledge about and reflection 
on drug policy in the UK. There are few mentions of DATs, for example, 
perhaps because the responses published have emanated from central 
organisations and reflect their concerns, thèse include, in their view, the 
décentralisation of drug policy into the localities (UKDPC 2007). The RSA 
Commission (2007) has more reflection on the work of DATs urging specific 
changes and suggesting that there are problems in policy delivery because 
DATs 'lack clout (RSA Commission 2007:14). There has been considérable 
focus over the last ten years on 'doing', but much less reflection on the policy 
process itself. This draws out the importance of this thesis; there have been 
few detailed studies of drug policy or which have looked at the process of 
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developing and implementing drug policy over the last ten years, meaning 
both have been kept hidden from view. Thus, when people are currently 
reflecting on achievements to date, DATs for example, are largely invisible, 
despite having been the means of policy irnplementation for over ten years. 
This is unhelpful as the mechanisms of irnplementation are imperfectly 
understood, as well as the means by which issues are resolved on the 
ground. A lack of knowledge and understanding in this área can lead, as we 
have discussed, to a view that there has been an 'irnplementation' gap. As 
we have seen, this supposed 'gap', in fact, often is the point at which central 
and local issues are resolved in the light of the localities needs and abilities. 
The thesis aids in the exploration of this área and works towards developing 
an academic understanding of the drug policy process. It also builds on and 
helps to develop work in the área of new institutions and the understanding of 
policy process and governance. The empirical work helps to understand the 
inter-face between policy development and irnplementation, drawing out how 
such relationships are negotiated. Importantly, developing our understanding 
of this área helps us to see more clearly what the impact of organisational 
change is, for example, both partnership working and the impact of 
performance management. This aids our knowledge of what other social and 
historical factors have affected this change and allows us to place policy 
development and irnplementation, ensuring that we do not misunderstand 
those changes simply as 'technical solutions' (Clarke 1996). The perspective 
of time, looking at the drug policy process over ten years, also ensures that 
we are able to consider factors such as the development of new institutions 
and institutional resilience, noting both change and contínuity. 
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Appendix A 
15 M a y 2002 
I a m wr i t ing to y o u as I am w o r k i n g o n a pièce o f research concemed w i t h the 
implementat iOQofpar tnersh ip structures i n the TJK. M y fôcus is both at a national p o l i c y 
mak ing l e v e l and at a l o ca l implementat ion level . 
In your prev ious rôle you may have p layed a part i n the development o f tbe thïnking 
around partnership structures, such as D r u g A c t i o n Teams and i n your current m i e you 
may have some thoughts about the cont inuat ion o f the strategy. 
I w o u l d par t i cu lar l y we l come taflring to y o u about this. T h e interv iew w o u l d last about 
an hour and I w o u l d l ike to tape h i f poss ib le . I w o u l d want to explore y o u r v i ews about 
the deve lopment and or ig inat ion o f partnership w o r k i n g . T h e interviewées w o u l d not be 
ident i f ied i n the fina! pièce o f pubhshed research. 
A s y o u m a y remember , I a m a Senior Lecturer i n C r i m i n a l Justice at the Un i v e r shy o f 
Hertfordsrùre. I a m however undertak ing this pièce o f w o r k under the superv is ion o f 
Professor Susanne M a c G r e g o r at M i d d l e s e x Un i v e r s i t y as part o f a doctora l thesis. 
I sha l l téléphone w i t h i n the next week to discuss this letter w i th y o u further. 
Y o u r s S incere ly 
E la ine A r n u l l 
Appendix B 
Semi-structured national interviews 
Pilots November 2000 
l r t Section - Partnérship - the development of an idea? 
1. Tartnership' is a word we hear a lot now - can you tbink back to when 
you firstheard aboutit? 
2. Wbere-doyoutbink 'Partcership' came from as a concept? 
3. So how did it come to seem like a good idea to apply the idea to drugs? 
Where did the idea of DATs come from? 
4. Was thereanyone who you think was important to taking the ideafs) 
forward / developing theidea? 
5. Why do you say that? How did they do that? How do you know mat? 
(or everyone says that, why do you think that is?) 
6. Were tbere others? Who? 
7. How did people get to be involved in the discussions about partoership 
working and DATs? 
8. When did you/ anyone in your organisation get invoíved? 
9. Were there any key documents/ Papers at that time? (i.e. across me 
divide/misspent youth) Do you have copies ofthose? Couldlhavea 
copy? 
10. Was it sigmficant that there was broadly cross-party support for inter-
organisational working? 
11. What différence wouüd-iíhave made iftheFe weren't? 
12. Were there any moments when it could have happened signiScantly 
différent? 
2 o d section- DATs - success? 
BWhat was your'first reaction to the idea of DATs? 
H.What did you expectthem to be-able to achieve/ do? 
15. Have they achieved what you expected? Haveaoy individuáis / 
organisations been key to that? 
16. Did any other people share your ideas? Who were they? 
E. Amul i Confidenliai questionnaire. November 2000 1 
n.Did any other people agrée/ disagree with your ideas? Who were they? 
Did it make a différence that they agrée/ disagreed? 
18. Keed a question re important or not that people agreed/disagreed with 
you. 
19. Have DATs achieved what others expected? Specify whom others are 
20. What bave DATs achieved? 
3 section - Policy transfer 
21 .Were DATs important in alłowing other inter-organisational fora to 
develop? 
22.1Îyes - How? 
23.If yes -Who was important? 
24, What about SRB, other fora? Did they influence thinking? Who's and 
how? 
25. What do you think of the partnership idea being applied to other areas, 
like YQTs? 
26 .Do you think the application was based on- the DAT structure and the 
same basie ideas or dłSeFeat oses-? Wfcich? 
27. Were any of the same people involved in developing the partnership 
ideas or structures ia- the 'new-' areas? Who? Where? 
28. There is obviously quite a lot différent theorising around partnership . 
working. For example lots of people have seen community involvement 
as important — did you see that as influential? Was it important re social 
responsibüity of the community? (E trio ni & communttariansim) Or to 
generale business interest and gênerai régénération? (Stoker & regime 
theory) Does it give more power to the community? (Hughes & 
community engagement) Are there in your expérience différent types of 
parmersbips, which can be labelled? (Crawford & typologies) Do you 
think it is possible for all groups in the community to gain equal access to 
partnership working? Was it envisaged that they would? (MÜler - check) 
Does the history of an area affect the outcomes for partaership working? 
What about local/ agency values?'.(Miller, Wong, Knoepfel and Kissling-
Naff) 
Are you Avère you aware of any? Who? 
Thank you for your time and your thoughts. Is there anyone eise you think I 
should speak to? 
E. Arnull Confidenrial questionnaire November 2000 2 
Appendix c 
Middlesex University 
School of Health and Social Sciences 
Criminology/Sociology Académie Group 
Application for research ethics approval 
The purpose o f this form is to help staff and students in the Cr im ino l ogy/Soc i o l ogy Académie Grou 
in the'ir pursuit o f ethical research méthodologies and procédures. 
For staff members, the Research Eth ics A d v i s o r y Panel w i l l rev iew all proposals/forms, whei 
ethical approva l has floj already been obtained f rom a recognised research ethics commit tee extern 
to M idd l esex Univers i ty . N o f i e ldwork should begin unti l such approva l has been obtained. 
For research students (B.PhiL M. Phil/PhD), the Research E th i c s A d v i s o r y Panel w i l l rev iew i 
proposals/forms. Where ethics approva l has already been obtained f r om a recognised research ethii 
committee extemal to M i d d l e s e x Univers i ty or through research ethics procédures o f the academ 
group, this w i l l be taken into aecount. N o f i e ldwork shou ld beg in unti l such approva l has bee 
obtained and ratified by the Research Degrees Commi t t ee . A n y proposed change to tl 
methodology outl ined on this f o rm inust be discussed w i th your supervisor(s ) . Th i s may necessitate 
fresh appl icat ion for ethical approva l . 
Please complète the form g iv ing as much detail as possible. I f a quest ion îs not appl icable, plea: 
indicate by mark ing N/A. Research students should discuss and complète the f o rm w i th the 
Supervisors. 
n-,WT\'>mpnr>FN.FS,iSM.\CfllM OCAI. SKTnNGi"iTEMPiSWI'M4CÛMcc 
2. P e r sona l détails 
a) Name o f principa] investigator: Ela ine A m u l i 
b) Address: 32 Whi teha l l Lane . Buckhurs t H i l l . Essex, 1G9 5 J G 
c) Phone N u m b c r : 020 S505 1362 
d) E m a i l address: e.Arnull@btinternEt.com 
e) Name(s) o f staff and/or other coi laborators ( i f applicable): 
2. F o r research s tuden ts : 
a) Y e a r o f study: 2004 
b) M o d e o f study: Part-t ime 
c) Names o f Supervisors: Susanne M a c G r e g o r and Tony Go o d m an 
d) Da t eo f en ro lment : I99S 
e) Da teo f r eg i s t ra t i on : 199S 
f) Date o f transfer from M P h i l to P h D : 20O4 
3. Deta i l s o f p roposed s t u d y : 
a) T ide o f study: T h e design and Implementation o f Br i t i sh D r u g Po i i cy 1983 -2003 
b) Please give a br i e f descript ion o f the nature o f the study (no more than 50 words ) , inc luding 
détails o f data co l lect ion procédures: 
The study l ooks at the design and Implementation o f Br i t i sh D r u g po i i cy by interv iewing key poi icy 
makers and those charged w i th Implementation and delivery o f that po i i cy within D r u g A c t i o n Teams 
and a loca l partnership. Me thods also include participation observat ion and analysis o f documentan" 
sources. 
c) W i l l pr imary data be collected? Y e s 
If no, please skip to Sect ion 7 o f this form. 
DWlNN"PíK0nLESASMACO!\LOCAl. SETriXti!ÄT1iMPVSWrM4l.DS)ii».-
4. Deta i ls o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the s t u d y : 
a) F rom what populat ion wi l l your participants he drawn? Po i i cy makers (c iv i l servants, Ch ie f 
Execut ives o f voluntary organizations) D r u g Ac t i on Team Coord inators and those detivering drug 
poiicy. 
b) H o w many participants w i l l be involved in your study? Please provide an estimate. Approx imate ly 
30 individuals 
c) A re children aged 16 or under to be involved? N o 
[f yes, what ages w i l l your participants be? 
5 . Access and consent : 
a) Brief ly describc how wi l l access be gained to the participants. Access w i l l be gained in the 
nrst instance by a letter. fo l lowed up by a téléphone cal l ; or by a request in person. 
b) W i l l informed consent be sought f rom any gatekeepers? N o 
I f so. wh i ch gatekeepers? 
W i l l you obtain wr i t ten consent from the gatekeepers? N / A 
c) W i l l informed consent be obtained d irec i ly from all participants Y e s 
If yes, w i l l y ou obtain written consent 0 N o 
d) W i l l payment or an incentive be offered to participants? N o 
I f yes, please State amount o f payment or type o f incentive 
e) Length o f session for an individual participant ( i f more than one session, please give number and 
nature o f sessions and amount o f time for each): One individual semi-struetured interview o f 
approximately 1 hour; for one group, one focus group o f approximately one hour 
f) In wh ich locations w i l l data gathering take place? Usuat ly the respondent 's office, or a place 
agreeable to and suggested by them. 
D^WIN?^PROFtLF^SMACGIiUKrU.S£rn>JGSTE>. iP iSWPKI- lC ' l l5doc 
g) W i i l y ou inform your participants o f their right to wi thdraw from the research? 
h) Wïll yau guaranlee confidentiality o f information to your part ic ipants 7 
i) W i l l you guarantee anonymity to your participants? 
Y e s 
Y e s 
Y e s 
6. Safety a n d legnl issues 
a) W i l l you be alone w i th a participant? Y e s 
b) Wilî you be alone w i th a group o f participants? Y e s (one focus 
group) 
c) What safety issues does your methodology raise for y o u and for y o u r participants? M y 
methodology does not raise any issues o f safety as a l l interviews are being sought w i th a pcrson in 
their professional capacity. their participation fo l l ows their in ibrmed consent and occurs at their 
place o f work / place o f their choosing. The only issue wh ich they might consider a risk is to ensure 
they remain anonymous and the interviews conùdential as some are very senior and could be easily 
identifiable I have addressed this on many occasions w i th my Supervisor. G i v e n where and wi th 
whom the interviews occur i do not antîcipate any risk to myself. 
d) What legal issues does your methodology raise for you and for your participants? N o n e o f which I 
am aware. 
7. Codes of ethics 
a) Have y o u read and understood the Code o f Eth ics for Researchers in the F i e l d o f Cr imino logy by 
the Br i t i sh Society o f Cr im ino logy? 
Y e s and those o f Soc ia l Research Assoc ia t ion 
b) A r e there any ethical issues w h i c h concern you about this particular piecfe o f research' ' N o 
Please attach ( i f available) a) draft o f any interview schedule or questionnaire y o u propose to use: 
and b) any information sheets and/or consent forms for participants Letter and interview schedule 
are in hard copy to follow. 
1 believe the information g iven above to be true. The methodology outl ined above w i l l be the 
methodology used in my research. I will notify my Supervisor (students)/REAP Cha i r (staff) o f any 
proposed changes to this methodology. 
D : \ W ] N ^ T . P R O F t L P ^ M r o i \ L O C A L S t r ! T T N G S V T V A I P i S W P M 4 C O ^ ^ 
Appendix D 
Dear 
I am currently undertaking some research for which I would like to interview 
you. I head up the Poiicy & Practice Research Group at Middlesex 
University and as such undertake a lot of funded research. However the 
study I would like to interview you with regard to is a doctoral 
dissertation which I am in the process of completing. As a part of this 
research, ï have undertaken interviews with a number of key players at a 
national level and have observed implementation of some drug policies at a 
local level. I want finally to undertake a round of interviews with 
current D A T coordinators about récent drug poiicy implementation; 1 am 
especially keen to interview those who have been in post for a number of 
years. The thesis is concerned with drug poiicy and partnership working 
and thus D A T s in particular, since 1983. 
I don't know i f you would feel able to be interviewed? The interview would 
last no more than 1 hour and could be conducted face to face or over the 
téléphone. A U interviewées are anonymous and wi l l remain so. This thesis 
is supervised by Professor Susanne MacGregor who may be known to you. 
I look forward to hearing from you and wi l l call early next week to 
discuss this and to respond to any questions you might have. Alternatively 
please do email me in reply i f that is most convenient. 
Best regards, 
Elaine 
Elaine Arnul l 
Head o f P P R G 
Middlesex University 
Queenswav 
EN3 4SA ' 
020 8411 5354/07966 693691 
www.prjrg.org.uk 
e.amullfgibtinternet.com 
Appendix E 
Semi-structured interview schedule for local poiicy 
implementers 
Section 1 - Your history 
1. Can you explain to me your job title / rôle and the organisation you 
work for? 
2. How long have you been in this rôle? 
3. Why did you come into this area of work / where were you 
previously? 
Section 2 
4. How are you involved in implementing drug poiicy? 
5. Can you describe / give examples of what has worked well in your 
expérience? 
6. Can you describe / give examples of what has not worked well? 
How would you have changed those things? 
7. What has surprïsed you? 
8. Have there been any barriers to implementing poiicy? 
9. (If not covered) why do you think 'partnership' was the mechanism 
chosen for delivery of drug poiicy? Can you give me an example of 
what the outcome has been of doing it that way? 
10. Have there been any key individuals / organisations / moments 
locally or nationalty in the last 20 years which you think has 
changed the course of drug poiicy / impacted on where we are 
now? 
11. (Where relevant) There have been 3 main drug stratégies since 
1995 - what have been the similarities / différences between them? 
Has much changed? 
12. (If not covered) Has the changing funding structure impacted on 
implementation? Can you give me an example? 
Finally, Is there anyone you would suggest I interview? How can I contact 
them? 
Thank you for your time. 

